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3Foreword by the Commissioner
Industrial re-
lations are at 
the heart of 
economic and 
social gov-
ernance in 
Europe. This 
report exam-
ines a number 
of important issues relating to the 
workplace, and to the role of the social 
partners. In particular, it shows how 
social partners have contributed to the 
implementation of the Lisbon Strategy 
in the world of work, notably in areas 
like training and lifelong learning, or 
working time flexibility. They are best 
placed to know the realities of the 
workplace, and can usefully contribute 
to economic and social policy-making, 
regulating working conditions and co-
managing public programmes. 
The analysis of wage bargaining shows 
that institutionally strong labour rela-
tions, characterised by strong actors, 
coordinated processes and high cover-
age rates, contribute to reduced wage 
inequality, a smaller gender pay gap 
and less in-work poverty. This is an 
important message if we keep in mind 
that both the OECD and the ILO re-
cently warned that poverty and the 
gap between rich and poor are on the 
rise globally, but also in parts of Eu-
rope. Moreover, there is no evidence 
that collective bargaining and strong 
employers and workers organisations 
have a permanent negative impact 
on competitiveness, employment or 
growth.  Evidence rather suggests 
that an adequate legal framework and 
wage-setting system, combining wide 
coverage and flexibility, can have a 
positive impact.
Europe and the world are facing a seri-
ous economic crisis. We must mobilise 
all the actors and resources at our dis-
posal to respond to the situation. Al-
though this report is based on evidence 
from less turbulent times, it is an apt 
reminder of how important a construc-
tive social dialogue between mutually 
trusting social partner organisations 
can be. High-quality industrial relations 
facilitate solutions that make workers 
and companies more adaptable,  at the 
same time protecting them from transi-
tory shocks. They therefore make a de-
cisive contribution to a peaceful social 
and institutional environment. They 
are also a key element in anticipating 
change and reducing its costs. Where 
trust and/or operational capacity are 
missing, the potential for negotiated 
solutions is simply not there. 
Social dialogue at European level ex-
emplifies the major contribution that 
social partners can make. They partici-
pate in policy development and imple-
mentation, for instance in the case of 
the common principles on flexicurity. 
But they also use their autonomous 
negotiating space to agree solutions 
adapted to workplace reality, for exam-
ple on violence and harassment or on 
maritime transport. I find it particular-
ly encouraging that the social partners 
across Europe have been able not just to 
negotiate framework agreements at EU 
level, but also to put them into practice 
on the ground, as demonstrated by the 
implementation reports on telework 
and work-related stress. But the sectoral 
social dialogue also grows in strength, 
and the Commission will present pro-
posals for its future later this year.
Equally, transnational company-level 
social dialogue is developing quickly. 
I am confident that the recent political 
agreement on a recast European Works 
Council Directive will lead to both more 
and more efficient European Works 
Councils. As a follow-up to  its discus-
sion document on transnational compa-
ny agreements, the Commission will, in 
co-operation with the proposed expert 
group, monitor developments and ex-
change information on how to support 
the process under way regarding this 
important tool in an increasingly inter-
national business environment. 
 
Finally, let there be no misunderstand-
ing. Wages, the right of association, 
rules for strikes and lock-outs are 
and remain under the competence 
of national governments. The degree 
and nature of social partner involve-
ment in these areas varies consider-
ably across the EU. But, as the report 
shows, the main pillars of industrial 
relations are shared by all Member 
States, and we should support social 
dialogue and collective bargaining, 
and not try to stifle them. Since 2007, 
the EU supports the capacity building 
of the social partners and industrial 
relations institutions at national level 
through the European Social Fund. I 
look forward to seeing how Member 
States and the social partners will seize 
this major opportunity. 
January 2009
Vladimír ŠPIDLA
Commissioner for  
Employment, Social Affairs  
and Equal Opportunities
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7An increasing convergence in European industrial relations 
can be attributed to a combination of factors: the existence of 
a consensus around a set of common values and standards; 
the actions of the Union itself through the exercise of regula-
tory power and the outcomes of social dialogue at European 
level, but particularly to the existence of an EU-wide set of 
concrete objectives to which all stakeholders and actors can 
sign up to, in a mutually self-reinforcing mechanism.
The European Union is unique among world economic 
groupings in combining a market building agenda with a 
social agenda that includes emerging transnational indus-
trial relations arrangements. In other global regions this 
process has barely begun and the EU is sometimes seen as 
a model for the development of a regional social dialogue. 
The distinguishing factor is the capacity to promote mini-
mum standards and common values to support the policies 
of Member States in this area. At the same time, implemen-
tation of EU rules and standards includes a high degree of 
flexibility, allowing for differences in national customs and 
practices (Chapter 1). 
The contribution of the social partners to achieving the Lis-
bon agenda is particularly important for reaching the em-
ployment targets and implementing the flexicurity agenda. 
The involvement of social partners in policymaking and 
policy implementation varies widely across Member States, 
but generally there is a trend towards the use of a wider 
mix of instruments to pursue policy objectives. Neverthe-
less, the quality of the social and institutional support that 
social partners enjoy is probably the major determinant of 
the quality of the social partners’ contribution to the Lisbon 
Strategy (Chapter 2).
Collective bargaining and wage determination are anchored 
in national customs and practices. Despite the increasing 
weakness of wage bargaining actors, with declines in trade 
union density in particular, wage bargaining institutions 
have remained relatively unchanged in recent years. There 
are wide disparities across the EU. However, the  degree 
of employers’ density seems to be the principal factor de-
termining bargaining coverage. Wage bargaining institu-
tions seem to have a small but positive effect on economic 
performance, but not on wage inequality, where it is trade 
union density which produces a statistically significant re-
sult. A rise in trade union density is associated with a fall 
in wage inequality. High bargaining coverage rates appear 
to lead to lower proportions of in-work poor, other things 
being equal (Chapter 3).
At European level, the social partners are delivering on their 
commitments. They concluded agreements on violence and 
harassment and on maritime labour standards, and made 
valuable contributions to employment and social policy-
making. The sectoral coverage of European social dialogue 
continues to increase (Chapter 4). Social partners know the 
world of work best, and they contribute to better govern-
ance by following-up joint commitments and recommen-
dations on the ground. First evidence of implementation 
of European social dialogue texts, in particular of the first 
cross-industry autonomous agreement on telework, shows 
that they make a difference (Chapter 5). Furthermore, there 
has been considerable activity in the field of European leg-
islation in the period since the last Industrial Relations in 
Europe report, including labour law (Chapter 6).
The capacity of the social partners to deliver high-quality 
industrial relations, and thus their ability to play their 
role in achieving the EU’s economic and social objec-
tives varies widely across the EU, and particularly in the 
12 Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 
(EU-12) where the tradition of autonomous bipartite in-
dustrial relations is less developed. In recognition of this, 
assistance is now available through the European Social 
Fund to help build the capacity of social partners in these 
countries, and there is evidence of increased participation 
of social partners in the implementation of the Structural 
Funds. European social partner organisations also contin-
ue to carry out a wide range of capacity building exercises 
themselves (Chapter 7).
Executive summary
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Industrial relations arrangements in post-1945 western Europe have rested on 
four institutional pillars: union organisation or density; coordination of bar-
gaining; employee representation in firms; and social partners’ involvement 
in consultation over social and economic policies on a regular basis. Develop-
ments in the four pillars, observed on the national level in the Member States of 
the EU throughout its history (from 6 to 27 Member States) indicate that, after 
the sharply divergent trends of the 1970s, some of the elements of these pil-
lars have experienced a mildly convergent trend since the mid-1980s, in spite of 
the growing number of Member States. While the 2004 and 2007 enlargements 
have resulted in an immediate increased divergence between the industrial rela-
tions regimes within the EU, this has been accompanied by the strengthening of 
(or in some cases truly developing) social regulations in the national systems of 
 Member States in central and eastern Europe that after 1989 tended to exclude 
them from political agenda and policies. 
These trends suggest an influence of (preparing for) EU membership, although 
other developments (similar pressures based on globalisation or domestic politi-
cal, social or economic changes) may also have played a role. No convergence 
is observable in areas where the EU level is least influential: the organisation 
of trade unions and employers’ associations, the organisation and coverage of 
collective bargaining and social pacts — these indicators still show large and 
growing divergence.
Against these national trends, there have been incremental developments in in-
dustrial relations arrangements at EU level. While during the first decades of its 
existence the capacity of the Community to build supranational-level industrial 
relations remained limited, since the mid-1980s the economic focus of the Eu-
ropean integration project has been paralleled by the development of the ‘social 
dimension’. Policy making in the social area, including industrial relations, has 
intensified. The limited possibilities of applying Community legislation in the 
field of industrial relations have been enhanced and qualified majority voting 
has been extended to a growing area of employment and industrial relations 
matters. The legislative method has been complemented by a number of ‘proce-
dural innovations’.
The emergence of EU-level industrial relations is evidenced by a (growing) 
number of common values and principles, and mutually reinforcing institutions, 
policies and processes, characterised by a mixture of hard (legally binding) and 
soft (non-legally binding) measures focusing on the social dimension of the 
market. They are institutionally anchored, and some of them have foundations 
in the Treaties.
The four pillars supporting the core European industrial relations arrange-
ments at the national level appear to be developing also at the EU level, al-
though the outcomes are still restricted in terms of the effectiveness of these 
transnational institutions. While the position of EU-level social partners has 
strengthened thanks to their gradual inclusion in the legislative process, the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) as well as BUSINESSEUROPE, 
UEAPME, and CEEP continue to be characterised by a very low degree of 
centralisation, i.e. their capacity to control member organisations is restricted. 
However, coordination on non-wage issues is increasing following the con-
Post-1945 industrial relations in west-
ern Europe have traditionally been 
based on four institutional pillars: un-
ion density; coordinated bargaining; 
employee representation in firms; and 
regular consultation on social and eco-
nomic policies. Since the mid-1980s, 
a certain degree of convergence in na-
tional trends has been observed in all 
these areas.
Convergence is more apparent in areas 
where the EU’s powers are stronger; 
non-existent where the EU has least 
influence
The introduction of ‘procedural in-
novations to complement the limited 
legislative possibilities in this field has 
helped bring about incremental de-
velopments in industrial relations ar-
rangements at EU level, particularly 
since the mid-1980s
The emergence of EU-level industrial 
relations is evidenced by a (growing) 
set of common values and principles, 
and mutually reinforcing institutions, 
policies and processes.
The four pillars supporting the core 
European industrial relations arrange-
ments at national level appear to be 
developing at EU level as well, albeit 
slowly. 
Chapter 1 — Europe’s industrial relations in a global perspective
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clusion of European autonomous agreements. A transnational dimension to 
collective bargaining has been emerging over recent decades, fostered by EU-
promoted processes and institutions. Also, the adoption of the 1994 European 
Works Councils and the 2001 European Company Directives has advanced the 
practice of informing and consulting the workforce in transnational contexts. 
Finally, the European Social Dialogue has become a defining characteristic of 
EU-level industrial relations, as it allows for the participation of social  partners 
in supranational policy arrangements.
In combining the market-building agenda with a social agenda that includes 
emerging transnational industrial relations arrangements, the EU is ahead of 
other economic powers and regional integration organisations. In other global 
regions this process has only just begun and the EU is sometimes seen as an 
example or model for the development of a regional social dialogue. In addi-
tion to a set of regional industrial relations institutions and policies, the EU has 
developed an embryonic supranational social policy in the fields of social re-
distribution, social regulation and social rights. The Structural Funds provide a 
mechanism whereby resources can be allocated to address economic and social 
disparities in the EU or be put to the assistance of social partners and workers 
adversely affected by global trade. There are regulations in the fields of occupa-
tional health and safety, equal opportunities, labour law, and social security and 
pensions (including for migrant workers and their families), together with social 
dialogue mechanisms that apply to all countries. The Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers defines a set of fundamental social rights 
which have been recognised by the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties (ECJ) as part of the general principles of Community law.
In the industrial relations domain proper, the EU promotes social partnership 
and cooperation by setting minimum standards for employee representation in 
national and cross-border firms, and by recognising the social partners in a con-
sulting and, in some domains, co-legislating role, through framework agreements. 
Yet collective bargaining and pay determination — core issues of industrial rela-
tions — remain nationally specific. In addition, the EU coordination regime allows 
the use of different implementation instruments, and variable implementation of 
actual standards, according to national preferences and capabilities. Comparing 
the other regions, Mercosur is probably nearest to the EU in its industrial set up 
and social policy ambitions. However, other regional organisations, especially in 
Africa and perhaps least NAFTA, seem to be moving in the same direction. 
The EU is ahead of other economic 
powers and regional integration or-
ganisations in the world in promoting 
a social agenda with emerging transna-
tional industrial relations.
Besides regional industrial relations in-
stitutions and policies, the EU has put 
in place policies in the fields of social 
redistribution, social regulation and 
social rights.
The EU promotes social partnership 
and cooperation at supranational level, 
although collective bargaining and pay 
determination are still based on na-
tional customs and practices. In an in-
terregional comparison, Mercosur ap-
pears to be closest to the EU model, but 
other regional organisations, especially 
in Africa, also seem to be following the 
EU example.
In the context of the Lisbon Strategy, 
the social partners’ contribution is cru-
cial for achieving the employment tar-
gets and the ‘flexicurity’ agenda.
Chapter 2 — The quality of industrial relations and the Lisbon Strategy
At all levels — European, national, sectoral and local — the social partners (trade 
unions and employers) have become increasingly involved in the Lisbon Strategy. 
Steps taken by the social partners at the European level include the identification of 
a number of modernisation issues in their renewed work programme for 2006–08; 
their joint analysis of the ‘Key challenges facing European labour markets’, of Octo-
ber 2007; and, since 2002, several European framework agreements, joint opinions 
and frameworks of action, which require joint engagement and monitoring. At na-
tional, sectoral and local level, employers and unions are involved in modernising 
labour markets through lobbying the government and parliament, the negotiation 
of social pacts, collective agreements at various levels, and by participating in the 
administration and implementation of particular programmes and policies.
Industrial Relations in Europe 2008
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There are considerable variations among EU Member States and across policy 
issues in the degree and nature of social partner involvement. In some Member 
States, particularly in northern Europe, their contribution is shaped through ‘au-
tonomous’ agreements, collective bargaining and related activities, without di-
rect involvement of supervision of the State. In other Member States, especially 
in southern and eastern Europe, there is a much stronger role of the State and 
tripartite agreements, advisory councils on social and economic policies, and 
administrative schemes in which the State is directly participating.  
Six policy areas related to the Lisbon Strategy and the flexicurity agenda are being 
reviewed: (1) active labour market policies (ALMP) targeted at disadvantaged 
groups and social security reforms; (2) training and the entry of young people 
in the labour market; (3) lifelong learning and older workers; (4) working hours 
and time flexibility; (5) the reconciliation of work and family; and (6) working 
conditions. In each of these the social partners make their contributions through 
influencing government policy, agreements among themselves and participation 
in the administration of programmes. Their influence and role is not the same in 
each of these areas, however. In ALMP most Member States set the parameters 
of labour market policies by law and the role of the social partners is limited to 
influencing government policies and, sometimes, co-managing particular pro-
grammes defined by the government. In the area of working hours, work–family 
policies, working conditions, training and lifelong learning, the influence and 
autonomy of the social partners tends to be stronger, but in each of these policy 
areas there is some interaction with legislation and public policy.
The involvement of the social partners also differs among EU Member States. 
Industrial relations are shaped by different traditions, institutions and practices 
affecting the interaction between public policy, collective bargaining and social 
dialogue. The main distinction runs between inclusive, dualist and market em-
ployment regimes. In inclusive regimes, policies are designed to extend both em-
ployment participation and employment rights as widely as possible through the 
working population. Dualist regimes, in contrast, tend to be less concerned with 
the overall employment levels but guarantee strong rights to a core workforce 
of skilled long-term employees. In the market-based regime, the assumption is 
that employment levels and job rewards are self-regulated. This classification 
overlaps, partly, with that of Nordic, continental European, liberal and south-
ern industrial relations regimes — but it is, as yet, unclear whether all or some 
of the new Member States from eastern Europe will assimilate to any of these. 
These industrial relations regimes differ in the strength of unions, the autonomy 
of the social partners, State intervention, and the place of social dialogue at the 
national level and in companies.
The typology of employment and industrial relations regimes helps to under-
stand the differences in the response to the Lisbon agenda at the national or 
local level. They explain differences in the level of engagement and in the meth-
ods used. One particular form through which social partners have become 
involved in the reform agenda of the EU is the conclusion of a social pact or 
agreement with the government. Such tripartite pacts were concluded in Ireland, 
Spain, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Finland, as well as in Bulgaria and Roma-
nia. Social pacts address both wage and non-wage issues, in particular issues 
related to unemployment, flexicurity, pensions, ALMP and training. With re-
gard to work–family reconciliation, working conditions and working hours and 
The social partners’ contributions can 
be developed through bipartite or tri-
partite agreements and activities. The 
latter foresee the direct involvement of 
the State.
The role and strength of the social part-
ners and the mix between bipartite and 
tripartite activities and agreements varies 
significantly across the policy areas…
… some of these policies — training, 
working time, working conditions and, 
increasingly, work–life balance — have 
become the object of regular collective 
bargaining.
Industrial relations are shaped by the 
nature of the existing employment re-
gime. Whether inclusive, dualist, or 
market-based, each involves a different 
role for trade unions and policy concer-
tation …
… these differences show up not only in 
employment levels and structures, but 
also in industrial arrangements, the 
strength of the unions, the role of the 
State, collective bargaining and social 
dialogue.
Social pacts continue to have an impor-
tant function; non-wage issues covered 
include unemployment insurance, flex-
icurity, training and pensions.
Executive summary
11
 working time flexibility, the social partners’ role is more clearly shaped through 
 collective  bargaining, although in many southern and eastern Member States 
the law  remains the main basis for regulation and provision, and social partner 
 agreements add little additional flexibility.
Industrial relations and the Lisbon Strategy have become interwoven. Many is-
sues have entered the agendas of the social partners at all levels. Various in-
struments, often based on an interaction between collective bargaining and the 
law, but also information exchange, consultation, best-practice diffusion, bench-
marking or joint administration and fund management, are used. It is less fre-
quently the case that one method — the law or classical collective agreements 
with binding effects — predominates.
Arguably, without the involvement of the social partners, at all levels, the reform 
agenda of the Lisbon Strategy cannot be carried out in the world of work. It is 
by adding flexibility to the implementation, and by raising support for bottom-
up solutions, that social partners and industrial relations generally provide a 
key resource. Trade unions and employers must ‘buy into’ the Lisbon agenda 
and the social dialogue process, but will only do so when there is a chance for a 
meaningful cooperation and influencing the direction and outcome of policies. 
Lastly, the quality of the social partners’ contribution is related to the social and 
institutional support that they enjoy at the European, national and local levels. 
Social support is evidenced by membership, mobilising power and standing in 
public opinion. Institutional support is based on the recognition of the social 
partners and of the rights of representation, consultation and codetermination 
by lawmakers, codified in legal norms or anchored in broad agreements, and 
supported by public policy and public opinion.
To implement the Lisbon Strategy both 
the social partners and governments 
have tended to rely less and less on tra-
ditional instruments such as the law or 
collective agreements, resorting instead 
to a greater variety of instruments. 
The active involvement of the social 
partners in the implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy provides for additional 
flexibility and increased support for 
bottom-up solutions.
While wage bargaining institutions 
have remained relatively unchanged, 
wage bargaining actors have become 
weaker.
Minimum wages are an increasingly 
important issue for wage setting insti-
tutions in the European Union 
Chapter 3 — Wage setting, minimum wages and industrial relations
Trade unions lost members both in absolute and in relative terms. Trade union 
density in particular has declined significantly over the last decade. At the same 
time, the wide disparity of union and employers’ density rates within the EU 
persists. Employers’ density is generally higher than trade union density rates. 
Trade union membership losses have prompted organisational restructuring in 
many countries. Increasing numbers of trade union mergers has contributed to 
a constant process of concentration of union organisations.
Wage bargaining institutions and industrial relations actors are highly intercon-
nected. Employers’ density rates correlate strongly with wage bargaining cen-
tralisation and bargaining coverage. Employers’ density rather than trade union 
density determines the stability of wage bargaining institutions. As a result of 
weak employers’ density wage bargaining institutions remain weaker in EU-12 
than in the EU-15.
Statutory and collectively agreed minimum wages are an increasingly important 
component of wage setting institutions in the European Union, particularly in 
the central and eastern European countries. Only countries with exceptionally 
strong wage bargaining institutions and strong bargaining actors have not intro-
duced statutory minimum wages.
Industrial Relations in Europe 2008
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Minimum wage setting institutions interact with wage bargaining institutions. 
In countries where wage bargaining is institutionally strong (strong actors, co-
ordinated processes and high coverage rates), statutory minimum wages are rare 
and the lowest wage floor is set by agreement. However, if statutory minimum 
wages exist, the presence of unions and centralised wage bargaining tends to in-
crease the ratio of minimum wages to average wages.
Collective bargaining institutions are complementary to statutory minimum wag-
es in such a way that statutory minimum wages in fact benefit from strong collec-
tive bargaining institutions. A decline in employers’ density and thereby a decline 
in collective bargaining coverage might thus not only increase the need for a mini-
mum wage floor but also make the introduction of a minimum wage more likely.
The analysis of the effects of wage setting institutions in Europe reconfirms exist-
ing research that institutionally strong labour relations have some moderating 
effects on nominal wage developments. The restraining effect of wage setting 
institutions on wages seems to have become weaker in recent years.
Industrial relations institutions can reduce the gender pay gap. An EU country 
with higher bargaining coverage, holding everything else equal, generally tends to 
have a lower gender pay gap than EU countries with low bargaining coverage.
Wage bargaining institutions (bargaining centralisation, bargaining coverage 
and coordination) do not appear to have any significant effect on wage inequal-
ity. However, trade union density has a very significant and robust positive ef-
fect. Countries with higher trade union densities, holding all other variables 
constant, have higher wage equality. Our research indicates that a 10 % increase 
in the trade union density ratio would reduce the wage inequality measure, on 
average, by around 2 %.
Bargaining coverage has a significant and robust negative effect on the propor-
tion of workers with less than 60 % of the median income, while wage bargain-
ing centralisation, trade union density and coordination do not appear to have 
any significant effect. This indicates that, holding all other variables constant, an 
increase in wage bargaining coverage by 10% is associated with a reduction of 
in-work poverty by around 0.5 %.
The effects of wage bargaining institu-
tions on economic performance are 
comparatively small and tend to be 
positive.
Industrial relations institutions — in 
particular trade union density rates — 
have a positive effect on reducing wage 
inequality and the incidence of in-work 
poverty.
European social partners shape indus-
trial relations in the EU through their 
contribution to policymaking (the 
common principles on flexicurity) or 
through autonomous action (frame-
work agreement on harassment and 
violence).
Chapter 4 — European social dialogue developments 2006–08
The last two years have confirmed that European social partners can deliver on 
their commitments and shape industrial relations in the EU. The joint analysis 
of key challenges facing European labour market drawn up by the cross-industry 
social partners (BUSINESSEUROPE, CEEP, UEAPME, ETUC) has helped to 
build the EU consensus on the common principles on flexicurity at the Euro-
pean Council in December 2007. Simultaneously, they continued their autono-
mous actions, most notably with the conclusion of an autonomous framework 
agreement on harassment and violence at work. Once implemented by the na-
tional member organisations and/or the Member States this agreement will help 
to prevent and manage problems of psychological and sexual harassment and 
physical violence at the workplace. The agreement obliges companies to adopt 
a zero tolerance policy and specify procedures (quick reaction to complaints, 
Executive summary
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principles of dignity, impartiality and fair treatment, disciplinary actions,  victim 
support, etc.). Consequently, EU-level representatives of management and labour 
of several sectors (commerce, local governments, hospitals and private security), 
which are characterised by contacts with clients, patients and others, have en-
gaged in a multisector initiative on third-party violence in order to complement 
this cross-industry agreement. Other sectors (cleaning, private security, Horeca) 
have collaborated on raising awareness about socially responsible procurement.
The cross-industry European social partners are currently negotiating two 
framework agreements. The first relates to the revision of the Parental Leave 
Directive. For the first time ever, they will themselves revise one of their agree-
ments implemented by way of EU directive back in 1995. The second will deter-
mine how the social partners can best contribute to an inclusive labour market 
and to maximise the potential of Europe’s labour market and workforce. This 
will include ‘provisions for facilitating access to and progression in the labour 
market for disadvantaged groups through a series of preventive and curative 
measures including lifelong learning’.
The year 2008 also saw the conclusion of the joint agreement on maritime la-
bour standards that aims to incorporate the provisions of the ILO Maritime La-
bour Convention 2006 into Community law. Maritime labour standards will be 
strengthened at global level and this will help to combat substandard working 
conditions and social dumping in the long term. Another framework agreement 
was concluded on social and environmental reporting standards in the Euro-
pean leather/tanning industry. Furthermore, the social partners of the inland 
waterways sector are negotiating an agreement in order to adapt working-time 
rules to the specific circumstances in their sector.
Mobility has become one of the important issues in European social dialogue. 
Social partners in sectors that have a particularly mobile workforce or need to 
improve the skills level in their sector on the whole have been developing quali-
fications and skills passports (hospitality), working with the European Quali-
fications Framework (inland waterways), exchange platforms (agriculture), or 
training programmes and certificates (commerce and hairdressers). The man-
agement of change, gender equality, and health and safety continue to attract 
much attention of social partners at European level. (In particular occupational 
health and safety practices in enterprises can benefit from recommendations 
and practical guides that address the specific situation in the sector.) On gender 
equality, some sectoral social partners have been innovative with guidelines for 
gender action plans (local and regional governments), ambitious policy orien-
tations accompanied by a work plan (railway), or practical toolkits for human 
resource management (electricity and telecoms).
Social partners in another two sectors have decided to engage in an EU-level 
dialogue in the last two years: contract catering and professional football. Public 
administrations launched a two-year test phase. Social dialogue in the sports 
sector is consolidating in Europe, and the European Commission encouraged 
this process in its White Paper on Sport of 2007.
Sectoral social partners are collaborat-
ing across sectors on, for example, third-
party violence and socially responsible 
procurement.
The cross-industry European social 
partners are currently negotiating a re-
vision of the Parental Leave Directive 
as well as a framework agreement on 
‘inclusive labour markets’.
Further agreements were concluded 
in 2008 in the sea transport sector 
(strengthening maritime labour stand-
ards) and in the tanning/leather sectors 
(improving social and environmental 
reporting).
Mobility, restructuring, health and 
safety, and gender equality continue to 
be important issues for European social 
partners
Two new European sectoral social dia-
logue committees have been created 
since 2006: contract catering and pro-
fessional football.
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The implementation of European social dialogue joint texts attracts increasing 
attention from the social partners, academia and public authorities. European 
social partners negotiate agreements on non-wage issues, which can be imple-
mented through Council directive or by themselves via their national affiliates 
(so-called autonomous framework agreements), and rather process-oriented 
texts, in which they undertake commitments or make recommendations to be 
followed-up at national level.
With the autonomous agreement on telework of 2002 the social partners have, 
for the first time, taken the responsibility to implement an EU-level agreement in 
line with national industrial relations systems and traditions. Implementation has 
taken place in 21 Member States. The instruments chosen (recommendations, col-
lective agreements or legislation) are in line with the industrial relations regimes 
identified in Chapter 2. However, Poland (legislation based on a national collective 
agreement) and the UK (guidelines agreed at national level) seem to have gone 
further. A lot has already been done following the second autonomous agreement 
on stress. These experiences also show that implementation is not a one-off action, 
but a process of learning and confidence building. The multisector agreement on 
the protection of workers from crystalline silica dust is a remarkable innovation. It 
establishes good practices and reporting procedures that are directly binding in all 
companies represented by the signatory parties.
European autonomous agreements have clearly had an impact on working con-
ditions and they are well suited as a means of regulating certain aspects of it. 
But as they cannot guarantee full coverage and consistent application of rules 
preference should be given to the implementation of a European social dialogue 
agreement via Council directive in cases where this is considered necessary. But 
also in this case, the social partners have a special responsibility in implementa-
tion, monitoring and revision that the cross-industry social partners assume by 
re-visiting the Parental Leave Directive. 
Process-oriented texts are frameworks of action (e.g. on gender equality con-
cluded in the cross-industry social dialogue, or musculoskeletal disorders in ag-
riculture) recommendations and guidelines. As the implementation is more in-
cremental and relies on voluntary action the impact remains difficult to evaluate. 
The available evidence suggests that the best results are delivered by establishing 
clear priorities for action and by facilitating learning through a structured re-
porting procedure. The duty to produce joint reports provides an opportunity 
for national social partners to discuss possible action, which sometimes influ-
ences the collective bargaining agenda. Although implementation seems to be 
patchy, in general research indicates that informal learning and the awareness 
raising effect of process-oriented texts should not be underestimated.
The implementation experience so far has improved understanding of the re-
sponsibilities of different actors and led to some important innovations. The 
commitment and capacity of the European and, in particular, the national social 
partners are fundamental. The EU-level organisations must assist, coordinate, 
monitor and report. The cross-industry social partners have also been refining 
the follow-up provisions of their autonomous agreements. Generally speaking, 
unclear follow-up provisions entail weak implementation. All actors must work 
European social partners negoti-
ate agreements, which can be imple-
mented through Council directives or 
by themselves in line with national 
industrial-relations traditions, or make 
recommendations to be followed up at 
national level.
The 2002 telework agreement and the 
multisector agreement on crystalline 
silica are good examples of how autono-
mous agreements can work in practice. 
They demonstrate that autonomous 
agreements are well suited as a means 
of regulating certain aspects of working 
conditions.
But as those cannot guarantee that 
rules are consistently applied through-
out the whole economy preference 
should be given to the implementation 
of a European social dialogue agree-
ment through Council directive where 
this is considered necessary.
It is more difficult to evaluate the im-
plementation of process-oriented texts 
(for example, frameworks of action, 
recommendations and guidelines). 
The best results seem to be achieved by 
establishing clear priorities for action 
and ensuring a structured reporting 
procedure.
Both the commitment and competence 
of the European and, in particular, the 
national social partners are of vital im-
portance. Clear follow-up provisions are 
also essential. Member States and the 
European Commission can both help 
improve the implementation process.
Chapter 5 — The challenge of implementation in European social dialogue
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together to make individual employers and trade union officials aware of the 
social partners’ joint commitments. Member States can also support the efforts 
of social partners, for example though funding from the European Social Fund. 
In some Member States autonomous agreements were incorporated in national 
legislation. The European Commission supports, monitors and assesses the im-
plementation process. It has also taken steps to stress the regulatory nature of 
autonomous agreements by communicating them to the European Parliament 
and the Council, and publishing them in the Official Journal.
European social dialogue contributes to better governance through consulta-
tion and the application of the subsidiarity principle. Social partners know 
best the realities of the workplace and can commit their constituencies to spe-
cific action, which distinguishes them from other organisations, like interest 
groups. Recent experience shows that if implementation at national or sectoral 
level is treated seriously European social dialogue results can go a long way in 
improving working conditions and modernising workplaces. It is still a recent 
process but first success stories and a gradual improvement can be observed.
European social dialogue can go a long 
way towards improving people’s work-
ing conditions and modernising work-
places — social partners know best the 
realities of the workplace and can com-
mit their members to specific action. 
The follow-up of commitments entered 
into at EU level shows first success sto-
ries and gradual improvement.
The Council’s political agreement on 
the Working Time Directive and a di-
rective on temporary agency work in 
June 2008 was a major achievement in 
the area of labour law.
As part of its renewed Social Agenda 
Package of July 2008 the Commission 
proposed a revision of the European 
Works Council Directive and put for-
ward a discussion paper on transna-
tional company agreements.
The 2002 Directive on Information and 
Consultation of Employees is expected 
to have a significant impact on employ-
ee involvement at national level. The 
Commission has reviewed the applica-
tion of the Directive, but concluded that 
it is too early to decide on a revision.
Chapter 6 — Review of European legislation 2006–08
Following several years of negotiations the Council reached a political agree-
ment on the revision of the Working Time Directive and a directive on tempo-
rary agency work. The first would introduce specific provisions for on-call time 
and maintain the use of the individual ‘opt-out’ from the normal 48 hours limit, 
subject to additional guarantees for the worker. The second would ensure that 
the principle of equal treatment, as regards basic working conditions, applies be-
tween temporary workers and the workers directly recruited by user companies 
from day one. Derogations are allowed if introduced by collective agreement or 
agreement between national social partners.
As part of its renewed Social Agenda package of 2 July 2008 the Commission 
proposed to recast the European Works Council Directive. This revision is in-
tended to ensure the effectiveness of employees’ transnational information and 
consultation rights, increase the take-up of European works councils (EWCs), 
incorporate definitions and provisions contained in more recent directives and 
remedy the lack of legal certainty. The renewed Social Agenda package also in-
cluded a staff working document on transnational company agreements that are 
increasingly negotiated between management and employees in transnational 
companies. It maps the importance of this phenomenon, emphasises the poten-
tial of transnational company agreements, discusses possible discrepancies be-
tween the transnational scope of the texts and national norms and references.
Concerning employee involvement at national level, the Commission reviewed 
the application of the Information and Consultation Directive of 2002. It noted 
a significant impact, in particular in Member States that did not have a general, 
permanent and statutory system previously. It concluded, however, that it is too 
early to make a decision on a possible revision as the Directive has not yet devel-
oped its full impact. Efforts should be geared to awareness raising, exchange of 
best practices, research and capacity building of the concerned stakeholders.
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The Commission continued to examine the problems raised by the application 
of the posting of workers directive and adopted a Recommendation to facilitate 
enhanced cooperation between national administrations in April 2008. It has 
also been reviewing the application of specific labour law Directives, such as the 
directive on transfers of undertakings, the directive on fixed-term work, and the 
directive on employer’s insolvency (with a special reference to complementary 
pension regimes). In parallel, larger-scale horizontal studies were carried out 
on the application of the EU body of labour law. Where shortcomings had been 
identified the Commission worked with Member States to resolve them, but also 
launched infringement procedures.
An extensive European discussion was initiated by the Green Paper on the Mod-
ernisation of Labour Law in 2006. An emerging European labour market throws 
down challenges on the most appropriate way to combine flexibility and security 
at work. But overall, contributors expressed a preference for finding solutions 
primarily through action at national level — involving a variety of approaches re-
flecting national legal traditions, industrial relations and practice. However, they 
also showed that there is a strong willingness to test that experience through dia-
logue and an exchange of good practice at an EU level. While the Commission 
decided not to propose any new legislative initiatives it nonetheless identified a 
number of areas for further research and discussion: undeclared work, lifelong 
learning, interaction between labour law and social protection rules, the nature 
of the employment relation, and subcontracting chains.
Several ECJ rulings provided important contributions to a more clear interpre-
tation of provisions laid out in a number of directives in the field of labour law, 
such as working time, employers’ insolvency and fixed-term work. The series of 
rulings on the Viking-Line, Laval and Rüffert cases, in particular, dealt with the 
crucial issue of how to balance the exercise of workers’ rights and the respect of 
fundamental economic freedoms enshrined in the Treaty, as well as the interpre-
tation of the obligations laid out in the Posting of Workers Directive, against a 
background of increasing labour mobility.
The Commission set out the 2007–13 strategy on health and safety at work that 
aims at effectively reducing the rate of accidents at work (25 % by 2012), occupa-
tional diseases and absenteeism. The reporting on implementation measures by 
the Member States was substantially simplified and rationalised.
The Commission also initiated infringement procedures against Member States 
that have not correctly transposed the Racial Equality Directive and the Em-
ployment Equality Directive of 2000. Two application reports have shown that 
the directives have helped to raise significantly the level of protection against 
discrimination across the EU. ECJ case-law is slowly developing.
The Commission attaches great im-
portance to the practical implementa-
tion and enforcement of labour law. 
Regarding the posting of workers, for 
example, it made a Recommendation 
for administrative cooperation between 
national administrations. It also stud-
ied in detail the overall application of 
EU labour law.
An extensive European discussion — 
initiated by the 2006 Green Paper on 
Labour Law – revealed a preference for 
finding solutions at national level. But 
also evident was a willingness for dia-
logue and exchange, which helped the 
Commission identify five areas for fur-
ther discussion and investigation.
Several ECJ rulings have contributed to 
a clearer interpretation of a number of 
directives in the field of labour law.
The Commission set out the 2007–
13 strategy on health and safety at 
work …
… and facilitated the implementation 
of the racial equality and the employ-
ment equality directives.
Social dialogue contributes to good 
working conditions, competitiveness 
and social cohesion. But in some Mem-
ber States, the social partners still do 
Chapter 7 —  Building capacity of social partners through the European Social Fund  
and European social dialogue
Social dialogue contributes to good working conditions, competitiveness, and 
social cohesion. Therefore, social partners play an important role in the Euro-
pean approach to economic and social governance. This is reflected in the Eu-
ropean employment strategy and European social dialogue, which both build 
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on a strong link between the European level and national social dialogue and 
the capacity of social partners in the Member States. Social partners must have 
the organisational, financial and personnel capacities to contribute to economic 
and social governance, be it through involvement in policymaking or through 
autonomous bipartite dialogue at national, sector or enterprise level.
Therefore, since 2007, the EU has been providing financial support for capacity 
building to social partners at national level through the European Social Fund 
(ESF). EU cohesion policy itself, of which the ESF is a part, is a good example 
of good governance through partnership. Development issues and challenges 
have become too complex and interdependent and the financial and managerial 
resources for addressing them too scarce, for any one single institution to be able 
to respond effectively to all these socioeconomic challenges alone. Therefore, 
the Commission, authorities at national, regional and local level in the Member 
States and other governmental and non-governmental organisations and bodies 
work together in all stages of the implementation cycle of the Structural Funds. 
In the case of the ESF, social partners have a special responsibility in this part-
nership, as they are closest to the workplace. In the preparation of the 2007–13 
programming period the Commission has observed increased participation of 
social and economic partners in most Member States and an involvement of 
social partners outside ‘traditional’ activities.
In the current programming period the ESF continues to support joint projects 
of social partners, e.g. in the area of lifelong learning, as well as the creation of 
networks for labour-market modernisation. But for the first time, social partners 
can now benefit from ESF support for projects that directly reinforce their own 
capacities. In fact, the new ESF Regulation stipulates that Member States shall 
allocate an ‘appropriate amount’ to capacity building and joint actions in Con-
vergence Regions. The latest data available shows that some EUR 1.200 million 
have been allocated to such measures.
The European social partners, with the financial support of the EU, have also un-
dertaken capacity building efforts, in particular in order to further integrate the 
social partners in the EU-12 countries in the European social dialogue and the 
implementation of its results. The cross-industry social partners have been imple-
menting ‘integrated programmes’ that consist of drawing up national action plans, 
a study and seminar cycle on restructuring, and resource centres for employers 
and workers. The last two elements are now being extended to all Member States.
Almost half of all sectoral European social partner organisations have under-
taken capacity building activities over the last two years. Projects included round 
tables, country visits, training and others. Results range from awareness raising 
and networking to a more frequent and constructive participation in European 
social dialogue meetings or an immediate impact on bipartite sectoral social 
dialogue, including collective agreements in some Member States.
In the western Balkans, the Commission organised conferences on social dia-
logue and facilitated the Memorandum of Understanding on social issues in the 
context of the Energy Community.
not have the organisational, financial 
and personnel capacities they need.
Therefore, as of 2007, the EU has been 
providing financial support for capac-
ity building to social partners at na-
tional level through the European So-
cial Fund (ESF). EU cohesion policy is 
itself a good example of how it is possi-
ble to solve complex problems through 
partnership.
For the 2007–13 programming period, 
EUR 1.200 million has been allocated 
to social partners’ joint actions, net-
working activities and capacity build-
ing in Convergence Member States and 
regions.
The cross-industry social partners — 
and almost half of all sectoral Europe-
an social partners — are working with 
their (potential) members in the EU-12 
and candidate countries, through semi-
nars, country visits, research, resource 
centres, etc., in order to help them par-
ticipate more effectively in European 
social dialogue.
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From a global perspective, the European Union is a forerunner in combining a mar-
ket-building agenda with a social agenda which includes emerging European indus-
trial relations. In other global regions this process has barely begun and the EU is 
sometimes seen as a model for the development of a regional social dialogue. While 
industrial relations arrangements in EU Member States continue to differ in tra-
ditions and practices, a limited convergence between them can be observed and is 
partly related to the EU as a regulatory space. The emergence of EU-level industrial 
relations is evidenced by a growing number of mutually reinforcing institutions, poli-
cies and processes at EU level and focusing on the social dimension of the market.
The chapter (1) begins with a survey 
of the key institutions of industrial re-
lations in Europe, then describes the 
process and elements of Europeani-
sation, and finally compares Europe’s 
approach to social dialogue and in-
dustrial relations to other economic 
powers and world regions.
The institutional 
characteristics of European 
industrial relations
The industrial relations arrangements 
in Member States of the European Un-
ion differ among each other, as do their 
welfare state regimes and social mod-
els (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Crouch, 
1993; Van Ruysseveldt and Visser, 1996; 
Ebbinghaus, 1999). However, they also 
share a number of elements, and these 
commonalities across the EU distin-
guish it from other regions in the world. 
Historically, the industrial relations ar-
rangements and their achievements in 
contributing to growth and publicly 
secured social protection in post-1945 
western Europe have rested on four in-
stitutional pillars: strong or reasonably 
established and publicly guaranteed 
trade unions; a degree of solidarity wage 
setting based on coordination at the sec-
toral level or above; a fairly generalised 
arrangement of information, consulta-
tion, and perhaps co-determination 
at the firm level based on the rights of 
workers and unions to be involved; and 
routine participation in tripartite policy 
1 This chapter is based on a draft by Jelle Visser and 
Monika Ewa Kaminska of the Amsterdam Institute 
for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS).
arrangements (Streeck, 1992; Traxler, 
2002; Visser, 2006a).
Each of these pillars will be briefly ex-
amined in the context of the various 
enlargements of the European Union, 
from the Community of six to the 
Union of 27 Member States. For each 
of these periods, the arithmetic mean 
(weighted by country size in the case 
of union density and coverage rates) 
will be shown, as a measure of develop-
ments or trends over time. Further, in 
order to explore commonalities across 
the EU at different times, the standard 
deviation, i.e. the dispersion or variance 
about the mean, will be used. Since the 
standard deviation is measured in the 
same units as the mean, it can easily be 
understood and compared. The data 
are from the ‘Institutional Character-
istics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, 
State Intervention and Social Pacts 
(ICTWSS)  database (see Box 1.1).
Chapter 1:  Europe’s industrial relations in  
a global perspective
Box 1.1: The ICTWSS database
The ICTWSS database contains data on wage setting (bargaining coordination, state in-
tervention, minimum wage regulation), social pacts and agreements (type, actors, wage 
and non-wage issues, and years of application), industrial relations institutions (bipartite 
and tripartite councils, routine involvement in policymaking, sectoral organisation, and 
employee representation in firms) and trade unions (gross and net membership, union 
density, bargaining coverage, organisational concentration, unity, authority of peak fed-
erations and national unions, bargaining centralisation). Currently, the database contains 
annual data for 34 countries, including all of the EU-27: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bul-
garia, Canada, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, from 1960 to 2006/07.
The data are mostly from national sources (books, journals and reports for the earlier 
years; government reports and documents from the social partners, excerpts from the 
European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) and the European Industrial Relations 
Review (EIRR) for the 1990s and since). The union membership data are from national 
sources, preferably household or labour force surveys, or else administrative data provided 
by the trade unions to the national register or statistical office. Scrutiny of the data and 
procedures to enhance comparability follow the checks and rules explained in detail in 
Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000), Visser (2006b) or at the OECD website (statistics section, 
and OECD at a glance). Differences from the statistics reproduced in the Industrial Rela-
tions in Europe reports of 2004 and 2006 are due partly to new data becoming available and 
causing the revision of the older series, and partly — in the case of the 2006 report — to 
the use of different sources.
The ICTWSS database can be obtained and used for scientific purposes via the AIAS 
website (http://www.uva-aias.net) and should be cited as: Visser, J. (2008), ‘Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICT-
WSS), an international database, Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies 
(AIAS), Amsterdam.
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Pillar I: Strong or reasonably 
established and publicly 
guaranteed trade unions
The definition of a ‘strong’ trade un-
ion is not easy. A sufficient member-
ship base, a capacity to begin and end 
a strike or other forms of protest if 
necessary, independent finances and 
staffing, the capability to enter negotia-
tions with employers and government, 
and sign and implement agreements 
are all ingredients of such a definition. 
‘Strength’ determines the capacity to 
influence social and economic devel-
opments, which goes beyond the mere 
recognition of the right to organise 
and bargain, as guaranteed under the 
relevant ILO conventions and the law 
of each and every EU Member State. 
In this section, two measures of union 
strength are discussed, aggregated at 
the level of Member States, for which 
comparative data are available: union 
membership (absolute and relative to 
the employed wage earning popula-
tion); and union centralisation (com-
bining the horizontal and vertical 
dimension of trade union unity and 
authority, and taking into account the 
level at which they bargain with em-
ployers), (see Box 1.2).
Current net union membership in the 
EU-27 stands at 42.3 million. This is 
the number of paid union members 
in employment, not counting the self-
employed. Unemployed workers and 
members who have retired from the 
labour market based on a disability 
pre-retirement or old-age pension are 
not included. With these members, 
gross EU-27 union membership is 
close to 60 million. Chart 1.1 shows 
the effect of the different enlargements. 
Obviously, each enlargement has in-
creased the absolute number of union 
members, but within each group we 
find a stagnating or declining mem-
bership. Set against the growth of the 
employed wage earning population, 
this translates in falling density rates 
(Chart 1.2).
The union density rate, defined as the 
net union membership as a proportion 
of the wage earning population in em-
ployment, averages 25.1 (2) across the 
27 Member States of the EU, meaning 
that one in four employees joins a trade 
2 This is the weighted average; the unweighted 
average is 32.5.
union. Chart 1.2 shows that this average 
has been on a downward trend since 
the 1970s for all the different configu-
rations of the EU, most spectacularly 
so in the Member States that joined the 
EU in 2004 and 2007. The more inter-
esting statistic, for the purpose of ex-
ploring commonalities, is the standard 
deviation, shown in Chart 1.3.
Chart 1.1.: Net union membership in the EU, in '000s
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Chart 1.2.: Net union density rates in the EU
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The divergence in unionisation rates 
across EU Member States is not only 
large but is larger than in the early 
days of the European Economic Com-
munity irrespective of the successive 
enlargements. Thus, the dispersion in 
union density rates has become larg-
er within the EU-6, EU-9 or EU-12. 
However, Chart 1.3 also reveals that 
the divergent pattern in unionisation 
observed during the 1970s and first 
half of the 1980s was halted and even 
turned into a mildly convergent trend 
during the 1990s. Similarly, the expe-
rience of trade unions in the 12 Mem-
ber States which joined the EU in 2004 
and 2007 (NMS in charts) suggests at 
first a sharply divergent development 
until around 2002. This ended, how-
ever, by the time of their accession to 
the EU or even earlier while prepar-
ing for accession. This end to further 
divergence — first among the EU-15 
and later among the NMS and EU-
27 — suggests that EU institutions 
and policies may serve as ‘anchors’ for 
Member State policies, for instance by 
enhancing union status or guarantee-
ing rights, or in any case exposing un-
ions to a more similar set of pressures 
and conditions, for instance through 
the policies of the internal market, 
monetary union, the acquis commun-
autaire, and the reform agenda of the 
Lisbon strategy (see Section 2).
The aggregate strength of the trade 
unions in a given country is deter-
mined by their unity and the capacity 
of the leadership to define, defend and 
implement common policies. This is 
reflected in union centralisation, 
which is a measure that combines 
the dimension of unity (number of 
and cooperation between federations 
and unions) and authority (capacity 
to make joint decisions and gain the 
compliance from lower-level units 
in the movement or organisation) 
(Box 1.2). The measure of union cen-
tralisation used here refers to union 
bargaining behaviour,  taking into 
 account the levels at which bargain-
ing takes place, the vertical order-
ing of these levels, and the effective 
number of unions or bargaining 
agents at each of these levels (Iversen, 
1999; Industrial Relations in Europe 
2004 report). The arithmetic means 
and standard deviations are shown 
in  Tables 1.1 and 1.2.
Overall, there is a slight decentrali-
sation trend, only interrupted by the 
1995 enlargement, with the addition 
of the rather highly concentrated and 
centralised unions of Austria, Finland 
and Sweden (Table 1.1). Across coun-
tries, trends appear to diverge after 
the mid-1990s. The general tendency 
of bargaining at lower levels (from 
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Box 1.2: Union centralisation
Centralisation is a composite indicator taking into account the authority of unions and 
union confederations, their unity and organisational concentration at multiple bargaining 
levels (see Iversen, 1999; Visser, 1990). The idea is that union bargaining decisions can 
become centralised in two ways, horizontally and vertically, i.e. by concentrating decisions 
in one rather than many actors (i.e. concentration or unity) and by allowing higher levels 
in the organisation (i.e. confederations relative to their affiliated national unions, and na-
tional unions relative to local, regional or company units) to control negotiations, strike 
decisions, funding and staffing. This is detailed in the ICTWSS database in a five-point 
scale for both (cross-sectoral and sectoral) levels above that of the company, in effect meas-
uring the resources with which confederations and national unions can exert influence 
over bargaining decisions. (This approach is close to that of Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel 
(2001) and their emphasis on compliance.)
Formally, the centralisation index can be written as
√[Cfauthority* ∑in (pCi2),) + (Affauthority* ∑in (pAi2)]
where pCi and pAi denote the proportion of total membership organised by the ith confed-
eration C or affiliate A and n is the total number of confederations (affiliates). Taking the 
square root of the sum serves to magnify the differences at the low end of this scale (cf. 
Iversen, 1999:53). 
For an extensive definition see Industrial Relations in Europe 2004 report. For data on 
union authority and concentration see also Table 2.3.
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national to sectoral and from sectoral 
to company bargaining), witnessed in 
many countries in recent decades, is 
in some Member States offset by the 
agreement of social pacts and frame-
work agreements, often with soft 
targets and rules, in others by the in-
creasing concentration of unions in a 
smaller number of bargaining agents, 
thus adding to horizontal coordina-
tion. Where these countertendencies 
are absent, decentralisation is more 
radical, explaining the increased 
 divergence.
Pillar 2: Solidarity wage 
setting based on coordination 
at the sectoral level or above
Union or bargaining coverage, togeth-
er with the minimum wage (provided 
it is set at a level that is high enough), 
appears to decrease earnings inequal-
ity more than any other measure. Lev-
els of earnings inequality tend to be 
significantly lower in countries with 
high levels of bargaining coverage, 
both in the 1980s and in the 1990s 
(Visser and Checchi, 2009, and sourc-
es cited there). This is true even if 
agreements are less constraining and 
set minimum rather than standard 
rates, as appears to be the recent trend. 
Chapter 3 looks at the issue of wages, 
earnings inequality and pay gaps.
Bargaining or union coverage 
rates, i.e. the proportion of em-
ployees covered by collective agree-
ments negotiated by trade unions, 
yield probably the best estimate 
of the presence and relevance of 
unions in the economy. Averaged 
across the 27 EU Member States, 
60 % of employees are covered by 
collective agreements. Unlike un-
ion density rates, bargaining cov-
erage rates tend to be rather stable 
over time. The main recent change 
in the average coverage rate (see Ta-
ble 1.1) is the effect of the 2004 and 
2007 enlargements, which added 
a group of countries where the in-
stitution of collective bargaining, 
in particular its sectoral format 
based on employer organisation, 
was much less established or had 
to be built up from scratch (Visser 
2007a). However, over the years, 
with each enlargement the variation 
in bargaining coverage rates among 
single Member States did increase 
(see Table 1.2), suggesting divergent 
experiences. The high average was 
maintained because some Member 
States (Belgium, France and Aus-
tria) moved to an almost 100 % cov-
erage rate, counterbalancing the fall 
in coverage rates in other Member 
States (the UK in particular and to 
a lesser degree Germany) (3).
3 For historical data going back to the 1950s and 
1960s the reference is Ochel (2001) based on qualified 
guestimates from industrial relations experts. For the 
1970s and 1980s the best source is Traxler (1994).
Table 1.1: Arithmetic means for the diverse EU enlargements
Indicators
EU-6 EU-9 EU-12 EU-15 EU-27
1960–71 1972–84 1985–94 1995–03 2004–06
Pillars
I
Union density (%) (*) 29.5 39.1 31.6 27.8 24.4
Union centralisation (0–1) 0.483 0.445 0.409 0.471 0.369
II
Sectoral bargaining (0–2) 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.2
Bargaining coverage (%) (*) 74.7 74.5 74.0 75.9 62.5
Wage coordination (1–5) 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.4 2.8
III Works councils (0–2) 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.5
IV
Consultation (0–2) 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.3 0.9
Social pacts (**) 0.0 17.1 27.5 31.9 16.7
Source: ICTWSS database.
(*) Weighted arithmetic means; the other arithmetic means are unweighted.
(**) Percentage of Member States signing social pacts (averaged over multiple years).
Table 1.2: Standard deviations for the diverse EU enlargements
Indicators
EU-6 EU-9 EU-12 EU-15 EU-27
1960–71 1972–84 1985–94 1995–03 2004–06
Pillars
I
Union density 8.6 16.0 18.5 22.6 20.1
Union centralisation 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.13
II
Sectoral bargaining 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8
Bargaining coverage 6.0 10.4 12.9 18.4 26.3
Bargaining coordination 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.2
III Works councils 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.8
IV
Consultation 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5
Social pacts 0.0 37.0 42.6 45.7 44.3
Source: ICTWSS database.
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The main explanation of high cover-
age rates is the existence of sectoral 
(or multisectoral) employers’ organi-
sations with a mandate to conclude 
agreements with sectoral (or multi-
sectoral) unions. Such organisations 
exist and have a bargaining man-
date in most EU-15 states, though 
no longer in the UK, but are sparse 
in the new Member States (except 
in Slovenia and, to a lesser extent, in 
Slovakia). In addition to employer or-
ganisations there is also the effect of 
public policy. In many EU countries 
the social partners can ask the gov-
ernment to declare contracts gener-
ally binding, thus preventing compe-
tition to undercut the agreed wages, 
working hours or other conditions. 
This raises the coverage rate and in 
many sectors makes agreements vi-
able, especially when union member-
ship is low (though in many cases the 
requirement is that, before extension, 
the agreement must cover at least half 
of employees, meaning that either 
employers or unions must be well 
represented). Extension, however, is 
only possible where there is a sectoral 
agreement. Thus even where Member 
State laws provide for the possibility 
of extension but unions and employ-
ers cannot reach sectoral or multi-
employer agreements, the effect will 
be nil. (France, where the law also 
allows the Minister to enlarge agree-
ments to other sectors is exceptional 
in this regard.) Generally, most EU 
governments endorse collective bar-
gaining. The same positive message 
comes from the European-level so-
cial dialogue.
The cornerstone of bargaining cov-
erage and of the ability of unions to 
reduce the pay differentials between 
workers employed in different firms is 
the organisation of bargaining at the 
level of sectors or above (Teulings and 
Hartog, 1998; Streeck, 2005, Traxler et 
al., 2001). The figures in Tables 1.1 and 
1.2 are based on a three-point scale. If 
bargaining in the market sector oc-
curs at the sectoral level, or above the 
sector at the national level for the en-
tire economy or private sector, a score 
of ‘2’ is given. If sectoral bargaining 
is shared or alternated with company 
bargaining, with limited authority of 
national unions over local bargainers, 
the score is ‘1’. If sectoral bargaining 
is absent or rare, the score is ‘0’. The 
average statistics calculated for the EU 
Member States indicate that the secto-
ral model is predominant in Europe, 
though weakening since the 2004–07 
enlargements, as it has had difficulties 
establishing itself in most of the new 
Member States. On this account, the 
variation between Member States has 
increased.
Coordination of wage bargaining 
across the economy — between un-
ions and employers, and within union 
or employers’ organisation, with or 
without the help of the government — 
provides another measure of ‘solidar-
ity’ bargaining, for instance expressed 
through wage moderation in times of 
high or rising unemployment.
Chart 1.4, based on the indicator de-
scribed in Box 1.3, suggests there is 
considerable variation among EU 
Member States combined with stability 
over time within individual  Member 
States. The major changes are observed 
in Ireland, where a period of uncoor-
dinated bargaining in the 1980s was 
followed by a series of social pacts that 
fixed maximum ceilings on wage in-
creases across the economy. Belgium 
and, in later years, Finland are other 
examples of such attempts at coordi-
nation in which the state takes an ac-
tive role. In contrast, after a period of 
centralised wage agreements, both 
Sweden and Denmark moved to lower 
(sectoral) levels of coordination. Quite 
a number of Member States are now 
applying mixed sector and economy-
wide bargaining or pattern setting (‘4’) 
and irregular sectoral bargaining (‘3’) 
or mixed sector and company bargain-
ing (‘2’). Economy bargaining based on 
enforceable agreements or direct state 
imposition is rare, as is lack of coordi-
nation above the company level — cur-
rently found only in the UK and Malta. 
In central and eastern Europe and in 
France the state often attempts to use 
the statutory minimum wage and/or 
wage setting in the public sector as a 
‘lighthouse’ for coordinating wages 
throughout the economy, but such at-
tempts are easily thwarted by politically 
and electorally motivated decisions on 
minimum wages and specific labour 
market pressures in the public sector.
Box 1.3: Index of bargaining coordination
5 =  economy-wide bargaining: based on enforceable agreements between the central or-
ganisations of unions and employers affecting the entire economy or entire private 
sector, or by government imposition of a wage schedule, freeze, or ceiling.
4 =  mixed sector and economy-wide bargaining: central organisations negotiate non-en-
forceable central agreements (guidelines) and/or key unions and employers associa-
tions set pattern for the entire economy.
3 =  sector bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting: limited involvement of central 
organisations and limited freedoms for company bargaining.
2 =  mixed sector- and firm-level bargaining: with weak enforceability of industry agreements
1 = none of the above: fragmented bargaining, mostly at company level.
This index is based on Kenworthy (2001) and applied with some small modifications. Trax-
ler, Blaschke and Kittel. (2001) offer an alternative two-dimensional index, in which the 
level of bargaining, and coordination, is distinguished from the capacity of organisations 
to enforce, jointly or individually, their commitments. Important as this is, this element is 
picked up in the centralisation measure, discussed in Box 1.2.
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Pillar 3: Generalised 
arrangement of information, 
consultation, and perhaps 
co-determination in the firm 
based on the rights of workers 
and unions to be involved
The ability of workers, directly or 
through their unions, to set up and be 
represented by an elected works coun-
cil or system of representation within 
the firm is the main institutional pro-
vision under pillar 3. Such a provision 
may be based on a general agreement, 
as tends to be the case in Scandinavia, 
on a company or sector agreement, 
as used to be the case in the UK, or 
it may be mandatory by law, as is the 
case now in most EU Member States. 
In March 2002 the European Coun-
cil and Parliament adopted Directive 
2002/14/EC establishing a general 
framework for informing and con-
sulting employees. This directive ap-
plies to firms employing at least 50 
employees.
Employee representation at the level 
of enterprises or firms is measured by 
a three-point scale constructed on the 
basis of two questions which, if both 
answered with ‘yes’, result in a score 
of ‘2’. If one is answered with ‘yes’ the 
score is ‘1’ and if none is answered with 
‘yes’ the score is ‘0’. The first question 
is whether there is a right to informa-
tion and consultation based on public 
law and/or a general agreement with 
binding effect on firms; the second 
question asks whether all firms above 
the size of 50 employees are effectively 
covered. Due to European legislation, 
there appears to be a mildly conver-
gent trend since the 1990s, after a di-
vergent experience in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. Considerable change oc-
curred between 2000 and 2006 as a re-
sult of Directive 2002/14/EC, though 
the transposition of the directive has 
not yet been fully completed in all 
Member States and effective cover-
age is yet unclear in many Member 
States (European Commission 2008, 
Eurofound, 2008a). Notwithstanding 
uncertainties due to the sample size of 
the survey data used, Chapter 3 of the 
Industrial Relations in Europe 2006 re-
port provides data on coverage.
It should be added that the numbers 
shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 do not say 
much about the effectiveness of worker 
consultation and information in firms, 
let alone co-determination rights. For a 
discussion of the modalities of worker 
consultation and information in firms 
see also Industrial Relations in Europe 
2006 report, Chapter 3. 
Pillar 4: Routine participation 
of unions in tripartite policy 
arrangements
Routine involvement of the social 
partners, and of unions in particu-
lar, in consultation over social and 
economic policies, and in the imple-
mentation of these policies, is a core 
element of the social dialogue at all 
levels: in the firm (see pillar 3), in the 
Member States and at EU level (see 
next section), both in sectors and at 
the cross-sectoral level. This routine 
involvement can come in different 
forms: it may be guaranteed by state 
or EU law (as in Articles 136 to 139 of 
the Treaty), be embodied in councils 
or tripartite advisory bodies or Com-
mittees that regularly meet and dis-
cuss government policy which exist in 
many Member States and at EU level, 
or it may be more informal, although 
more than just an ad-hoc affair only 
convened in times of crisis and neces-
sity. The Austrian social partnership 
based on informal yet regular par-
ticipation of social partners in social 
and economic decision-making is a 
case in point (Guger, 1998). Routine 
participation requires a degree of in-
stitutionalisation, that is, the estab-
lished and validated expectation and 
belief of all participants that they will 
be consulted over policy decisions 
and that their views will be taken into 
consideration. Such beliefs and expec-
tations may be anchored in a law or 
formal agreement, but they may also 
be based on custom and practice. The 
point is that when beliefs are invali-
dated and expectations not honoured, 
for instance when governments take 
decisions without consulting the so-
cial partners, it stirs a major upheaval, 
as was the case when, for instance, the 
Austrian government decided in 2000 
Chart 1.4.: Bargaining coordination - variation across time
and Member States, 1985-2007
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and again in 2003 to change the pen-
sion system without serious negotia-
tions with the unions.
Where there is routine participation, a 
score of ‘2’ is assigned; where partici-
pation sometimes takes place, or is de-
pendent on the government of the day 
or the stance of the social partners, 
score ‘1’ is attributed; where there is 
never consultation the score is ‘0’.
Consultation over social and eco-
nomic policy through the routine in-
volvement of the social partners — an 
essential part of the social dialogue — 
is practiced in nearly all EU Member 
States, though not always on a regu-
lar basis. The current exceptions, with 
only ad hoc consultations, are found 
in the UK and many of the new Mem-
ber States. Since the mid-1990s and 
again after 2004 the variation between 
Member States has decreased.
The conclusion of a social pact between 
the social partners, or one of them, 
and the government, with reciprocal 
commitments and promises, is anoth-
er more stringent measure of involve-
ment. Social pacts tend to be specific 
responses to crises or emergency situ-
ations, or in any case historically spe-
cific attempts to ensure the coopera-
tion of all relevant social actors for the 
purpose of attaining specific targets, 
like EU membership, participation in 
the EMU or the Lisbon Strategy objec-
tives, though in some cases these pacts 
may institutionalise into a repeated 
pattern or experience and blend with 
routine involvement of governments 
in wage policy and the social partners 
in government decision-making over 
social and economic issues. The most 
prominent example is Ireland, where 
seven multiannual pacts have been 
signed since 1987.
Social pacting is an experience that be-
gan in the 1970s and has remained ever 
since, now applying to a quarter — in 
the previous period to one third — of 
the EU Member States (Table 1.1). 
However, variation across EU Mem-
ber States was, and is, massive (Table 
1.2). There are some Member States in 
which there are many social pacts; and 
many other Member States where there 
is just one or none. In this respect, there 
appears to be little convergence.
First interim conclusion
For some of the elements of impor-
tance for industrial relations and social 
dialogue — union organisation or den-
sity; coordination of bargaining; em-
ployee representation in firms or estab-
lishments; involvement in consultation 
over social and economic policies on 
a regular basis — the experience since 
the mid-1980s points to a mildly con-
vergent development or, at any rate, a 
halting of the sharply divergent trends 
of the 1970s and early 1980s. This de-
velopment is visible in spite of subse-
quent enlargements, although the latest 
and largest enlargements, in terms of 
Member States added, have tended to 
add to diversity. This conclusion sug-
gests an influence from (preparing for) 
participation in the EU, although other 
developments (similar pressures based 
on globalisation or domestic political, 
social or economic changes) may also 
play a role. However, the comparison 
with the 1970s, when industrial rela-
tions responded with widely divergent 
policies to similar pressures, is striking. 
The fact that EU social policies gained 
more bite after the mid-1980s as we 
show below, may also have enhanced 
the increased commonality. This devel-
opment is, however, not visible in one 
area where the EU level is least influ-
ential: the organisation of trade unions 
and employers’ associations, and the 
organisation and coverage of collective 
bargaining. It is exactly in these indi-
cators, and in the experiences of social 
pacts, that we see the largest and still 
widening divergence.
The Europeanisation of 
industrial relations
The possibility of creating an EU-level 
industrial relations system has been 
described in various ways. Hyman 
(2001) groups these views into three 
approaches. One of them sees the EU 
as a ‘vehicle of social regulation of the 
internationalising labour market’ (Hy-
man, 2001:290; see Falkner, 1998). As 
supporters of this view argue, in recent 
years a European industrial relations 
system has been emerging, which is 
evidenced by existence of EU-level ac-
tors like the ETUC or BUSINESSEU-
ROPE, who produce EU-level rules 
promoting high social standards. A 
second, contrasting view, argues that 
European integration has been, as a 
matter of fact, ‘a process of economic 
liberalisation by international means’ 
(Streeck, 1998:429). Its main goal has 
been to raise the competitiveness of 
European companies in the globalising 
world economy and to create a com-
mon market able to face the challenge 
of the American and later the Asian 
markets. Advocates of this interpre-
tation of the European project claim 
that industrial relations at EU level 
is ‘a matter of form rather than sub-
stance’ (Hyman, 2001:290; see Streeck, 
1998; Streeck and Schmitter, 1992). A 
third approach adopts a Euro-realist 
perspective which, on the one hand, 
does not downplay the obstacles to 
building a supranational industrial re-
lations arrangement but, on the other 
hand, recognises the achievements of 
the EU in constructing the ‘social di-
mension’ of the European integration 
process and the potential for further 
development.
This chapter builds on the third ap-
proach and argues that Europeanisa-
tion is both a mechanism promoting 
market-building and a means to coun-
ter its negative effects by promoting 
social regulation. On the one hand, 
it is obvious that national systems 
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have to strengthen their responses to 
new competitive conditions, often by 
reconfiguring national welfare and 
labour market institutions and poli-
cies, in order to face global competi-
tive pressures but also to comply with 
the market-building agenda of the 
EU. Within a liberalising European 
market, ‘established forms of national 
cross-company standardisation of 
which the sectoral collective agree-
ment has been the principal instru-
ment’ are under pressure, perhaps 
even threatened (Hyman, 2001:288). 
More freedom for multinational com-
panies in selecting locations for pro-
duction based on comparative advan-
tages in labour costs between Member 
States as well as free movement of 
labour have posed challenges to the 
traditional industrial relations insti-
tutions. On the other hand, Member 
States have to adopt the growing so-
cial aquis to ensure participation of 
social partners, information and con-
sultation of employees, to conform to 
health and safety requirements and 
anti-discrimination law and policies. 
These contrasting effects of European-
isation have been particularly visible 
during the recent (2004 and 2007) EU 
enlargements. Upon joining the Eu-
ropean Union, the post-socialist cen-
tral and eastern European countries 
(CEECs) had to adopt and implement 
the acquis communautaire including 
its social regulations. The challenge 
of reconciling market-building with 
social solidarity has had to be met in 
the context of an EU understanding 
of markets and social institutions that 
was relatively new in the central and 
eastern European region.
Since the 2000 launching of the Lisbon 
Strategy with a focus on ‘boosting em-
ployment, economic reform and social 
cohesion within the framework of a 
knowledge-based economy’ (Council, 
2000) there has been an ongoing debate 
about the compatibility of its social and 
economic goals. However, as has been 
convincingly claimed by Traxler, ‘there 
is no structural contradiction between 
the economic and socio-political di-
mensions of European integration’ 
(2002:7). Indeed, it can be further ar-
gued that not only are the social and 
economic goals pursued within the Eu-
ropean integration process compatible, 
but they may be mutually reinforcing: 
a particular selection of social policies 
can be helpful in achieving economic 
goals and good economic policy is 
necessary for reaching social goals. On 
the one hand, as shown by the example 
of Ireland (Wickham, 2002), imple-
menting EU labour legislation (rights 
of representation and consultation, the 
regulation of working conditions, laws 
against discrimination, etc.) does not 
have to stand in the way of economic 
growth. On the other hand, the exam-
ple of Nordic countries suggests that 
liberalising market reforms (aimed 
at raising a country’s competitiveness 
within the globalising economy) can 
be successfully combined with a de-
veloped welfare state (Sapir, 2005). In 
the Nordic countries, ambitious labour 
market reforms drawing on the flexi-
curity approach have kept unemploy-
ment down without triggering social 
exclusion or a major increase in pov-
erty (OECD, 2006; see also Visser and 
Hemerijck, 1997, for the example of 
the Netherlands). They have been ac-
companied by family-friendly policies 
and decentralisation of education and 
healthcare systems (Giddens, 2007; see 
also Palme, 2005). Crucially, the quality 
of industrial relations has proved to be 
of major importance in achieving the 
two — economic and social — goals. 
Not only have the reforms in Nordic 
countries left space for involvement of 
social partners, but constructive coop-
eration of employees and unions has 
been fundamental for these positive 
outcomes.
In broader terms, the positive im-
pact of cooperative industrial rela-
tions on labour market perform-
ance has been defended, inter alia, 
by Freeman and Medoff (1984). 
Empirical evidence supporting this 
argument has been discussed, for 
example, by Blanchard and Philip-
pon (2004) who, based on a sample 
of industrial European countries, 
found that cooperative industrial 
relations played an important role 
in alleviating unemployment rates, 
while ‘countries with worse [con-
flictual] labour relations have ex-
perienced higher and longer-lasting 
unemployment’ (2004:2). This has 
been corroborated by Feldman on a 
larger sample of industrial, develop-
ing and transition countries (2008). 
Feldman’s conclusion is that coop-
erative industrial relations ‘have a 
noticeable pay-off in terms of lower 
unemployment’, both ‘among the to-
tal labour force, and among women 
and youths’ (Feldman, 2008:201).
The place of industrial relations in the 
EU economic and social governance
For decades after the inception of the 
European integration project, the ca-
pacity of the Community to build an 
EU-level industrial relations arrange-
ment remained limited. Among the 
reasons, Marginson and Sisson list 
‘the economic focus of the political 
project which led to its creation and 
enlargement; the narrow scope of its 
competence in the field of industrial 
relations enshrined in the Treaty of 
Rome and subsequent revisions […]; 
the requirement to secure unanimity 
in the Council of Ministers for matters 
other than health and safety and the 
working environment […]; and the 
weakness of the social partners […] in 
relation to their constituent national 
affiliates’ (1998:513). Nonetheless, in-
dustrial relations have occupied an in-
creasingly important place within the 
EU approach to economic and social 
policies, and the obstacles mentioned 
above have been gradually reduced.
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The importance of industrial relations 
across the common market was rec-
ognised already in the Treaty of Rome 
(1957). In Part One (‘Principles’), the 
Treaty expressed the Community’s com-
mitments to, inter alia, maintaining a 
high level of social protection for work-
ers. However, Part 3 of the Treaty (the Ti-
tle on Social Policy) did not contain legal 
provisions for developing transnational 
industrial relations. Article 118 limited 
the Commission’s role to promoting 
‘close collaboration’ between Member 
States in the fields of ‘employment; la-
bour law and working conditions; vo-
cational training; social security; pre-
vention of occupational accidents and 
diseases; occupational hygiene; the right 
of association, and collective bargaining 
between employers and workers’. And 
while Article 119 was explicit in formu-
lating the ‘equal pay for equal work for 
men and women’ principle, it was only 
implemented years later (the 1975 and 
1976 gender equality directives). Other 
legislation adopted by the end of the 
1970s, apart from measures facilitating 
the free movement of workers, had in-
cluded directives on the procedures re-
garding collective redundancies, and the 
protection of workers’ acquired rights in 
case of a transfer of the undertaking to 
another owner (Threlfall, 2006).
The policymaking in the social area in-
cluding industrial relations intensified 
in mid-1980s thanks to the vision of ‘a 
greater social dimension to the Euro-
pean integration project’ proposed by 
Commission President Jacques Delors 
(Threlfall, 2007). This approach ‘le-
gitimated and provided fresh impetus 
to the introduction of EU measures in 
the industrial relations field’ in the fol-
lowing years (Marginson and Sisson, 
1998:513; see Hall, 1994). As a result, 
EEC guiding social principles were em-
bodied in the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights for Work-
ers adopted in the form of declaration 
by all Member States in 1989 (with the 
exception of the United Kingdom).
In that period, the social dialogue be-
tween social partners on the Commu-
nity level received recognition from 
the Commission, first in the White 
Paper on completing the internal 
market (1985) and later in a working 
paper entitled ‘Social dimension of 
the internal market’ (1988). The lat-
ter document stressed that ‘dialogue 
between labour and management has 
an absolutely essential role to play in 
building Europe’ (European Commis-
sion, 1988:32). Formal recognition of 
the European social dialogue, and of 
the Commission’s role in promoting 
it, came with the 1986 Single Euro-
pean Act, through Article 118b.
In the discussions that accompanied 
the preparation of the 1989 Charter 
of Fundamental Social Rights and the 
Treaty of Maastricht (1991) ‘social 
dialogue was considered important 
first as an institution-building process 
necessary as a precursor to any Euro-
pean industrial relations system, and 
second as a potential joint regulatory 
procedure alongside other more cen-
tralised and legalistic forms’ (Gold et 
al., 2007:9). These functions were pro-
vided for by the Social Policy Agree-
ment appended to the Social Protocol 
annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht. 
The Social Policy Protocol extended 
the use of qualified majority voting to 
cover a broader area of employment 
and industrial relations issues. Further, 
it provided for agreements concluded 
between the social partners to acquire 
the force of legislation. This was a 
‘procedural breakthrough’ (Leibfried, 
2005) in terms of an alternative means 
of introducing EU-level regulation by 
allowing the European social partners 
to act independently of the Council 
and the European Parliament.
In the mid-1990s, a piece of legisla-
tion contributing to an emergence of 
transnational industrial relations in 
the EU was the 1994 European Works 
Council Directive. The 2002 Infor-
mation and Consultation Directive 
has further extended this procedure 
into national forums by establishing a 
general framework for informing and 
consulting employees in firms em-
ploying at least 50 employees (4).
The 1997 Intergovernmental Confer-
ence and the Treaty of Amsterdam 
brought into the focus the issue of the 
failing European labour market. The 
Treaty specified, in Articles 125-130, 
that the Member States and the Com-
munity were required to work towards 
developing ‘a coordinated strategy 
for employment’. Later that year, the 
European Employment Strategy was 
inaugurated, based on an agreement 
of Member States to coordinate their 
employment policies through rely-
ing on common guidelines, indica-
tors, decentralisation, evaluation and 
mutual learning. This procedure for 
implementing the European Employ-
ment Strategy is known as the Open 
Method of Coordination. 
The 1997 Intergovernmental Con-
ference resulted in an agreement to 
include the Charter of Fundamental 
Social Rights into the Treaty of Am-
sterdam. The Social Policy Agreement 
was incorporated into the Treaty as the 
current Articles 136 to 139, which en-
hanced the role of European social part-
ners (the European federations of trade 
unions and employers) as ‘potential co-
legislators in the social policy domain’ 
(Visser, 2007b:62). These changes have 
given the ‘social dimension’ a ‘much 
needed treaty-based legitimacy’ (Mar-
ginson and Sisson, 1998:514).
The historical account of the incre-
mental developments in industrial 
relations at the EU level suggests that 
the constraints to building a supra-
national set of industrial relations 
4 Article 17 of the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers provided 
for a right of information, consultation and 
participation of workers ‘taking account of the 
practices in force in different Member States’, but 
this clause was non-binding.
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arrangements listed at the begin-
ning of the section have been gradu-
ally softening. The economic focus of 
the European integration project has 
been, especially since the mid-1980s, 
paralleled by the development of the 
‘social dimension’; qualified majority 
voting has been extended to cover a 
growing area of employment and in-
dustrial relations matters; the posi-
tion of the social partners at the EU 
level has been enhanced thanks to 
their gradual inclusion in the legisla-
tive process; finally, while the Mem-
ber States remain unwilling to com-
promise their sovereignty over social 
policy areas (Borrás and Jacobsson, 
2004), the unspecified resistance and 
specific blocking powers (Wallace, 
2005:61, cited in Threlfall, 2007:281) 
have been partially overcome.
This has been possible thanks to a 
specific approach: as the use of Com-
munity legislation in the field of in-
dustrial relations has been limited, 
it has been complemented by other 
methods and routes which after 
Threlfall (2006; 2007) can be called 
‘procedural innovations’, like stipu-
lating charters on principles and val-
ues; annexing agreements to treaties; 
enabling social partners to influence 
and take decisions on social policy at 
the EU level; fostering benchmark-
ing, learning and cooperation be-
tween Member States.
This approach has resulted in a mix-
ture of hard (legally binding) and soft 
(non-legally binding) measures that 
add up to emerging EU-level indus-
trial relations. As a result, during the 
five decades of the existence of the 
Communities, unique features of EU-
level industrial relations arrangements 
have been constructed, consisting of 
common values and principles; insti-
tutions; procedures and policies. Be-
low, we enumerate and briefly discuss 
the most important characteristics of 
European industrial relations.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union
After 20 years, the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights has received recogni-
tion with a legally binding reference 
included in the body of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, which is currently awaiting 
ratification by the Member States (5). 
The charter has been recognised by 
the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities as part of the general 
principles of Community law. The 
seven chapters of the Charter, cov-
ering fundamental rights relating 
to dignity, liberty, equality, solidar-
ity, citizenship and justice, are an 
expression of principles and values 
endorsed by the EU Member States. 
In the charter, social and economic 
rights receive the same status as civil 
and political rights, which arguably 
is a groundbreaking development in 
terms of defining fundamental rights, 
not only within the EU but world-
wide. Also, based on the charter’s 
provisions, the EU institutions are 
expected to promote a European so-
cial model. Of particular importance 
in promoting EU-level industrial re-
lations are the provisions on the pro-
tection of personal data (Article 8), 
freedom of association (Article 12), 
freedom to choose an occupation 
and right to engage in work (Article 
15), non-discrimination (Article 21), 
equality between women and men 
(Article 23), workers’ right to infor-
mation and consultation within the 
undertaking (Article 27), right of 
collective bargaining and collective 
action (Article 28), protection in the 
event of unjustified dismissal (Article 
30), fair and just working conditions 
(Article 31), prohibition of child la-
bour and protection of young people 
at work (Article 32) and reconcilia-
tion of family and professional life 
(Article 33).
5 Poland and the UK demanded and obtained the 
assurance that this reference would not affect national 
labour laws. 
European social dialogue and Euro-
pean social partners
In 2002, the Barcelona European 
Council stated that the European so-
cial model is about good economic 
performance, a high level of social pro-
tection, and social dialogue. Collective 
bargaining between unions and em-
ployers, information and consultation 
of employees in firms and employing 
organisations, consultation of unions 
and employers on social and economic 
policies or negotiations between them 
and with the public authorities are all 
manifestations of the social dialogue. 
Social dialogue can then be defined as 
societal and institutional (legal and po-
litical) support for the routine consul-
tation of employers (organisations) and 
trade unions on matters of social and 
economic policy, combined with struc-
tured contractual and non-contractual 
relations between employers (organisa-
tions) and trade unions. As mentioned 
before, social dialogue appears to be 
a distinctive feature of industrial rela-
tions in the European Union; in the 
Commission’s words, it is ‘rooted in 
the history of the European continent’ 
(European Commission, 2002a:7) (for 
a contrasting view, see Schroeder and 
Weinert, 2004). The European social 
dialogue, as provided for under Arti-
cles 138 and 139, can then be seen as 
a unique feature of EU-level industrial 
relations, distinguishing it from weaker 
arrangements in other regional integra-
tion endeavours (infra).
The European social dialogue contrib-
utes to enhancement of social goals at 
the EU level and to the convergence 
of Member States’ industrial relations 
regimes with different modes of social 
regulation. The impact of the Europe-
an social dialogue is visible in the form 
of regulation produced on the basis 
of agreements (at cross-industry or 
sectoral level) establishing minimum 
standards. Article 139(2) provides for 
two implementation routes of agree-
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ments signed by the European social 
partners: implementation ‘according 
to the procedures and practices spe-
cific to management and labour and 
the Member States and ratification by 
a decision of the Council of Ministers 
(directives). Intersectoral framework 
agreements implemented by means of 
directives cover the issues of parental 
leave (1995), part-time work (1997), 
working time in sea transport (1998), 
fixed-term contracts (1999), mobile 
workers in civil aviation (2000), and 
working conditions of mobile workers 
in cross-border services (2004). The 
outcomes of the ‘autonomous agree-
ments’ include the European frame-
work agreement on telework of 2002, 
one on work-related stress of 2004, 
and another on violence and harass-
ment in the workplace of 2007 (see 
Chapter 4). 
Crucially, the intensifying interaction 
of European social partners and social 
partners from Member States within the 
European social dialogue fosters their 
socialisation (defined as ‘a process of in-
ducting actors into the norms and rules 
of a given community; its outcome is 
sustained compliance based on the inter-
nalisation of these new norms’, Checkel, 
2005:804). This process is of particular 
importance for the social partners from 
the EU-12. Lessons drawn from such 
cooperation enhance their position 
in the national setting (see Visser and 
Ramos Martín, 2008). European social 
dialogue seems then to be also a means 
for ‘horizontal’ Europeanisation both 
for policies and mechanics of change 
(European Commission, 2004).
The very existence of European social 
partners, an obvious sine qua non for 
the European social dialogue to take 
place, is also a unique feature of EU 
level industrial relations. In its com-
munication of 1993, the Commission 
specified the criteria (later formalised 
in a Decision of 1998) according to 
which European social partners are 
recognised. Organisations of man-
agement and labour should ‘be cross-
industry or relate to specific sectors or 
categories and be organised at Euro-
pean level; consist of organisations, 
which are themselves an integral and 
recognised part of Member State social 
partner structures […]; have adequate 
structures to ensure their effective 
participation in the consultation proc-
ess’ (European Commission, 1993:5). 
Eighty-one such organisations have 
been recognised. The cross-industry 
European social partners are BUSI-
NESSEUROPE (formerly UNICE) 
representing European employers in 
the private sector, the European or-
ganisation of employers in the public 
sector (CEEP), the European Asso-
ciation of Craft, Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises (UEAPME) and the 
European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC). They are involved in tripar-
tite concertation at the EU level and 
have signed European cross-industry 
agreements (see Box 1.6).
European Works Councils 
The existence of a workplace employ-
ee representation and participation 
structure (based on law or collective 
agreements) is a distinctive feature of 
European industrial relations (Euro-
found, 2005). European Works Coun-
cils (EWCs) are a specifically EU-level 
development deriving from a regula-
tory initiative of the Commission, but 
also from pressures by European mul-
tinational companies in the context of 
‘increasingly integrated production 
systems across Europe’ (Marginson, 
2000:10), as well as counter-pressures 
from trade unions across Member 
States. While formally designed as 
employee information and consul-
tation structures, the EWCs appear 
to have offered trade unions in EU 
Member States ‘a new platform for 
cross-border information exchange 
and cooperation’ (Arrowsmith and 
Marginson, 2006:246, see also Box 
1.4 ‘Transnational collective bargain-
ing in Europe’). The EWCs have also 
offered opportunities to trade union 
representatives in new Member States 
to enhance their practical experience 
in exchanging cross-country informa-
tion and negotiating with manage-
ment (Eurofound, 2006).
EWCs can be seen as extensions of na-
tional systems of workplace represen-
tation (Streeck, 1997). However, other 
authors — based on empirical analysis 
of the provisions establishing EWCs 
and their functioning — find that 
while ‘traces of the national systems in 
which a given multinational corpora-
tion is headquartered are undeniable’, 
EWCs ‘represent an intersection of 
country-specific and transnational in-
fluences’ and are evolving into organ-
isms whose behaviour and practice are 
‘transnational or European in  nature’ 
(Marginson, 2000:29–30).
Transnational coordination of collec-
tive bargaining
In recent decades, the internationalisa-
tion of the global economy in general 
and, in particular, the ‘ever closer in-
tegration of markets for products and 
services, capital (including the “mar-
ket” for production locations) and 
— especially since the EU’s 2004 and 
2007 eastern enlargements — labour’ 
(Marginson, 2008) have considerably 
changed the conditions for collective 
bargaining in Europe. Increasingly, 
the so-far nationally bounded context 
has been acquiring transnational in-
terdependencies.
Since the early 1990s, institutional 
developments within the EU in-
dustrial relations arrangement have 
enhanced intra-European transna-
tional coordination of collective 
bargaining. The agreements stipu-
lated through the European social 
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dialogue ‘have paved the way for fur-
ther negotiations on matters of social 
and employment policy at multisec-
tor level’; further, the establishment 
of the European works councils ‘has 
given a direct impetus to collec-
tive negotiation between manage-
ment and labour’ in European mul-
tinationals (Marginson and Sisson, 
1998:505–506). It is too early to give 
a definitive judgment on the influ-
ence of EWCs on actual outcomes. 
Some contend that EWCs as a means 
of coordinating union positions in 
different countries have been ineffec-
tive (Hancké, 2000). Others, however 
(Lecher et al., 2001; Marginson et al., 
2004; Arrowsmith and Marginson, 
2006), have presented evidence that 
EWCs may facilitate transnational 
bargaining (see Box 1.4).
Two forms of transnational collective bargaining have progressively 
emerged over recent years. Both forms implicate European works 
councils (EWCs), in a manner which de facto extends their remit 
beyond the provision of transnational employee information and 
consultation as specified in the 1994 EWCs Directive. 
The first form is implicit and takes the form of cross-border exchange 
of data relevant to national and local bargaining, by either employers 
or trade unions, with the aim of setting the context for negotiations. 
Such activity may result in coordination of bargaining agenda and 
outcomes across different national and local negotiations.
There is a striking asymmetry in the predominant level of em-
ployer and trade union ‘context setting’ and coordination activity, 
respectively. Amongst employers, the primary focus of activity is 
the company level, through management systems in multinational 
companies (MNCs) which systematically monitor workforce costs, 
flexibility and performance in local operations, enabling manage-
ment to compare these across borders and deploy the results in local 
and national negotiations. The use of such ‘coercive comparisons’ 
to secure common outcomes in a linked series of local negotiations 
within an MNC is well documented. Recent evidence from the au-
tomotive sector indicates that some EWCs have been mobilised by 
either management or trade union and employee representatives 
for context-setting activity purposes in local negotiations. For trade 
unions, the primary focus of activity is at sector level, through cross-
border bargaining cooperation initiatives. These have been instigat-
ed by a number of European industry federations (EIFs), notably 
the European Metalworkers Federation, and also under bilateral and 
multilateral arrangements between national unions in some cross-
national regions within the EU. They aim to share bargaining infor-
mation across borders, coordinate bargaining objectives and moni-
tor outcomes, although in practice coordination of key outcomes 
such as wage increases is yet to be realised.
The second is ‘explicit’ and involves transnational negotiations be-
tween the management of MNCs and workforce representatives, ei-
ther international trade union federations and/or EWCs, which result 
in the adoption of joint texts and non-binding framework agreements 
of varying degrees of regulatory ‘hardness’ or ‘softness’. Such agree-
ments have been concluded in a small, but growing, number of MNCs, 
and involve two main developments. Those concluded by EWCs are 
specifically European in scope. By late 2007 these were estimated at 
over 70 concluded with 40 MNCs, figures which have increased from 
17 agreements in just nine MNCs in 2001. These EWC agreements 
address a range of topics, amongst which four themes are prominent: 
corporate social responsibility, including core labour standards; elabo-
ration of key principles underpinning company employment policies; 
business restructuring and its effects; and specific aspects of company 
policy, such as health and safety or data protection.
‘International framework agreements’ (IFAs) are global in scope, con-
cluded with MNCs by international trade union organisations, most 
commonly global union federations (GUFs), sometimes in conjunction 
with national trade unions from the ‘parent’ country. IFAs address core 
labour standards, and tend also to cover the supply chain as well as the 
MNC’s operations. Some 65 had been concluded by mid-2007, almost 
all since 2000. Although global in their reach, the great majority have 
been concluded with European-based multinationals, possibly signify-
ing greater familiarity with company-based social dialogue and there-
fore greater preparedness to engage in social dialogue at a global level.
The main negotiating agent on the employee-side differs between 
these two main types of transnational agreement. Yet, the two forms, 
and therefore their employee-side signatories, intersect. One in four 
IFAs have been co-signed by EWCs, and in several others EWCs are 
accorded a role in their implementation. Conversely some, but not 
all, EWC agreements are co-signed by EIFs and/or national trade 
unions: recent prominent examples include those at Schneider Elec-
tric (EMF) and Suez (EPSU and relevant French trade unions).
Whether EWC agreements are intended to be mandatory in their 
implementation for the signatory parties, and for management and 
employee representatives within company operations across Europe, 
varies considerably. At the softest end of the possible regulatory spec-
trum are agreements which elaborate general principles of a com-
pany’s personnel policy, but which do not envisage or require any 
specific actions. Examples include the charters adopted at Suez and 
Vivendi. Somewhat harder in their regulatory nature are agreements 
which commit the signatory parties to specific actions, such as the 
establishment of a health and safety observatory at ENI, but do not 
invoke action by local management and employee representatives. A 
degree harder also are framework agreements which establish a set of 
general principles on a specific issue, and incite — but do not require 
— follow-up action by management and employee representatives at 
lower levels of the MNC. Examples include Danone’s agreement on 
training. Harder still in their regulatory nature, and coming closest to 
the status of the provisions laid down in national and local company 
agreements, are obligatory frameworks which require actions by the 
parties at lower levels within the company, but where national and lo-
cal-level practice in implementation can vary. The principal instances 
are the agreements on specific restructuring decisions at major auto-
motive manufacturers such as Ford Europe and GM Europe.
Author: Paul Marginson, IRRU, 
University of Warwick, UK.
Box 1.4: Transnational collective bargaining in Europe
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Macroeconomic Dialogue
Established during the German Presi-
dency in 1999, the Macroeconomic 
Dialogue provides a high level forum 
for the exchange of views between the 
representatives of the Council (or more 
precisely: the troika of the current, sub-
sequent and previous presidencies), the 
Commission, the European Central 
Bank and the European social partners. 
The dialogue is based on the principle 
that key macroeconomic policy stake-
holders and decision-makers and those 
responsible for wage formation (man-
agement and labour organisations) 
should have a proper understanding of 
each other’s positions and constraints 
in carrying out their respective respon-
sibilities. Against that background, 
its purpose is to improve the interac-
tion between wage developments and 
monetary and fiscal policies. In the 
Council’s view, it is ‘an effective way to 
approach implementing the growth- 
and stability-oriented macroeconomic 
policy forming part of the broad eco-
nomic policy guidelines as pursued by 
the Member States and the Communi-
ty’ (Council, 1999). Like the European 
social dialogue, it is a unique structure, 
specific to the EU industrial relations 
arrangement. Unlike the European so-
cial dialogue, however, the Macroeco-
nomic Dialogue produces no binding 
results, no binding conclusions and no 
joint ‘target-setting’.
While the ETUC has proposed to 
strengthen the Macroeconomic 
Dialogue and to create ‘a European 
framework formula for collective 
bargaining’ (Eurofound, 2007c), the 
European Central Bank’s interpreta-
tion of the macroeconomic dialogue 
role is that of ‘a forum within which 
the various policy actors could be kept 
informed of developments in other 
relevant policy areas’ (ECB, 2000:90) 
and not a coordination institution. In 
theory, the Macroeconomic Dialogue 
could provide a forum for synchronis-
ing wage policy with monetary policy 
(the European social dialogue cannot 
play this role, as the Social Protocol 
annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht 
explicitly excluded wages from its 
dealings). The views of the ETUC and 
BUSINESSEUROPE on the Macr-
oeconomic Dialogue, are set out in the 
article on p. 99.
 European Employment Strategy 
The European Employment Strategy 
(EES), launched in 1997 and reformed 
a number of times since, is one of the 
key elements of the Lisbon strategy. 
The Employment Chapter of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam which institutionalises 
the EES is based on the idea of shared 
responsibility of national govern-
ments and EU institutions in obtain-
ing particular results in the EU labour 
market (Kilpatrick, 2006). To facilitate 
the implementation of this idea, the 
EU ‘employment policy toolkit’ has 
been expanded to include the Open 
Method of Coordination, aiming ‘to 
unleash the EU’s social dimension 
from the constraints of the Commu-
nity method’ (Borrás and Jacobsson, 
2004:186). Indeed, some see the OMC 
as the most significant innovation in 
labour market governance on the EU 
level (Zeitlin, 2003).
The European Employment Strategy 
stipulates the involvement of social 
partners. Here, there is still need for 
enhancement of the social partners’ 
role, as stressed both by the Commis-
sion and the Council, because experi-
ence suggests that consultation rather 
than participation through partner-
ship is the rule in almost all Mem-
ber States (European Commission, 
2002b; Council, 2005). (On the in-
volvement of social partners in OMC 
see also Gold et al., 2007). Chapter 
2 of this report analyses further the 
contribution of the social partners to 
the Lisbon agenda.
Second interim conclusion
The above list of institutions and proc-
esses is a testimony to the emergence of 
an EU-level industrial relations arrange-
ment, although the outcomes are still 
modest in terms of the effectiveness of 
the transnational institutions. In terms of 
the four pillars supporting the core Euro-
pean industrial relations arrangements at 
the national level, as discussed in the first 
section of this chapter, they appear to be 
developing also on the EU level. As for 
the first pillar, it is true that the ETUC’s 
strength is limited as the federation con-
tinues to be characterised by a very low 
degree of centralisation, with very lim-
ited resources and power to direct or 
control its affiliated national and sectoral 
member organisations. The same is true 
for BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, and 
CEEP as their capacity to direct member 
organisations is even more restricted and 
sectoral organisations at the European 
level are not integrated (Streeck and Viss-
er, 2006). Secondly, a transnational di-
mension to collective bargaining has been 
emerging over recent decades, fostered 
by EU-promoted processes and institu-
tions. Thirdly, since the adoption of the 
1994 EWCs directive, the practice of in-
forming and consulting the workforce in 
transnational contexts has been steadily 
advancing, involving a growing number 
of European multinational companies. 
Finally, the European social dialogue — 
despite its shortcomings — has become a 
defining characteristic of EU-level indus-
trial relations, as it allows for the partici-
pation of social partners in supranational 
tripartite policy  arrangements.
The European Union 
compared to other regions in 
the world
When it comes to its social model, la-
bour rights and industrial relations ar-
rangements, the European Union (EU) 
is usually compared with other major 
industrialised countries. For example, 
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since 2000 the European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions (Eurofound) has 
published annual surveys of industrial 
relations in the EU, Japan and the USA, 
with recently some references to devel-
opments in China and India (6). The 
most common comparative perspective 
on the European social model or mod-
els confronts the EU and the USA. In 
these accounts the EU usually compares 
positively with the USA from the point 
of view of employee rights and social co-
hesion (Wickham, 2002) (7), and rather 
negatively from the point of view of eco-
nomic growth, flexibility and innova-
tion (Alesina and Gavazzi, 2006). Other 
accounts stress the EU internal diversity 
and admit that there are combinations 
of social and economic policies and in-
stitutions within Europe that do as well 
as or better than the USA on efficiency 
and equity (OECD, 2006; Sapir, 2005).
There is something incorrect, how-
ever, in comparing the EU with Japan, 
the USA, or other states in the global 
economy. These are different units of 
analysis. Japan is a unitary state, like 
France; the USA is a federal state, like 
Germany or Belgium. The EU, in con-
trast, is neither a state nor a federa-
tion, but a regional organisation based 
on intergovernmental cooperation 
combined with state-like features as 
well as a common social foundation 
(‘union’). A more proper compari-
son, therefore, would be between the 
EU and other regional organisations, 
like those between trading partners 
in North America or South America 
(NAFTA and Mercosur respectively), 
in western Africa (Ecowas) or south-
ern Africa (SADC) or in south-east 
Asia (ASEAN).
6 Published online as part of the European 
Industrial Relations Observatory (http://www.
eurofound.eu). In July 2008 the European Foundation 
published its seventh report in the series, comparing 
developments in the EU with  Brazil, China, Japan 
and the USA (European Foundation, 2008b).
7 The simplest difference between the USA and 
Europe is that we have welfare states and they don’t’, 
J. Wickham (2002).
Apart from methodological considera-
tions, interregional comparison is also 
justified by the increasing relevance of 
the interregional dimension in the glo-
bal economy. Most international trade 
in goods and services, and the larg-
est flows in labour migration, happen 
within world regions. Within interna-
tional organisations like the WTO or 
ILO the position of regional groups 
has been gaining importance. Interre-
gional negotiations represent the most 
distinctive features of the EU external 
trade policy. (The EU common com-
mercial policy entitles the Commission 
to negotiate on behalf of the 27 Mem-
ber States.) Apart from the framework 
of the WTO (of which the EU has 
been member and one of the key play-
ers since its creation in 1995), the EU 
conducts trade negotiations with other 
regional groups like NAFTA, Mercosur 
or SADC. Usually, the goal of these ne-
gotiations is to strengthen interregional 
arrangements through association, co-
operation and partnership agreements, 
in which promotion of social policies 
and labour rights features as an impor-
tant element of the EU policy, as speci-
fied in the 2004 Commission commu-
nication on the ‘Social dimension of 
globalisation’. First the main features of 
industrial relations arrangements and 
social dialogue in three of the main 
global players — the EU, Japan and the 
USA — will be compared following the 
traditional approach. Subsequently, the 
EU industrial relations and social pol-
icy institutions will be compared with 
those in other global regions (see Box 
1.5 for  methodological remarks).
Industrial relations and social dialogue 
in the EU, Japan and the USA
Workers in the EU are on average 
twice as likely to be a member of a 
Box 1.5: Traditional vs interregional approach
There are methodological problems with both approaches presented in this chapter. For 
the traditional approach, comparing the main features of industrial relations arrangements 
and social dialogue in the EU, Japan and the USA, it would have been desirable to include 
China, India or Brazil, but comparable information is missing on nearly all indicators. The 
data shown here relate to (the average of) 2004–06 and consider the EU before (EU-15) 
and after (EU-27) the two recent enlargements. It is based on the ICTWSS database, com-
pleted with information from the annual surveys of Eurofound, which offer a very useful 
comparison between these three global actors on key economic, political and legislative 
developments; social partner developments; the main collective bargaining issues, cover-
age and coordination, as well as major events and trends in industrial conflict (Eurofound, 
2008b). On most aspects these surveys actually illustrate developments in the EU by refer-
ring to what happens in Member States, clearly demonstrating how difficult it is to speak 
of European industrial relations proper.
Secondly, when comparing the EU industrial relations and social policy institutions with 
those in other global regions, the main problem is the lack of complete data. Data on la-
bour market institutions are typically collected and aggregated at the national level. For the 
purpose of aggregation of these data to the level of world regions or regional organisations, 
the relevant statistics should not only be comparable but also reasonably complete. This is 
now the case in the EU (albeit with many missing values and doubts about the reliability 
of data for some of the recently acceded Member States) and in the OECD (including its 
non-EU members, though sometimes with missing values for Mexico and Turkey). There 
are efforts on the part of the ILO and World Bank to establish similar data collections on 
‘decent work indicators’ and industrial relations in other world regions, but the results are 
far from complete. On trade unions and collective bargaining, for instance, the informa-
tion is scattered (ILO, 1997; Visser, 2003). Because of these limitations, the interregional 
comparison presented here is based on qualitative information on a small number of key 
features of industrial relations and social policy.
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trade union compared with US work-
ers, and about 1.5 times as likely as 
Japanese workers. They are, moreover, 
represented by unions and federations 
which, on average, tend to be more 
centralised than their Japanese and 
American counterparts.
Table 1.3 compares the industrial re-
lations features of the EU, Japan and 
the USA for three ‘aggregations’ of the 
European Union: the current size of 
27 Member States (EU-27), the pre-
2004 size of 15 Member States (EU-
15) and the 12 Member States that 
acceded in 2004 and 2007 (NMS) (8). 
All arithmetic means are weighted by 
the size of the wage earning popula-
tion in employment.
Within the EU, union organisations 
tend to be more fragmented and less 
centralised in the new Member States, 
with most unions in the 10 former 
Communist countries making a sharp 
break with the monopolistic and 
centralised situation in their recent 
past (9). After more than a  decade of 
8 Although Bulgaria and Romania acceded in 2007, 
their data is included in the averages for the EU-27 
and EU-12 calculated over the years 2004–06.
9 The union movements in the other two new 
Member States, Cyprus and Malta, inherited many 
industrial relations features from British rule, with 
sharply falling density rates in the 
post-Communist countries, union 
membership rates have tended to sta-
bilise just below the EU-15 average 
(see Chart 1.5).
Comparing unionisation trends in the 
EU, USA and Japan, one observes rath-
er similar downward trends. World-
wide, trade unions tend to face similar 
pressures and challenges of industrial 
and occupational change, unstable 
employment patterns and contracts, 
globalisation and restructuring. In 
the developing countries unions have 
yet to find an organising response to, 
and make themselves relevant for, the 
increasing number of workers in the 
informal economy (see ILO, 1997; 
Visser, 2003). In the developed econo-
mies of the EU, Japan and the USA, 
the comparable challenge is to make 
unions relevant outside the traditional 
sectors of manufacturing and public 
administration and services.  
The key difference between the EU, 
Japan and the USA, however, resides 
in collective bargaining or union 
coverage. On average, nearly two out 
additional splits on political and ideological grounds. 
Union density rates have held up well and are far 
above the EU average.
of three workers in the EU are cov-
ered by a collective agreement (10), 
compared to nearly one in five in 
Japan and one in eight in the USA. 
The average coverage rate in the EU 
Member States of central and eastern 
Europe is significantly lower than 
the EU average and reaches less than 
half of all employees. The exception 
is Slovenia where practically all em-
ployees are covered by multi-em-
ployer agreements negotiated with 
the unions. The main problems here 
are the weak organisation of employ-
ers, the lack of a mandate to reach 
multi-employer agreements with un-
ions, and the prevalence of company 
bargaining, with many (small) firms, 
areas and sectors left uncovered. (A 
rather similar situation has prevailed 
in the UK since the 1990s.).
The difference in trends between 
unionisation and bargaining cover-
age is apparent only in the European 
Union (see Chart 1.6). In Japan and 
the USA the fall in trade union mem-
bership (see Chart 1.5) is tracked by a 
fall in union coverage; in the EU this 
is not the case. The main reason is 
that unions and employers in Europe 
negotiate above the level of the firm, 
usually on a sectoral, sometimes on 
10 The variation, by country, sector or company, in the 
content of these agreements defies a meaningful way of 
aggregation and comparison across regions, even within 
the EU. Compared to the USA, collective agreements 
in Europe are probably less specific on health plans and 
related issues covered by national and occupational 
schemes in most European welfare states, but in many 
sectors and countries in the EU agreements do guarantee 
sickness pay, provisions for paid leave, pension benefits, 
dismissal protection or unemployment insurance above 
the levels guaranteed under universal or occupational 
schemes guaranteed by the state. In addition, there 
has been an increase in special provisions (‘social 
plans’) guaranteeing workers’ job training, placement 
services or additional insurance, and in some case early 
retirement, in the case of company restructuring and 
lay-offs. Furthermore, not all agreements include a pay 
clause, and many fix only minimum and entry wage 
rates, leaving other rates to be decided in the company or 
workplace, individually by management or through joint 
consultation and bargaining. Finally, the legal effects of 
agreements and the provisions for including non-union 
members differ widely across EU Member States. (For 
an overview of collective labour law in the EU-15: 
Rebhahn, 2003; 2004.)
Table 1.3 Weighted arithmetic means EU,  
Japan and the USA, 2004–06
Indicators EU-15 NMS EU-27 Japan USA
Pillars
I
Union density (%) 25.8 22.0 24.4 18.8 11.8
Union centralisation (0–1) 0.414 0.303 0.369 0.226 0.305
II
Sectoral bargaining (0–2) 1.3 0.9 1.2 0.0 0.0
Bargaining coverage (%) 68.8 42.5 62.5 16.8 13.8
Wage coordination (1–5) 3.1 2.3 2.8 3.0 1.0
III Works councils (0–2) 1.7 0.8 1.5 0.0 0.0
IV
Consultation (0–2) 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.0
Social pacts (% share MS) 19.6 11.0 16.7 0.0 0.0
Source: ICTWSS database.
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a national (cross-sectoral) basis. This 
allows for the inclusion of a far great-
er number of employees, for instance 
those working in small and medium-
sized firms who would otherwise be 
unrepresented.
While powerful business organisations 
exist in the USA, they do not act as em-
ployer organisations, with a mandate to 
negotiate collective employment agree-
ments for their members (firms) with 
the unions. All bargaining in the USA 
happens within companies. Pattern set-
ting disappeared long ago, around the 
early 1980s, when it took the form of 
‘concession bargaining’ (Capelli, 1990). 
In Japan, too, bargaining is conducted 
at the enterprise level with enterprise 
unions, and the powerful business 
federation Nippon Keidanren has no 
formal role in it. But unlike the USA, 
pattern bargaining is common in Ja-
pan with a strong coordinating role of 
Nippon Keidanren, but with a weaken-
ing influence of trade unions and their 
annual spring offensive on the results 
(Nakamura, 2007). BUSINESSEU-
ROPE, the main EU-level organisation 
for business, does represent its affiliates 
in negotiations with the unions and 
signs ‘multi-employer’ agreements on 
non-wage issues.
EU-level employers’ organisations 
do not engage, nor do they have the 
ambition to engage, in pattern set-
ting with regard to wages (as some 
of their affiliates do within Member 
States, for instance in Germany). The 
union side, represented by the Eu-
ropean Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) and its transnational secto-
ral affiliates, does express this ambi-
tion, in order to counter tendencies 
towards wage competition and stag-
nating real wages. However, even on 
a small scale, within a particular sec-
tor like metal engineering or between 
neighbouring states like Germany 
and Austria, this turns out to be ex-
tremely difficult (Traxler et al., 2008). 
Thus, when comparing the statistics 
for wage bargaining coordination and 
the sectoral organisation of bargain-
ing in Table 1.3, we should be aware 
that these are  averages based on the 
situation in Member States. They tell 
us that in most EU-15 Member States 
the sector is the basis for collective 
bargaining and that unions and/or 
employers engage in coordination; 
and that this is much less so in the 
new Member States, and not at all the 
case in the USA.
With the implementation of the 2002 
Directive on Consultation and Infor-
mation of Employees almost all EU 
Member States now have structures 
in place that guarantee employees, 
including non-union members, rep-
resentation within the firm. This is 
different in Japan and the USA, where 
there is no law or general agreement 
guaranteeing employees the right of 
information and consultation in the 
firm where they work. Consultation, if 
it happens at all, is entirely internal to 
the enterprise union and covers very 
few firms and employees throughout 
the economy.
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Box 1.6: Unions and employers’ organisations in the EU, 
Japan and the USA
The main union organisation in the USA is the AFL-CIO, whose 59 affiliates had a com-
bined membership of 12.5 million in 2005, which at that time equalled 82 % of total union 
membership in the USA. However, in 2005 the American federation suffered a serious 
weakening with the formation of a rival organisation. Following disagreement on how to 
organise non-unionised workplaces and sectors, two of its largest affiliates — the Serv-
ice Employees’ International Union and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
— broke away. Together with five other unions they founded a new organisation called 
Change to Win, claiming some 6 million members. On its website, AFL-CIO claims a total 
membership of more than 10 million organised in 56 unions.
In Japan the dominant union confederation RENGO claimed as of December 2007 6.8 mil-
lion members organised in 52 federations, though the real unit of organisation in Japan is the 
enterprise union, of which there are some 60 000. There are two smaller confederations or 
peak federations and a considerable number of local unions are unaffiliated. RENGO’s com-
bined membership accounts for about two-thirds of total union membership in Japan.
The European Trade Union Confederation has been successful in uniting nearly all rel-
evant union federations in Europe, even beyond the European Union in its current size. The 
ETUC represents more than 90 % of all organised employees in the EU. In total, the ETUC 
claims 60 million members organised in 82 national federations from 36 European coun-
tries. These include, beyond the EU-27, Andorra, Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, 
Norway, San Marino, Switzerland and Turkey. In addition, national union federations from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia have been 
given observer status. The ETUC also heads 12 European industry federations organised on 
a transnational basis and incorporates a special European federation for professional and 
managerial staff (Eurocadres) and one for retired and elderly persons (EFREP).
In the USA there are many powerful business lobbies but no overarching employers’ organi-
sations that could act as a social partner to the unions. Thus the Business Roundtable, the 
American Chamber of Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers are very 
active in lobbying Congress and also operate internationally, but they do not coordinate firms 
or sectors across the USA in matters of wages and employment. This is different in Japan. 
Nippon Keidanren, which can be translated as Japan Business Federation, is a comprehen-
sive organisation representing employers and has a track record in coordinating wage setting 
across the private sector. The present organisation results from a merger, in 2002, between 
the Japanese Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren) and the Japanese Federa-
tion of Employers’ Associations (Nikkeiren). It claims the membership of 1 343 companies, 
130 industrial associations and 47 regional economic organisations (as at 22 June 2007).
In the EU the main employers’ and business organisation is BUSINESSEUROPE, pre-
viously the Union of Business and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE). It 
combines 36 member organisations from 31 countries, including Croatia, Montenegro, 
Iceland, Norway and San Marino (but no members from EU Member States Slovenia and 
Slovakia). Unlike its Japanese counterpart, or the ETUC on the side of labour, BUSINES-
SEUROPE has no sectoral affiliates and does not attempt to coordinate wage setting by its 
member organisations. It does, however, engage in coordinating and monitoring member 
behaviour on other, non-wage issues (Visser and Ramos Martin, 2008). Two smaller Euro-
pean confederations represent small and medium-sized businesses (UEAPME) and busi-
nesses of general interest and operating in the public sector (CEEP). 
It is impossible to make generalising 
statements with regard to the strength 
of works councils and employee rep-
resentation in EU companies. Em-
pirical research shows great variation, 
depending on union strength, union–
council cooperation, formal rights, 
management behaviour, etc. In terms 
of formal rights, guaranteed under le-
gal statute or by collective agreement, 
EU employees tend to have a stronger 
position than their American or Japa-
nese colleagues if it comes to influenc-
ing decisions of management, though 
whether this warrants the crude op-
position between ‘stakeholder’ and 
‘shareholder’ models is dubious.
Finally, most EU Member States do 
involve the social partners, and trade 
unions in particular, in consultations 
over social-economic policies and 
reforms. In some Member States this 
is legally anchored in statutes and 
embodied in tripartite councils with 
representatives of unions, employers, 
the government and, in some cases, 
other interests groups (farmers, so-
cial groups, women). The effective-
ness of these bodies and of the social 
dialogue approach in terms of actual 
influence is a matter of dispute, but 
clearly the ambition is there, and ap-
pears lacking in Japan and the USA 
(but not in other parts of the world; 
see the next section).
It is impossible to relate these differ-
ences in industrial relations and social 
dialogue to differences in economic 
and social performance (see Chapters 
2 and 3). Cross-national comparisons 
including the USA and Japan (and 
other non-EU OECD countries) tend 
to show that high coverage rates and 
coordinated bargaining are associ-
ated with lower earnings dispersion 
and lower poverty rates, that coordi-
nated bargaining is associated with 
lower unemployment and inflation, 
and offsets the possible negative in-
fluence of union power, that works 
councils help in adjusting to change 
and reduce industrial conflict, and 
that social pacts have helped to adjust 
to EMU and to overcome resistance 
to social policy and pension reforms. 
Whilst such findings may give some 
confidence to the EU approach to 
social dialogue, they do relate to in-
dustrial relations in Member States 
rather than at the EU level.
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The interregional comparison
The interregional comparison focuses 
on social rights and labour regulation, 
as stepping stones to a ‘fairer’ glo-
balisation, as suggested by the World 
Commission on the Social Dimension 
of Globalisation in its report A fair 
globalisation: creating opportunities for 
all (ILO, 2004a). Of all the examples of 
regional integration, the EU is unique 
in that in addition to an internal mar-
ket for goods and services it also guar-
antees the ‘free movement of labour’, 
and has numerous supranational in-
stitutions, like the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities and the 
European Parliament, although many 
of these features do also exist, at least 
on paper, in the Economic Commu-
nity of West African States (Ecowas). 
Migration of workers, for instance, has 
been a very important feature in West 
Africa (Robert, 2004) (see Box 1.7).
Social policies across global regions 
may differ on three dimensions: re-
distribution, regulation and rights 
 (Deacon 2001). From the point of view 
of industrial relations, there is a fourth: 
the institutional pillars of social dia-
logue, discussed in this chapter.
Redistributive policies require funds 
to re-allocate resources or come to the 
rescue of depressed areas or groups. Of 
the regional organisations, the EU is 
the only one where a common budget 
is used for these aims: the EU Struc-
tural Funds and the recently launched 
Globalisation Adjustment Fund for the 
assistance and retraining of workers 
adversely hit by global trade. Although 
modest in size, these funds may be di-
rectly relevant for industrial relations, 
as they may assist workers and firms in 
disadvantaged areas and support the 
capacity building of unions and em-
ployers (see Chapter 6). Ecowas and 
the SADC seek the use of development 
aid funds for this purpose, though 
nearly all money is channelled through 
bilateral agreements and programmes 
with donor countries. The parties to 
NAFTA explicitly excluded redistribu-
tive policies. ASEAN had, and has, no 
ambitions in this direction, whereas 
Mercosur has expressed ambitions in 
this regard.
Social and labour regulation in re-
gional trading blocs is always a con-
tentious issue. Typically, within any re-
gional trading bloc, the countries with 
more advanced economies and social 
arrangements, and the labour move-
ments within them, want some harmo-
nisation of employment standards so 
as to allay fears of ‘social dumping’ and 
protect the working and living condi-
tions of their own populations and 
membership (Burgoon, 2004; Gitter-
man, 2003). The less advanced coun-
tries, with lower productivity and wage 
levels, tend to fight off such attempts 
since this would limit their competitive 
advantage. Alternatively, they ask for 
compensating redistributive policies. 
Given these contrasting interests dif-
ferent compromises have been struck, 
reflecting the different strength and 
policies of dominating coalitions. Thus, 
in the EU since the mid-1980s progress 
with social regulations and common 
minimum labour standards has taken 
place alongside the expansion of the 
Structural Funds.
NAFTA does not provide for harmo-
nised minimum labour and employ-
ment standards, but has somewhat 
strengthened the monitoring and en-
forcement of existing domestic stand-
ards in the three participating coun-
tries. The agreement contains one 
formal clause on regulatory standards, 
discouraging trade partners from re-
ducing environmental standards or 
health and safety rules, and one side 
agreement on labour issues, the North 
American Agreement on Labour Co-
operation (NAALC), in which the 
three countries promise to improve 
oversight and enforcement of domes-
tic labour and employment standards, 
and to participate in a dispute regu-
Box 1.7: Some global interregional economic organisations 
and trade zones
The North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) was ratified in 1993 and imple-
ments a free trade zone between Canada, Mexico and the USA, without provisions for 
labour mobility across borders. The third-largest trading bloc after the EU and NAFTA, the 
Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) was founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay; Venezuela acceded in 2006; Bolivia, Chile, Mexico and Peru are associated 
members. Since 2004 efforts to become a ‘community of states’ have been stepped up and 
in May 2008, on the initiative of Brazil, 12 countries — Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Columbia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela — signed 
the treaty for the creation of the Union of South-American Nations (Unasur), which is 
explicitly modelled on the example of the European Union (1).
The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) was founded in 1975 in La-
gos (Nigeria) and combines 15 states, i.e. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leo-
ne and Togo. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) includes Angola, 
Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) began as a political association be-
tween Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, and 
later expanded to 10 with Cambodia, Laos and Burma/Myanmar. In 1992 ASEAN mem-
bers decided to implement a free trade area — the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) 
— in the space of 15 years.
1 ‘À Brasilia, les pays sud-américains font un pas vers l’intégration régionale’, Le Monde, 25 May 2008.
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lation process. NAALC resulted from 
pressure in the US Congress and from 
the unions. They advocated minimum 
standards applied to Mexico, but this 
was opposed by business and by the 
Mexican government, which feared 
that such standards would undermine 
its competitive cost advantages. Mexi-
can labour pushed instead for a kind 
of structural fund, the North Ameri-
can Development Fund, but US Con-
gress opposed any redistributive poli-
cy. The final result was the creation of 
a regional body, the Commission for 
Labour Cooperation (CLC), charged 
with the task of promoting enforce-
ment of each nation’s labour and em-
ployment laws. However, each coun-
try retains full control to establish, 
change or increase or, if it so chooses, 
to lower domestic labour standards; 
this is different from the EU where 
lowering standards requires a deci-
sion of the Council of Ministers. Fur-
thermore, the CLC, unlike the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, is an informal 
body and has no jurisdiction in the 
three partner states.
Under pressure from the trade unions, 
which cooperate for this purpose, 
Ministers in Mercosur agreed to pro-
mote ‘core’ labour principles according 
to national legislation, through collec-
tive bargaining and legal statutes. Em-
ployers oppose any move towards har-
monised minimum standards and no 
firm conclusion has been reached yet. 
There is a Social–Labour Commission 
charged with the task of monitoring 
standards but its position is weak and 
it has no authority. Within Mercosur, 
countries have made a beginning with 
the recognition of social security en-
titlements of migrant workers, after 
the example of the EU Regulation 
(EC) No 2004/88 (previously (EEC) 
No 1408/71) regarding the coordina-
tion of social security regimes. A start 
has been made with reciprocal joint 
health and safety inspections. Agree-
ments have been signed, moreover, 
to recognise education credentials, 
degrees and diplomas across member 
countries. There are proposals for a 
regional social fund, and a few region-
ally funded projects exist in border 
areas. Technical cooperation has oc-
curred in most social areas.
In Ecowas, some progress has been 
made in the area of migrant workers, 
with the adoption of the ILO protocol 
on the right of residence and estab-
lishment for migrant workers. How-
ever, in spite of its stated objective of 
seeking legislative harmonisation, lit-
tle progress has been made even with 
regard to creating common minimum 
standards. The weakness of monitor-
ing structures and of the trade unions, 
combined with the large size of the 
informal sector, stand in the way of 
progress. As a result, migrant workers 
are often excluded from social securi-
ty and work-related benefits (Robert, 
2004). In the SADC there is an Em-
ployment and Labour Sector with the 
objective of harmonising policies in 
support of the labour market, regulat-
ing labour mobility, and introducing 
and harmonising social mobility sys-
tems (Nauertz, 2002).
The 10 ASEAN Member States have 
been unwilling to part with any au-
thority in matters of social and la-
bour regulation (Chavez, 2006). Un-
like other free trade agreements, the 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement does 
not include any reference to labour 
regulation, not even as a side agree-
ment. The exclusive focus on inter-
governmental decision-making, the 
choice of consensus and unanimous 
decisions, non-intervention, sen-
sitivity to political needs of others, 
personal contacts and preference for 
minimum institutions, are sometimes 
stylised as the ASEAN Way (see Ser-
rano et al., 2004). There are no pledges 
for central monitoring or third-party 
enforcement mechanisms, and thus 
far ministers have only agreed to share 
information and exchange best prac-
tice, mainly on training, manpower 
and human capital issues. In 2006 
ASEAN labour ministers added oc-
cupational health and safety; in 2007 
they declared the issue of  migrant 
workers a priority area.
When it comes to social and labour 
rights, the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Work-
ers has served as an important exam-
ple for other regions, together with 
the ‘Decent Work’ programme of the 
International Labour Organisation 
(ILO, 2004b). In NAFTA there is a firm 
commitment to the core labour rights 
of the ILO but no common charter. 
The original treaty establishing Mer-
cosur did not address labour rights is-
sues, but starting in 1994 unions have 
been advocating the adoption of a 
binding charter of social and employ-
ment rights, modelled on the EU. In 
recent times there is a stronger adhe-
sion to the ‘Decent Work’ programme 
of the ILO as well as a commitment 
by some leaders to social policies and 
policies combating poverty.
The revision of the Ecowas treaty in 
1993 marked the shift from a bureau-
cratic to a more ‘people-centred or-
ganisation’ and included for the first 
time a provision for the sharing of 
information among business men and 
women, workers and trade unions. A 
new reference to the African Charter 
on Human and People’s Rights was 
added together with a commitment 
to social justice. However, no specific 
institutional mechanism was created 
for monitoring these rights and the 
Court of Justice that does exist cannot 
hear cases brought to it by individu-
als and is therefore entirely dependent 
on states. Probably as a consequence, 
the Court has seen very little activity 
(Robert, 2004). In October 2006 the 
Ministers of Social Affairs met for the 
first time to establish a ‘sustainable 
social dimension for Ecowas regional 
Industrial Relations in Europe 2008
38
integration programme’. The SADC 
has a social charter protecting funda-
mental rights, freedom of association 
and collective bargaining, health and 
safety, as well as equality for women, 
persons with disabilities and older 
persons. Governments of the SADC 
have also recently endorsed a first 
draft of a regional social policy.
The ASEAN+3 summit of 1999, in-
cluding China, Japan and South Ko-
rea, which followed the Asian crisis 
of 1997, for the first time declared 
the importance of ‘social and human 
development resources for sustained 
growth of east Asia by alleviating eco-
nomic disparities between and within 
nations’. As a follow-up to the declara-
tion, a Committee on the Implemen-
tation of the ASEAN Declaration on 
the Protection and Promotion of the 
Rights of Migrant Workers was estab-
lished in July 2007, but concrete policy 
measures have yet to be decided.
Industrial relations institutions have 
similar elements to those found in the 
EU. Based on the position of Brazil-
ian and South African unions, the 
position of trade unions in Mercosur 
and SADC is stronger than in NAF-
TA, Ecowas or ASEAN. Collective 
bargaining coverage is also higher in 
southern Africa and South America, 
at least in the formal economy and in 
urban areas (ILO, 1997; Visser, 2003). 
In South America and in eastern and 
southern Africa there are regional or-
ganisations of trade unions, similar to 
the ETUC, and there are also attempts 
to involve them in tripartite social dia-
logue (Nauertz, 2002). However, these 
regional social partners’ organisa-
tions are extremely fragile, often lack-
ing even the funding to meet. Such 
structures and attempts are missing in 
North America and south-east Asia. 
Employers organisations are every-
where even more poorly organised 
on a regional basis and have even less 
of a mandate than the unions. Social 
partnership structures with Labour 
Ministers are frequently sidelined by 
colleagues from other, more powerful 
ministries, a problem that was also ap-
parent in central and eastern Europe 
during the transition. Another weak-
ness shared by most regional organisa-
tions is the absence of strong suprana-
tional governmental institutions, like 
the Commission or the Parliament 
in the EU. In South and south-east 
Asia the dominant industrial relations 
model is based on enterprise unionism 
and enterprise bargaining, with limited 
coverage, as is the case in Canada and 
the USA (Mexican unions used to be 
highly integrated in the state and in 
politics, but reliable information on 
their actual importance is hard to come 
by). Union fortunes in western and 
southern Africa have been extremely 
volatile depending on politics and 
civil warfare. Tripartite councils and 
policy forums with advisory status do 
exist in Mercosur at the regional level, 
somewhat similar to the EU. South Af-
rica has since the overturn of apartheid 
experimented with tripartism, while 
some countries in Asia, for instance 
South Korea, have tried to address the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis with a ‘so-
cial pact’ approach, albeit with limited 
success (Baccaro and Lin, 2007).
Third interim conclusion
Undoubtedly, the EU represents the 
most advanced form of regional social 
and economic integration. In terms 
of supranational social policy it can 
be said that the EU has an embryonic 
social policy in all the three fields of 
social redistribution, social regulation 
and social rights, as well as a relevant 
set of regional industrial relations in-
stitutions and policies. The Structural 
Funds provide a mechanism whereby 
resources can be allocated to address 
economic and social disparities in the 
EU or be put to the assistance of social 
partners and workers adversely affected 
by global trade. There are regulations 
in the fields of occupational health and 
safety, health services, equal opportu-
nities, labour law, and social security 
and pensions schemes, together with 
social dialogue mechanisms that apply 
to all countries. In terms of regional so-
cial rights the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 
was established at an earlier stage.
In the industrial relations domain 
proper, the EU promotes social part-
nership and cooperation by setting 
minimum standards for employee 
representation in national and border-
crossing firms, and by  recognising the 
social partners in a consulting and, 
in some domains, co-legislating role, 
even through autonomous agree-
ments. Yet collective bargaining and 
pay determination — core issues of 
industrial relations — remain nation-
ally specific. In addition, it should be 
recognised, as was explained in the 
first part of this chapter, that the EU 
coordination regime allows the use of 
Box 1.8: International social partner organisations
At the global level, a significant trade union merger occurred in November 2006 when the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (IFCTU) and the World Confedera-
tion of Labour (WCL), along with eight other national organisations that formerly had 
no international affiliation, merged to form the International Trade Union Confederation 
(ITUC). It represents 168 million workers and 311 affiliated organisations from 155 coun-
tries. Staying away from the ITUC is the Communist-affiliated World Federation of Trade 
Unions (WFTU). Social partners also play a role in global governance, in particular in 
the tripartite International Labour Organisation, which is, however, not the topic of this 
report. Employers are represented by the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) 
that consists of 146 national organisations from 139 countries.
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different implementation instruments, 
and variable implementation of actual 
standards, according to national pref-
erences and capabilities (as has been 
shown in the implementation studies 
on the six ‘labour’ directives by Falkn-
er et al., 2005; 2008). Comparing the 
other regions, Mercosur is probably 
nearest to the EU in its industrial set 
up and social policy ambitions. How-
ever, other regional organisations, per-
haps least NAFTA, seem to be moving 
in the same direction.
General conclusions
First, the EU is ahead of other world 
regions in combining the market-
building agenda with a social agenda 
which includes emerging European 
industrial relations. In other global 
regions this process has only just be-
gun and the EU is sometimes seen as 
an example or model for the develop-
ment of a regional social dialogue.
Second, the emergence of EU-level 
industrial relations is evidenced by 
a (growing) number of mutually 
 reinforcing institutions, policies and 
processes being established at the EU 
level and focusing on the social di-
mension of the market. They are in-
stitutionally anchored, and some of 
them have foundations in the Treaties. 
These institutions, processes and poli-
cies have a special role to play in sup-
porting and supplementing reforms 
(see Chapter 2) and they have been 
developing with a growing intensity 
in the last two decades, together with 
the process of market building. 
Third, while Member States’ indus-
trial relations regimes continue to 
differ in traditions and practices, 
a limited convergence among EU 
Member States can be observed. This 
is particularly true in areas where 
the EU has been able to advance its 
regulatory power. The EU adds value 
by setting minimum social standards 
at the workplace and beyond, and 
by providing political and technical 
‘backup’ for national efforts to reform 
work and welfare.
Fourth, the 2004 and 2007 enlarge-
ments have increased the diversity of 
EU industrial relations. This has been 
seen as a major threat to the quality of 
social standards, with social dumping 
as one of the potential results (Woolf-
son and Sommers, 2006). However, 
the recent enlargements may also be 
seen as a further stimulus for conver-
gence towards a European social mod-
el. While the immediate result of the 
recent enlargements is an increased 
divergence between the industrial 
relations regimes within the EU, this 
is accompanied by strengthening of 
(or in some cases truly developing) 
the social regulations in the national 
systems of EU-12 countries that after 
1989 tended to exclude them from 
the political agenda and policies, and 
upon enlargement had weak labour 
and employers organisations (Mai-
land and Due, 2004). The conditional-
ity principle introduced in the acces-
sion negotiations (Schimmelfenning, 
2007) has also affected fundamental 
rights and the quality of industrial 
relations regimes in these countries. 
The Europeanisation process thus of-
fers prospects for an expansion of so-
cial rights and convergence of labour 
standards across Member States, not 
for purely economic reasons but for 
the purpose of making continued 
market integration politically feasible 
among states at vastly different stages 
of development (Visser, 2007b).
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Industrial relations and the Lisbon reform agenda are interwoven. The Lisbon Strat-
egy has entered the agenda of the social partners at all levels: European, national, in 
sectors and in companies. The use of instruments — law, collective agreements with 
and without binding effects, guidelines and benchmarking — varies and generally 
there is a tendency to combine hard and soft instruments, and less binding regula-
tion, allowing more flexibility in implementation under diverse conditions. Differ-
ences in industrial relation regimes across Member States are visible in employment 
outcomes, the capacities of industrial relations actors and the contribution of the so-
cial dialogue process. In addition to differences in capacities, however, the willingness 
of unions and employers’ association to ‘buy into’ the dialogue process and the Lisbon 
agenda may be the overriding factor explaining a successful contribution.
Introduction
This chapter (11) evaluates how recent 
developments in industrial relations, 
social dialogue and social partnership, 
have contributed to achieving Lisbon 
Strategy objectives since its launch in 
2000. It presents an overview of how 
trade unions and employers (the so-
cial partners) have responded to the 
Lisbon agenda and contributed to the 
achievement of the Lisbon objectives. 
The chapter describes how the Lisbon 
Strategy defined new objectives for 
modernising employment relations 
and social policy in six policy areas: 
(i) active labour market policies target-
ed at disadvantaged groups; (ii) train-
ing and the entry of young people into 
the labour market; (iii) lifelong learn-
ing and the position of older workers; 
(iv) working hours and working-time 
flexibility; (v) the reconciliation of 
work and family; and (vi) working 
conditions. One key policy domain, 
i.e. bargaining over wages, is not dis-
cussed in this chapter, which deals ex-
clusively with non-wage issues. Issues 
related to wages, economic perform-
ance, inequality and poverty are ad-
dressed in Chapter 3.
In the second section the three key 
roles of the social partners — political 
influence and negotiators of reform; 
collective bargainers producing joint 
11 This chapter is based on a draft by Jelle Visser, 
with research input of AIAS researchers Marieke 
Beentjes, Minna van Gerven and Valentina Di Stasio 
regulation; and co-managers of policy 
programmes — are spelled out. The 
third section relates the variation in 
production, employment and indus-
trial relations regimes across the EU 
to a small number of industrial rela-
tions characteristics. The fourth sec-
tion is devoted to the discussion of 
social pacts, and the fifth section is a 
qualitative review of the various social 
partner initiatives in the six policy ar-
eas. The chapter concludes with some 
observations on the quality of indus-
trial relations in the European Union.
The Lisbon strategy and social 
partnership 
At the Lisbon Summit of March 2000 
three new goals were added to the Eu-
ropean Employment Strategy (EES). 
Firstly, achieving full employment by 
implementing a comprehensive policy 
approach was introduced to incorpo-
rate demand and supply side measures 
and thus to raise employment rates on 
the whole, as well as for women and 
people aged 55 to 64 years, towards 
the Lisbon and Stockholm targets set 
in 2000 and 2001. Secondly, improve-
ment of quality and productivity at 
work was set as an objective. Thirdly, 
Member States should strengthen so-
cial cohesion and inclusion by promot-
ing access to quality employment for 
all women and men who are capable 
of working, combating discrimination 
in the labour market, and preventing 
the exclusion of people from work. 
As a response to these new goals, the 
guidelines were streamlined in 2003, 
and again in 2005.
Between 2005 and 2008, the integrat-
ed guidelines were regrouped under 
three priorities identified in the 2003 
task force report:
(i)  attract and retain more people in 
employment and increase labour 
supply and modernise social pro-
tection systems;
(ii)  improve adaptability of workers 
and enterprises;
(iii)  increase investment in human 
capital through better education 
and skills.
The contribution of unions and em-
ployers (the social partners) is con-
sidered important. According to the 
Council, in a statement of March 
2005, ‘their support will be crucial 
in areas such as active labour mar-
ket policies, lifelong learning or an-
ticipating restructuring in industrial 
sectors’. In its 2004 communication, 
specifically directed at the social dia-
logue at the European level, the so-
cial partners are ‘invited to develop 
a joint Lisbon action programme 
[…] identifying their contribution 
to the Lisbon goals’. Under the head-
ing of ‘Delivering reforms’, the Com-
mission ‘calls on the European and 
Chapter 2:  The quality of industrial relations  
and the Lisbon Strategy
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 national social partners to take part 
in genuine partnership for change by 
stepping up their efforts to address 
the themes identified above and en-
suring that their contributions are 
as concrete and effective as possible’ 
(EC, 2004b).
The High-Level Group on Industrial 
Relations and Change in the Euro-
pean Union proposed a new agenda 
for industrial relations in response to 
the challenges of globalisation, en-
largement, EMU, the transition to a 
knowledge economy, demographic 
change, changing employment and 
family patterns. It suggested that this 
agenda should comprise the tradi-
tional issues of wage responsiveness, 
productivity and competitiveness as 
well as social inclusion, training and 
lifelong learning, working conditions 
and work organisation, new forms of 
employment, working-time flexibility 
and reconciliation of work and family 
life (EC, 2002b). These issues will be 
given a central place in this review. In 
order to strengthen the contribution 
of the social partners in the European 
reform agenda, the high-level group 
advised to create more space for the 
bipartite (‘autonomous’) social dia-
logue at the European level, to explore 
the possibility of ‘soft law’ instru-
ments, including benchmarking, and 
to work towards better integration of 
the activities at various levels (Euro-
pean, national, sectoral and local). 
Steps taken by the social partners at the 
European level include: the identifica-
tion of a number of modernisation is-
sues in their renewed work programme 
for 2006–08; their joint analysis of the 
‘Key challenges facing European labour 
markets’, published in October 2007; the 
three ‘autonomous’ framework agree-
ments on telework (2002), work-related 
stress (2004) and harassment and vio-
lence at work (2007), and the current 
negotiations on a fourth one on inclusive 
labour markets; as well as agreements 
at the sectoral level and cross-industry 
frameworks of action on training and 
gender equality (see Chapter 4). This 
chapter will refer to some of these EU-
level agreements and frameworks of ac-
tion, in particular where they influence 
activities and policies in Member States, 
which is the main focus of this chapter.
The different roles of the social 
partners
With regard to the role of social part-
ners in labour market and social policy 
reform, one can distinguish between 
three broad lines of influence.
Firstly, trade unions and employers 
(organisations) can act, alone or joint-
ly, as special interest groups and con-
dition the course of reform through 
lobbying activities, political influence 
or entering into negotiations with the 
government. This line assumes the ex-
istence and use of some veto power; 
agreements typically require some 
concessions (‘quid pro quo’) over the 
speed and nature of policy reforms. 
One specific form in which this may 
happen is the conclusion of a so-
cial pact, here defined as a tripartite 
agreement between the government 
and the social partners on one or more 
issues of socioeconomic policy.
Secondly, unions and employers (or-
ganisations) can negotiate between 
themselves. Such bipartite agree-
ments, without direct involvement 
of the state and the public authori-
ties, are common in the domain of 
Table 2.1: The different roles of the social partners
Member States EU
1. Veto power
(a) Lobby ing
Pressure of main employers 
organisation VNO-
NCW to change existing 
Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) in the 
Netherlands
ETUC campaign to 
change draft service 
directive
(b) Social pacts For example in Ireland, Slovenia or Finland
2.  Collective 
bargaining
(and as a weaker 
form: joint 
guidelines/
benchmarking)
(a) Autono mous
Danish collective 
agreements, including 
‘social plans’ and EPL 
elements; Dutch collective 
agreements over flexicurity 
and agency work
Framework 
Agreements on 
Telework; Work-
related Stress; 
Violence and 
Harassment
(b) Spon sored
2003 agreement on 
vocational training and 
individual training rights 
in France
Framework 
agreements on 
parental leave, part-
time and fixed-term 
(c) Depen dent
Belgian biennial agreements 
since 1997; national 
agreements to implement 
the EU framework 
agreement on telework 
(Union guidelines 
for coordinated 
bargaining agenda’s 
in the context of 
EMU)
3. Implementation
(a) Co-manage ment Swedish Labour Market Board
(b) Advise
Consultation over setting 
of minimum wages in most 
Member States
Social partner 
advisory role in 
EU social security 
coordination for 
migrants
Source: J. Visser.
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wages, working hours and working 
 conditions, but may expand to in-
clude other issues, including employ-
ment protection, social insurance, 
pension provision, vocational train-
ing, conflict resolution or innovation 
of employment practices and employ-
ment contracts. The interaction be-
tween collective bargaining and state 
policy foresees three possibilities: 
(a) autonomous agreements imple-
mented without interference of third 
parties (public agencies, courts, etc.); 
(b) sponsored agreements the im-
plementation of which depend on the 
support and intervention of the gov-
ernment or legislator; and (c) depend-
ent agreements which depend on, and 
implement, a particular law, reform or 
government policy. These possibilities 
are also available in a weaker form as 
joint guidelines rather than binding 
agreements.
Thirdly, trade unions and employers 
(organisations) can be involved, alone 
or jointly, in the co-management and 
implementation of public policies and 
reforms, for instance by joining la-
bour market boards, training councils 
or insurance funds under public su-
pervision. This involvement may also 
take a purely advisory character, with-
out assuming the responsibility for the 
adopted policy and its execution. 
These different lines of involvement 
can occur both at the European and 
national (or sub-national) levels. Ta-
ble 2.1 offers a summary and some 
examples.
This scheme will be used to analyse the 
involvement of the social partners in 
six policy areas: (i) active labour mar-
ket policies targeted at disadvantaged 
groups; (ii) training and the entry of 
young people in the labour market; 
(iii) lifelong learning and older workers; 
(iv) working hours and time flexibility; 
(v) the reconciliation of work and fam-
ily; and (vi) working conditions.
The six areas differ with regard to the 
role of public policy and the involve-
ment of unions and employers. In ac-
tive labour market policies and social 
security, for instance, in most Member 
States the parameters of labour market 
policies are set by law and the role of 
the social partners is reduced to influ-
encing the policies of the government, 
through lobbying, using political chan-
nels and via regular or ad hoc consulta-
tion. In some Member States the social 
partners use the opportunity to make 
or change the law through sponsored 
agreements and social pacts; in other 
Member States they influence the exe-
cution of the law, through a dependent 
implementation agreement or by as-
suming a role as co-managers of public 
policies or public–private partnerships. 
In a few Member States, there has been 
a genuine tripartite selection of both 
the goals and instruments of policy, 
but that is rather untypical in the area 
of ALMP. In the area of working hours, 
work–family policies, working condi-
tions, training and lifelong learning, the 
influence of the social partners tends to 
be stronger, but in each of these policy 
areas there is some interaction with 
legislation and public policy.
The relevance of EU policies and reg-
ulations differs across these six policy 
areas too. EU directives in the area of 
working hours, working conditions 
and reconciliation of work and fam-
ily are sometimes prepared by EU-
level agreements negotiated between 
the European social partners. In the 
domains of ALMP and training, the 
EU has no competence and EU level 
policies are shaped through the open 
method of coordination process, 
based on guidelines, targets, policy 
review, recommendations, mutual 
learning and benchmarking. In the 
OMC process the social partners, at 
the European and national levels, are 
informed and consulted. They do not 
negotiate or condition the selection 
of EU objectives in these areas. At the 
national level, within firms and sec-
tors, their contribution is often much 
more pronounced, in particular when 
such policies are shaped through 
collective bargaining and when em-
ployers and unions have assumed a 
co-management role in the imple-
mentation of policies, for instance in 
the field of training. 
Variations in concertation, 
collective bargaining and 
social dialogue across the 
Member States
The involvement of the social part-
ners not only differs from one policy 
area to the next but also across EU 
Member States. Industrial relations 
are shaped by different traditions, in-
stitutions and practices affecting the 
interaction between public policy, col-
lective bargaining and social dialogue. 
As was argued in the previous chapter, 
the EU may have created some com-
monality, but by no means did this 
create similarity.
This diversity can be described 
through different typologies. They can 
be helpful insofar as they help direct 
our expectations concerning the rela-
tionship between the contribution to 
the Lisbon agenda on the one hand 
and institutions of industrial relations 
or, more broadly, social and economic 
governance on the other. The analysis 
in the following section will draw on 
three typologies: production regimes, 
employment regimes and industrial 
relations regimes.
There are different ways to approach 
this diversity. The ‘Varieties of capital-
ism’ literature distinguishes between 
production regimes on the basis 
of the interaction between financial 
markets, company investment strate-
gies, production of skills, social pro-
tection and wage policies. Employers 
and coordination of employer behav-
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iour play a key role. The main distinc-
tion is between coordinated market 
economies, like Germany or Sweden, 
and liberal or uncoordinated mar-
ket economies like the United King-
dom (Hall and Soskice, 2001). There 
is some dispute as to how to classify 
France or the Mediterranean coun-
tries. Given the prominent role of 
the state, especially in prompting or 
standing in for employer coordina-
tion, Schmidt (2002) has proposed 
to classify the production regimes in 
these countries as ‘state-centred’. The 
new Member States from central and 
eastern Europe also cannot be clas-
sified unambiguously, though most 
seem to oscillate between liberal and 
state-centred, perhaps with the excep-
tion of Slovenia, which is closer to a 
coordinated economy. In the transi-
tion economies, generally, the state 
has continued to be a central and 
dominant actor in the governance of 
the economy; first, by virtue of its po-
sition in creating the legal basis for the 
transition into a market economy and, 
subsequently, by the need to transpose 
the acquis communautaire (Kohl and 
Platzer, 2007:615). The outcome is in 
most cases close to the liberal market 
regime, also because of the weakness 
of societal actors, such as employers’ 
organisations and trade unions.
Gallie (2007) has proposed a classi-
fication of employment regimes, in 
which unions and employment strat-
egies are the key variables. There is a 
strong connection with Esping-An-
dersen’s classification of welfare state 
regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
The main distinction runs between 
inclusive, dualist and market employ-
ment regimes. Inclusive employment 
regimes ‘are those where policies are 
designed to extend both employment 
and common employment rights as 
widely as possible through the popula-
tion of working age’ (Gallie, 2007:17). 
In inclusive regimes, ‘organised labour 
has a strongly institutionalised par-
ticipation in decision-making, both 
in its own right and through its influ-
ence over the party in government’ 
(idem, 18). High employment levels, 
common employment rights and a 
strong safety net help to minimise dif-
ferentials between different employ-
ment statuses and contain or prevent 
polarising tendencies in the labour 
market. Dualist regimes, in contrast, 
‘will be characterised by a consultative 
involvement of labour in the decision-
making system, reflecting its weaker 
organisational strength’ (idem, 19). 
Labour’s influence on policies — Gal-
lie infers — will be contingent on the 
political orientation of the government 
and the strength of unions will mostly 
depend on ‘a more easily mobilisable 
core workforce of employees in large 
firms’ (ibid.). This tends to be reflected 
in larger differences between insiders 
and outsiders as ‘dualist regimes are 
less concerned with the overall em-
ployment levels but guarantee strong 
rights to a core workforce of skilled 
long-term employees, at the expense 
of poor working conditions and low 
security at the periphery’ (idem, p 
18). The third employment regime is 
called a market-based regime: ‘the as-
sumption is that employment levels 
and job rewards are self-regulated by 
a well-functioning market and that 
institutional controls by organised 
labour are negative rigidities’. As a 
consequence, labour is excluded from 
a significant role in decision-making. 
The distinction between insiders and 
outsiders based on employment rights 
should be less pronounced, since mar-
ket employment regimes emphasise 
minimal employment regulation, but 
polarising tendencies based on skill, 
rewards and job quality might be large 
without the countervailing power of 
unions, collective bargaining or social 
protection.
For the purpose of this chapter, classi-
fication by production regimes can be 
helpful for understanding the differ-
ent approaches to education, company 
training and lifelong learning. Coordi-
nated regimes, based on cooperation 
among employers, are expected to in-
vest more in vocational education and 
training, and to produce higher rates 
of participation in company-based vo-
cational training. The classification by 
employment regimes is important for 
understanding the social partner con-
tribution to ALMP, the integration of 
young people and those furthest from 
the labour market, and the reconcilia-
tion of work and family interests. The 
expectation is that the differences 
between skilled and unskilled, older 
and younger, male and female groups 
are smallest in inclusive regimes, and 
that the social partners in these re-
gimes are most active, through col-
lective bargaining and otherwise, to 
further an agenda of integration and 
equal opportunity. Working condi-
tions should be less polarised. Finally, 
for understanding the methods used 
by the social partners, and also their 
role in dealing with the issue of mod-
ernisation of employment relations, 
including working-time flexibility and 
working conditions, a third classifica-
tion is needed.
This third classification is based on 
industrial relations arrangements 
proper, such as union and employer 
organisations, the power relations be-
tween them, levels and styles of bar-
gaining, the space for social partner 
intervention in public policy and for 
state intervention in union–employer 
relations. On that basis it is possible 
to distinguish four arrangements or 
regimes (see Table 2.3): Nordic cor-
poratism; social partnership, mostly 
developed in continental (western) 
Europe; liberal pluralism originating 
in the British Isles; and a polarised or 
state-centred regime found in south-
ern Europe (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 
1997; also Crouch, 1993, 1996). In ‘De-
mocracy in Europe’, Schmidt (2006) 
produces a rather similar  distinction 
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based on the position of the state and 
the role of societal and economic in-
terests in policymaking.
Of the four countries she discusses, 
France is classified as state centred: 
policies are designed without the sys-
tematic input from societal actors, 
but actors are subsequently accom-
modated in a rather flexible imple-
mentation process, often based on 
derogation from the law. If this flex-
ibility is not offered, actors will seek 
confrontation. In the United King-
dom, too, the state is rather powerful 
and may formulate policies without 
significant societal input. But because 
the state acts in a much more restrict-
ed sphere, far more is left to society 
or to the market. Rather than dero-
gation from the law, there is simply 
less law in the socioeconomic domain 
and more self-organisation. In Ger-
many, like in other corporatist econo-
mies, the state tends to formulate and 
implement policies in tandem with 
certain ‘privileged’ societal actors, 
mainly business and labour. Rather 
than acting through open policy net-
works, and exerting their influence 
through lobbying, as is the case in 
the liberal-pluralist model, these in-
terests are organised in peak associa-
tions. Compared to other ‘corporatist’ 
countries, but with unitary states like 
Sweden or the Netherlands, the state 
in federal Germany is weaker and less 
effective in its bargaining with soci-
etal interests (see also Streeck, 2003). 
This weakness is partly compensated 
through a stronger legalism, especial-
ly in labour relations. 
The final case is Italy, which is halfway 
between the state-centred and corpo-
ratist model. In Italy, state and society 
do try to act together, but they tend to 
be weak on both sides and the state 
operates in a clientelistic rather than 
a corporatist manner. The corporatist 
approach in industrial relations was 
strengthened in the 1990s, for instance 
with the 1993 pact on collective bar-
gaining, which in itself could be seen 
as a preparation for EMU membership 
(Ferrera and Gualmini, 2004). But the 
corporatism in Italy is still weaker 
even than in Germany, ‘since the co-
operative orientation of societal actors 
is of recent vintage, not backed up by 
public law, and much more dependent 
on action by a state that remains quite 
weak, despite changes for the better in 
the 1990s’ (Schmidt, 2006:147).
Table 2.2: Industrial relations regimes or arrangements 
North Centre-west South West Centre-east
Production regime Coordinated market economy Statist market economy Liberal market economy Statist or liberal?
Welfare regime Universalistic Segmented (status-oriented, corporatist) Residual Segmented or residual?
Employment regime Inclusive Dualistic Liberal
Industrial relations 
regime Organised corporatism Social partnership Polarised/state-centred Liberal pluralism
Fragmented/state-
centred
Power balance Labour-oriented Balanced Alternating Employer-oriented
Principal level of 
bargaining Sector Variable/unstable Company
Bargaining style Integrating Conflict oriented Acquiescent
Role of SP in public 
policy Institutionalised Irregular/politicised Rare/event-driven Irregular/politicised
Role of the state 
in IR Limited (mediator)
 ‘Shadow of 
hierarchy” Frequent intervention Non-intervention Organiser of transition
Employee 
representation
Union based/high 
coverage
dual system/high 
coverage Variable (*)
Union based/small 
coverage
Union based/small 
coverage
Countries
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Belgium
Germany
(Ireland)
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Austria
Slovenia
(Finland)
Greece
Spain
France
Italy
(Hungary)
Portugal
Ireland
Malta
Cyprus
UK
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
Source: J. Visser, extended on the basis of Ebbinghaus and Visser (1997); Crouch 1993; 1996; Esping-Andersen (1990); Schmidt (2002; 2006); and 
Platzer and Kohl (2007).
(*) In France employee representation in firms incorporates both principles, in Spain and Portugal it is dualist, in Italy and Greece it is merged with 
the unions but based on statutory rights.
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Whether the transition economies of 
central and east European countries 
(CEECs) form a separate regime or 
must be classified according to one 
of these arrangements is a matter of 
debate. They tend to mix several ele-
ments. In a recent contribution, Kohl 
and Platzer (2007:617) argue that 
‘based on the typology proposed by 
Ebbinghaus and Visser (1997), no na-
tional CEE system of industrial rela-
tions can be unambiguously assigned 
to one of the western European models 
[…]. Only Slovenia exhibits reasonably 
close parallels with one of the Western 
European models — the continental 
social partnership model, with a strong 
Austro-German flavour.’ Absence of 
sectoral collective bargaining and low 
bargaining coverage rates tend to ori-
ent the CEE economies towards the 
liberal or uncoordinated model. But 
the state and collective labour law play 
a much stronger role and this makes 
them more like the state-centred mod-
els of southern Europe. However, in 
contrast to the latter, the interaction 
between unions and management, and 
between unions and the state, tends to 
be less confrontational and more de-
termined by the weakness of the union 
actor. With the exception of Slovenia 
and perhaps Slovakia, the transition 
economies do share the absence of 
sector level and unstable structures of 
workplace representation.
Obviously, as with any classification, 
the real world is messier than these ty-
pologies and the application to single 
countries is an approximation at best. 
Ireland, for instance, after the experi-
ence of two decades of social pacts, has 
developed features of social partner-
ship or ‘roundtable corporatism’ (12). 
There are distinctions between Fin-
land and the Scandinavian countries 
in matters of labour law, the role of the 
state and wage bargaining, or between 
Germany and its western neighbours 
12 The expression is of Walter Münchau, Financial 
Times, 23 June 2008.
in the autonomy of wage bargaining 
from state interference and the insti-
tutionalisation of the social dialogue. 
Italy (and Spain) do not share all the 
features of French industrial relations, 
especially as Italian trade unions have 
a much stronger social support and 
the state is less present in collective 
bargaining. Further distinctions can 
even be made between sectors and 
regions within states, for instance in 
Italy or Belgium.
These typologies can be helpful, how-
ever, insofar as they help direct our 
expectations concerning the relation-
ship between employment policies or 
the contribution to the Lisbon agenda 
on the one hand and institutions of in-
dustrial relations or, more broadly, so-
cial and economic governance on the 
other. Moreover, rather than a contin-
uum along one dimension, industrial 
relations regimes differ qualitatively 
along different dimensions. The qual-
ity of industrial relations, therefore, is 
not measurable along one dimension 
or in one simple statistic, like high 
or low union membership, bargain-
ing coverage, the rule of law, sectoral 
organisation or policy concertation. 
There are, as it were, different quali-
ties, each with different effects on the 
regulation of the economy and the 
 labour market
For example, in Nordic (‘corporat-
ist’) and continental (‘social partner-
ship’) industrial relations systems one 
expects to find a greater use of au-
tonomous agreements and collective 
bargaining; in statist and transitional 
systems, more sponsored agreements 
and legal standards rather than those 
produced through collective bargain-
ing; in liberal-pluralist systems there 
will be less standard setting by either 
the law or collective bargaining, since 
agreements will be less binding (or 
benchmarking and guidelines will be 
used instead) and cover fewer compa-
nies and employees.
A test of these predictions, and of the 
value of the classification by industrial 
relations regimes, can be obtained by 
studying the implementation of the first 
‘autonomous’ framework agreement 
on telework, concluded between the 
European social partners in July 2002 
(Visser and Ramos Martin, 2008; EC, 
2008a). With this agreement, the social 
partners made first use of their right, 
to follow the implementation route of 
Article 139(2) of the EC Treaty and im-
plement the agreement ‘in accordance 
with the procedures and practices spe-
cific to management and labour and 
the Member States’. It turned out that 
a great variety of procedures and prac-
tices were in fact used.
The variation in the use of these instru-
ments (guidelines, collective agree-
ments, legislation etc.) across Member 
States, as shown in Chapter 5, is inter-
esting and offers few surprises. With 
regard to the role of the state, there is 
a cluster of Member States, including, 
as one would expect, those in Scan-
dinavia, the British Isles, the Nether-
lands, Germany and Austria, but also 
Italy and Spain, where guidelines and 
agreements have been the main instru-
ment for implementing the European 
Framework Agreement on Telework, 
and where there was often much activ-
ity prior to the 2002 agreement. There 
is a second cluster where the legisla-
tion, usually based on or preceded by a 
national agreement or by consultations 
with the social partners, has seemed 
the preferred instrument. If we include 
the extension technique, which makes 
(‘sponsored’) national agreements 
binding, then this cluster includes 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Greece, 
France, Luxembourg, Hungary, Po-
land, Portugal and Slovakia. There is 
however some overlap between the two 
clusters, as the legal and collective bar-
gaining instruments do not exclude one 
another. This overlap is clearly present 
in Belgium, Greece and France, and in 
the public sectors of Spain and Italy.
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A more profound test of the classifi-
cation is obtained by verifying how it 
matches the variation according to the 
four pillars — union organisation, un-
ion–employer relations and collective 
bargaining, employee workplace rep-
resentation, and national-level con-
certation — proposed in Chapter 1 of 
this report. Table 2.3 presents the av-
erages for each regime calculated for 
the years 2000–06. 
These data confirm by and large the 
qualitative portrait based on industrial 
relations systems in Europe, presented 
in Table 2.2. As expected, union den-
sity is significantly higher in the north 
and union authority and centralisation 
is highest under conditions of northern 
corporatism and social partnership. 
Union fragmentation — the opposite 
of concentration or ‘unity’ — mostly 
affects the unions in southern and east-
ern Europe. Bargaining coverage does 
not differ much between the industrial 
relations systems based on organised or 
labour-led corporatism, social partner-
ship or state-centred systems, though 
the mechanisms through which this is 
achieved differ. In the north the unioni-
sation rate of workers is higher than the 
organisation rate of employers (13) and 
high levels of coverage are the product 
of high rates of unionisation. In conti-
nental western and southern Europe, 
coverage rates are two to three times 
higher than the union density rate and 
much more driven by high rates of em-
ployer organisation and the legal exten-
sion of collective agreements to non-
organised firms by the state.  Coverage 
13 The organisation rate of employers is calculated 
by taking the size of the firms that affiliate with 
employers’ into account. This makes this statistic 
comparable with the way in which the union density 
rate is calculated (see Industrial relations in Europe 
2004 report). 
rates are much lower in the UK and 
in the CEECs (with the exception of 
Slovenia, here grouped together with 
the other social partnership countries). 
This is the result of much lower lev-
els of employer organisations and the 
absence of sectoral agreements. Thus, 
even where the law does provide for 
the possibility to extend agreements to 
non-organised firms, usually on condi-
tion that the original agreement has 
the support of at least half the firms, 
weighted by size, the absence of secto-
ral agreements or the small minority of 
firms covered by any multi-employer 
agreement makes such provisions inef-
fective. The sectoral organisation of col-
lective bargaining and the correspond-
ing sectoral organisation of the social 
partners is clearly most developed in 
northern and continental western Eu-
rope, and mostly absent in the UK and 
Ireland (as well as Cyprus and Malta) 
Table 2.3: Models or clusters of industrial relations
North Centre South West Transit
Years Organised Corporatism Social partnership State-centred Liberal Mixed
1 Union density 2000–06 74.7 35.4 20.2 33.9 (*) 22.8
Union authority 2000–06 0.500 0.474 0.357 0.243 0.251
Union concentration 2000–06 0.375 0.344 0.217 0.413 0.276
Centralisation 2000–06 0.476 0.538 0.378 0.370 0.318
2 Bargaining coverage 2000–06 86.8 82.8 75.4 35.3 (**) 34.5
Employer density 2001–02 58.0 72.7 65.8 47.5 (*) 28.4
Sectoral organisation 2000–07 2.0 1.8 1.2 0.5 0.7
3 Employee representation 1999–01 2.00 2.00 1.60 0 0.48
2005–07 2.00 2.00 1.60 0.83 0.93
4 Concertation 2000–07 1.33 1.44 1.00 0.50 0.81
Averages of:
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Belgium
Germany
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Austria
Slovenia
Greece
Spain
France
Italy
Portugal
Ireland
Cyprus
Malta
United 
Kingdom
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
Source: Averages calculated from ICTWSS database.
(*) Without Cyprus and Malta.
(**) UK only (coverage rate in Ireland is unknown).
For measurement and data issues, see Chapter 1. Union authority and concentration are the main determinants of centralisation (see box 1.2).
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and ill-developed in the other transi-
tion economies (with the exception of 
Slovenia and, partly, Slovakia).
Employee representation in the firm 
reaches its highest levels under condi-
tions of corporatism and social part-
nership, though on this dimension 
the differences with southern Europe 
are small, thanks to highly institu-
tionalised forms of employee repre-
sentation in Spain, France and Italy 
in particular. The main differences 
were with the ‘voluntarist’ regime in 
the UK and Ireland and many of the 
new Member States, with limited em-
ployee representation, especially in 
non-union firms (with Slovenia and 
Hungary as the main exceptions). As 
a result of Directive 2000/14/EC es-
tablishing a framework for informing 
and consulting employees, adopted in 
March 2002, there was considerable 
change between 2000 and 2006, and 
the differences across Member States 
have narrowed, but the transposition 
has not yet been fully completed in all 
Member States and effective coverage 
is often unclear (Eurofound, 2008; EC, 
2008b). Finally, the scores for national 
concertation or the institutionalised 
involvement of the social partners 
in social and economic policymak-
ing also show the expected variation 
across these five industrial relations 
clusters. In this case the score of ‘2’ is 
reached when there is an institution-
alised practice of such consultation 
extending over many years and over 
issues of social and economic policy-
making, including macroeconomic 
policy, social security and social pro-
tection, and work–family policies.
Social pacts
One particular form through which so-
cial partners have become involved in 
the reform agenda of the EU is the con-
clusion of a social pact or agreement 
with the government. Such tripartite 
pacts were concluded in a number of 
EU-15 countries in the 1990s, in many 
cases related to the preparation of en-
try into the Economic and Monetary 
Union in 1999. Examples of such pacts, 
including wage and non-wage issues, 
were found in for instance Ireland, 
Spain, Italy Portugal and Finland. In 
recent years there have been attempts 
at social pacts in the EU-12, with some 
success, for instance in Bulgaria, Slov-
enia and Romania. Chart 2.1 presents 
an overview, by Member State, of the 
different instruments — pacts, spon-
sored (and dependent) agreements, 
and autonomous agreements.
Once again, we observe considerable 
variation across EU Member States, 
with most activities apparent in Por-
tugal and Spain. These differences are 
in part a consequence of the different 
types of pacts or agreement. In Portu-
gal and Spain the idea of broad pacts 
valid for a number of years and cov-
ering many (wage and non-wage) is-
sues seems to have been abandoned. 
Instead, social pacts and agreements 
tend to focus on one single issue 
(training, wage coordination or mini-
mum wage) and need re-affirmation 
each year. Ireland presents a contrast-
ing case; here a practice of plurian-
nual social pacts has developed since 
1987, covering a broadening range of 
policies and reforms — in 2006 the 
seventh such pact was signed. In Fin-
land, too, the tripartite incomes policy 
agreements that have been signed 
since 1995 cover two years or more 
and various policies, including taxa-
tion, social insurance and training. In 
the Netherlands and in Slovenia, too, 
social pacts tend to cover many issues 
and more than one year.
In many countries there were attempts 
to conclude single issue pacts, such as 
wages or conflict resolution for instance 
in Sweden, or on unemployment insur-
ance and active labour market policies 
in Denmark or, indeed, broad pacts 
covering many wage and non-wage is-
sues, for instance in Belgium (1997 and 
2005), Germany (1998–2002), Greece 
(2000) France (1997) or Poland (2003). 
Including such (unsuccessful) attempts 
and agreements sponsored by the state 
or those that implement legislation, 
social pacts are a rather widespread 
phenomenon that excludes only a few 
countries (the Czech Republic, Malta 
and the United Kingdom, where the 
unions have proposed a social pact). 
Social pact activities tend to run 
across all types of industrial relations, 
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Chart 2.1: Social pact activities 2000 - 07
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Source: ICTWSS database.
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 employment and production regimes. 
This is consistent with the interpreta-
tion that social pacts, and sponsored 
or dependent agreements, are not just 
an expression of social partnership 
but also attempt to renegotiate once 
established social policies and pat-
terns of decision-making in the social 
and economic domain, or in industrial 
 relations proper. Thus, we find attempts 
at social pacts, and renegotiation of es-
tablished patterns, even in the Nordic 
corporatist regime, which are usually 
 characterised by highly institutional-
ised patterns of consultation and little 
intervention of the state in industrial 
relations like Sweden and Denmark.
The cross-national variation in social 
pacts and agreements is not related to 
union density or bargaining coverage. 
Perhaps the relationship is curvilinear 
and unions in the middle range — not 
too strong and not too weak either — 
are most attractive as partners for the 
government. If they are very strong, 
they may demand too many conces-
sions or feel that they can realise their 
objectives through normal collective 
bargaining in sectors and firms. If they 
are very weak they may be unattrac-
tive for opposite reasons, for instance 
because they cannot deliver consen-
sus on behalf of employees. Of greater 
relevance for the conclusion of social 
pacts is the extent to which they can 
take decisions that bind their affiliates 
and members, and their capacity to 
coordinate activities with employers.
The authority of union confederations 
does increase the likelihood of a so-
cial pact and of concertation generally 
(r = 0.521) (14). Confederal authority is 
14 Confederal authority is measured as the sum-
score of five elements: whether the confederation has 
a mandate to represent its affiliates in joint bodies and 
councils with the employers and/or the government or 
independent experts,; whether they have the apparatus to, 
and do regularly participate in central negotiations with 
employers or governments; whether they have central 
strike or resistance funds; whether they can influence the 
appointment of union officials of affiliates; and whether 
they can veto agreements signed by affiliates.
associated not only with concertation 
and social pacts, but also with higher 
bargaining coverage (r = 0.559) and 
higher levels of coordination between 
the social partners (r = 0.612). No 
claims of causality are made however; 
it may be that the participation in na-
tional consultation proceedings causes 
confederations to demand and receive 
more power and resources from their af-
filiates. It seems plausible, however, that, 
once established, confederal authority 
is itself a source of policy coordination 
and contributes to achieving higher 
levels of coverage through national or 
sectoral agreements. This is confirmed 
in a forthcoming analysis, based on a 
pooled regression over 21 countries 
and 35 years, using the ICTWSS data-
base, by Tirelli et al. (2008). They show 
that the probability of social pacts and 
agreements increases with the ‘problem 
load’ of the national economy (instabil-
ity, high unemployment and inflation), 
political instability and the need for gov-
ernments to seek re-election.
Social pacts may relate to wage mod-
eration, the targeting of the expected 
inflation rate, the articulation of sec-
toral and company bargaining, or con-
flict resolution procedures, issues that 
are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
The non-wage issues included in these 
social pacts, or subject to specific ‘sin-
gle issue’ social pacts and agreements, 
are listed in Table 2.4. It turns out that 
social security issues (the level and du-
ration of unemployment, sickness and 
disability benefits, eligibility rules) are 
most frequently negotiated, followed 
by active labour market policies and 
job subsidy schemes. This is to be ex-
pected, as these are issues that require 
negotiations with the state and can al-
most never be dealt with by the social 
partners themselves. Training, early re-
tirement and, especially, working hours 
and time flexibility are much closer to 
the issues that are the subject matter 
of collective bargaining and autono-
mous agreements. Taxes and budgets, 
of course, are not, neither are subsidies 
and mandatory social security contri-
butions and benefits (15). Employment 
protection legislation issues have a 
relatively low profile in social pacts 
(Boeri, 2005; Elmeskov and Duval, 
2006) which is usually explained by the 
resistance of trade unions to renegoti-
ate the rights of their core membership. 
One of the major positive examples of 
15 Although some recent agreements and pacts do 
mention issues related to work–family reconciliation 
(for instance, leave rights for parents and childcare 
facilities), these issues could not be sufficiently 
separated and are here covered under time flexibility 
(leave and flexible working hours) and taxation 
(subsidies and provision of childcare).
Table 2.4: Social pacts and agreements by issue area
Social 
security
ALMP 
subsidies 
jobs
Taxes / 
budget
Training 
(youth 
+ older 
workers)
Pensions, 
early 
retirement
Employment 
protection 
legislation
Time 
flexibility 
working 
hours
2000 4 3 3 3 3 3 3
2001 3 3 1 6 3 2 2
2002 5 3 2 3 1 3 0
2003 5 3 3 3 2 3 0
2004 6 5 4 2 2 0 2
2005 2 3 2 1 2 0 0
2006 5 3 4 2 3 2 0
2007 4 4 2 1 3 1 0
Total 34 27 21 21 19 14 7
Source: ICTWSS database.
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One of the main challenges the European Union is currently facing 
is how, in the era of globalisation and ageing, to live up to European 
citizens’ expectation of providing a distinct European social model. 
Can a strong social Europe also be a strong economic Europe? Can 
Europe indeed have its own way compared to the rest of the world? 
This is what the flexicurity debate is about.
Flexicurity strategies aim to combine employment and income securi-
ty with flexibility in labour markets, work organisation and labour re-
lations. This approach should transcend the simple trade-off between 
flexibility and security, where the former is seen to be in the exclusive 
interest of the employer and the latter in the interest of the employee. 
In a flexicurity strategy, flexibility and security should not be seen as 
opposites, but as mutually supportive labour market components.
In today’s labour markets, traditional kinds of job security are not 
always sustainable and do not always constitute the right solution; 
people change jobs more often, sometimes because they want to and 
sometimes because they have to. In this context, new kinds of secu-
rity are needed, so that workers can change from one job to another 
job in a safe and successful way and acquire new skills. Active labour 
market policies, motivating lifelong learning and training, improving 
customised support to jobseekers, supporting equal opportunities for 
all and equity between women and men contribute to such transition 
security. Similarly, flexible contractual arrangements should ensure 
that companies can adapt to changing market circumstances. Inter-
nal (within the enterprise) as well as external flexicurity are equally 
important. Therefore, high-quality and productive workplaces, good 
work organisation, and continuous upgrading of skills are essential.
Considering the wide differences in practices and challenges between 
Member States, a one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate. Second, 
it has to respect Member States’ autonomy regarding labour market 
and social policies. The solution has been to propose a set of flexicurity 
pathways, based on the work of the European Expert Group on Flexicu-
rity. The word ‘pathways’ suggests that Member States can take different 
roads forward, based on different challenges, priorities and possibilities.
Flexicurity pathways can be designed and implemented across four 
policy components:
(i) flexible and reliable contractual arrangements;
(ii)  effective active labour market policies to strengthen transition security;
(iii) comprehensive lifelong learning (LLL) strategies;
(iv) modern social security provisions that provide adequate income 
support, encourage employment and facilitate labour market mobility.
Moreover, a supportive and productive social dialogue and trust-based in-
dustrial relations system are a general precondition for flexicurity to work.
The main elements of the typical flexicurity pathways, which could inspire 
Member States in setting their own flexicurity agenda, are the following.
Pathway 1: Tackling contractual segmentation
This pathway addresses the issue of flexibility at the margin of the 
labour market. It suggests reducing asymmetries between stand-
ard and non-standard work by promoting upward transitions in 
the labour market and by integrating non-standard contracts fully 
into labour law, collective agreements, social security and lifelong 
learning systems. Non-standard contracts are then treated as equal 
to standard contracts, following the principle of pro rata temporis. 
Alternatively, standard contracts could be made more attractive for 
companies by introducing an open-ended contract in which specific 
elements of protection are built up progressively with time, until 
‘full’ protection is achieved. Such a contract guarantees basic but 
adequate protection from the start and automatically builds up ‘full’ 
protection as the working relationship continues. Social partners 
and governments should negotiate the terms of these arrangements 
and make the benefits of changes visible to their constituents.
Pathway 2: Developing flexicurity within the enterprise and of-
fering transition security
The second pathway emphasises safe and successful job-to-job tran-
sitions. Built-in contractual guarantees and human resource man-
agement policies should ensure timely progress into new jobs either 
within the company or outside the company once the necessity arises. 
Furthermore, it may be feasible to introduce individualised transition 
guarantees to redundant workers, to be borne jointly by employers, 
social partners and public employment services in order to prevent 
unemployment. A strong system of lifelong learning and vocational 
training may form the basis for productive labour market transitions 
both inside and outside companies. Such a system should allow for 
quick access to effective training funds and facilities at branch level. 
Within this pathway, strengthening internal flexicurity is also relevant, 
especially to enhance the employability and skills of workers.
Pathway 3: Tackling skills and opportunity gaps among the workforce
This pathway recommends strengthening, on the basis of existing levels 
of labour market dynamism, investment in skills and R & D. The em-
ployment and security opportunities and options of specific groups in 
the labour market can thereby be enhanced and productivity growth 
boosted. A broad-ranging approach is needed to keep the labour market 
accessible to the low-skilled and other groups at risk, such as minorities, 
older workers, women and the early school leavers, of becoming long-
term unemployed or excluded in other ways. Employability and skills 
enhancement is an important task for public employment services, but 
flexicurity will also benefit from the possibility to conclude binding col-
lective agreements at branch or regional level that combine provisions 
on how to address the flexibility needs of both employers and work-
ers by investment in innovation and training. Where the institutional 
structures for such agreements are not yet in place, support from the 
social partners and government is needed.
Pathway 4: Improving opportunities for benefit recipients and 
informally employed workers
This pathway starts from the urgent need to increase the employment 
opportunities of persons who are currently on social security benefits or 
working in the informal sector. ALMP and social security should offer 
sufficient opportunities and incentives, in terms of increased condition-
ality of benefits, for return to work and to facilitate this transition. Long-
term welfare dependence could thus be prevented. Informal work can 
be regularised by offering flexi-secure contracts, lower payroll taxes and 
a skills perspective for these sectors. By formalising informal economic 
activities, increased financial resources can be raised for building up a 
more comprehensive social security system. Stronger institutional ca-
pacity can be developed by stimulating the social partners to negotiate 
key elements of working conditions and by better cooperation between 
labour market and benefit institutions. Social dialogue can be further 
developed at sector and regional levels.
This text box is based on a contribution by Ton Wilthagen, professor at 
Tilburg University, the Netherlands and rapporteur of the European Ex-
pert Group on Flexicurity. For an extensive presentation of the flexicurity 
pathways see European Commission communication ‘Towards common 
principles of flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility and secu-
rity’, COM(2007) 359 final of 27 June 2007, Brussels. For information on 
the contribution of European social partners, see Chapter 4.
Box 2.1: Europe’s pathways to flexicurity and the role of social partners
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a reform initiated and supported by 
the social partners is the reform of the 
statutory severance pay system in Aus-
tria in 2001. The reform extended the 
system beyond the small majority of 
employees which had been entitled to 
severance pay, reduced the length-of-
service increment, and removed obsta-
cles to mobility by making payments 
portable in individualised accounts. 
The industrial relations 
contribution to the Lisbon 
Strategy
The Joint Employment Report 2007/08 
(Council 2008) finds that Member 
States have increased their efforts to 
integrate people at the margins of the 
labour market and to create an active 
approach towards higher employment 
levels and social inclusion. To this 
end, Member States have used differ-
ent means, like active ageing strategies 
through restricting eligibility condi-
tions and increasing incentives to 
work longer for employees, enhancing 
work opportunities for older and par-
ticularly disabled workers, improving 
working conditions and providing op-
portunities for skills upgrading and re-
training, and providing conditions for 
working-time flexibility and reconcili-
ation of work and family life. In each 
of these areas the social partners’ and 
collective bargaining agendas are im-
portant. This section reviews the state 
of play in six related policy domains: 
active labour market policies and so-
cial security reforms; training and in-
tegration of youth; improving the em-
ployment prospects of older workers 
and lifelong learning; working-time 
flexibility; reconciliation of work and 
family life; and working conditions. 
An additional text box looks at flexi-
curity, the pathways towards flexicu-
rity, and the role social dialogue could 
play (Box 2.1).
Table 2.5 offers a baseline for the dis-
cussion in this section. For each of the 
five industrial relations regimes, the 
mean employment and unemployment 
rates by age group and the mean male–
female gaps have been calculated. The 
data largely confirm Gallie’s analysis 
of these regimes in terms of employ-
ment inclusion or exclusion. Thus, the 
highest employment levels and lowest 
male–female gaps are found in the in-
clusive employment regimes of Nordic 
corporatism. The liberal pluralist (or 
market-based) regime comes second 
best. Of the two dualist employment 
regimes, the polarised pluralist re-
gimes of southern Europe have worse 
outcomes — in particular the low em-
ployment rate and high unemployment 
rate for young people, and the large 
disadvantage for women, is striking. 
The dualist employment regimes of 
continental western Europe, operating 
under conditions of social partnership, 
perform poorly when it comes to older 
workers, partly because of the exten-
sive provisions for early retirement that 
seem hard to reverse. There are also 
low employment rates of young people, 
and high youth unemployment rates in 
the transition economies.
Unsurprisingly, for the inactive popu-
lation, the decision not to seek em-
ployment varies with age (Table 2.6). 
For those between 15 and 24 years, the 
main reason is (full-time) participation 
in education and training, whereas later 
in life this motive becomes negligible. 
For the group between 25 and 49 years 
of age the responsibility for children or 
other caring duties is the most impor-
tant self-declared reason, in particular 
(but not only) among women. For old-
er workers, between 50 and 59 years, 
such responsibilities still play a role, 
though to a lesser extent. One third of 
those in this age group have retired but 
there are many others who do not be-
lieve that there is a job for them. From 
this simple analysis, it is apparent that 
large gains, in terms of employment 
inclusion, can come from policies that 
reconcile work with care responsibili-
ties, for instance through: provision of 
childcare, improved leave arrangement 
or flexible working arrangements; poli-
Table 2.5: Employment inclusion by regime type in 2006
Indicators for 2006 Nordic corporatism
Social 
partnership
Liberal 
pluralism
Polarised 
pluralism
Transition 
economies
Employment rates
Total 73.3 67.3 70.1 63.0 61.3
F/M gap – 5.5 (*) – 13.9 – 14.9 – 19.4 – 10.7
Youth (total) 49.0 42.9 51.6 30.9 26.4
F/M gap – 0.6  – 4.7 – 4.7 – 9.6 – 7.9
Older workers (total) 61.6 39.4 55.3 41.3 42.5
F/M gap – 6.2 – 16.9 – 22.4 – 21.2 – 16.2
Unemployment rates
Total 6.2 6.4 4.9 8.2 8.5
F/M gap 0.7 (*) 1.3 0.7 4.2 0.5
Youth (total) 16.0 13.2 11.4 20.7 18.7
F/M gap 0 0.3 – 2.4 7.4 1.6
Older workers (total) 5.0 6.1 2.7 4.9 6.1
F/M gap – 0.2 1.3 – 0.7 0.4 – 0.5
Source: Calculated from the European labour force survey, 2006, Eurostat.
(*) F/M gap, meaning that the female employment rate is 5.5 percentage points below the male 
employment rate, and the female unemployment rate 0.7 percentage points higher, etc.
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cies that make work more and retire-
ment less attractive for older workers; 
lifelong learning and training policies 
that make older workers more compet-
itive in the job market; policies that re-
verse age (as well as sex) discrimination 
and increase the transparency of the la-
bour market; and policies that improve 
working (and health) conditions for all, 
but in particular older workers. These 
are issues for collective bargaining and 
public policy, and often the combina-
tion of the two — providing general 
incentives and ensuring delivery in the 
company or workplace — is crucial.
Active labour market policies and so-
cial security reforms
In the past five years, EU Member 
States have increased spending on ac-
tive labour market policies (ALMP), 
with a tendency to increase the con-
ditionality of unemployment insur-
ance, tighten the eligibility conditions 
for unemployment benefits, raise the 
effectiveness of job-search assistance, 
emphasise the individual responsi-
bility of jobseekers and monitor job 
searching activities. Additionally, in 
many Member States financial incen-
tives are being created to increase the 
readiness of people with a disability 
to take up work, while subsidies are 
given to employers to hire disabled 
people and to adapt their workplace 
to their needs. There is, however, still 
a way to go; the Joint Employment Re-
port notes that the current average exit 
age from the labour market (at the age 
of 60.9 years on average) is still much 
below the 2010 target of 65 years of 
age. This is one of the hardest areas of 
reform and it is clearly related to many 
other issues (dismissal protection, 
lifelong learning, better employment 
opportunities for older workers, part-
time retirement and flexible time use, 
and working conditions). For migrant 
workers and their families, activation 
measures vary from training and lan-
guage courses, wage subsidy schemes 
to employers, attempts to integrate 
children of immigrants into the edu-
cational system and the launching of 
special programmes in geographic ar-
eas where migrants are concentrated.
In most Member States, unions and 
employers are in some way or an-
other involved in the political process 
of preparation and establishment of 
these policies. In a majority of coun-
tries, this participation is institution-
alised through the participation of the 
social partners in tripartite bodies or 
via political and administrative chan-
nels. In the Nordic countries, govern-
ments have a long tradition of includ-
ing both employer’s organisations and 
trade unions in decision-making over 
ALMP, partly because trade unions 
have retained a role in the provision 
and administration of unemployment 
insurance. In Belgium, too, policies are 
mostly set through tripartite consulta-
tions, even though the state retains fi-
nal responsibility. In the Netherlands, 
as in Germany and Austria, the role 
of the social partners in ALMP has 
been weakened. In France the social 
partners have retained a strong role 
through bipartite funds and there 
have been attempts to carve out a 
more autonomous bargaining role for 
the social partners.
Austria presents an example of social 
partner involvement in ALMP in early 
2007, when unions and employers of-
fered a joint programme aimed at im-
proving employment opportunities 
for unskilled, unemployed and young 
people. Something similar happened 
in Denmark with regard to young 
people with low levels of formal ini-
tial education. The recent social pacts 
signed in Ireland (2000–03, 2003–05 
and 2006–11) include a wide range 
of labour market measures. In or-
der to tackle the labour market and 
demographic problems, the Finnish 
government and the social partners 
adopted in 2003, after lengthy ne-
gotiations, legislation to reform the 
private sector pension system with a 
view to discouraging early retirement. 
Furthermore, in late autumn 2002, the 
Central Organisation of Finnish Trade 
Unions presented proposals including 
a substantial increase in the resources 
for active labour market policy so that 
the ‘activation rate’ for unemployed 
people can be lifted from the present 
20 % to 40 %, which is more in line 
with the activation rates usually seen 
in other Nordic countries.
After almost a year of negotiations, 
the Dutch social partners concluded 
a social pact with the government in 
November 2004, including measures 
to phase out early retirement. In the 
tripartite Social and Economic Coun-
cil their representatives agreed to set 
the target for the employment rate at 
80 % in 2020. A specific participation 
summit between the government, the 
social partners and the municipali-
ties was supposed to agree on specific 
job measures for the 200 000 people 
with the largest distance to the labour 
market. However, it turned out to be 
impossible to reach a new pact on 
Table 2.6: Main reasons for not seeking employment in 2006
EU-27 total 15–24 25–49 50–59
In education or training 87.4 10.9 0.3
Looking after children or incapacitated adults 2.0 25.0 3.9
Other family or personal responsibilities 1.8 19.5 13.9
Retired 0.3 2.8 31.5
Discourages workers or belief that no work is available 1.6 7.7 6.4
Source: Calculated from European labour force survey 2006, Eurostat.
Chapter 2: The quality of industrial relations and the Lisbon Strategy
57
this occasion. Employers had linked 
the issue to a reform of the dismissal 
protection system for workers under 
open-ended contracts, a move which 
the trade unions vetoed.
In Spain, a tripartite agreement contain-
ing measures related to pension reform 
was signed in July 2006 by the govern-
ment and the social partners. Many of 
these measures were already included in 
the agreement relating to improvement 
and development of the social security 
system (‘Acuerdo para la mejora y el de-
sarollo del Sistema de Protección Social’) 
for 2001–04. Also, an agreement was 
reached between the government and 
social partners in early 2006 on merging 
the occupational training schemes for 
the unemployed with the continuous 
training systems for active workers.
In July 2007, the Italian government 
signed a social pact with the trade un-
ions concerning pension reform, social 
security, flexible employment con-
tracts, competitiveness, young work-
ers and women. In Slovenia, the social 
agreement for the period 2003–05 es-
tablished plans for a sustainable social 
security system for all citizens (16). After 
a difficult period, with social dialogue 
at a low, another three-year social pact 
was signed in July 2007, though its ef-
fects are unclear and its most tangible 
result appears to be that the tripartite 
system of concertation was rescued for 
the time being. In the Czech Republic 
the government accepted the propos-
als agreed between the social partners, 
submitted through the Social and 
Economic Council, aimed at broaden-
ing the inclusion of long-term unem-
ployed in retraining programmes and 
to improve active measures to enhance 
youth employability.
There were also failed attempts at re-
form pacts. The most spectacular case 
is probably the end of the ‘Alliance for 
16 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2007/08/
articles/si0708029i.htm
jobs, competitiveness and training’ in 
Germany. Initiated in September 1998, 
the social partners had agreed with the 
government to join forces on a number 
of issues, including a permanent re-
duction of non-wage labour costs and 
structural reform of the social security 
system; employment-promoting work-
sharing; better use of early and partial re-
tirement; the development of new fields 
of employment for low-skilled work-
ers; and labour market policy to fight 
youth and long-term unemployment. 
No agreement could be reached on con-
crete solutions and by 2002 it was dead. 
Following the re-election of the govern-
ment the government moved alone and 
introduced a series of reforms (‘Agenda 
2010’) on pension, social assistance and 
unemployment insurance, against the 
opposition of the trade unions.
In Belgium the government tried in 
2006 to reach a so-called ‘generation 
pact’ with the social partners, intended 
to make early retirement less attrac-
tive and introduce measures to tackle 
youth unemployment and welfare pov-
erty. But it proved impossible to secure 
the cooperation of the trade unions 
and the government moved on its own 
with a weaker version of its original 
plans. However, in the next general 
round of central bargaining between 
the social partners, for 2007–08, many 
of the measures to increase the active 
participation of older worker were in-
cluded in the agreement and recom-
mended to the sectoral and company 
negotiators. These negotiations take 
place under a strong ‘shadow of hierar-
chy’ of the state, since the state has tied 
the maximum wage increases by law 
to the developments in France, Ger-
many and the Netherlands. The Italian 
centre-right government that was in 
power from May 2001 to 2006 was less 
inclined to acknowledge the role of the 
social partners in policy concertation. 
Yet, the government did start nego-
tiations with the unions and manage to 
secure the support of two of the three 
main union confederations in the 2002 
‘Pact for Italy’, which included various 
measures, including benefits and serv-
ices for workers when they (re)enter 
the labour market and experimental 
measures to lift dismissal protection in 
companies employing less than 15 em-
ployees) (17). The pact was highly con-
tested and large parts of the pact were 
never implemented.
In most European countries, issues 
relating to the unemployment ben-
efit system are not included in the 
(bipartite) negotiations of collective 
agreements. An exception is Belgium, 
where most sectors have set up welfare 
funds that grant additional advantages 
in the case of illness, unemployment 
and recently, retirement. In Greece, 
the social partners have signed agree-
ments on the issue of insuring work-
ers against unemployment. Danish 
and Swedish agreements also contain 
provisions for the re-employment and 
training of workers made redundant 
and these issues have in both countries 
been subject to general agreements for 
the private sector, preceding the ne-
gotiations in sectors. Since 2000, the 
Dutch social partners include provi-
sions for re-integration of people with 
weak attachments to the labour mar-
ket in their collective agreements.
Finally, in several Member States, the 
trade unions play a role in the admin-
istration of the system, by manag-
ing either payment bodies (Belgium) 
or unemployment funds that collect 
contributions and pay the benefits 
(Denmark, Finland, Sweden). These 
institutions have come under consid-
erable pressure for change, however. 
The current trend is towards a dimin-
ishing role of the unions in the admin-
istration of unemployment benefits 
(Schaapman and Van het Kaar, 2005). 
Such reforms, creating a single entry 
point for all types of (insured and 
17 http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/
ifpdial/sd/social_pacts/italy.htm
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uninsured) jobseekers, have taken 
place in many countries, including 
the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and 
Norway. In the Netherlands this meant 
that the social partners were sidelined 
and they no longer have managerial 
control over labour market offices or 
the administration of unemployment 
insurance. In the Nordic systems, as in 
Austria and Belgium, unions have re-
tained more control, but in Denmark, 
trade unions feel that their position in 
this domain has weakened.
In Finland, the introduction of an in-
dependent unemployment insurance 
fund in 1992 has allegedly undermined 
the strong position of the trade unions 
in the management of unemployment 
benefits. Before, trade unions admin-
istered all unemployment insurance 
funds in Finland (18), but since the 
reform they must now compete with 
an independent (and cheaper) fund. 
Böckerman and Uusitalo (2005) argue 
that its success has eroded the link 
between unions and the entitlement 
to earnings-related unemployment 
benefits, and thus contributed to the 
decline in unionisation in Finland. In 
Sweden, the government has intro-
duced similar legal changes in 2007, 
altering the connection between un-
ion membership and membership of 
an unemployment insurance fund.
Youth employment and the school to 
work transition
The successful integration of young 
people in the labour market has be-
come a priority goal of European poli-
18 Like Denmark and Sweden, Finland operated 
a so-called Ghent system, where membership of an 
unemployment insurance fund is required to access 
earnings-related unemployment benefits, which are 
paid at much higher level that the state guaranteed 
benefits. Theoretically it was possible in Finland 
to be a member of a union-administered fund 
without joining the trade union, but in practice the 
two memberships have been inseparable. YTK has 
been providing since 1992 earnings-related benefit 
coverage for a price considerably below the level of 
union membership fees.
cymakers. The size of the youth popu-
lation, aged 15 to 24 years, is predicted 
to shrink from 12.6 % to 9.7 % of the 
total population between 2005 and 
2050, yet, the training of young people 
and the organisation of the transition 
from school to jobs remains a matter 
of great concern.
Youth unemployment has fallen be-
tween 2000 and 2006, but in some re-
gions (southern and eastern Europe) 
unemployment still affects one in five 
or six young people. Employment rates 
also vary a great deal. The highest em-
ployment rates of young people are 
reached in Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Austria, the UK and Ireland; the low-
est are in Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Roma-
nia. Generally, low employment rates 
go together with high unemployment 
rates, and in fact many young people 
may stay longer in (full-time) educa-
tion. Obviously, enrolment rates in 
(tertiary) education and the division 
between part-time and full-time edu-
cation and work have a major influ-
ence on employment rates. It is for 
this reason that the OECD has tried to 
draw attention to those young people 
who are not in employment, educa-
tion or training (NEET) (Quintini et 
al., 2007). Better than inactivity rates, 
they capture the problem of inadequate 
training and education, and the diffi-
culty of organising the transition from 
education to work. The EU average 
of young people not in employment, 
education or training stands at 18 % of 
the population aged 15 to 24 years, but 
this hides considerable variation across 
Member States, with the lowest NEET 
rates in Denmark and Netherlands and 
the highest in France, Italy, Poland, Ro-
mania and Slovakia. Although NEET 
rates are usually higher among young 
adults, with teenagers more likely to be 
enrolled in education, Spain, Italy, Mal-
ta, the UK, Romania and Bulgaria also 
exhibit high percentages of NEET rates 
among teenagers, indicating problems 
of school dropout, lack of training and 
joblessness (EC 2007a, pp. 36ff).
Policy measures to improve youth em-
ployment include improved vocational 
education and training, specific guid-
ance and pathways for at-risk school-
leavers, intensified and personalised 
guidance and job search support, re-
duction of employers’ social security 
contributions, tax promotion for ap-
prenticeship places, wage support for 
recruitment of long-term unemployed 
youth and even reduced taxation of 
students’ jobs. The availability and 
acceptance of part-time jobs, and the 
combination with part-time educa-
tion, is another major factor. 
The major contribution of the social 
partners lies in the area of wage poli-
cies (youth entry rates), working time 
(part-time jobs) and training. The 
first area lies outside the scope of this 
chapter, part-time employment will 
be discussed in a later section. Train-
ing and organising the transition to 
work is especially important for those 
with weak or low educational creden-
tials. Both unemployment and em-
ployment rates are strongly related to 
educational attainment.
Table 2.7 shows the gap in employ-
ment ratios between those with tertiary 
(ISCED 5–6) and primary schooling 
(ISCED 1–2). Unsurprisingly, young 
people with tertiary education reach 
much higher levels of employment, and 
are less likely to be unemployed, than 
those with the lowest levels of educa-
tion. The main exception is southern 
Europe, where a majority of higher edu-
cated young people are not in employ-
ment and one fifth is unemployed. The 
education gap is particularly large in the 
transition economies, but the problems 
for young people with little education 
are visible from these data in all employ-
ment and industrial relations regimes. 
Here, there is clearly a huge task for gov-
ernments and social partners.
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Strategies aimed at tackling youth un-
employment are, in most cases, part of 
a broader policy design addressed at 
unemployment in general. Only rarely 
do youth employment programmes 
enter social dialogue or collective 
bargaining as the only or key issue. 
Moreover, a comparison across coun-
tries suggests that the priority given 
by social partners to this topic is not 
very strong and not correlated with 
the extent of youth unemployment.
Austria, Belgium and Denmark are 
among the Member States where 
the involvement of social partners is 
highly institutionalised. In 2007 the 
Austrian social partners presented 
joint proposals aimed at reforming 
the current, generalised system of 
apprenticeships with individualised 
qualification programmes for young 
and unemployed workers and to in-
troduce a special programme for 
unemployed older workers. The gov-
ernment welcomed the initiative and 
adopted a youth employment pact in 
April 2008 that had been agreed with 
the social partners. It relates to train-
ing arrangements outside the work-
place as well as incentives for quality 
or gender mainstreaming measures 
in vocational training. In Belgium the 
generation pact foundered, but in the 
bargaining round of 2007–08 some 
proposals for training and easing 
the employment prospects for young 
people were incorporated. In the au-
tumn of 2004 an ambitious tripartite 
cooperation project was launched in 
Denmark, involving the government 
and the social partners, with a view 
to analysing the levels of access to vo-
cational training of Danish workers, 
especially those with only a short pe-
riod of formal education (19). In Feb-
ruary 2005, the government followed 
with an action plan for the develop-
ment of competences for this group of 
(future) workers.
Another Member State showing con-
siderable involvement of social part-
ners is Spain, which set up the 2005–
08 youth plan based on discussions in 
the Tripartite Commission on Youth 
Employment. Slovenia has also moved 
in this area, based on tripartite discus-
sions in its Economic and Social Com-
mittee. In the other CEECs with tri-
partite bodies for consultation, social 
partners, when at all consulted, tend 
to have only a vaguely advisory role 
with little leverage on actual policies. 
In Bulgaria, for instance, unions and 
employers agree on the inadequacy of 
19 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/02/
tfeature/dk0502101t.htm
the national action plan in fostering 
the provision of a skilled workforce 
matching the labour demand (lack of 
professional skills).
The regulation of youth employment 
programmes via collective agreements 
varies a great deal across EU Member 
States. The main topics are minimum 
entry wages (Netherlands), apprentice-
ship programmes (Germany, Belgium) 
and the organisation of vocational 
training. Sectoral agreements and co-
ordination among employers play a key 
role in job classification systems, train-
ing requirements and apprenticeship 
schemes in the coordinated production 
regimes of northern and continental 
Europe. This implies usually joint re-
sponsibilities for the management of 
vocational training schemes, some-
times even for the recruitment of young 
people. Elsewhere in Europe, there are 
many attempts to do the same.
In France, for instance, unions and 
employers draw up job classification 
schemes and training requirements in 
sector-level collective bargaining. Un-
der the 2007 pact, Italian sectoral bar-
gainers are encouraged to do the same 
for apprenticeship training. In Spain the 
2005 multisector agreement regulates 
the establishment of training contracts. 
Collective agreements on training at 
the sectoral level are also negotiated in 
Romania and Slovakia. In Poland some 
sectoral collective agreements define 
the rules according to which employees 
can develop their occupational skills. In 
the Czech Republic, social partners at 
the sectoral level monitor enterprise-
level collective agreements, seeking to 
incorporate into collective agreements 
more adequate training arrangements. 
In Hungary tripartite regional councils 
produce the list of the vocational quali-
fications most demanded in the labour 
market. In Slovenia and Malta the role 
of employers is much more pronounced 
than that of the unions. In Portugal 
governments have tried to interest em-
Table 2.7: Youth employment and unemployment rates  
by level of educational attainment
Nordic 
corporatism
Social 
partnership
Liberal 
pluralism
Polarised 
pluralism
Transition 
economies
Youth employment rate
ISCED 0–2 37.6 30.1 33.7 25.9 8.9
ISCED 5–6 71.5 72.0 79.0 48.0 65.4
Education gap – 33.9 – 41.9 – 45.3 – 22.1 – 56.5
Youth unemployment rate
ISCED 0–2 23.0 19.0 20.6 22.6 37.9
ISCED 5–6 12.9 16.1 7.2 22.9 19.5
Education gap 10.1 2.9 13.4 – 0.3 18.6
Source: Calculated from the European labour force survey 2006, Eurostat.
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ployers in designing sectoral training 
programmes together with the unions. 
In the UK union officials are involved 
in the development of the occupational 
and qualifications standards, but remain 
outside the framework of any systematic 
social partnership arrangement.
Lifelong learning and the position of 
older workers
The changing occupational structure 
of employment and the transition into 
a knowledge economy is arguably one 
of the most important trends in cur-
rent and future labour markets. Rapid 
economic growth goes together with 
occupational and sectoral change 
and the reallocation of labour across 
firms, sectors and occupations. It re-
quires workers to constantly update 
their skill and engage in a process of 
up-skilling. Social dialogue at vari-
ous levels has addressed the issue of 
enabling enterprises to provide con-
tinuous vocational training or lifelong 
learning and offer employees adequate 
training opportunities. Given the ex-
pansion of highly skilled occupations 
and the rising educational attainment 
of the labour force, older workers are 
under pressure to remain competitive 
compared with younger workers with 
higher educational qualifications.
Employment rates of the population 
aged 55 to 64 years are still below 50 % 
in most Member States, the target rate 
of the Lisbon Strategy for 2010. Only 
the inclusive Nordic regimes achieve 
rates as high as 60 %. As one might ex-
pect, employment rates of older work-
ers, between 55 and 64 years of age, 
are highly correlated with educational 
attainment (see Table 2.8), as for the 
younger age groups (Table 2.7). Peo-
ple with less than upper secondary ed-
ucation are more disadvantaged, espe-
cially in Italy, Hungary, Malta, Poland 
and Slovakia. In some Member States 
(Portugal, Finland, the United King-
dom and Sweden), however, the em-
ployment rate of low-educated older 
workers is very high, though mostly in 
low-wage jobs. This is directly related 
to the high employment rates of older 
women in these countries. In view of 
the gap in employment rates across 
educational attainment levels, and the 
generally lower level of employment 
among workers with only primary ed-
ucation, the need for additional train-
ing on a continuous basis is particu-
larly large among older workers with 
low levels of education. This is an area 
where the social partners, in particu-
lar, can play an important role. 
On average, participation in lifelong 
learning has been on the rise in the 
majority of the EU Member States, but 
most Member States are still far off the 
target of a 12.5 % participation rate set 
for 2010 in the Lisbon Strategy, and 
more common effort, including social 
partner action, is called for (see Chart 
2.2). There is a massive variation 
across Member States with only Swe-
den, Denmark, the United Kingdom, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Slovenia 
and Austria reaching the 2010 Lisbon 
target for lifelong learning. Italy, Por-
tugal and most of the EU-12, includ-
ing Ireland and Germany, are still far 
off target. In the past five years, the 
strongest improvements were made 
in the Nordic corporatist countries, 
which already had the highest level of 
lifelong learning (Table 2.9).
Post-initial learning provided or con-
sumed after formal schooling works cu-
mulatively rather than as  compensation 
Table 2.8: Employment rates of population aged 55-64, by 
educational attainment
Nordic 
corporatism
Social 
partnership 
Liberal 
pluralism
Polarised 
pluralism
Transition 
economies
ISCED 0–2 48.7 29.0 52.1 36.5 27.7
ISCED 5–6 74.0 59.0 72.4 61.1 62.8
Gap – 25.3 – 30.0 – 20.3 – 24.6 34.1
Source: Calculated from the European labour force survey 2006, Eurostat.
2002
2006
Chart 2.2: Trends in adult participation, aged 25-64 in lifelong learning
four weeks prior to the survey (2002-06)
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for the lack of formal education (Table 
2.9). Participation rates in such learn-
ing increase with educational levels. 
Employers find it more rewarding to 
provide training to higher skilled work-
ers, since the returns to investment are 
supposed to be higher. A similar argu-
ment explains the lower access of older 
workers to training, given the shorter 
time span over which training costs 
can be recouped. The decline in train-
ing intensity over the life cycle is one of 
the main hurdles to be addressed by a 
lifelong learning approach to education 
and training (20).
20 “Study on access to education in Europe” –  
Final report, 2005:76; see also Chapter 2 in 
Employment in Europe 2007.
Levels of training are lower and the 
educational gap in lifelong learn-
ing is larger in pluralist, polarised 
and transition industrial relations 
systems (Table 2.9). This is related 
to the much lower rates of compa-
ny-provided training, especially by 
smaller firms. The SME sector is also 
poorly covered by unions and col-
lective agreements, especially where 
company bargaining prevails. Only 
when they are covered under secto-
ral arrangements, with the help of 
common funding, will small firms 
have the capacity and incentives to 
offer training to a significant number 
of employees. These conditions are 
poorly fulfilled in southern and in 
eastern Europe (see Table 2.9).
A considerable share of adult learn-
ing is concentrated in non-formal 
and informal activities (Table 2.9), 
for which the assessment, validation 
and recognition has become a matter 
of particular concern for unions and 
employers. From the point of view 
of employability, the effectiveness of 
skill enhancement achieved through 
vocational training is correlated 
with the external recognition of the 
skills acquired and the transferability 
across firms. Hence, needs assessment 
and validation of training are two as-
pects relevant for the social dialogue. 
In their Framework of Actions on 
Lifelong Development of Competen-
cies and Qualifications of 2002, the 
European social partners identified 
four areas for action: (i) identification 
and anticipation of competences and 
qualifications needed; (ii) recogni-
tion and validation of competences 
and qualifications; (iii) information, 
support and provision of guidance; 
and (iv) mobilisation of the necessary 
resources.
At the national level, the involvement 
of social partners in planning training 
activities and lifelong learning patterns 
is subject to considerable cross-coun-
try variation. The extent to which well-
established practices of consultation of 
interests are extended to cover adult 
education as a central issue of the social 
dialogue is contingent, to a certain de-
gree, on path-dependent trajectories. 
Hence, longstanding commitments 
to social partner involvement in poli-
cymaking in labour market reforms, 
common in the Nordic countries but 
also found in Germany, Belgium, Lux-
embourg, Austria and the Netherlands, 
are reflected in a more encompassing 
approach towards lifelong learning. In 
contrast, in Member States that have 
traditionally relied on voluntary bar-
gaining, like the UK, or in Member 
States without a tradition of concerta-
tion, the influence and involvement of 
social partners is more haphazard and 
Table 2.9: Participation rates of adult workers  
(25 to 64 years) in post-initial education activities  
and enterprises offering vocational training
Nordic 
corporatism
Social 
partnership
Liberal 
pluralism
Polarised 
pluralism
Transition 
economies
Lifelong learning
2002 17.9 8.6 13.4 3.1 4.3
2006 26.2 10.4 17.1 5.9 4.4
+ 8.3 + 1.8 + 3.7 + 2.8 + 0.1
Any learning activity in 2006
ISCED 0–2 57.1 43.3 23.4 23.4 12.7
ISCED 5–6 90.4 77.8 63.6 66.2 56.3
Gap – 33.3 – 34.5 – 40.2 – 42.8 – 43.4
Formal education 10.1 3.8 6.9 3.1 2.6
Non–formal education 45.5 16.9 24.3 9.9 9.6
Informal education 62.6 53.7 45.0 33.0 25.4
% of enterprises offering training
10–49 employees 70.0 55.2 63.0 32.8 29.3
50–249 employees 88.3 78.4 75.0 61.4 55.6
250+ employees 94.7 92.2 83.0 85.2 78.2
Source: Eurostat, calculated from European labour force survey, and refers to 2006. Participation 
rates of adults in formal, non-formal and informal education are calculated from provisional 
Eurostat data for 2005. Formal education is defined as education and training in schools, 
universities and colleges; non-formal education and training includes all activities outside a 
formal education programme, in particular vocational training at the initiative of the enterprise; 
informal learning corresponds to self-learning (using printed material, libraries, video and audio 
material, or computer-based and online Internet-based web education), which is not part of either 
formal education or company training.
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the role of the state usually larger. In the 
EU-12, provisions and regulations tend 
to be directly dependent on the posi-
tions taken by the government. Public 
agencies and administrative structures 
have a leading role, as is also the case in 
Ireland, Portugal and Greece. Whereas 
in the first group of countries continu-
ing vocational training has been part 
of the industrial relations and collec-
tive bargaining agenda for some time, 
elsewhere the issue seems to have en-
tered the social dialogue agenda more 
recently and is not always integrated 
into collective bargaining. Recurrent 
attempts to negotiate sponsored agree-
ments, for instance in Portugal and 
Spain, indicate both the importance 
of the issue and the difficulty of imple-
menting such agreements.
There are three key issues addressed 
in collective agreements that include 
clauses on training, common in many 
EU-15 Member States: funding; pro-
gramme management and selection; 
and the extent of individual training 
rights of employees. The introduction 
of the so-called ‘Individual learning 
account’ is a matter of discussion espe-
cially in Sweden and United Kingdom, 
and a trend likely to spread to other 
countries in the foreseeable future. In 
France, the social partners agreed on 
an individualised training right in 2003 
(see Box 2.2). The recognition of a right 
to training and the availability of paid 
leave for educational purposes are also 
common in the Netherlands, Finland, 
Austria, Spain, Malta, Slovakia and Ire-
land (limited to the public sector).
Local representation appears to mat-
ter greatly for the access to training. 
In some countries an increasing role 
is assigned to the works councils, es-
pecially in Denmark, Germany and 
Finland. The case of United Kingdom 
stands out, as trade unions function to 
some extent as brokers favouring ac-
cess to training through the presence 
of Union Learning Representatives at 
the company level. A recent study, us-
ing data from the workplace employ-
ment relations survey of 2004 found 
that trade union recognition has a 
consistently positive effect not only on 
the extent to which employees receive 
training opportunities, but also on the 
amount of training they receive (Stu-
art and Robinson, 2006). The research 
also showed that enterprises are more 
likely to offer higher levels of employee 
training — defined as 10 or more days’ 
training a year — when they recognise 
trade unions, have some form of rep-
resentative structure and where trade 
unions directly negotiate with man-
agement with regard to training. A 
similar result comes from research on 
Germany. A study based on matched 
pair analysis of IAB establishment 
panel data for 1996–2005 found that 
participation in training was consist-
ently higher in establishments with 
works councils, compared with those 
without works councils (Bellmann 
and Ellguth, 2006). Moreover, the par-
ticipation rate increased in establish-
ments with works councils after the 
reform of the Works Constitution Act 
in 2001, whereas it stagnated in com-
panies without worker representation. 
The European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions (Eurofound 2008) refers 
to another example from Lithuania, 
where a survey conducted in 2005 un-
der the EU EQUAL initiative exam-
ined the issues of training and skills 
development for employees. Looking 
at enterprises with collective agree-
ments and trade union representation, 
the survey found that a majority of re-
spondents reported that improvement 
in qualification levels and reskilling of 
employees were ensured by collective 
agreements. The agreements covered 
issues such as the skills development 
of older workers in particular.
Box. 2.2: Individual right to training in France
Reform of continuing vocational training was one of the issues considered under the in-
dustrial relations reform initiative launched by French employers association MEDEF in 
2000. On 20 September 2003 a national cross-sectoral agreement on employees’ lifelong 
access to training was concluded, signed by all five principal union confederations.
The agreement makes room for a customisation of training trajectories based on profes-
sional assessment by employers and the creation of an individual training right for em-
ployees. A new tool is created, the so-called training passport, drawn up at the behest of 
the employee and lists the knowledge, skills and occupational aptitude acquired either in 
initial and continuing training or through professional experience. Existing training leave 
schemes remain unchanged and employees can save training credits up to a period of six 
years, but they must seek agreement with employers about actual training and financing. 
There is a limited transferability of training rights, thus making the entitlement personal 
rather than company based.
The agreement was given the force of law in May 2004, with some modifications. The law 
encourages sectoral negotiations to detail arrangements, and some 130 sectoral agree-
ments on professional training were concluded between October 2004 and April 2005. 
These agreements seek to guarantee equal access and improve conditions for training in 
SMEs and for older workers, as well as transferability of training rights, but they do less 
well in defining training needs, probably because the sector is less and less an organising 
unit and large firms tend to opt-out from sectoral arrangements. Another obstacle is that 
during economic downturns, when firms or sectors face difficulties, training rights tend to 
be sacrificed. An evaluation study commissioned by the Ministry also notes that the means 
for joint action and social dialogue are often lacking (Rivier and Seiler, 2006).
Source: Jelle Visser and Birgit Bentzen, ‘Better governance and delivery of reform through 
partnership’, Thematic Review Seminar of the EES, 24 April 2006, Brussels.
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There are widespread attempts across 
Member States to involve all social 
actors in financing the training ef-
fort (21). One way is to create sectoral 
training funds administered by bi-
partite bodies based on compulsory 
training levies and/or payroll contri-
butions, possibly in combination with 
government and ESF subsidies or tax 
exemptions. Such collective training 
funds can be found in the Nether-
lands, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
the United Kingdom (only construc-
tion), Spain, Cyprus, Greece and Italy 
(Cedefop, 2008). Finland is a particu-
lar case insofar as training schemes 
providing funding for continuous vo-
21 ‘Sharing costs and responsibilities for lifelong 
learning’, Thematic Review Seminar, Brussels, 28 
September 2005. 
cational training can be set up at the 
initiative of employees.
A shift towards demand-led instru-
ments seems to be the principal trend, 
in the framework of proactive policies 
aiming at eliminating skill shortages 
in national labour markets. In Fin-
land, social partners are involved in 
government-forecasting approaches 
for future skills and qualifications. 
In the UK, employers in each sec-
tor lead the identification of training 
needs and the design of programmes; 
trade union officials are involved in 
this process depending on the union 
density in the sector and their degree 
of coverage. Employer-led sector skills 
bodies are also common in the Czech 
Republic. In Sweden social partners 
have started projects on validation of 
sector skills in a tripartite governmen-
tal body; at the company level, valida-
tion relies on the employers’ separate 
dialogue with employees directed to 
the identification of specific training 
needs. Other examples come from 
Denmark and Ireland (Box 2.3).
Working hours and working-time  
flexibility
Working hours and working-time 
flexibility (when and how long to 
work, the possibilities to take leave, 
or change schedules) are important 
not only for productivity, teamwork 
and job satisfaction, but also for the 
inclusion of women, older workers, 
students, disabled persons and those 
with commitments outside work in 
employment. In most EU-15 coun-
tries working hours became an in-
creasingly important issue for collec-
tive bargainers in the early 1980s in 
response to unemployment and the 
growing intensity of work, but the is-
sue has now shifted from the length 
of the working week to working-time 
flexibility, focusing on the annualisa-
tion of working hours, the possibilities 
for part-time work, the reconciliation 
of work and family life, and the or-
ganisation of ‘time savings accounts’ 
or ‘working time banks’. In contrast, in 
most EU-12 countries collective bar-
gaining plays a relatively small role in 
setting weekly working hours. Collec-
tive agreements either do not deviate 
from the statutory 40-hours norm or 
do not deal with the issue at all.
While the average number of working 
hours per person has declined over the 
last two decades, the length of the full-
time working week has changed very 
little, indicating a significant part-
time effect in the decline of working 
hours. According to the European la-
bour force survey, the average number 
of usual weekly working hours in the 
Box 2.3: Advanced vocational training (Sweden, Denmark) 
and Skillnets (Ireland)
In 2002, Sweden included advanced vocational education in its regular educational system. 
Already in 1994, trade unions and employers’ association had put forward a proposal for a 
system of tertiary non-academic education with strong links to working life. In response, a 
pilot project was carried out between 1996 and 2001. When the pilot scheme was extended 
to the whole country and to other target groups, it was brought under the newly formed 
Swedish Agency for Advanced Vocational Education. The key factor in the success of the 
programme is that it is demand-led and flexible. The scheme is locally grounded, based 
on bottom-up initiatives of trade unions and employers’ associations in response to needs 
they identify through their members. Flexibility is built into the implementation structure, 
which means that new challenges and labour market demands can be met continuously. 
Stakeholders learn by monitoring as knowledge and experiences with implementing the 
programme find a feedback into the supply of courses.
A range of similar lessons can be drawn from the reform on adult and educational training 
in Denmark. A new Labour Market Institution for Financing Education and Training 
(AUF) with social partners’ representatives was set up with similar aims to the Swedish 
Commission in 1996.
Skillnets is an example of experimenting partnerships in Ireland. Companies contribute 
on average one third of the costs of training. The scheme is demand-led insofar as the 
companies and their employees direct and control what training is offered and by whom. 
Skillnets has initiated an enthusiasm for training and enabled companies to undertake cost 
effective and flexible training of high quality with more focus. There are still some difficul-
ties, however, related to the predominance of the sectoral approach to the formation and 
development of training networks promoted by Skillnets. Sharing sensitive information 
and knowledge with competitors within sectors has limitations, especially in a context 
where sectoral employer organisation is weak (Irish employers do not negotiate sectoral 
wage agreements, unlike many continental European countries).
Source: Jelle Visser and Birgit Bentzen, ‘Better governance and delivery of reform through 
partnership’, Thematic Review Seminar of the EES, Brussels, 24 April 2006.
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main paid job for full-time employees 
has remained close to 40 hours; it was 
40.3 hours in 1995 and 39.9 hours in 
2006. There are however pronounced 
differences across the EU-27; cur-
rently, full-time employees work on 
average the largest number of hours 
in Latvia, Romania and Austria, the 
smallest number in France, Finland 
and Belgium (Chart 2.3).
Actual weekly hours are almost al-
ways longer than contractual work-
ing hours, due to overtime. Collec-
tively agreed weekly working hours 
have also remained quite stable over 
recent years, after the campaigns for 
further reductions came to a stand-
still in the late 1990s. Over the eight-
year period from the beginning of 
1999 to the end of 2006 the EU-15 
average of the number of work-
ing hours set by collective agree-
ment decreased slightly from 38.6 
to 37.9 hours per week. The issue of 
working-time cuts has not fully dis-
appeared from the agenda. It is still 
an issue in Belgium in response to 
employer pressure to lengthen the 
working week, in Greece, Portugal 
and Spain, reflecting union pressure 
to catch up with a trend to shorter 
working hours which they later 
joined, and in France, where recent 
new legislation seeks to mitigate ear-
lier legislation on the 35-hour work-
ing week. The tendency is now for 
employers to press for longer work-
ing hours. The lack of real wage 
growth is likely to have lowered the 
appetite for working-time reduction 
among workers and unions.
One issue that clearly attracts the at-
tention of trade unions and legisla-
tors is that of long working hours, 
exceeding the European norm of 48 
hours per week. That was the maxi-
mum laid down in the EU Working 
Time Directive (93/104/EC) of 1993 
(see Chapter 6). The 1993 directive 
allowed Member States to derogate 
and set another reference period for 
calculating average working hours if 
so decided by collective agreement. In 
Article 18(1)(b) it also allowed Mem-
ber States to make use of a so-called 
individual ‘opt-out’ from the obliga-
tion to limit the maximum working 
week to 48 hours, if individual work-
ers are willing to sign. The United 
Kingdom availed itself of this possibil-
ity when, in 1998, it ended the opt-out 
of the social agreement annexed to the 
Maastricht Treaty and decided to im-
plement the directive.
Research in the US has shown that Ar-
ticle 18(1)(b) had been used widely, its 
application driven by employers’ per-
ceived need of flexibility and workers’ 
desire to top up earnings (Barnard et 
al., 2003). Dickens and Hall (2005:15) 
conclude that the ‘reliance on the indi-
vidual opt-out has been the key route 
to flexibility’. They speculate that the 
absence of employee representation 
and collective bargaining in many 
UK firms ‘may well have inhibited the 
flexible application of the statutory 
rules’ and have created a handicap for 
Chart 2.3: Actually worked and collectively agreed
weekly working hours in 2006, full-time employees
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making full use of European law. The 
Working Time Directive, and national 
legislation in many Member States, 
allows derogation from the law by 
collective agreement, thus creating a 
framework as well as incentive for ne-
gotiating the annualisation of working 
hours, longer reference periods, and 
limiting the use and cost of overtime. 
These possibilities have been widely 
used, for instance in Denmark, Ger-
many, the Netherlands and Austria. 
In the EU as a whole, the share of em-
ployees working more than 48 hours 
has risen slightly from 8.5 % in 2000 
to 8.8 % in 2006. The largest incidence 
of long hours, above the norm of 48 
hours, is found in the UK (17.7 %), 
Austria (14.5 %) and Latvia (11.6 %). In 
most Member States the share of em-
ployees working more than 48 hours 
lies between 4 % and 10 %; long work-
ing hours are rare in Sweden (1.6 %), 
Lithuania (1.3 %), Netherlands (1.1 %) 
and Luxembourg (0.6 %).
These differences are in part explained 
by the different interpretation, use and 
sometimes derogation of the 1993 direc-
tive. The individual opt-out clearly ex-
plains the case of the United Kingdom. 
In 2004, the Confederation of British 
Industry reported that nearly one third 
of the employees in their member firms 
had signed the individual opt-out. The 
Austrian case is almost opposite. Here, 
workers in many sectors are contractu-
ally allowed to work 50 weekly hours 
while maintaining an average of 40 
hours a week over a year. For almost half 
of all Austrians who work long hours, 50 
hours per week is the norm. In 2007, the 
maximum changed to 60 hours, with a 
shorter reference period of 24 weeks. In 
the summer of 2007, the Austrian par-
liament passed an amendment to the 
1969 Working-Time Act, which pro-
vides for a number of new regulations, 
in particular with regard to working-
time flexibility and part-time work. This 
amendment was drafted in close co-
operation with the social partners and 
obliges employers, including very small 
firms, to provide accurate information 
on the exact hours and time schedules 
actually worked by employees.
In Latvia, long hours reflect the fact 
that employees, pushed by low wages, 
seem willing to agree to work long 
hours. However, since Latvia joined 
the EU with the added possibility to 
find work outside Latvia, workers have 
become more demanding towards 
their employers and are less willing to 
accept very long working hours and/or 
low wages. In fact, from 2005 to 2006 
the share of employees working long 
hours fell by 1.2 percentage points. 
In countries with the lowest share of 
employees working long hours, refer-
ence periods for deviating from the 
weekly norm are usually shorter and 
the law and collective agreements of-
fer less room for expanding maximum 
 working hours.
Part-time work is another form of 
individual working-time flexibility 
which has been influenced by Euro-
pean social dialogue, with the direc-
tive of 1997 based on an agreement 
between the European social partners 
(see Chapter 5). The incidence of part-
time employment is still rising in the 
EU, from a share of 16.3 % in 2001 to 
18.1 % in 2006. The dispersion across 
Member States is very large. In all 
new Member States part-time work 
remains uncommon. This may be ex-
plained by the low level of wages, and 
with more labour demand one may 
expect workers to increase hours and 
the share of part-time employment to 
decrease, as in fact has happened. It 
appears that, in comparing countries, 
there is a significant negative associa-
tion between involuntary part-time 
work and the incidence of part-time 
work — the higher the share of invol-
untary part-time work, the lower the 
incidence of part-time in total em-
ployment (r = 0.507).
The opposite situation appears to pre-
vail in the Netherlands, which is the 
first part-time economy in the world 
(Visser, 2002). The high and still in-
creasing share of part-time work 
(more than two out of five employees 
work in a part-time job) goes togeth-
er with a very low share of part-time 
workers looking for a full time job, 
despite government and employer 
campaigns to promote longer working 
hours. This tends to indicate a ‘nor-
malisation’ of part-time employment, 
at least among women, as part-time 
employment has remained mainly 
a working-time pattern for women 
even in the Netherlands. A dimension 
of that normalising process is the ap-
plication of standard rights and work-
ing conditions, including access to 
pension schemes and fringe benefits, 
to part-time employees, as foreseen 
under several national social partner 
agreements and the European part-
time work agreement.
Reconciliation of work and family life
Due to the feminisation of the labour 
force and changes in demography 
and family structure, as well as the 
further intensification of work, the 
reconciliation of work and family life 
has become increasingly important 
on the agenda of public policymak-
ers, human resource managers and 
social partners. The most desirable 
initiatives mentioned by employee 
representatives in European com-
panies, according to the European 
working-time survey, are displayed 
in the chart 2.5.
The introduction or extension of flexi-
time or working-time accounts tops 
the list. One in four employee repre-
sentatives named this as the only or 
most important measure for further 
improvement of employees’ work–
life balance; 6 out of 10 said that they 
worked in establishments that already 
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practised some form of flexitime or 
used working-time accounts. A gen-
eral reduction of the weekly working 
hours was mentioned by 19 % and 
ranks second. In the United King-
dom, Cyprus, Hungary, Portugal and 
Spain, and more remarkably in Swe-
den, employee representatives more 
often preferred a general reduction of 
working hours than the extension of 
flexible working-time arrangements. 
This can be understood against the 
background of long working hours 
in these countries, and perhaps the 
already satisfactory extent of time 
flexibility in Sweden. Eleven percent 
mentioned either early retirement or 
phased-in retirement, switching to 
part-time jobs towards the end of ca-
reer. More opportunities for part-time 
employment was mentioned by only 
6 % of these employee representatives. 
Remarkably, those that did mention 
this option were more likely to work 
in establishments that already offered 
opportunities to work part-time.
Broken down by country, the fit be-
tween working hours and family life 
varies considerably. The worst fit, ac-
cording to those interviewed in the 
European working conditions survey, 
exists in Greece (44.1 %) and Latvia 
(29.8 %). An explanation for Latvia may 
be the relatively large share of employees 
working more than 48 hours; for Greece 
it is more likely to be the low incidence 
of time flexibility. In the new Member 
States and in southern Europe, employ-
ee representatives express relatively high 
levels of dissatisfaction with work and 
family balance. At the other end, with 
the highest level of satisfaction about the 
work–family life fit (89 %), there is Den-
mark, which happens to be the country 
with the highest level of female labour 
market participation.
The disparity in satisfaction of work–
family life balance among EU coun-
tries reflects the pattern of provision of 
family friendly measures and flexible 
forms of working-time arrangements. 
In the 12 new Member States (EU-12), 
legislation is the main tool for intro-
ducing family-friendly provisions, 
and collective agreements have added 
little as this has hardly been an issue 
and bargaining coverage is fairly lim-
ited. Those family friendly provisions 
that exist are set by law, usually as part 
of the social acquis and the directives 
of the 1990s: paternity leave or other 
forms of leave (Latvia, Lithuania, Po-
land and Slovakia); protection of preg-
nant women (Latvia, Romania); fam-
ily friendly measures (Malta); gender 
equality (Poland and Slovakia); child-
care provisions (Latvia, Romania and 
Slovakia). Only in the Czech Republic 
(regarding leave), Slovenia (gender 
equality) and Bulgaria (maternity 
leave and benefits) are there signs that 
these issues have been subject to col-
lective bargaining in some cases.
In the EU-15, the influence of EU di-
rectives and also of the EES employ-
ment guidelines is picked up both in 
collective bargaining and in legislation. 
As far as leave and career breaks are 
concerned, agreements have been con-
cluded at the national level in Belgium, 
Ireland, Greece and Finland; at the 
sectoral level in Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and 
Sweden; and in companies in Greece, 
Italy and Portugal. Agreements are rare 
on the protection of pregnant workers, 
childcare and elder care, however — 
they seem to belong to a more exclu-
sive zone of state regulation. Examples 
do exist, however, for instance in the 
recent Irish social pacts which advocate 
the increase of childcare places and out-
of-school-hours childcare services, in 
various recommendations to sectoral 
and company bargainers by the Dutch 
social partners at central level and in a 
number of agreements at sectoral and 
company levels. Legislative measures 
were introduced in Belgium, Portugal 
(equality), Italy (childcare provisions) 
and the Netherlands (pregnant work-
ers, childcare provisions, paternity 
leave and other leave).
Working conditions, autonomy, work 
intensity and health
For most of the 20th century the Tay-
loristic model of work organisation 
was predominant in many parts of in-
dustry and services. The traditional or 
Chart 2.5: Most desirable work-life balance initiatives
Introduction or extension of exi-time
or working-time accounts
A general reduction in weekly working hours
Introduction or extension
of opportunities for early retirement
Introduction or extension of opportunities
for phased retirement
Reduction of overtime or introduction
of time o in-lieu
Introduction or extension of opportunities
to work part-time
No action needed
Better possibilities to change from
unusual hours to normal working hours
Introduction or extension of long-term leave options
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Source: European working time survey, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions.
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Tayloristic model is characterised by 
standardised productivity processes 
and a top-down or prescribed organi-
sation of work, with limited autonomy, 
little flexibility and rigid hierarchies. 
In the 1980s and 1990s new forms 
of work organisation evolved and it 
was generally believed that in most 
industries and also in many services 
the Tayloristic model was counterpro-
ductive, associated with poor quality 
and inflexible in its response to chang-
ing consumer taste and market shifts 
and worker dissatisfaction. With the 
new organisational forms, work or-
ganisations were supposed to change 
towards flatter hierarchical structures 
with greater workers’ autonomy.
Data from the European working con-
ditions survey suggests that in the first 
half of the 1990s EU-15 employees, on 
average, did gain more control over 
the speed of work and over the order 
in which to fulfil tasks. However, this 
trend did not continue after the mid-
1990s and the tendency to decreased 
autonomy of employees appears to 
have continued after 2000. This is also 
the prevailing trend in the EU-12. A 
similar finding is reported for the Unit-
ed States (Osterman, 1999). The diffu-
sion of new organisational models as-
sociated with greater worker autonomy 
seems to have stalled in the 1990s.
Across Member States there is con-
siderable variation. Employees in the 
Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Bel-
gium and Luxemburg, and in Malta, re-
port the highest levels of autonomy on 
all three indicators (Table 2.10, upper 
panel). In the transition economies and 
in southern Europe employees report 
must lower levels of autonomy with re-
gard to the speed of work, but not on 
the other two dimensions, especially 
with regard to the order in which tasks 
must be fulfilled, suggesting stronger 
hierarchical controls. Liberal pluralist 
(Ireland and the UK) and social part-
nership countries (Germany, Austria, 
etc.) fall in between on this indicator.
The lower panel of Table 2.10 reports 
the outcomes on work intensity. Em-
ployees in the Nordic countries report 
the highest levels of work intensity — 
fewer respond that they have ‘enough 
time’ and more that they work at high 
speed and under tight deadlines. Per-
haps surprisingly, employees in the 
transition economies report less work 
intensity. The significantly lower pro-
portion of employees reporting work at 
high speed in the United Kingdom and 
Ireland is also to be noted. The idea that 
longer working weeks are correlated 
with less work intensity, in particular 
speed of work, is not borne out by the 
facts. There appears to be no significant 
relation, across countries, between ac-
tual working hours and speed of work. 
More likely, the higher intensity of work 
in northern Europe is associated with 
more rationalised production methods 
and technological developments, both 
in industry and services.
High work intensity tends to have a 
negative influence on workers’ health. 
This is especially the case when high 
work intensity goes together with low 
work autonomy. According to Ka-
rasek and Theorell (1990) demanding 
jobs need not be bad for health if they 
allow employee control. If, however, 
work intensity is experienced togeth-
er with little control over the job, a 
stressful situation emerges with nega-
tive consequences for health.
Table 2.11, based on the scores averaged 
over the EU-27, supports this idea. The 
Table 2.11: Interaction between work intensity and work 
autonomy in its negative effects on health and stress
‘Work affects health negatively’
Work autonomy
Low High
Work intensity
Low 27.7 23.9
High 43.5 38.0
‘Work leads to stress’
Work intensity
Low 56.3 63.2
High 76.3 69.4
Source: Calculated from the European working conditions survey 2005, European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.
Table 2.10: Work autonomy and work intensity
Nordic 
corporatism
Social 
partnership
Liberal 
pluralism
Polarised 
pluralism
Transition 
economies
Work autonomy
Speed of work 72.4 69.3 69.3 64.2 67.8
Methods of work 80.1 68.5 62.8 58.1 58.8
Task order 83.5 65.9 64.8 53.4 54.7
Work intensity
Enough time 67.3 63.4 69.2 71.6 75.1
Tight deadlines 71.7 63.9 61.0 58.5 58.4
High speed 79.7 64.7 45.3 60.1 52.3
Source: Calculated from the European working conditions survey 2005, European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.
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negative consequences for health and 
the perceived levels of stress are high-
est — at 43.5 % and 76.3 % respectively 
— when employees experience a com-
bination of high work intensity and low 
levels of autonomy. Higher job auton-
omy can partly offset negative impacts 
of high work intensity; the perceived 
negative consequences for health and 
work-related stress decrease signifi-
cantly to 38.0 % and 69.4 %. This is still 
higher than what is felt to be the case 
in situations of low work intensity, even 
where autonomy is lacking. In other 
words, it seems desirable to address 
both the issue of workload — work 
speed and intensity — and the degree 
to which employees have control over 
their work.
The EU Health and Safety Directive 
(89/391/EC) of June 1989 addresses 
some of these issues. In Belgium, Den-
mark, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden legal provisions and those 
based on collective bargaining (Den-
mark) go further than the EU health 
and safety directive by relating health 
at work to detailed aspects of work or-
ganisation. Employees in these coun-
tries report high levels of work inten-
sity but also the highest levels of work 
autonomy. In many Member States, 
however, collective bargaining has yet 
to detail and develop the legislative 
provisions and often regulations lag 
behind the legal framework because 
it establishes only a weak relationship 
between work organisation and health, 
and monitoring instruments are weak. 
This can have potentially negative con-
sequences, not only for productivity 
but also for absenteeism and continu-
ous participation in the labour market, 
especially for older workers.
In October 2004 the European social 
partners formally signed an autono-
mous European framework agreement 
on work-related stress. According to 
that agreement the workload and de-
gree of autonomy should be analysed 
in identifying stress and concurrent 
health risks. If stress and health prob-
lems are identified, the employer must 
take action to prevent, eliminate or 
reduce it, with the participation and 
collaboration of workers and/or their 
representatives. Learning from their 
framework agreement on telework, 
the social partners developed a moni-
toring procedure for the implementa-
tion of the agreement at the national 
level (see Chapter 5; Visser and Ra-
mos Martin, 2008). 
The European Foundation for the Im-
provement of Living and Working 
Conditions published in 2008 a study 
entitled ‘Working conditions and so-
cial dialogue’ (Eurofound, 2008). Di-
rective 89/391/EC is a key reference in 
the study, in particular its clause that 
‘employers shall consult workers and/
or their representatives and allow them 
to take part in discussions on all ques-
tions relating to safety and health at 
work’. In the study, reference is made 
to a number of national surveys and 
reports, for instance in Belgium, Bul-
garia, Germany, Estonia, Sweden, 
Finland and the United Kingdom, 
showing the positive impact of the 
presence of union workplace represen-
tation and works councils on occupa-
tional health and safety. For example, 
a Belgian trade union survey cover-
ing some 3 000 employees working in 
small and medium-sized enterprises 
found a correlation between the pres-
ence of trade unions and the extent of 
the influence that employees reported 
having on managerial decisions relat-
ing to occupational health and safety 
in their company, although the main 
determinant was occupational status 
(De Weerdt et al, 2005). Furthermore, 
the study found that the information 
flow on occupational health and safety 
matters to workers was better if a trade 
union was present. Similarly, a study of 
trade union representatives in Bulgar-
ia, commissioned by the International 
Labour Organisation, revealed a posi-
tive impact of social dialogue in the 
area of occupational health and safety, 
more specifically regarding issues such 
as good access to occupational health 
and safety training, trade union par-
ticipation in the development of oc-
cupational health and safety policies, 
and improvements in occupational 
health and safety as a result of moni-
toring (Rice and Repo, 2000). Finnish 
and Swedish studies reported the posi-
tive effect of safety representatives and 
systematic cooperation between man-
agement and employee representatives 
(Gellerstedt, 2007).
Qualitative studies and administrative 
reports from labour inspectorates are 
another relevant source (Eurofound, 
2008). In the United Kingdom, a re-
port of the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) on stress management reviewed 
organisations, mainly in the public 
sector, that had adopted successful 
approaches to stress management at 
work. Social dialogue and ‘round table’ 
meetings were identified as highly ef-
fective tools in aiding the rehabilitation 
of employees with stress problems and 
in preventing or minimising sickness 
absence; at the same time, they helped 
to highlight shortfalls in management 
skills. (Jordon et al, 2003). The most no-
table example from Ireland concerned 
the establishment of the Construction 
Safety Partnership of 2000, following a 
safety crisis in the industry in the late 
1990s. Among the objectives were the 
appointment of safety representatives 
on all sites with more than 20 workers; 
greater consultation; and the mandato-
ry introduction of training provisions. 
A similar sectoral initiative, highlight-
ing the importance of local and region-
al safety representatives participating 
in planning and follow-up activities, 
took place in Sweden. During the 
project, the number of fall-related ac-
cidents within the house building, road 
and construction sectors decreased by 
almost 3 000, after having increased 
during 1998 and 1999.
Chapter 2: The quality of industrial relations and the Lisbon Strategy
69
Unfortunately, reports by labour in-
spectorates or health and safety au-
thorities that comment on the defi-
ciencies of social dialogue in this area 
are rare. In one such report, the Gen-
eral Inspectorate of Social Affairs in 
France criticised the role of the social 
partners, stating that many bodies in 
which the social partners participate 
fail to take initiatives in the definition 
of priorities for a preventive approach 
(Zeggar et al, 2003). Shortcomings in 
the election and duties of employee 
representatives in occupational health 
and safety have also been observed 
by the Estonian Labour Inspectorate 
(Eurofound, 2008). Labour inspec-
torates can play an important role in 
encouraging social dialogue. In Portu-
gal, for example, the General Labour 
Inspectorate has been involved in or-
ganising seminars and other meetings 
for social partners in the construc-
tion sector. In Romania, the Labour 
Inspection Office works to support 
the development and expansion of 
social dialogue structures, aiming to 
increase the social partners’ involve-
ment at decision-making level and in 
implementation activities. The Office 
also organises awareness campaigns 
and exchanges of good practice. In 
Italy, local-level occupational health 
services and the National Workplace 
Accident Insurance Institute play a 
prominent role both in advising or-
ganisations and providing informa-
tion on occupational health and safety 
matters. Labour inspectorates in the 
Czech Republic are by law author-
ised to inspect compliance with legal 
regulations that establish rights and 
obligations in labour relations for em-
ployers, employees, the appropriate 
trade union body or works council, as 
well as occupational health and safety 
representatives. In Luxembourg, the 
Mines and Labour Inspectorate plays 
an important role in terms of informa-
tion and informal mediation for social 
partners in the mining sector; it also 
provides advice to employer repre-
sentatives, as well as information and 
guidance to employee representatives. 
Finally, in Austria, the labour inspec-
torate has been actively involved in 
trying to encourage social dialogue 
on a sectoral basis, through so-called 
 ‘focus activities’ (Eurofound, 2008).
Conclusion: the quality of 
industrial relations
Industrial relations and the Lisbon 
reform agenda have become inter-
woven. Many issues have entered 
the agendas of the social partners 
at all levels. Various instruments, 
often based on an interaction be-
tween collective bargaining and the 
law, but also information exchange, 
consultation, best-practice diffu-
sion, benchmarking or joint admin-
istration and fund management, are 
used and it is less frequent for one 
method — the law or classical col-
lective agreements with binding ef-
fects — to predominate. Industrial 
relations adds a certain element of 
flexibility to the governance toolkit 
of the European Union and it might 
be argued that without the involve-
ment of the social partners at all lev-
els in the Lisbon Strategy its reform 
agenda cannot be carried out in the 
world of work. It is exactly by add-
ing flexibility in the implementa-
tion, and by raising the support for 
bottom-up solutions, that industrial 
relations provide a key resource.
For social dialogue to be successful, 
particularly in relation to potentially 
contentious areas, both parties need 
to be able to put forward their case co-
herently; at the same time, they need 
to have the mutual trust and respect 
necessary to work together to resolve 
differences. Sometimes, trust between 
the social partners can be built by 
working together on issues that are 
generally less controversial — such as 
telework or training and development 
(Eurofound, 2008) — before moving 
on to more potentially contentious 
topics. But social dialogue is not al-
ways a matter of choice. Employers 
in many areas (such as company re-
structuring, and health and safety) 
are bound by law or agreement, and 
employee representatives and unions 
are under pressure to respond quickly 
when fears over job security arise due 
to restructuring or increased competi-
tion as a result of globalisation.
The Eurofound study on working con-
ditions and social dialogue (Eurofound, 
2008) ends with some important les-
sons that can be extended on the basis 
of the examples in this chapter. Firstly, 
it is crucial that both employer and 
employee representatives ‘buy into’ the 
social dialogue process. If one or both 
parties are not firmly committed to 
making the process work, it is unlikely 
to succeed or get off the ground. In 
some cases, the social dialogue process 
may fail due to irreconcilable differ-
ences between the parties. Obviously, it 
is difficult to bring together parties that 
have opposing views and expectations 
of the social dialogue process. Howev-
er, this can sometimes be achieved by 
introducing the appropriate mediation 
arrangements. Mandatory statutes can 
help by raising the costs of non-dia-
logue and they usually help to protect 
the weaker party in the process.
Difficulties in the social dialogue proc-
ess and the inability to come to mean-
ingful proposals or agreements may 
also be related to internal disagreement 
and a lack of unity within one of the so-
cial dialogue parties. This can happen 
among both employers’ and employee 
organisations and is responsible for 
many failures in social pact negotia-
tions. One of the deeper causes is relat-
ed to decline in membership support, 
especially on the union side, which 
usually makes leaders uncertain and 
hesitant towards agreements that in-
volve deep and lasting commitments.
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Sectors that are dominated by small 
companies, which are often not un-
ionised, present problems in terms of 
the implementation and effectiveness 
of social dialogue, even if the dialogue 
process itself runs smoothly. Building 
and construction, and retailing, hotel 
and restaurants, are sectors dominated 
by SMEs with low levels of unionisa-
tion (and employer organisation in 
some cases); these present considerable 
problems with regard to making and 
implementing agreements, especially in 
the vital areas of working-time, working 
conditions, and health and safety. There 
is a need for both legal and extra-legal 
strategies to ensure that smaller compa-
nies have the necessary means and sup-
port to implement desirable policies.
Finally, some of the social partners ex-
pressed frustration at the fact that, al-
though consulted by the government, 
their views were not always been taken 
into account in the drafting of new 
laws. The OPTEM (2007) study, com-
missioned by the Commission, showed 
that in particular the trade unions, more 
than the employers, were divided about 
the benefits of the European Employ-
ment Strategy and that their ambiva-
lence was related to the perception that 
they had less influence than employers 
over the general direction of the strat-
egy. Several respondents regretted that 
they had only a consulting role and that 
governments were not always forth-
coming with information (22). Where 
such perceptions are held they clearly 
lower the commitment to be involved 
in the implementation of the Lisbon 
Strategy. Ensuring meaningful con-
sultation in the selection of policies at 
the EU and national level is crucial for 
the mutually reinforcing contribution 
of social dialogue and open method of 
coordination process.
22 ‘The European employment strategy — Attitudes 
of the main actors in employment policy in 28 
European countries’, a qualitative study conducted by 
OPTEM and its European partners, on behalf if the 
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs 
and Equal Opportunity, Brussels, July 2007.
There is a wide variety in industrial 
relations across the European Union. 
The ‘quality’ of the actors, in terms of 
power, representation, support, techni-
cal competence, democratic capacity 
for information exchange, and trust-
worthiness differs massively and these 
differences tend to be embedded in 
long-established patterns of relation-
ships between employers, unions, po-
litical parties and states. The ‘quality of 
industrial relations’ is a key issue for the 
regulatory space that industrial rela-
tions can claim against the rival claims, 
or forces, of politics and markets.
Starting with the seminal contribution of 
Freeman and Medoff (1984), higher qual-
ity in terms of performance, productivity 
or worker satisfaction has been attributed 
to the ‘voice’ of unions in the workplace. 
At the macrolevel, Blanchard and Philip-
pon (2004) report that cooperative in-
dustrial relations played an important 
role in alleviating unemployment rates, 
while ‘countries with worse [conflictual] 
labour relations have experienced high-
er and longer-lasting unemployment’ 
(2004:2). This has been corroborated by 
Feldman on a larger sample of industri-
al, developing and transition countries. 
Feldman’s conclusion is that cooperative 
industrial relations ‘have a noticeable 
pay-off in terms of lower unemployment’, 
both ‘among the total labour force, and 
among women and youths’ (Feldman, 
2008:201).
The ‘quality’ of industrial relations is 
directly related to the social and in-
stitutional support that the industrial 
relations actors enjoy in a particular 
political context, but which they must 
also earn (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997). 
Social support is evidenced by member-
ship, mobilising power and standing in 
public opinion. Institutional support is 
based on the recognition of the social 
partners by lawmakers, codified in legal 
norms and supported by public policy, 
of the rights of representation, consulta-
tion and codetermination in particular 
domains of social and economic policy. 
In this chapter the emphasis has been 
placed on the second — institutional 
— dimension, though in the variation 
across country groups or industrial rela-
tions regimes the differences in both di-
mensions were brought out clearly (23). 
The extent to which industrial relations 
are embedded in the wider production 
and employment regime — generally 
the complementarity of institutions — 
is important (see on this also the survey 
of studies in the Industrial Relations in 
Europe 2006 report (EC, 2006b)).
Data are missing for comparing sys-
tematically, and quantitatively, the con-
tribution of industrial relations, explor-
ing differences across Member States 
and regimes, sectors, instruments and 
issue areas, and using a multivariate 
approach. It is tempting to relate the 
‘better’ outcomes in for instance the 
Nordic countries in terms of employ-
ment inclusion, reconciliation of work 
and family life, and work autonomy, to 
the more encompassing organisation 
of the social partners and the ways in 
which they negotiate over a wide range 
of issues including social protection 
and labour legislation, but the influ-
ences of unspecified factors, like a more 
advanced economy and position in the 
international division of labour, or a 
long tradition of learning to do things 
in a particular way, cannot be ruled 
out. Yet, if used with wisdom, the com-
parison of achievements and successes, 
or failures, across countries or regimes 
remains a useful learning device both 
for academics and practitioners, from 
which inspiration can be drawn.
23 A study conducted by the European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions (European Foundation, 2004) proposed a 
concrete set of comparative indicators for measuring 
the quality of industrial relations. Among these 
indicators, also used in this chapter, are those that 
measure the ‘capacity’ of unions and employers’ 
associations to represent their constituencies and 
negotiate binding agreements (organisational densities, 
coverage of agreement, organisational concentration, 
authority and centralisation) and those that measure 
the degree of coordination between them (bargaining 
coordination and engagement in social pact). 
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While Europe’s industrial relations have traditionally been characterised by the 
strength of social partners in comparison to other world regions wage bargaining 
institutions have remained relatively unchanged despite an increasing weakness of 
wage bargaining actors. Trade union density in particular has declined significant-
ly over the last decade. Wage bargaining institutions remain weaker in the 12 new 
Member States (EU-12) than in the EU-15.
Minimum wages are increasing in importance across the EU. Only countries with ex-
ceptionally strong wage bargaining institutions and strong bargaining actors have not 
introduced statutory minimum wages. In countries with statutory minimum wages, 
strong bargaining institutions tend to drive up the relative level of the minimum wage.
The effects of wage bargaining institutions on economic performance are comparatively 
small and tend to be positive. High bargaining coverage rates are associated with lower 
nominal wage growth, less in-work poverty and a smaller gender pay gap. There is a 
strong effect of trade union density on wage inequality.
This chapter is complemented by a short article based on the findings of an ILO mini-
mum wage project which argues that the importance of minimum wages is increasing 
in the EU because of the rise of labour mobility and non-standard work contracts, 
and the weakness of collective bargaining actors.
Development of actors and 
institutions 2000–06 (24)
The conduct of industrial relations 
in Europe is primarily defined by the 
organisational strength of the social 
partners and the degree of centrali-
sation and coordination of collective 
bargaining. In comparison to other 
world regions, Europe’s industrial re-
lations have traditionally been highly 
organised, centralised and encom-
passing; collectively agreed regula-
tion of wages and working conditions 
have usually covered the majority of 
 employees in the economy.
Major changes have occurred over the 
last decade. First, there is a marked 
difference in the degree of organisa-
tion and centralisation between the 
EU-15 and the EU-12. The majority of 
the EU-12 countries are characterised 
by a lower degree of social partner 
membership density as well as a lower 
level of collective bargaining cover-
24  This chapter is based on research and and a draft 
by Anke Hassel, Hertie School of Governance Berlin, 
Alison Johnston, London School of Economics and 
Bettina Wagner, Hertie School of Governance Berlin. 
age. Second, a general decline in the 
membership level of trade unions can 
be observed everywhere. In the EU-15 
countries, unionisation peaked with 
more than 50 % union membership in 
1978 and has been declining ever since 
(Visser, 2003). In EU-12, the average 
unionisation rate has been steadily de-
clining since the early 1990s and was 
below 30 % in 2005.
At the same time, wage bargaining in-
stitutions and coverage rates of collec-
tive agreements tended to be stable over 
time. Wage bargaining institutions and 
industrial relations actors are highly in-
terconnected. Employers’ density rates 
correlate strongly with wage bargain-
ing centralisation and bargaining cov-
erage. Employers’ density rather than 
trade union density has stabilised wage 
bargaining institutions.
Trade union density
Trade unions have been losing members 
in both absolute and relative terms. Apart 
from a few exceptional cases where small 
increases have been reported since 2000, 
this has been significant. Only in Italy and 
France has union membership remained 
stable, while in Belgium and Estonia un-
ion density has increased.
Trade union density varies widely 
across the EU, from very high density 
rates in the Scandinavian countries 
and extremely low densities in France 
and the Mediterranean countries, as 
well as in the majority of the EU-12.
Countries can be classed into three 
types with regard to unionisation. The 
first group has union density rates 
lower than 25 %. This group consists 
of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Ger-
many, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, the Neth-
erlands, Poland and Portugal. The sec-
ond group and consists of countries 
with a union density rate between 25 % 
and 50 %, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and the United Kingdom. The 
third group consists of countries with a 
density above 50 %, Denmark, Cyprus, 
Malta, Finland and Sweden (25).
25 This comparison refers to the density rates in the 
EU after 2003.
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In particular, trade union density in 
central and eastern European Mem-
ber States has been falling dramati-
cally. With the exception of Romania, 
Slovenia and Slovakia, the former 
Communist countries are in the third 
group with the lowest trade union 
density rates. The remarkable decline 
in union density in these Member 
States can partially be explained by 
the role of the trade unions during 
the era of socialism and later politi-
cal upheaval, combined with massive 
changes on the labour market. Moreo-
ver, attitudes towards unionisation 
differ in these countries. Employees in 
transition countries fear that unions 
could harm their own interests. While 
in the traditional western sense, em-
ployees would expect that social 
progress has to be eked out in dispute 
with enterprises, employees in central 
and eastern Europe assumed that their 
welfare depended upon the welfare of 
the company. Fighting against one’s 
employer would mean cutting off one’s 
nose to spite one’s face (Ost, 2000).
Trade union centralisation
Trade union membership losses have 
prompted a response through organi-
sational restructuring in many coun-
tries. Increasing numbers of trade 
union mergers have contributed to a 
constant process of concentration of 
union organisations.
The trend towards merging smaller 
unions into big trade unions can be 
observed in various countries, such 
as Germany, where the United Serv-
ices Union (Vereinte Dienstleistungs-
gesellschaft (ver.di)) was founded in 
2001. In Austria, the 13 big trade un-
ions representing blue-collar as well as 
white-collar trade unions have merged 
into four major trade unions during 
the last two years (see also European 
Commission, 2006, pp. 19–32).
In the United Kingdom, the merger 
of Amicus and the Transport and 
General Workers’ Union, which was 
initially planned to include other un-
ions, created UNITE, the biggest trade 
union in the United Kingdom with 
almost 2 million members. The main 
goal of this merger was an increase of 
the role and involvement of labour in 
economic and social issues as well as 
an increased influence on the Labour 
Party. The merger was completed by 
May 2007 (Hall, 2007).
There is, however, no general trend to-
wards centralisation at the level of peak 
confederations. In Germany, Ireland, 
Latvia, Austria, Slovakia and UK one 
major confederation unites the trade 
unions at the national level. Greece, 
Spain and Portugal each have two major 
unions. The remaining Member States 
have three or more confederations rep-
resenting the trade unions depending 
on occupational, public–private, politi-
cal or regional divisions.
Employers’ organisation density
Data on employers’ organisations is 
scarce and comparisons over time 
are generally not available. However, 
based on the available data, countries 
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Chart 3.1 Trade union density 2000/05 (%)
Source: ICTWSS database 2007.
The indicator measuring trade union density refers to the ratio of actual to potential membership 
and is the result of the total figure of gainfully employed members divided by the number of wage 
earners in the country.
Box 3.1: Trade unions in Romania
While Romania is the post-Communist Member State with the highest trade union density 
rate today, the comparison with the density rate in the early 1990s (80 %) shows a decline 
by more than 50 %. The comparatively high density rate can be traced back to the industri-
al structure of the country and the fact that industry still contributes considerably to GDP. 
These are also the industries with active trade union representation. Moreover, trade union 
organisation is present at various levels including sectoral, national and company level. In 
industry, the predominant level of collective bargaining is the national level. Trade unions 
in Romania are moreover active in political debates and often associated with a political 
party (Chivu 2005). At the same time, the highly privatised and foreign-owned sectors are 
characterised by little or no union representation. 
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can be divided into three groups. The 
first group, with a low employers’ or-
ganisation density rate below 30 %, 
consists of Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland and Slovakia. The second 
group, with a density rate between 
30 % and 60 %, consists of the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, 
Cyprus, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. The third 
group, with a density above 60 %, con-
sists of Belgium, Germany, Greece, 
Spain, France, Luxemburg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Austria and Finland.
As these data show, employers’ organi-
sation density is generally higher than 
trade union density. The only excep-
tions are the Nordic countries, where 
trade union density is higher. There is 
no clear correlation between union and 
employers’ density rates. For instance, 
French unionisation rates are excep-
tionally low, but employers’ density lev-
els are above average. Similarly, despite 
very high union membership rates in 
the Scandinavian countries, their em-
ployers’ density levels are not equally 
high. In the EU-12, with the exception 
of Malta, employers’ organisation den-
sity is below average in all countries 
(the average ranges around 58 %).
Collective bargaining
The conduct of collective bargaining 
is a major influence on the economic 
performance of the industrialised 
world. It can be measured in various 
ways. The most important of these is 
the degree of coordination of wage 
bargaining. Coordination denotes the 
degree of interconnectedness between 
different collective bargaining units.
Coordination can be specified by 
focusing on one particular case of 
coordination, such as collective bar-
gaining centralisation. While both 
concepts aim to define and capture 
the degree to which decisions on 
wages and working conditions are 
determined collectively rather than 
in a decentralised individualised 
form, in this section both concepts 
will be presented separately, keeping 
in mind that centralisation is only 
one aspect of collective bargaining 
coordination. 
The wage bargaining centralisa-
tion index combines a measure of 
trade union concentration and the 
prevalent level of collective bargain-
ing, taking into account both union 
authority and union concentration 
at multiple levels. It is derived from 
the Iversen centralisation index and 
varies between 0 and 1. While tak-
ing account of the multiple levels at 
which bargaining can take place, the 
index weights the degree of authority 
or vertical coordination within the 
union movement with the degree of 
concentration or horizontal coordi-
nation of the union (Iversen, 1998). 
Therefore, countries can score higher 
on the centralisation index if unions 
and employers are highly concentrat-
ed even though collective bargaining 
itself is decentralised. Within this 
concept, the most centralised wage 
bargaining can be found in Austria, 
where the peak trade union confed-
eration has a monopoly over all trade 
union members, wage bargaining 
takes place at the industry level and 
decisions made by the trade union 
confederation and the employers af-
fect all employees. Decentralised 
wage setting is characterised by trade 
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Chart 3.2: Employers' organisation density in 2006 (%)
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Source: ICTWSS database. No data are available for Bulgaria, Ireland and Romania.
Box 3.2: Employers’ organisation in Austria
The highest employers’ organisation density can be found in Austria. The Austrian Federal 
Chamber of Commerce, Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (WKÖ), is based on the princi-
ple of statutory membership of firms. All firms in the private sector are therefore legally 
required to become a member. Apart from some specific professions and government 
services, all branches are organised in economic chambers under the WKÖ. The WKÖ is 
also responsible for collective bargaining with the effect that multi-employer bargaining 
is privileged and thus membership in the employers’ organisation as well as the cover-
age of collective agreements at the sectoral and industry level are high. In the EU, only 
Slovenia has a similar organisational structure of employers’ organisations. In other coun-
tries, membership in employers’ organisations is voluntary and chambers of commerce act 
solely as trade associations.
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union pluralism, plant-level bargain-
ing and low control by unions and 
employers over wage developments. 
There are cases where actors can be 
highly concentrated but collective 
bargaining is decentralised, such as 
in Denmark (Eurofound, 2007a). 
Processes of decentralisation can 
therefore take two routes: a decline 
in trade union concentration or a 
move of bargaining to a lower level. 
The former process has been labelled 
as ‘controlled decentralisation’ (Trax-
ler, 1994). (For further information 
on this composite index see Box 1.2 
in Chapter 1.)
Collective bargaining centralisation 
is higher in the EU-15 than in the 
EU-12. Centralisation in all the EU-
12 is below 0.4 and in the cases of 
Hungary, Poland, Latvia, and Malta 
0.2 (there is no recent reliable in-
formation available on Bulgaria and 
Romania). With the exception of 
Slovenia, the decentralised bargain-
ing structures are combined with low 
density rates of trade unions as well 
as employers’ organisations.
Further centralisation of collective 
bargaining can be observed in Greece 
and Slovenia. In Luxembourg, cen-
tralisation has decreased since 2000. 
Interestingly, both cases of increases 
in centralisation since 2000 have been 
followed by policies aiming at decen-
tralisation since 2006.
In France, decentralised bargaining 
has been explicitly promoted by the 
state through changes in the legisla-
tion on working time and collective 
bargaining. In contrast, the Spanish 
government has tried to counteract 
the growing tendency towards decen-
tralisation by introducing new legisla-
tion such as the royal decree on the 
extension of collective agreements 
(Albarracín, 2005).
In the case of Luxembourg, decen-
tralisation of collective bargaining to-
wards the company level in 2006 was 
accompanied by a first cross-industry 
agreement signed by the central so-
cial partner organisations on telework 
(Wlodarski, 2006). In Greece, the in-
crease in centralisation refers to the 
introduction of social dialogue in 
the national government in 2000 as 
well as to several laws and regulations 
with regard to industrial relations 
and working conditions that have 
been implemented since 2000. A re-
cent example is the national collective 
agreement for the private sector that 
was signed in 2006 for salary as well 
as non-salary issues for all employees 
in the private sector for the period 
2006/07 (Stamati, 2006).
Slovenia has seen an increase in cen-
tralisation which is also correlated 
with the high degree of unionisation 
and employers organisation in the 
country. Recent developments show 
however, that an attempt towards 
decentralisation has been under way 
since 2006. The new three-tier struc-
ture (central, sectoral, company level), 
particularly designed for wage bar-
gaining, allows for greater flexibility 
of wage setting as well as non-wage 
issues according to specific sectoral or 
company needs (Skledar, 2007).
However, as the case of Luxembourg 
has shown, despite the increasing fo-
cus towards decentralisation, cross-
industry bargaining at the national 
level can still play an important role in 
wage determination but also more fre-
quently regarding conditions of work 
and employment. In Belgium, Greece, 
Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands, as 
well as Slovenia and Romania, cross-
industry agreements have been signed 
on issues of a more general and na-
tional concern (Eurofound, 2007b) 
such as minimum wages. There are 
also countries, such as Belgium, Esto-
nia, France, Italy and Luxembourg, in 
which cross-industry agreements are 
signed on more specific issues, such as 
aspects linked to the implementation 
of European social dialogue outcomes 
(telework or work-related stress) 
(Wlodarski, 2008).
Moreover, current agreements con-
cerning EU-legislation and outcomes 
of European social dialogue show 
that in the majority of those Mem-
ber States where agreements between 
the social partners play a role in the 
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Chart 3.3: Collective bargaining centralisation 2000/06
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Source: ICTWSS database.
NB: Data on Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta refer to 2005 rather than 2006; 
no data available for Romania.
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 implementation process they are fixed 
at a central level. A possible reason for 
this contrary tendency is that govern-
ment interest in implementation and 
involvement in these (non-wage) is-
sues is high. These cross-industry 
agreements are based on the prospect 
of legislative implementation in na-
tional law or implementation by the 
industrial relations actors directly, 
and therefore a centralised agreement 
is also justifiable for all parties.
Collective bargaining coordination
Collective bargaining coordination re-
fers to the level of bargaining combined 
with the range of companies/sectors that 
are bound by the collective agreement 
that follows the negotiations (26) (see Box 
1.3 in Chapter 1). The least coordinated 
collective bargaining takes place in the 
United Kingdom, which has a fragment-
ed bargaining structure at the company 
level. The most coordinated collective 
bargaining takes place in Belgium and 
Ireland. In Ireland, centralised wage 
agreements are negotiated in social pacts 
and apply to the economy as a whole.
In the majority of the EU-12 (27) col-
lective bargaining is characterised by 
mixed industry and firm-level bar-
gaining as well as a weak enforceabili-
ty of industry agreements. The average 
score for the EU-12 is 2.7 compared 
with 3.3 for the EU-15.
Romania is an exception among these 
countries, whose coordination of col-
lective bargaining changed in 2001 to-
wards a stronger involvement of cen-
tral organisations and a revitalisation 
of industrial-level bargaining. This is 
strongly correlated with the adoption 
of the new Labour Code in late 2000 
(SEER, 2004). In Lithuania, Slovenia 
and Slovakia the coordination of wage 
26 The measure was initially been developed by 
Kenworthy and was supplemented by Visser.
27 No reliable data exist for Cyprus and Malta.
bargaining is similar to that in Germa-
ny, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Austria. Changes towards a higher co-
ordination of wage bargaining can be 
found in Spain and Finland, where the 
coordination has moved from 3 to 4, 
and in Belgium, where coordination 
has moved from 4 to 5.
Belgium has been constantly moving 
between these two levels for the past 
25 years. The degree of coordination 
of Belgian collective bargaining de-
pends crucially on the involvement of 
the government (see Box 3.3).
Collective bargaining coverage
Collective bargaining coverage is 
an important indicator for the ac-
tual influence of industrial relations. 
 Irrespective of the density rate of 
unions and employers, the coverage 
of collectively bargained contracts 
provides an insight into the scope 
of collective agreements and thereby 
determines the power of the social 
partners aside from their member-
ship levels.
Collective bargaining coverage indi-
cates the number of workers covered 
by a collective agreement divided by 
the dependent labour force (all wage 
and salary earners in employment). 
Based on this indicator the relevance 
and scope of collective bargaining in 
the countries can be evaluated.
The contrast between EU-15 and EU-
12 is particularly strong with regard 
to collective bargaining coverage. The 
average coverage among EU-12 stands 
Chart 3.4: Collective bargaining coordination 2000/06
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Source: ICTWSS database. No data available for Cyprus and Malta.
Box 3.3: Belgium
In Belgium, two different types of agreements can be reached at the macro level. Whereas 
the National Labour Council (CNT/NAR) reaches agreements which are cross-industry 
and are extended to all branches of the respective activity within the country, the effective 
implementation assumes the agreement is recognised at lower levels and is thus difficult to 
achieve. The second possibility refers to negotiations which take place every second year 
outside the bipartite cross-sectoral agreements and cover all companies in the private sec-
tor. These agreements are predominantly political and moral agreements but are neverthe-
less considered to be very influential given the fact that framework agreements are decided 
at this level (Eurofound, 2007c). 
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at 78 %, compared to 58 % for the EU-
15. With the exception of Slovenia, the 
majority of the post-Communist EU10 
have a coverage rate below 50 % and 
thus also below the EU average of 65 %. 
Among EU-15 only the UK has a cov-
erage rate of below 50 %. Coverage rates 
have been largely stable since 2000 in 
the whole EU, and have even increased 
in Spain, France and Finland.
Coverage rates are highly correlated 
with employers’ density rates. In some 
cases, they are the same thing (for in-
stance in Germany, Greece and the 
Netherlands). In these countries, em-
ployers who are member of employers’ 
organisation are generally bound by 
collective agreements. In other cases, 
coverage rates go beyond employers’ 
density rates due to statutory exten-
sion procedures which are supported 
and legislated by governments. This is 
the case in France, where statutory ex-
tension compensates for low trade un-
ion membership levels (Carley, 2002).
Thus, while the density rates of the so-
cial partners, especially in the case of 
trade unions, are tending to decrease, 
the coverage rates might remain stable 
or even slightly increase.
Comparing the coverage rates and the 
degrees of coordination in the Nordic 
states, one can argue that high collec-
tive bargaining coverage rates are posi-
tively correlated with a high degree of 
centralisation. This is also the case for 
Belgium and Austria. Moreover, the 
positive correlation also holds for the 
United Kingdom, where both rates 
are the lowest within the EU-15. In 
the case of collective bargaining cov-
erage, the low levels in the EU-12 are 
strongly linked to the lack of extension 
procedures and the low priority gov-
ernments give to supporting these pro-
cedures. The weak presence of sectoral 
agreements and the predominance of 
company-level agreements go along 
with low degrees of coordination and 
centralisation of collective bargaining 
in these Member States.
According to the results of a question-
naire conducted by the Labour Market 
Working Group of the European Com-
mission, countries with an intermediate 
level of bargaining are characterised by a 
higher level of collective bargaining cov-
erage (European Commission 2007a). 
In countries with coverage rates above 
70 %, sectoral bargaining dominates, 
while in countries where company bar-
gaining prevails coverage rates stand 
at 40 % or below. However, examples 
of multiple bargaining levels such as 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Chart 3.5 Collective bargaining coverage 2000/06 (%)
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2000 99.0 96.0 95.0 95.0 91.0 86.0 81.4 86.0 80.0 70.0 70.0 68.8 63.0 62.0 63.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 61.0 43.9 48.0 41.3 43.0 38.0 36.2 36.3 22.0 19.0 18.0
2006 99.0 96.0 95.0 95.0 92.0 90.0 83.0 81.4 80.0 70.0 70.0 68.8 63.0 62.9 62.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 57.0 49.6 48.0 43.6 40.0 38.0 35.0 33.5 16.0 16.0 11.0
Source: ICTWSS Database. No data are available for Ireland. Data on Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
Malta, Slovenia and Romania refer to 2005 instead of 2006
Table 3.1: Institutional linkages
Correlations
Collective 
bargaining 
coordination
Collective 
bargaining 
centralisation
Union 
density
Employers’ 
density
Collective 
bargaining 
coverage
Collective 
bargaining 
coordina-
tion
Correlation 
coefficient 1.000 .541 (**) .234 (**) .439 .542 (**)
N 450 361 354 20 320
Collective 
bargaining 
centralisa-
tion
Correlation 
coefficient 1.000 .168 (**) .851 (**) .560 (**)
N 361 352 17 320
Union 
density
Correlation 
coefficient 1.000 .135 .270 (**)
N 368 15 316
Employers’ 
density
Correlation 
coefficient 1.000 .797 (**)
N 21 15
Collective 
bargaining 
coverage
Correlation 
coefficient 1.000
N 320
(**) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
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in Belgium, Austria and France, which 
rank highest in collective bargaining 
coverage, show that bargaining levels 
in almost all cases are composed of sec-
tor, industry and company level (ibid 
p.52). This leads to the conclusion that 
although the majority of the Member 
States are characterised by sectoral-level 
bargaining, the combination of sectoral- 
and company-level bargaining leads to 
the highest coverage scores (ibid p.52).
Institutional linkages
The strengths and structures of collec-
tive bargaining actors and institutions 
are interrelated. Strong actors go hand 
in hand with centralised and coordi-
nated institutions and high coverage 
rates. Weak actors correspond to de-
centralised and lowly coordinated in-
stitutions. In some Member States the 
comparatively low density rates of em-
ployers and trade unions are accom-
panied by weak collective bargaining 
institutions. Whereas the weakness 
seems to be particularly prevalent in 
the Baltic States, industrial relations in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and especially in Slovenia are 
more comparable to western continen-
tal European countries like Germany. 
Cyprus and Malta are characterised 
by actors’ densities and coverage rates 
around the EU average.
Neither collective bargaining centrali-
sation, nor bargaining coordination or 
coverage rates seem to be strongly cor-
related with trade union density. But 
collective bargaining centralisation and 
coverage rates are correlated with em-
ployers’ density rates. How do institu-
tional linkages occur? One explanation 
is that in the absence of statutory exten-
sion of bargaining agreements, coverage 
rates depend on high levels of member-
ship of firms in employers’ associations. 
Moreover, collective bargaining centrali-
sation depends on strong employers’ as-
sociations which can enforce collective 
agreements in a given sector. Far reach-
ing coordination can be based on an 
important role for national employers’ 
peak federations (e.g. Austria, Belgium 
or Ireland) as well as on pattern setting 
by key sectors, as in Germany.
If employers’ density rates decline be-
low a certain threshold, centralised 
bargaining will lose its positive effect of 
setting a going wage rate and tend to be-
come increasingly irrelevant for firms. 
High levels of trade union membership 
do not have these institutional effects 
on collective bargaining. As the case 
of France shows, centralised  industrial 
relations institutions do not depend on 
strong trade unions. As a consequence, 
trade union weakness does not auto-
matically contribute to a weakening 
of collective bargaining institutions, 
while a weakening of employers’ den-
sity is more likely to undermine collec-
tive bargaining institutions. 
Minimum wages and 
collective bargaining 
institutions
Statutory and collectively agreed 
minimum wages are an increasingly 
important component of wage setting 
institutions in the European Union, 
particularly in the central and east 
European countries. Minimum wage 
setting institutions interact with wage 
bargaining institutions. In countries 
where wage bargaining is institution-
ally strong – meaning strong actors, 
coordinated processes and high cover-
age rates – statutory minimum wages 
are rare and the lowest wage floor is 
set by the agreement. However, if stat-
utory minimum wages exist, the pres-
ence of unions and centralised wage 
bargaining tends to increase the ratio 
of minimum wages to average wages.
The spread of minimum wage regula-
tions
The majority of EU Member States 
have some form of regulation regard-
ing the establishment of a minimum 
wage. The forms and regulations of 
minimum wages vary between statu-
tory minimum wages and minimum 
wages that are set by collective agree-
ments. While in the former case the 
national minimum wage is defined 
either by national legislation or by an 
inter-sectoral agreement at the na-
tional level, in the latter case the mini-
mum wage is negotiated and defined 
by the social partners at the sectoral 
level. However, there are also combi-
nations of these two possibilities.
The Member States with statutory 
minimum wages are: Belgium, Bul-
garia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, France, Latvia,  Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Roma-
nia, Slovenia, Slovakia and the United 
Kingdom. Cyprus has a statutory mini-
mum wage only for a few specific oc-
cupations in which unionisation and 
collective bargaining coverage are low 
and employees have a weak bargaining 
power. Within this group of countries 
several distinctions can be made with 
regard to the level of the minimum 
wage, the ratio to the average wage level 
within the country, the minimum wage 
coverage and level and female/male em-
ployees receiving the minimum wage.
Box 3.4 The Kaitz-Index
The Kaitz-Index measures monthly minimum wages as a share of average monthly gross 
earnings in industry and services. It is a commonly used measure for the comparison of 
minimum wage levels. (Funk and Lesch, 2005)
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In January 2008 the statutory mini-
mum wage varied from EUR 92 to 
EUR 1 570. While minimum wages 
are lowest in countries like Romania, 
Slovakia and Estonia, these countries 
do show a significant increase of the 
minimum wage level during the last 
10 years (Funk and Lesch 2005). The 
Kaitz-Index (see Box 3.4) shows that 
minimum wages in industry and serv-
ices vary from 33 % to 51 % (28).
Countries with relatively high mini-
mum wages (approximately 50 % of 
the average wage level) are Bulgaria, 
Ireland, France, Luxembourg and 
Malta (29). The countries with an aver-
age percentage below 40 % are Esto-
nia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Roma-
nia, Slovakia and the United Kingdom 
(Eurostat, 2007).
Statutory minimum wages are set and 
regularly adjusted by governments. The 
time span varies from semi-annually as 
in Spain to irregularly as in Latvia. The 
adjustment of the minimum wage usu-
ally follows consultations of the social 
partners, with their involvement rang-
ing from recommendation to intensive 
consultations. In the special case of 
the United Kingdom, the adjustment 
follows a recommendation of the Low 
Pay Commission (Gilman, 1997). The 
Low Pay Commission was granted 
permanent status in October 2001 and 
consists of members from the business 
community, trade unions as well as 
academics who make a recommenda-
tion on the minimum wage level based 
on the evaluation of its economic and 
social consequences for the country 
(Funk and Lesch, 2005).
It can be observed that since the begin-
ning of the decade there has been an over-
all increase of the minimum wage level as 
a share of average wages (Kaitz-Index). 
28 Eurostat: public administration is excluded
29 Eurostat, EIRO; in the Eurostat database on 
minimum wage no recent data are available for 
Belgium, Greece or France. 
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Box 3.5: Minimum wages and undeclared work
Minimum wages have a complex impact on undeclared work. A special Eurobarometer 
survey on undeclared work from the second quarter 2007 revealed the importance of enve-
lope wages (the share of total wages which is paid cash-in-hand and undeclared) in Europe, 
especially in the construction sector. The Commission noted that significant increases in 
minimum wages have been introduced, especially in the EU-12. These were usually set 
in a cautious way (at less than half of the average wage) so as to avoid the destruction of 
regular jobs and substitution by undeclared work. Moreover, in many new Member States 
where the practice of envelope wages is widespread, higher minimum wages reduce the 
margin for negotiating such ‘envelopes’. Hence the Commission pointed out that one point 
to watch in policy design is the respect of minimum wages or wages set by collective agree-
ments and their possible role as levels of reference for envelope wages.
European Commission (2007), ‘Stepping up the fight against undeclared work’ communi-
cation of the Commission, COM(2007) 628 final of 24 October 2007, Brussels.
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Substantive increases can be observed 
especially in some EU-12. While time 
series data from the past 8 years show 
that the majority of the EU-12 countries 
have a minimum wage level below 40 % 
compared to an average level of 44 % in 
the EU-15, the upwards trend has been 
stronger (growing from 31 % in 2000 
to 40 % in 2006 (30)). This indicates that 
there is a tendency towards convergence 
between all Member States in terms of 
the relative minimum wage level.
The level of minimum wages has a 
complex impact on undeclared work, 
which the Commission pointed out in 
a recent communication (see Box 3.5).
In 2005 the average minimum wage le-
vel in countries with statutory minimum 
wages was less than 50% of the average 
gross monthly earnings (Funk and Le-
sch, 2005). Minimum wages which are 
determined by collective agreements 
tend to be higher than statutory mini-
mum wages although data is hard to es-
tablish and often sector-specific. 
30 Own calculations based on the time series data 
available from Eurostat
The number of employees receiving 
minimum wages — the coverage rate 
— varies considerably across countries. 
In the European Union the ratio of em-
ployees receiving minimum wages is 
lowest in Spain, Slovakia and the United 
Kingdom and highest in Bulgaria, Lux-
embourg and Latvia. However, Latvia 
has at the same time a relatively low 
Kaitz index which implies that a large 
proportion of the working population 
is paid at a comparatively low minimum 
wage level. In contrast, there has been a 
recent increase in the minimum wage 
in Bulgaria, leading to higher coverage 
rates. However, the level and coverage 
rate of minimum wages are only weakly 
correlated (.24*). While in a compari-
son of all 27 EU Member States the 
lowest absolute minimum wage level is 
to be found in Bulgaria (EUR 92), the 
Kaitz level indicates that simultaneously 
Bulgaria has the highest proportion of 
workers paid at a minimum wage level.
Minimum-wage setting mechanisms
Minimum-wage setting mechanisms can 
be measured by the degree of government 
involvement vis-à-vis the social partners. 
The minimum wage setting index dif-
ferentiates between eight different levels 
with regard to the involved actors and 
their power when the minimum wage is 
bargained and set. The figure shows that 
in all EU Member States, there is some 
form of minimum wage established in 
at least some sectors, meaning that even 
in countries in which no statutory mini-
mum wages exist, wage levels are set by 
collective bargaining for some sectors. 
The different levels for minimum wage 
2006
2000
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setting are the following (Visser 2007).
0 = No national (cross-sectoral or in-
ter-occupational) minimum wage.
1 = Minimum wages are set by collec-
tive agreement in (some) sectors.
2 = Minimum wages are set by national 
(cross-sectoral or inter-occupational) 
agreement (‘autonomous agreement’) 
between unions and employers.
3 = Minimum wage is set by agree-
ment (as in 2) but extended and made 
binding by law or ministerial decree.
4 = Minimum wage is set through tri-
partite negotiations.
5 = Minimum wage is set by govern-
ment after (non-binding) tripartite 
consultations.
6 = Minimum wage is set by judges or ex-
pert committee, as in an award system.
7 = Minimum wage is set by govern-
ment but government is bound by fixed 
rule (index-based minimum wage).
8=  Minimum wage is set by govern-
ment, without fixed rule.
Statutory minimum wages and collec-
tive bargaining
Statutory minimum wages tend to be 
found in countries with weak collective 
bargaining institutions and weak social 
partner organisations. Countries with 
strong collective bargaining regimes 
tend not to have statutory minimum 
wages. It is however, not clear how 
both aspects are causally related. While 
some authors claim that statutory min-
imum wages lead to trade union mem-
bership decline because employees no 
longer have a reason to join (Aghion 
et al. 2007), there is also empirical evi-
dence that the weakness of collective 
bargaining might have led to the in-
troduction of minimum wages, in the 
UK, for instance.  The debate about the 
minimum wage in Germany (see Box 
3.6) can also point in this direction. 
An explanation for this trend could be 
that labour markets where bargaining 
is highly coordinated do not require a 
wage floor for the least skilled workers, 
because these workers are represented 
or accounted for in collective bargain-
ing on the sectoral or national level.
In countries without a statutory mini-
mum wage (Denmark, Germany, Italy, 
Austria, Finland and Sweden), the so-
cial partners agree on minimum  levels 
of wages in sector-based collective 
agreements. The collective bargain-
ing coverage within these countries is 
generally the highest within the Euro-
pean Union, leading to the conclusion 
that the majority of employees in these 
countries are also covered by some 
form of minimum wage. The highest 
coverage rate is reached in Austria, 
where all employers are members of 
the national employers’ organisation 
and collective bargaining coverage rate 
reaches approximately 98 %. The latest 
developments in Austria show that the 
government has proposed a statutory 
minimum wage of EUR 1 000 for full-
time employees. This has been accepted 
by most of the trade unions and will be 
implemented in 2009 (Adam, 2007).
The level of minimum wages and col-
lective bargaining institutions
Where statutory minimum wages are 
in place, empirical correlations sug-
gest that strong collective bargaining 
institutions tend to push up the level 
of the minimum wage.
Table 3.2: Average level of strength of collective bargaining institutions  
and social partners by the existence of a statutory minimum wage
Statutory 
minimum wage
Collective bargaining 
coordination
Collective bargaining 
centralisation
Collective bargaining 
coverage Union density Employers’ density
No 3.55 .48 80.31 54.31 65.16
Yes 2.96 .38 68.69 34.00 49.66
Box 3.6: The minimum wage debate in Germany
Among the countries without a statutory minimum wage, Germany has the lowest cov-
erage rate of collective agreements. Therefore, the share of employees who are covered 
neither by a statutory minimum wage nor by a collective agreement is higher than in any 
other EU Member State. Minimum wages in collective agreements can be extended to all 
employees in a sector via a ministerial decree based on the consultation with the social 
partners. In some branches, statutory minimum wages have been established as a result 
of the implementation of the Posted Workers Act. Currently minimum wages have been 
extended up to six sectors in 2007 covering approximately 1.4 million workers (Dribbusch, 
2007). As from January 2008, the collective agreement between the trade union and the 
Postal Services Employers’ Association, which represents in particular the market leader 
Deutsche Post AG and other companies which belonged in the past to the former Federal 
Postal Service, has been declared binding, leading to a minimum wage in the postal servic-
es sector (Dribbusch, 2008). After the introduction of a minimum wage for the postal sec-
tor, the private competitors of the Deutsche Post have challenged the decision in court. In 
July 2008, the Cabinet decided to introduce a statutory minimum wage in some branches 
by extending the existing regulations.
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The reason for a positive interaction 
between the strength of bargaining in-
stitutions and the minimum wage level 
could be that with strong collective 
bargaining institutions wages tend to 
be more compressed and low wages are 
generally higher than in labour markets 
with weak labour market institutions. 
This could apply to the setting of mini-
mum wages as well. Also strong social 
partners might push for higher mini-
mum wages in order to avoid low wage 
competition which might undermine 
centralised and all-embracing collec-
tive agreements. It is interesting to note 
that the correlation of the Kaitz-Index 
and employers’ density is very strong 
(.741**) and higher than the correla-
tion with union density (.600**) and 
bargaining centralisation (.581**).
In conclusion it seems that collective 
bargaining institutions are comple-
mentary to statutory minimum wages 
in such a way that statutory minimum 
wages in fact benefit from strong collec-
tive bargaining institutions. A decline 
in employers’ density and thereby a de-
cline in collective bargaining coverage 
might thus not only increase the need 
for a minimum wage floor but also 
make the introduction of a minimum 
wage more likely. On the other hand, 
as long as bargaining coverage remains 
the guiding framework for wage set-
ting in general, statutory minimum 
wages might become a challenge for 
successful collective bargaining. As the 
prolonged discussion on the introduc-
tion of the minimum wage in Germa-
ny shows, it is a long decision-making 
process for countries with traditionally 
strong bargaining institutions to cede 
wage setting to the government.
The effects of wage setting 
institutions on economic 
performance, wages and wage 
equality
Industrial relations institutions play an 
important role in labour market out-
comes. Wage structures and wage in-
creases differ according to the type of 
wage bargaining institutions that exist 
in a given country. So far, however, lit-
tle is known about the effects of indus-
trial relations institutions in the EU-12. 
Since transition countries have under-
gone a major restructuring of labour 
market institutions and trade unions in 
particular have assumed new roles, the 
question of their contribution to the 
European social model remains.
Effects of industrial relations on wages 
and employment
The effects of wage setting institu-
tions on economic performance can 
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Chart 3.10: Monthly minimum wage by employers organisation density
Source: Eurostat/ICTWSS database, 2007.
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be measured in different ways, de-
pending on the context, and consists 
of indicators such as unemployment, 
employment growth, productivity, 
inflation, nominal wage growth, etc. 
This section focuses on wages and 
employment.
In general terms, the theoretical lit-
erature makes assumptions about 
how institutions shape the bargain-
ing behaviour of trade unions when 
facing the trade-off situation of 
choosing between pay and employ-
ment. Depending on the bargaining 
strategy of the union, wages are more 
or less oriented towards promoting 
employment growth. Industrial rela-
tions institutions thereby facilitate 
to a greater or lesser extent nominal 
wage restraint, while at the same time 
making wages less flexible and gener-
ally more compressed.
Economy-wide coordination mecha-
nisms have been accepted as the 
most important factor influencing 
wage bargaining behaviour. As has 
been pointed out by several authors 
(Soskice, 1990; Traxler and Blaschke, 
2000) the coordination of wage bar-
gaining can take place even in organi-
sationally decentralised wage bargain-
ing institutions. If decentralised wage 
bargaining is organised around a pat-
tern-setting mechanism or replaced 
by other mechanisms such as govern-
ment intervention, the lack of formal 
centralisation can be compensated.
If there is no coordination in the wage 
bargaining behaviour, local wage bar-
gaining will reflect the local conditions 
on the labour market and will not be 
sensitive to wider economic constraints. 
Moreover, local bargaining encourages 
leap-frogging with highly profitable 
companies influencing the expectations 
of workers in other companies. Local 
trade unions that are not embedded in 
a national bargaining system tend to ex-
ploit their bargaining power since they 
do not have any reason not to do so 
(Soskice, 1990; Flanagan, 1999).
The coordination argument has been 
countered by the bargaining power ar-
gument. As union bargaining power 
increases, wage settlements should be-
come less responsive to economic con-
straints. Decentralised bargaining struc-
tures tend to face highly elastic demand 
curves, since customers can easily shift 
their purchases to other companies if a 
collective bargaining settlement raises 
wages at one company (Flanagan, 2003). 
As a result, in the economic literature, 
economists such as Calmfors and Driffil 
have hypothesised a hump-shaped rela-
tionship, where highly centralised and 
highly decentralised wage bargaining 
institutions outperform intermediate 
levels of centralisation (Calmfors and 
Driffil, 1988).
The arguments which link wage bar-
gaining institutions to nominal wage 
growth are the same as those which 
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Box 3.7: Major findings
Bargaining coverage: While no effect of bargaining centralisation or coordination was 
found for performance measures, higher bargaining coverage rates were associated with 
lower nominal wage growth, a lower gender pay gap and less in-work poverty.
Trade union density: Trade union density has a significant, robust inverse relationship 
with wage inequality  – thus, higher trade union density is associated with lower wage in-
equality, holding other variables constant. High trade union density countries have higher 
p10/p90 and p50/p90 values (indicating higher wage equality).
Our analysis of the effects of wage setting institutions in Europe reconfirms existing re-
search results stating that institutionally strong labour relations, characterised by strong 
actors, coordinated processes and high coverage rates, have some moderating effects 
on nominal wage developments. It shows that stronger labour relations contribute to 
positive economic outcomes on the labour market and have a robust dampening ef-
fect on wage inequality, poverty and gender pay inequality. While the former effect of 
facilitating wage restraint seems to have become weaker in recent years, the latter effect 
of providing equality could become of increasing importance given the importance of 
egalitarian outcomes for the European social model and the recent challenges of widen-
ing income and wealth gaps.
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are used in the literature on economic 
performance. Wage bargaining actors 
embedded in institutionally strong la-
bour relations are more likely to take 
the negative effects of high wage set-
tlements into account and thereby 
internalise negative externalities. On 
the whole, when controlling for mac-
roeconomic variables such as produc-
tivity, inflation and unemployment 
a higher degree of coordination and 
centralisation should have a dampen-
ing effect on nominal wage increases.
Our regression analysis for all Member 
States using data for the period 1996 
to 2000 tested this proposition. There 
was little significance in the results for 
wage bargaining centralisation, coordi-
nation or minimum wage institutions. 
The only institutional variable which 
proved robust and significant for all of 
the models where it was included was 
collective bargaining coverage (see ta-
ble 1 in annex). Bargaining coverage 
consistently came out with a highly 
significant beta coefficient of about – 
0.33. This result implies that holding 
all other variables constant, the higher 
bargaining coverage a country had in 
this period, the lower its nominal wage 
growth, compared with a country with 
lower bargaining coverage.
This result can point to the difficulties 
of measuring centralisation and coor-
dination, in particularly in the EU-12, 
as the OECD pointed out. Here, wage 
bargaining coverage (which is closely 
related to employers’ association den-
sity) might be a better indicator for 
a greater capacity for internalisation 
of inflationary wage effects through 
wage bargaining institutions. But it 
can also be seen as an indication that 
the role of wage setting institutions is 
indeed changing with degrees of cen-
tralisation and coordination losing in 
importance and being increasingly 
replaced by the question of whether 
workplaces are covered by collective 
agreements at all. Non-covered work-
places would therefore not be more 
flexible as the OECD assumed in its 
‘Jobs Study’ but rather the opposite. 
They would face higher nominal wage 
increases which were not accounted 
for by productivity increases.
Empirically, there is no consensus in 
the literature about the effects of wage 
bargaining institutions on performance 
and in particular employment. Many 
studies covering OECD countries be-
tween the 1960s and today find that la-
bour market rigidities are related to in-
stitutional variables. For instance, in a 
recent comprehensive empirical study, 
Box 3.8 The OECD’s perspective
The OECD Employment Outlook concluded in 2006 that: ‘Overall, recent empirical re-
search … suggest that high corporatism bargaining systems tend to achieve lower unem-
ployment than do other institutional set-ups. Nevertheless, the evidence concerning the 
impact of collective bargaining structures on aggregate employment and unemployment 
continues to be somewhat inconclusive. The overall non-robustness of results across stud-
ies probably reflects, at least in part, the difficulty of measuring bargaining structures and 
practices, as well as the fact that the same institutional set-up may perform differently in 
different economic and political contexts. One exception to this pattern is the robust asso-
ciation between higher centralisation/coordination of bargaining and lower wage disper-
sion. Evidence is mixed, however, about whether the compressed wage structures associ-
ated with corporatist bargaining reduce employment by pricing low-skilled workers — or 
those residing in economically disadvantage regions — out of work’ (OECD, 2006, p. 86).
In its 1994 ‘Jobs Study, the OECD had been particularly critical of statutory provisions that 
extended bargaining coverage beyond union members. This criticism was considerably 
rephrased in 2006 when the OECD conceded that industrial relations structures and prac-
tices are part of the social and political fabric, implying that bargaining structures are not 
easily changed by government action. The report added that ‘Recent experience also sug-
gests that greater allowance be made for the potential contribution of centrally coordinated 
bargaining to achieving aggregate wage restraint, at least in those countries whose histories 
and institutional structures are compatible with such an approach.’
Table 3.4 Unemployment rates by unionisation levels
1990s 2000s
High level of 
unionisation
Low level of 
unionisation
High level of 
unionisation
Low level of 
unionisation
EU-12 8.8 10.3 6.9 11.9
EU-15 7.9 8.9 6.2 7.0
NB: High union density countries are countries with union density levels above 40 %.
Table 3.3 Unemployment rates by degrees  
of bargaining coordination
1990s 2000s
High level of 
coordination
Low level of 
coordination
High level of 
coordination
Low level of 
coordination
EU-12 8.2 10.2 11.4 10.2
EU-15 8.0 8.7 7.0 6.0
NB: High bargaining coordination is above 3.
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labour market institutions were seen 
as a major explanation for differences 
in economic performance accounting 
for 55 % of the variation in unemploy-
ment, the generosity of the unemploy-
ment benefit system being the most 
important factor, followed by taxes and 
union density (Nickel et al, 2005).
However, studies generally disagree 
as to which institution is responsible 
for rigidities and to what extent these 
institutions matter. A recent article in-
cluding a comparison of findings from 
11 econometric studies between 1997 
and 2005 focused on a number of in-
stitutional variables such as employ-
ment protection, unemployment ben-
efit replacement rates, union density, 
a bargaining coordination index, the 
magnitude of the tax wedge, unem-
ployment benefit duration, collective 
bargaining coverage, and expenditures 
on active labour market policies. The 
review shows that so far no single insti-
tutional variable is consistently found 
to be significantly different from zero 
across all studies (Baker et al, 2006).
Another recent study focusing on the 
same set of variables and data came to 
the conclusion that there is no robust 
evidence of labour market institutions’ 
effects on the unemployment rate. 
They did not find evidence that the 
within-country variation of bargaining 
coordination is associated with lower 
unemployment nor that bargaining 
coordination moderates the impact 
of other institutions. The analysis did, 
however, show that higher union den-
sity is related to higher unemployment 
rates, as did previous studies. This ef-
fect declines with growing coordina-
tion, i.e. a more coordinated bargain-
ing system partially internalises the 
externalities caused by wage pressure 
(Baccaro and Rei, 2007).
A first glance at the data used in this 
analysis, which covers all current EU 
Member States between 1990 and 2006, 
reveals only partial support for a posi-
tive effect of bargaining institutions on 
the unemployment rate. While for the 
1990s, unemployment rates were lower 
in countries where bargaining coordi-
nation rates were higher, this pattern 
reversed during the first five years of the 
2000s. Here, lower levels of coordina-
tion in wage bargaining were correlated 
with better employment performance.
However, this pattern cannot be ob-
served vis-à-vis union density rates, 
which are quite often assumed to be 
related to higher unemployment levels. 
Higher unionisation tends to be asso-
ciated with lower unemployment rates 
in all Member States. In the EU-12 this 
relationship is quite considerable, as 
unemployment rates in countries with 
low unionisation rates were double the 
unemployment rate in countries with 
high unionisation. However, this effect 
is driven by relatively few cases.
Overall, the discussion about the role 
of wage bargaining institutions is still 
evolving and there is not enough evi-
dence to make a clear policy judgment. 
Neither a significant negative effect by 
wage setting institutions on unemploy-
ment nor the traditional assumption of 
a positive effect of coordinated wage 
bargaining institutions on unemploy-
ment can be proven. It seems premature 
and unjustified to base policy recom-
mendations on the evidence given in 
the literature (Baccaro and Rei 2007).
Wage bargaining institution effects on 
measures of equality
Throughout Europe, solidarity and 
cohesion are important shared values 
that economic and social policies are 
built on. The relationship between 
employment, work, poverty and so-
cial exclusion is an integral part of 
the Lisbon Strategy. In the Employ-
ment Guidelines EU Member States 
agree to work towards substantially 
reducing segmentation, gender pay 
gaps and in-work poverty. The link 
between quality and quantity of em-
ployment thereby becomes increas-
ingly important given the atypical and 
precarious work patterns augmenting 
the risk of polarisation within society. 
Social partnership and wage bargain-
ing institutions can play an important 
role in achieving greater degrees of 
equality and therefore social cohesion 
in Europe as the analysis shows.
In research on the effects of wage bar-
gaining institutions on labour market 
outcomes, a consistent finding is the 
effect of strong bargaining institutions 
leading to a more compressed and 
therefore more egalitarian wage struc-
ture. Numerous studies have shown a 
negative relationship between the level 
of collective bargaining centralisation 
and the degree of wage inequality.
There are two basic explanations for 
the observation that more centralised 
wage bargaining systems tend to have 
flatter wage structures. The first refers 
to the role of regulation in general: 
trade unions have an interest to curtail 
subjective decisions by management 
and therefore tend to standardise wage 
systems. The less market-driven wage 
setting takes place, the lower the level 
of wage dispersion will be. The second 
explanation assumes a median voter 
perspective of trade union decision-
making: within trade unions there is 
a wage-push from below as long as the 
mean wage is above the median wage. 
In other words: in big trade union or-
ganisations with a majority share of un-
skilled members, the lower wage group 
will try to catch up in wage bargaining 
(Freeman, 1980; Pontusson, 1996).
In the following, the effects of com-
prehensive wage bargaining institu-
tions on equality will be tested using 
a number of different equality meas-
ures, particularly wage inequality, the 
gender pay gap and in-work poverty.
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Gender pay gap
While the promotion of gender equali-
ty has been an integral part of the Trea-
ties of the European Union since 1957, 
in 1998 the Council of Europe defined 
‘Gender mainstreaming’ as the ‘(re)or-
ganisation, improvement, development, 
and evaluation of policy processes, so 
that a gender equality perspective is 
incorporated in all policies, at all levels 
and at all stages, by the actors normally 
involved in policy making’. Since then, 
various policy papers have been com-
pleted on gender equality and equal 
treatment and gender mainstreaming 
was also introduced into the European 
Employment Strategy in 1999. 
The importance of gender equality and 
the reduction of structural imbalances 
in the labour market were set as neces-
sary preconditions for the overall objec-
tives of the Lisbon agenda in 2002. The 
Employment Guidelines of 2003 ask all 
Member States ‘through an integrated 
approach combining gender main-
streaming and specific policy actions, 
[to] encourage female labour market 
participation and achieve a substantial 
reduction in gender gaps in employ-
ment rates, unemployment rates, and 
pay by 2010’. With regard to the gender 
pay gap, Member States are asked to 
pursue policies which, ‘with a view to 
its elimination, […] will aim to achieve 
by 2010 a substantial reduction in the 
gender pay gap in each Member State, 
through a multifaceted approach ad-
dressing the underlying factors of the 
gender pay gap, including sectoral and 
occupational segregation, education 
and training, job classifications and pay 
systems, awareness raising and transpar-
ency’ (European Commission, 2003).
Recent studies of the European Foun-
dation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions and the Com-
mission show that gender segregation 
and pay gaps are a prevalent problem 
at workplaces throughout the European 
Union. Both sector specific as well as 
occupational segregation exists in the 
Member States and impede initiatives 
for equal treatment of female and male 
employees. At the same time, female-
dominated work is often the lowest-paid 
work occurring in sectors with little or 
no collective bargaining coverage and 
little opportunities for training and pro-
motion (Eurofound, 2007d). However, 
recent studies such as the Gender Equal-
ity Report of the Commission of 2005 
show that with regard to labour market 
participation, the gender gaps are con-
tinuously closing and countries with 
high employment rates also provide high 
part-time and full-time female employ-
ment rates. However, while the struc-
ture of the welfare state is transforming 
in many countries, gender segregation 
with regard to pay and career develop-
ment remains an important problem 
(European Commission, 2007b).
The graph compares developments in 
the gender pay gap in 2000 with 2006 
and shows the difference in average 
gross hourly earnings between men 
and women across the whole econo-
my and all establishments (European 
Commission, 2003). It shows that on 
average the gender pay gap decreased 
in the majority of the Member States. 
The only exceptions are Germany, 
Denmark, Italy and Finland, where 
the gender pay gap increased. In Es-
tonia, Austria, Portugal, Slovakia and 
the United Kingdom the gender pay 
gap stayed the same. The gender pay 
gap in 2006 varied from some 4 % in 
Malta to 25 % in Estonia.
In general, Member States can be di-
vided into three different groups. The 
first group, with a gender pay gap 
below 10 % in 2006, consists of Bel-
gium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal, Romania and Slovenia. The 
second group, with a gender pay gap 
between 11 % and 20 % consists of 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Spain, France, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Latvia, Hungary, the Neth-
erlands, Austria, Poland, Finland and 
Sweden. The third group, containing 
all countries with a gender pay gap 
above 20 %, consists of Germany, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Slovakia and the 
United Kingdom. Another interest-
ing finding is the strong reduction 
of the gender pay gap since 2000 in 
majority of Member States.
Can collective bargaining institutions 
and the social partners contribute to 
closing the gender pay gap? In order 
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to analyse and evaluate the interaction 
between the data on gender pay gap 
in the European Union and the bar-
gaining institutions, a cross-sectional 
analysis has been used.
In this analysis (see Table 2 in Annex 
for details), collective bargaining cov-
erage emerges as a crucial determi-
nant for closing the gender pay gap. 
While the interaction with most of 
the indices for collective bargaining 
institutions is rather small or difficult 
to measure given the lack of data, the 
correlation with collective bargaining 
coverage provides some interesting 
results. Collective bargaining cover-
age has a robust, negative effect on 
the gender pay gap, indicating that 
the greater the proportion of the la-
bour force that are subject to collec-
tive bargaining agreements, the lower 
the gender pay gap, ceteris paribus. 
This holds true when controlling for 
secondary education, which has a 
significantly robust, negative effect 
indicating higher rates of proportion 
of women completing secondary ed-
ucation compared to men also works 
towards closing the gender pay gap. 
This effect also holds given a relative-
ly small sample size (EU-27). This is 
comforting, as it also conforms to 
what previous literature has said on 
the effects of collective bargaining 
on the gender wage gap (Felgueroso 
et al. 2007; Blau and Kahn, 2003). 
If coverage is higher, this would in-
dicate that more employees in the 
workforce — including women — 
would fall under terms and condi-
tions determined by collective agree-
ments which not only include pay 
terms but also equal  opportunities 
policies. Interestingly, macroeco-
nomic indicators (unemployment 
and GDP per capita) do not demon-
strate a high significance, indicating 
that unemployment performances as 
well as country wealth do not appear 
to influence the gender gap.
Therefore, in the light of the aggre-
gate data, it appears that an EU coun-
try with higher bargaining coverage, 
holding everything else equal, gener-
ally tends to have a lower gender pay 
gap than EU countries with low bar-
gaining coverage. In this sense, collec-
tive bargaining institutions can have a 
narrowing effect on the gender gap.
With regard to part-time employment, 
first calculations with the available data 
indicate that the greater proportion 
of women in part-time employment 
compared to men would correlate with 
a higher gender pay gap. However, the 
lack of significant results should not 
lead one to conclude that part-time 
employment has little significant effect 
as the sample size is quite small.
However, collective bargaining coordina-
tion shows a significant positive correla-
tion with the gender pay gap. This would 
indicate that, holding all other variables 
constant, an increase in wage bargain-
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ing coordination would prompt a slight 
increase (around 0.02 % for every 1 unit 
increase in the index) in the gender pay 
gap.  While the increase is not of sub-
stantial magnitude, holding everything 
else equal, a country with a coordination 
index of 5 would have a 0.1 % higher gen-
der pay gap compared to a country with a 
coordination index of 0.   
In conclusion, more data is needed in 
order to be able to define the causes 
of the gender pay gap and their inter-
relations with institutional settings. 
Moreover, as a recent study by Rubery 
et al. (2005) has shown, the traditional 
or mainstream approach to the gender 
pay gap has focused primarily on gen-
der pay gaps and in particular women’s 
deficiencies relative to the attributes of 
men. This approach which has also been 
followed in this section provides only a 
general overview of the gender pay gap 
as women have for example closed the 
gaps in education and experience and 
other factors have become more impor-
tant in explaining the gender gap. 
Wage inequality 
The existing literature on the rela-
tionship between wage inequality 
and industrial relations institutions 
shows that in some Member States 
such as the United Kingdom there 
is a clear relationship between the 
decline in union membership and 
the rise in wage inequality (Machin, 
1997). This finding has been con-
firmed by other authors who in a 
comparative study came to the same 
result that there is a significant neg-
ative impact of trade union density 
and bargaining coverage on wage 
inequality in 16 countries.  Union 
density can be defined as the single 
most important factor influencing 
wage inequality across institutional 
contexts; its effects are consistently 
egalitarian and they are greater than 
those of any other institutional fac-
tors (Rueda, Pontusson, 2000). A 
third factor which has been identi-
fied to have a significant effect on 
the (un-)equal distribution of wages 
seems to be the wage setting level i.e. 
the degree of collective bargaining 
centralisation (Wallerstein, 1999). 
According to some authors, a higher 
level of centralisation leads to lower 
degrees of wage dispersion. These 
primary findings for the enlarged 
EU were tested with regard to their 
interrelation with the wage bargain-
ing  institutions  described above.  
Two prominent measures of wage in-
equality were used (p10/p90 and p50/
p90), which reflect the relative share 
of the highest 10 % or 50 % to the low-
est 10 % of wages. 
The regressions (see table 3 in annex) 
on the minimum wage setting level 
did not show any significance, even 
when trade union density was exclud-
ed from the models. Thus, there does 
not appear to be sufficient evidence 
that minimum wage institutions (at 
least the data we have) explain the 
wage distribution of the lowest 10th 
percentile compared to the highest 
10th percentile amongst EU countries. 
Also, wage bargaining centralisation, 
bargaining coverage and wage bar-
gaining coordination did not appear to 
have any significant effect on p10/p90. 
However, trade union density had a 
very significant and robust positive ef-
fect on p10/p90. This would mean, as 
with the above analysis, that countries 
with higher trade union densities, 
holding all other variables constant, 
have higher p10/p90 values and thus 
higher wage equality. A 10% increase 
in the trade union density ratio would 
increase the p10/p90 ratio, on average, 
by around 2%, ceteris paribus. 
The in-work poor 
The rise of a knowledge-based society 
with constantly improving informa-
tion and communication technolo-
gies can also be a pattern for exclu-
sion widening the gap in quality of 
life between skilled and low skilled. 
This phenomenon creates a new cat-
egory of those affected by poverty: the 
in-work poor. The Eurostat indicator 
combines various aspects of work and 
the poverty threshold. Work is defined 
as at least 15 hours of employment 
as well as the most frequent activ-
ity status in the last year. The poverty 
threshold refers to relative monetary 
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The minimum wage has returned to the EU policy agenda. EU en-
largement and legal developments have contributed to this. While 
only nine out of the EU-15 Member States have introduced a statu-
tory national minimum wage, the integration of the 12 new EU 
Member States has significantly increased the proportion of Mem-
ber States with such a system: 20 out of 27 now have a national statu-
tory minimum wage.
Symbolic of the revival of minimum wages was the decision by the 
United Kingdom to introduce a national minimum wage in 1999 
(the previous government having dismantled the system of indus-
try minimum wages in the 1980s), imme-
diately followed by Ireland in 2000. From 1 
January 2009 Austria will also introduce a 
national minimum wage fixed by collective 
agreement. The possibility of implement-
ing a national minimum wage has also been 
debated recently in Germany and Sweden, 
where minimum wages are traditionally 
fixed by sectoral collective bargaining. The 
issue remains open and discussions taking 
place in these countries are addressing the 
pros and cons of such a shift for their econ-
omy and society, as well as for their indus-
trial relations system. Among the candidate 
countries, in 2008 Croatia implemented a 
new law on minimum wages, while Turkey 
decided to reduce taxes for minimum wage 
earners in 2008.
This renewed interest in the minimum wage 
is confirmed by the statistics. Globally, over 
the most recent period, 2000–08, nearly all 
countries — 18 out of the 20 with a statutory 
minimum wage — have allowed the minimum wage to increase in 
real terms to improve the purchasing power of workers at the lower 
end of the labour market. The growth has been particularly marked in 
the EU-12 — Estonia tops the rankings with + 94 % — but it has also 
been significant in some EU-15 countries such as the United King-
dom (+ 25 %), followed by Spain, Ireland, France and Greece, and in 
Turkey (+ 22 %).
This more active minimum wage policy is also illustrated by the in-
crease in the minimum wage relative to the average wage, which 
increased in 13 out of 20 countries between 1995 and 2007, with the 
Box 3.9: The minimum wage revisited in the enlarged EU
Chart 1: Change of minimum wage in real terms, 2000-07
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poverty being less than 60 % of the 
median equalised household income. 
The latter is of particular  importance, 
as the entire household and not only 
the working individual are considered 
within the definition. 
This distinction is justified by the fact 
that the incidence of poverty is strong-
ly influenced by household structures 
and household employment patterns. 
Therefore, in-work poverty must be 
analysed not only through individual 
characteristics linked to the particular 
person and their occupation but also 
through household characteristics 
(Eurostat 2005). 
Regression analysis (see table 4 in 
annex) controlling for GDP per cap-
ita and in-work poverty shows that 
countries with a higher average GDP 
per capita have a lower proportion of 
their labour force disposing of less 
than 60 % of the national median in-
come than poorer countries. 
Wage bargaining centralisation and 
coordination do not appear to have 
any significant effect on the propor-
tion of workers disposing of less than 
60 % of the average income. However, 
bargaining coverage has a significant 
and robust negative effect on this vari-
able. This would indicate that, holding 
all other variables constant, a country 
that has a 60 % trade union density 
rate as opposed to a 50 % trade union 
density rate will have a proportion of 
workers having below poverty-line in-
come that is 0.5% smaller.
In addition to this chapter, text box 3.9 
gives the first findings of an ongoing 
ILO project on minimum wages. 
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EU-27 average ratio increasing from 40 % to 
41.5 % over the period. Two countries expe-
rienced an advance of more than 10 points — 
Estonia and the Czech Republic — followed 
by Lithuania and Hungary. Turkey has also 
experienced an increase of 18 points. Finally, 
among those countries that have experienced 
adverse minimum wage developments since 
the mid-1990s, a few of them shifted recently 
to a more active minimum wage policy; for 
example Spain, where the minimum wage in 
real terms has increased since 2000 by 26 %, 
and Greece (+ 14 %) and Poland (+ 11 %).
There are three major reasons for such a re-
newed interest in minimum wages.
Increased labour and capital mobility
The first is the increased mobility of labour 
and capital after EU enlargement, but also 
intensified flows at international level. The 
arrival of significant numbers of migrant 
workers, often hired on lower wages and un-
der more intensive working conditions, has 
put the ensuing new labour reserve in the 
spotlight. In countries such as Ireland and the United Kingdom not 
only has the minimum wage helped to reassure domestic workers 
that their pay will not be undermined by such immigration, but it 
has also protected workers from central and eastern Europe from 
excessively low wages. It also became an element in attracting them 
in a context of labour shortages. Interest in minimum wage develop-
ments has also developed among countries of origin as a potential 
tool for limiting outward migration, as in Poland where a minimum 
wage for healthcare employees has been proposed.
New forms of employment contracts and low pay
The second reason is the rise, since the late 1990s, of new forms of 
employment contract such as part-time work, self-employment and 
temporary employment. While this has certainly managed to boost 
employment it also had the effect of confining certain categories of 
workers to the more precarious employment conditions often as-
sociated with lower wages. In Germany, 85 % of those with so-called 
‘mini-jobs’ have been found to be low paid (below two thirds of 
the median wage). The case is similar in Spain among workers on 
fixed-term contracts. Low pay is also increasingly prevalent among 
part-timers in the Netherlands. It is important to report, however, 
that the increase in the minimum wage has been accompanied by a 
decrease in the number of low-paid workers in countries such as the 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, France, the United Kingdom and Turkey. 
In contrast, the decline of the minimum wage has coincided with 
an increase in the number of low-paid workers in the Netherlands 
and Poland.
The progressive decline of collective bargaining
Another explanation must be found in the progressive decline 
in trade union membership and collective bargaining coverage 
observed in most EU countries. To counter their declining influ-
ence in the wage-fixing process — especially in those countries 
without a statutory minimum wage — many trade unions have 
pushed for the introduction of such a statutory tool to help them 
to keep better control of workers’ real wages and purchasing pow-
er. It is also possible that this new interest in the minimum wage 
is due to the difficulties of existing industrial relations systems 
to deal with the combination of the two factors described above, 
namely increased mobility and new forms of employment. It is 
true that migrant workers are present mainly in sectors such as 
construction, hotels and restaurants and hospital cleaning, which 
remain, like many service activities, traditionally less covered by 
collective bargaining. Moreover, the decision of the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities in the Laval case in Sweden is 
a challenge to traditional collective bargaining without statutory 
minimum wages.
Towards an EU minimum wage?
The new context has also led to suggestions to introduce a mini-
mum wage at EU level. However, most observers agree that it is not a 
minimum wage as such that should be envisaged at EU level, but the 
need to introduce national minimum wages and a number of basic 
principles. Basic principles could cover such important questions as 
the existence, scope and beneficiaries of the minimum wage — cer-
tain categories of workers are excluded from the national minimum 
wage in several countries — as well as recommendations concerning 
its level compared to other variables, such as the subsistence mini-
mum or the average wage.
Such policy guidelines at EU level, eventually combined with ex-
change of good practices between EU Member States, may contrib-
ute to improving minimum wage institutions in the near future.
This box is based on a text drafted by Daniel Vaughan Whitehead 
(ILO), and relates to a project carried out by the ILO with financial 
support of the European Union: Vaughan-Whitehead, D. (ed) (2008) 
The minimum wage revisited in the enlarged EU, ILO, Geneva.
Chart 2: Change of minimum wage compared to the average wage, 1995-07
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Annex
Table 1: Economic and institutional factors affecting  
nominal wage changes in EU Member States
Independent variables I II III
Nominal wage growth (– 1) – 0.15* – 0.1046 – 0.1346
0.073 0.203 0.102
Productivity growth 0.4942** 0.4190** 0.510**
0.02 0.048 0.014
Productivity growth (– 1) 0.115186 0.053494 0.12343
0.569 0.788 0.53
Unemployment (– 1) – 0.69*** – 0.61*** – 0.60***
0.007 0 0
Unemployment – 0.0461 – 0.031** – 0.031**
0.205 0.016 0.011
Inflation 0.478*** 0.8417** 0.469***
0 0.032 0
Inflation (– 1) 0.255** 0.6387* 0.259**
0.02 0.083 0.015
Bargaining coverage – 0.35*** – 0.32*** – 0.34***
0 0.001 0
Coordination 1.51783 0.317246
0.601 0.517
Centralisation – 0.2178 – 0.0639
0.55 0.523
Constant 29.28*** 16.782** 33.38***
0 0.013 0
Observations 148 148 148
F– statistic 6.06*** 6.67*** 7.33***
R– squared (within) 0.4043 0.4482 0.4058
R– squared (between) 0.4089 0.3998 0.4127
R– squared (overall) 0.3289 0.3217 0.3278
Rho_AR 0.125573 0.067987 0.110661
Rho_fov 0.948422 0.95911 0.956174
Modified Bhargava et al. Durbin– Watson 1.911995 1.958525 1.921784
NB: Some control variables are omitted in table. In 1997, wage growth in Bulgaria was 848 and in Romania inflation was 107%.  
Therefore, these two outliers were excluded. 
Dependent variable is nominal wage growth. The p-value is below the coefficient.
*, **, and *** indicated significance on a 0.90, 0.95 and 0.99 confidence interval, respectively.
An AR(1) time series model was used.
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Table 2: Regression analysis; gender pay gap as dependent variable
Independent variable I II III IV V VI
Part-time gap 0.0833 0.157* 0.1302 0.1670* 0.11102 0.0498
(0.303) (0.092) (0.190) (0.076) (0.161) (0.560)
Secondary education gap -0.524* -0.686** -0.692** -0.702** -0.647** -0.467
(0.075) (0.020) (0.020) (0.047) (0.049) (0.122)
Tertiary education gap -0.4587 -0.1644 -0.1262 0.03104 -0.3129 -0.0252
(0.250) (0.707) (0.771) (0.946) (0.467) (0.940)
Bargaining coverage -0.06 -0.155** -0.143** -0.183** -0.152**
(0.197) (0.017) (0.038) (0.011) (0.037)
Wage coordination 0.025** 0.026** 0.029** 0.0245**
(0.039) (0.048) (0.014) (0.050)
Government intervention -0.0096
(0.511)
MW bargaining level 0.00309 0.00587
(0.500) (0.315)
TU density 0.0849 -0.0235
(0.215) (0.663)
Observations 19 19 13 18 18 25
F-statistic 3.17** 10.08*** 23.7*** 7.63*** 7.56*** 0.91
(0.047) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.474)
R2 value 0.4076 0.5314 0.6505 0.5852 0.6358 0.1134
Dependent Variable is gender pay gap. 
*, **, and *** indicated significance on a 0.90, 0.95 and 0.99 confidence interval, respectively. P-values using robust standard errors are in parenthesis. These 
findings are based on an Ordinary Least Squares method, with cross sectional data using the average gender pay gap between 1995-2006. The data source 
for these calculations is Eurostat data on education and pay.
In these regressions, the variable centralisation has not been included, as previous controls showed that collective bargaining and centralisation were 
significantly and positively correlated – almost on a 1-to-1 basis, which is expectable given the fact that centralisation is a form of coordination.
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Table 3: Regression analysis: wage inequality (P10/P90) as dependent variable
Independent variable I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Ln GDP per capita 0.1046** 0.0965** 0.0820* 0.132*** 0.0664 0.0968* 0.148*** 0.1067
 (0.042) (0.060) (0.098) (0.007) (0.265) (0.069) (0.007) (0.154)
Unemployment 0.1519 0.328 0.3083 0.0017 0.0353 0.2828 0.0432 0.2523
 (0.674) (0.493) (0.390) (0.996) (0.929) (0.474) (0.922) (0.607)
Export share -0.0087 -0.0006 -0.0263 -0.0409 -0.013 -0.0447 -0.0634 -0.0623
 (0.858) (0.991) (0.407) (0.225) (0.723) (0.165) (0.103) (0.395)
Average part-time 0.0993 0.1331 0.1453 -0.0007 -0.0666 0.1949 0.0905 0.1513
 (0.468) (0.564) (0.398) (0.996) (0.695) (0.268) (0.527) (0.393)
Secondary education -0.014 0.0820 0.0283 0.1569 0.1743* 0.0552 0.1746 0.0824
 (0.919) (0.597) (0.793) (0.163) (0.087) (0.655) (0.134) (0.588)
Tertiary education -0.2465 -0.1151 -0.3003 -0.0902 0.217 -0.3768* -0.2191 -0.389*
 (0.348) (0.677) (0.111) (0.740) (0.547) (0.093) (0.392) (0.099)
MW bargain institutions  -0.0098      0.00599
  (0.282)      (0.654)
TU density   0.2120***   0.1904***  0.2152**
   (0.009)   (0.009)  (0.037)
Wage coordination    0.018  -0.0050 0.0123 0.0111
    (0.097)  (0.772) (0.259) (0.447)
Coverage     0.117    
     (0.122)    
Government intervention      0.0153 0.0202 0.0122
      (0.268) (0.144) (0.502)
Constant -0.6757 -0.6585 -0.549 -1.075** -0.5262 -0.7216 -1.251** -0.8653
 (0.202) (0.174) (0.243) (0.022) (0.306) (0.167) (0.019) (0.262)
Observations 25 22 23 23 19 23 23 22
F-statistic 2.56* 2.94** 5.41*** 2.58* 3.25** 4.78*** 2.41* 3.63**
 (0.057) (0.041) (0.003) (0.058) (0.040) (0.005) (0.072) (0.023)
R-squared 0.3338 0.4972 0.6746 0.5281 0.5458 0.6957 0.5604 0.7055
Dependent variable is P10/P90 ratio (percentages are expressed as between 0 and 0.1 rather than 0 and 100).
*, **, and *** indicate significance on a 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99 confidence interval, respectively. OLS regression method used.  
P-values using robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
When standard OLS regressions were conducted using two different measures of wage inequality (P50/P90 ratios and P10/P90 ratios) as dependent 
variables for three separate regressions, trade union density had a consistent, significant, inverse relationship with wage inequality, across over 30 regression 
models for robustness checks.  Controlling for Ln GDP per capita, export share, unemployment levels, proportion of the population with a secondary 
qualification and tertiary qualification, as well as other industrial relations variables (wage coordination, minimum wage bargaining institutions, 
and centralisation), trade union density was significantly, and negatively correlated with wage inequality. We found the significant, robust correlations 
particularly striking considering the fact that our sample included only 25 countries.
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Table 4: Regression analysis: percentage of in-work poor as dependent variable:
Independent variable I II III IV V VI VII
Ln GDP per capita -0.0105 -0.0218 -0.0235 -0.027* -0.008 -0.0058 -0.003
 (0.668) (0.318) (0.242) (0.100) (0.714) (0.803) (0.876)
Unemployment 0.2688 0.1047 0.2691 0.334 0.2986 0.1147 0.0570
 (0.213) (0.550) (0.245) (0.125) (0.206) (0.547) (0.673)
Export share -0.0079 0.0033 0.0082 0.0097 0.0011 0.0060  
 (0.764) (0.891) (0.694) (0.600) (0.951) (0.788)  
Average part-time -0.0176 -0.0258 0.0130 0.035 0.0250 -0.0111  
 (0.797) (0.688) (0.841) (0.554) (0.719) (0.900)  
Secondary education -0.0602 -0.138** -0.1333** -0.148*** -0.1483** -0.1629** -0.161***
 (0.372) (0.047) (0.020) (0.010) (0.013) (0.038) (0.005)
Teritiary education -0.0950 -0.1616** -0.1646** -0.1882** -0.2059* -0.2011* -0.2098**
 (0.286) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.056) (0.079) (0.039)
MW bargain institutions  0.0011    -0.0019 -0.001
  (0.734)    (0.619) (0.676)
Trade union density   -0.0241     
   (0.346)     
Wage coordination    -0.0054   0.005
    (0.209)   (0.362)
Coverage     -0.0530** -0.0526* -0.0679*
     (0.044) (0.069) (0.081)
Constant 0.2094 0.3740* 0.3808* 0.4236** 0.2726 0.2802 0.2525
 (0.417) (0.097) (0.057) (0.014) (0.185) (0.234) (0.206)
Observations 25 22 23 23 19 18 18
F-statistic 1.82 5.04*** 6.51*** 4.7*** 5.07*** 3.17* 4.24**
 (0.151) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.009) (0.053) (0.020)
R-squared 0.3442 0.5789 0.5957 0.616 0.6495 0.675 0.6852
Dependent variable is proportion of in-work poor (percentages are expressed as between 0 and 0.1 rather than 0 and 100).  
*, **, and *** indicate significance on a 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99 confidence interval, respectively.  OLS regression method used.  
P-values from robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
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The Macroeconomic Dialogue (MED), 
instituted by the June 1999 Cologne 
European Council, contributes to the 
growth and stability orientation of the 
macroeconomic framework in the EU. 
It provides a high level forum for the 
exchange of views between the Coun-
cil, Commission, European Central 
Bank and the social partners.
According to the European Council of 
Cologne, the MED should focus on the 
economic situation and outlook and 
the macroeconomic policy mix. The 
MED is based on the principle that 
key macroeconomic policy stakehold-
ers and decision-makers and those re-
sponsible for wage formation should 
have a proper understanding of each 
other’s positions and constraints in 
carrying out their respective respon-
sibilities. Against that background, 
its purpose is to improve the inter-
action between wage developments 
and monetary and fiscal policies to 
make it conducive to non-inflationary 
growth. An important feature of the 
MED is the strict confidentiality of 
the proceedings so that participants 
can speak freely and frankly with con-
fidence, considered to be crucial for 
the success of the MED.
The MED, which takes place twice a 
year, has a two-layer structure; politi-
cal and technical. The organisation of 
the MED at political level (MEDPOL) 
is a matter for the Presidency of the 
time, assisted by the Council secretari-
at. The MEDPOL is preceded by a pre-
paratory technical meeting which the 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) 
sets the framework for. The President 
(or Vice-President) of the EPC acts as 
moderator and sets the agenda for the 
meeting at technical level, in agree-
ment with the EPC and the Council 
Presidency, having regard to the views 
of the other participants. In its rec-
ommendations for strengthening the 
macroeconomic dialogue from March 
2006, the EPC suggested:
•  the first of the two meetings in the 
year should also include strategic 
topics linked to the Spring Europe-
an Council, in particular the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines and the 
Lisbon strategy, reflecting their mac-
roeconomic implications;
•  the second meeting in the year could 
also include a discussion of policies 
to further improve the interaction 
between wage developments, mon-
etary and fiscal policies. Ideally, the 
MED should then take place after 
the publication of the new autumn 
forecasts. 
The secretariat for the meeting at 
technical level is provided by the 
Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs; the 
Commission services are also typical-
ly asked to introduce the discussions 
at the technical level. The moderator 
then reports briefly to the political 
level on the main results of the discus-
sions at the technical level.
The social partners are represented by 
BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME and 
CEEP on the employers’ side and by 
ETUC on the trade unions’ side.
For the Industrial Relations in Eu-
rope 2008 report, the Commission 
has invited the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) and BUSINES-
SEUROPE to present their views on the 
functioning and the future of the MED. 
Their articles are quoted in full.
The background: European integration 
and wage formation
A key point which cannot be stressed 
enough is that European integration, 
in particular monetary integration, 
has had a profound impact on the 
processes and dynamics of wage bar-
gaining. As illustrated in the graph 
below, collectively bargained wages at 
the level of the euro area have become 
extremely disciplined already since 
the beginning of the 1990s. During 
this entire period, growth of collec-
tively bargained wages has stayed ex-
tremely close to the 2 % price stability 
target of the European Central Bank, 
thereby leaving most of productivity 
growth to capital and increasing profit 
shares. Even now, at the peak of the 
recent upturn, with unemployment 
falling and with rising energy and 
food prices eating away the purchas-
ing power of wages, growth of collec-
European social partners’ views  
on the Macroeconomic Dialogue
The Macroeconomic Dialogue: experiences and evaluation  
from the point of view of the ETUC
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tively bargained wages is still subdued 
and limited to 2 % in the last quarter 
of 2007.
This structural change in the dynam-
ics of collectively bargained wages has 
primarily to do with reforms initi-
ated at the national level in response 
to the process of European monetary 
integration. Social partners in several 
Member States clearly understood that 
currency devaluations were no longer 
possible in monetary union and re-
formed their wage bargaining systems 
with the aim of preventing wages from 
getting out of line in the first place. 
On the other hand, Member States 
with an already existing tradition of 
‘competitive disinflation’ started to see 
monetary union as an opportunity to 
intensify wage moderation policies 
since gains in competitiveness in re-
lation to other members of monetary 
union would no longer get erased by a 
revaluation of the national currency.
The Macroeconomic Dialogue in the 
past: turning wage moderation into a 
call for growth and job friendly macro-
economic policy mix
Against this background of ongoing 
wage moderation, the ETUC’s key 
message towards the other discussion 
partners in the Macroeconomic Dia-
logue has consistently been to stress 
that trade unions were playing their 
part and that other actors (monetary 
and fiscal policymakers) should now 
take up their responsibility. The idea 
behind is that, if wage moderation is 
to work and produce more and bet-
ter jobs, monetary and/or fiscal policy 
needs to become expansionary so that 
losses in aggregate demand triggered 
by a stagnation of real wages can be 
compensated for.
In the ETUC’s experience with the 
discussions in the Macroeconomic 
Dialogue, this rather basic approach 
was and remains highly necessary 
given the fact that, with the exception 
of employer organisations who are 
also close to collective bargaining re-
ality, the other policy makers (central 
banks, finance ministers, Commission 
and EPC) have not been able to fully 
grasp the sea change that has taken 
place in the structure of collective 
bargaining. Indeed, again and again, 
the ETUC has been confronted at the 
Macroeconomic Dialogue with calls 
to change wage behaviour and deliver 
more “responsible” wage settlements, 
even though wage moderation was al-
ready ongoing.
This lack of understanding can be 
partly explained by the fact central 
bankers and finance ministers have 
tended to focus on wage demands 
and less on the actual agreements 
coming out of the bargaining process 
themselves: wage demands of 5 % or 
6 % easily enter the mind of central 
bankers and finance ministers, where-
as these actors tend to be oblivious 
to the fact that such a wage demand 
is part and parcel of a  negotiating 
 process and that the actual outcome 
is actually a modest one. In this way, 
wage bargaining remains associated 
in policy thinking with potential in-
flation instead of being thought of as 
a force for disinflation.
This bias in the way wages and collec-
tive bargaining are perceived also has 
consequences for the issues discussed 
at the Macroeconomic Dialogue itself. 
Indeed, there have been systematic 
attempts from the side of other ac-
tors to shift the discussion away from 
macroeconomic policies towards the 
theme of structural reforms. If wag-
es are indeed part of the problem, it 
may indeed seem logic to do so and 
to promote more structural reforms 
in labour and/or product markets to 
change wage bargaining behaviour. 
However, doing so when wages al-
ready are part of the answer does not 
make any sense.
Impact on internal organisation within 
the ETUC
How did the ETUC organise itself 
internally in order to prepare its in-
put into the MED? In parallel with 
the creation of the MED, the ETUC 
at its 1999 Helsinki Congress decided 
to install a committee on the coor-
dination of collective bargaining in 
Europe, assembling those trade un-
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ion officers responsible for (the coor-
dination of) collective bargaining in 
the different countries as well as the 
European industry federations. The 
aim was double. On the one hand, it 
was to avoid that monetary integra-
tion as well as European enlargement 
would result in trade unions under-
cutting each other in their collective 
bargaining strategies. On the other 
hand, the ETUC internal committee 
was to accompany the discussions at 
the MED and contribute, through its 
coordination of different collective 
bargaining strategies to a growth and 
job friendly macroeconomic policy 
mix. In other words, the ETUC was 
(and is) seeking to avoid excessive 
wage moderation and at the same 
time obtain responsible wage forma-
tion, compatible with non-inflation-
ary growth, by trying to improve the 
coordination of different collective 
bargaining strategies in Europe. 
As regards the MED, what has been 
the practical impact to date? The 
ETUC collective bargaining commit-
tee has certainly allowed improving 
the flow of information. In addition 
to an annual questionnaire and report 
on overall bargaining trends, real-time 
information on collective bargaining 
deals is being exchanged by collective 
bargaining bulletins and internal up-
dates. This certainly allows the ETUC 
to undertake a thorough and docu-
mented input to the MED.
Moreover, the question of a growth 
and job friendly policy mix and the 
role of wages in realising this policy 
mix have also been discussed regu-
larly inside the committee. The to-
nality of the discussion has been 
somewhat mixed. On the one hand, 
members have shown strong reluc-
tance in recognising the price stability 
target of the ECB as a formal basis for 
wage bargaining strategies, fearing, 
amongst other things, that this would 
constitute a “free lunch” for govern-
ments to hike indirect taxes and ad-
ministrative prices. On the other 
hand, the ETUC committee has taken 
the view that guidelines on bargaining 
wages should be handled in a flexible 
way and should also take the broader 
economic context into account.
Finally, the real-time exchange of in-
formation has also served to raise 
further our members’ awareness that 
they are not ‘bargaining on an island’ 
and that situations in which employ-
ers abuse collective agreements in one 
country to weaken the bargaining po-
sition of trade unions in other coun-
tries need to be avoided.
Future expectations for the macroeco-
nomic dialogue: an opportunity to re-
think the Brussels/Frankfurt consensus
After 10 years of MED, in combina-
tion with a decade or more of wage 
moderation, it needs to be recognised 
that the existing macroeconomic 
policy framework is up for revision. 
As highlighted above, with the Euro-
pean Central Bank in particular be-
ing rather reluctant to translate wage 
moderation into more and better jobs, 
workers’ efforts have not been fully 
recognised. So, the question whether 
to continue a situation of stagnating 
real wages has become pressing for the 
ETUC and its affiliates.
This question has become even more 
pressing since recent developments in 
the economy (bursting of the subprime 
mortgage and housing bubble, con-
tinuing appreciation of the euro) point 
to the fact that there are limits to what 
monetary policy and strategies of ex-
port led growth can do in substituting 
the loss of aggregate demand coming 
from wage moderation. With the share 
of profits in the euro area at a record 
high, the time has come to pursue the 
development of a policy mix in which 
growth is not driven any longer by un-
sustainable “beggar-thy-neighbour” 
policies and/or by speculative debt-as-
set price bubbles but by workers receiv-
ing a fair share of economic progress in 
the form of higher real wage dynamics. 
Here, the MED is to be seen as a plat-
form and an opportunity to develop 
such a new growth model.’
The Macroeconomic Dialogue is 
an essential part of the governance 
framework of the European Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union and 
the business community is entirely 
committed to it. BUSINESSEU-
ROPE takes part in this process 
with the full support of its 39 na-
tional member federations, repre-
senting a total of 20 million compa-
nies in Europe.
The main objective of this dialogue 
is to ensure constructive exchange of 
views between European social part-
ners, the Council, the Commission 
and the ECB on the appropriate mix 
between fiscal, monetary, wage and 
structural policies.
For the business community, an un-
wavering commitment to fiscal sus-
tainability remains of the essence, 
even more so in today’s uncertain 
BUSINESSEUROPE: Building mutual understanding of growth-
enhancing policies
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global economic environment. Gov-
ernments must abide with the let-
ter and spirit of the Stability and 
Growth Pact and euro-area Member 
States must continue to honour their 
pledge to balance budgets by 2010. 
While so-called automatic stabilis-
ers should be allowed to play their 
role in a slowing economy, the po-
litical debate should today focus on 
the quality of public expenditures 
with a clear emphasis on growth-
enhancing areas like research, in-
novation and education, and on tax 
reforms able to rapidly support the 
next economic upturn. The EU must 
also better than today learn from 
the successes of some of its Member 
States, and promote national fiscal 
rules and institutions that are most 
conducive to forward-looking and 
sustainable budgetary policies.
Regarding monetary policy, BUSI-
NESSEUROPE strongly supports 
the independence and mandate of 
the ECB and assesses its track record 
positively. The ECB has been credible 
in its commitment to deliver price 
stability, which has allowed favour-
able financing conditions to be main-
tained in all euro-area countries. It 
has reacted well and appropriately 
to the credit market turmoil and is 
showing pragmatism in the face of 
uncertain and sometimes conflict-
ing economic developments. Finally, 
in the context of the Macroeconomic 
Dialogue it has made a useful con-
tribution to the debate in the area of 
 fiscal and structural policies.
Moving to wage policy, it has two 
dimensions that influence the dis-
cussions in the Macroeconomic Di-
alogue. First, real wage levels are a 
fundamental factor determining un-
employment and, second, nominal 
wage flexibility shapes the capacity 
of an economy to adjust when it is 
hit by a shock. Obviously, with the 
loss of two national policy instru-
ments in monetary union (inter-
est rates and exchange rates), the 
pressure on flexible wage setting 
has increased considerably among 
 euro-area countries.
In this regard, while a sustained proc-
ess of wage moderation has been key 
to supporting a strong labour market 
performance and declining unem-
ployment over the last decade, wage 
flexibility remains an important topic 
for discussion as competitiveness im-
balances continue to grow unabated 
across euro-area Member States.
In this regard, BUSINESSEUROPE 
has repeatedly called for wage policies 
to be:
•  consistent with productivity devel-
opments, not only at the macroeco-
nomic level but also across sectors 
and at company level;
•  discussed on the basis of the ECB’s 
definition of price stability (inflation 
close to but below 2 %);
•  reactive to labour market and com-
petitiveness conditions.
But, of course, there is only so much 
wage policy can do in isolation. It is 
part of a more general framework 
that needs to be conducive to effec-
tive macroeconomic adjustments at 
the national level. The main ingredi-
ents are sound and counter-cyclical 
fiscal policies, labour mobility, prod-
uct market competition and financial 
market integration. This is why the 
Macroeconomic Dialogue touches on 
a wide range of policy areas, including 
the EU’s Lisbon agenda in its Com-
munity dimension, and in the coordi-
nation of national reforms.
Returning to wage policies, it is very 
important to acknowledge that no 
bargaining system will work for all 
countries and that a harmonisation of 
practices is not needed to improve the 
functioning of monetary union. The 
effectiveness of individual systems 
will depend on culture, traditions 
and, most importantly, the degree of 
trust among social partners and gov-
ernments. The diversity of bargaining 
structures and of labour market per-
formances is there to illustrate that 
there is no one-size-fits-all model.
However, looking at current develop-
ments, we see in most euro-area coun-
tries a tendency for wage agreements 
to be concluded at a lower level today 
than in the past.
The Macroeconomic Dialogue has an 
important contribution to make to 
bridge this tendency towards more 
decentralisation of wage bargaining 
structures and the need for social 
partners to consider the macroeco-
nomic dimension of their decisions in 
monetary union.
To conclude, the Macroeconomic Di-
alogue serves its purpose of building 
mutual awareness among policy stake-
holders in the euro area and beyond. It 
deserves the full commitment of all its 
participants and will continue to be 
considered as a crucial exercise by the 
European business community.’
May 2008
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The last two years have confirmed two trends in European social dialogue. First, the 
European social partners have developed autonomous action and delivered on their 
commitments. Second, a growing number of sectoral European social partners have 
taken part in a sectoral dialogue and thereby broadened its coverage of the economy, 
including a move to focused cooperation between several European social partners 
representing different sectors.
European social dialogue refers to the 
EU-level dialogue of the representa-
tives of management and labour (see 
Box 4.1). This chapter reports on main 
developments in cross-industry social 
dialogue (section 1), major develop-
ments in different sectors and newly 
established sectoral social dialogue 
committees (sections 2) over the last 
two years.
Main developments in 
European social dialogue
Social partners’ contribution to em-
ployment policy development: flexicu-
rity in response to labour market chal-
lenges
Flexicurity is the deliberate combina-
tion of flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements, comprehensive lifelong 
learning strategies, effective active la-
bour market policies, and modern, 
adequate and sustainable social pro-
tection systems. The European Coun-
cil adopted common principles on 
flexicurity in December 2007. These 
principles are a means to reinforce 
the implementation of the Lisbon 
Strategy. As such they do not promote 
one single labour market or work–life 
model, but Member States should tai-
lor them to their specific circumstanc-
es and report on their implementation 
in their national reform programmes. 
(For more information on flexicurity, 
see Box 2.1 in Chapter 1.) As trust and 
broadly based dialogue are essential 
for a successful flexicurity strategy the 
Council stressed that ‘the involvement 
of social partners in the design and 
implementation of flexicurity policies 
through social dialogue and collective 
bargaining is of crucial importance’. 
The European social dialogue has 
contributed to building the consensus 
around the flexicurity principles.
European social partners conducted for 
the first time a vast joint study of the de-
velopments and challenges on Europe’s 
labour markets and reached a joint 
understanding on the implications for 
public policy and social dialogue. 
The cross-industry social partners 
(the ETUC, BUSINESSEUROPE, 
CEEP and UEAPME) had already 
started working on a joint analysis of 
the key challenges facing European 
labour markets in September 2006, 
as foreseen in their joint social dia-
logue work programme for 2006–08. 
Discussions on this document were 
concluded in September 2007.
The result is a substantial document of 
more than 60 pages, which was formally 
adopted by the decision-making bodies 
of the European social partners. In the 
introduction the European social part-
ners ‘reiterate their support for the Lis-
bon strategy aimed at turning Europe 
into the most competitive knowledge-
based society in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth, with 
more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion. Faced with the challenges of 
globalisation, technological progress 
and demographic ageing, the Lisbon 
strategy remains as valid and neces-
sary as when it was adopted in 2000. 
Europe’s weakness in terms of growth 
and jobs needs to be addressed’.
In terms of the way forward to mod-
ernise the European economies and la-
bour markets, social partners recognise 
the need to improve ‘our competitive-
ness in high added-value products and 
services and more generally about se-
curing Europe’s place on world markets 
by moving up the ladder of innovation, 
technology and productivity. Europe 
cannot compete with low-wage coun-
tries for labour-intensive products’.
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Box 4.1: European social dialogue
European social dialogue is one of the instruments of governance in the employment and 
social area in the European Union. It refers to the discussions, consultations, negotiations 
and joint actions undertaken by the social partner organisations representing the two sides of 
industry (management and labour) at European level. It is an instrument by which the social 
partners assist in the definition of European employment policy and social standards.
Article 138 of the EC Treaty gives the Commission the role to promote social dialogue, 
gives recognition to social dialogue at European level and obliges the Commission to con-
sult the European social partners in two phases before submitting proposals in the em-
ployment and social policy field. The autonomous bipartite dialogue takes place in social 
dialogue committees (SDCs). Article 139 offers the possibility to negotiate agreements that 
can be implemented in Member States either by the social partners themselves or by Coun-
cil directive for areas covered in Article 137.
For a typology of European social dialogue texts, see table 5.1. All joint texts of the Euro-
pean social partners can be found in the social dialogue texts database (http://ec.europa.
eu/employment_social/dsw/dspMain.do?lang=en).
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The joint analysis consists of three parts.
•  First it examines recent labour 
market outcomes and its determi-
nants, such as growth, productivity, 
demography, contractual arrange-
ments, education and training, so-
cial cohesion, job mobility and job 
quality, by looking at available data 
and statistics and providing a shared 
understanding and analysis of this 
information.
•  The document then goes on to iden-
tify the key challenges and the right 
mix of policy measures, including ac-
tive labour market policies, lifelong 
learning, macroeconomic policies, 
a favourable business environment, 
public services, tax and social protec-
tion policy, labour regulation and in-
dustrial relations and flexicurity.
•  Finally, social partners address spe-
cific recommendations to Member 
States, the EU institutions and their 
members in the abovementioned 
policy areas.
In part, this was a response to the re-
quest from the 2006 Spring European 
Council to the Commission, Mem-
ber States and the social partners to 
explore the development of common 
principles on flexicurity. With a view 
to encouraging the European social 
partners to play their full role in the 
debate, the Finnish Council Presi-
dency and the Commission jointly or-
ganised an informal Tripartite Social 
Summit meeting in Lahti (Finland) 
on 20 October 2006. The Commission 
asked the social partners at EU level 
to deliver a joint contribution as input 
to the communication on flexicurity 
(June 2007), which would also engage 
their national members in the follow-
up work on labour market reforms at 
national level.
In the text of the joint analysis, so-
cial partners also embrace the con-
cept of flexicurity which they recog-
nise ‘can create a win–win situation 
and be equally beneficial for em-
ployers and employees’. Agreeing 
that ‘there is no one single model 
applicable for all 27 Member States’, 
social partners acknowledge the 
need for a holistic and balanced ap-
proach combining the four compo-
nents proposed by the Commission: 
labour law and contractual arrange-
ments; effective and high-quality ac-
tive labour market policies; lifelong 
learning policies; and efficient and 
sustainable social protection sys-
tems. They suggest adding as a fifth 
component the need for a social 
dialogue contributing to negotiated 
solutions and highlighting the im-
portance of the quality of work. Eu-
ropean social partners call on Mem-
ber States to ‘strengthen efforts for 
a real and effective implementation 
of the various flexicurity measures 
at the appropriate level’ and invite 
their national members to ‘actively 
contribute to the design and imple-
mentation of policy measures’.
Social partners presented the joint 
analysis at the informal Tripartite So-
cial Summit meeting in Lisbon on 18 
October 2007, at which both the Por-
tuguese Council Presidency and the 
Commission warmly welcomed it as 
a milestone in social dialogue and as 
a key contribution to the flexicurity 
debate. The document helped to reach 
consensus on the common principles 
on flexicurity in the Council in De-
cember 2007.
Representatives of BUSINESSEU-
ROPE and the ETUC were also ac-
tively involved in the Expert Group 
on Flexicurity in the beginning of the 
process as well as in the mission for 
flexicurity that was carried out by a 
high-level group of the employment 
ministers of the Slovenian and French 
Presidencies and Commissioner Spid-
la to France, Sweden, Finland, Poland 
and Spain, in summer 2008, in order 
to raise awareness and ownership of 
the common principles.
The joint analysis will not be the final 
element of the social partners’ action 
in this area. The cross-industry social 
dialogue work programme for 2006–
08 already provides for a follow-up of 
the joint analysis. In concrete terms the 
social partners had agreed that they 
will, on the basis of the joint analysis, 
‘define priorities to be included in a 
framework of actions on employment 
by the social partners’ and ‘negotiate 
an autonomous framework agreement 
on either the integration of disadvan-
taged groups on the labour market or 
lifelong learning’.
For their next autonomous agreement, 
the social partners agreed that they did 
not want to choose either one or the 
other of the two topics mentioned in 
the work programme but to combine 
both through a broader approach, as in 
practice there is a ‘significant overlap’ 
between the two themes.
They agreed that ‘one of the ways in 
which social partners can best contrib-
ute to the integration of disadvantaged 
groups is through the improvement of 
competences and qualifications as this 
(partly) falls within their remit. […] The 
main aim of the negotiations would be 
to determine how the social partners 
could best contribute to maximising 
Europe’s labour market potential and 
that of its workforce. This will include 
provisions for facilitating access to and 
progression in the labour market for 
disadvantaged groups through a series 
of preventative and curative measures 
including lifelong learning. […]
The focus should not only be on getting 
people on the labour market or into a 
job but also on workers at risk in order 
for them to be able to remain on the la-
bour market.’ The social partners also 
agreed to ‘avoid focusing on people 
furthest from the labour market, as this 
is a topic requiring first and foremost 
the involvement of other stakeholders, 
notably public authorities’.
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The preliminary working title of 
‘inclusive labour markets’ was also 
agreed. Negotiations started in 
 October 2008.
For the framework of actions on em-
ployment, the social partners consid-
ered that the priorities to be included 
and the procedures to be followed 
should be discussed at a later stage.
The contributions of the European so-
cial partners of the temporary agency 
work sector
The Commission also consulted the 
sectoral European social partners on 
flexicurity. In March 2007, the social 
partners of the temporary agency work 
sector pointed out that temporary agen-
cy work can contribute to transitions 
between education and work as well 
as between different types of contracts; 
that it can contribute to matching sup-
ply and demand on the labour market 
and to improving work–life balance. 
This is supported by good practices 
in some Member States, like joint sec-
toral training funds (Belgium, Spain, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands,) so-
cial funds (providing subsidies to sup-
port scholarship and university fees for 
temporary workers’ children, financial 
guarantees to get housing, or comple-
mentary private health insurance in 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands), 
cooperation agreements with the na-
tional public employment services, col-
lective bargaining agreements granting 
extra benefits (e.g. pension schemes), 
and bipartite bodies monitoring their 
implementation.
The European social partners draw 
the attention of policymakers to a list 
of topics that should be taken into ac-
count, like, for example, the principle 
of equal treatment, that temporary 
agency workers should not replace 
workers who are on strike, the im-
portance of continuity of rights, voca-
tional training, a system of licensing 
where relevant, the regular review of 
restrictions or prohibitions, the pre-
vention of discriminatory measures 
against the industry, or ILO Conven-
tion 181 on temporary agency work 
as useful regulatory guidance at the 
national level.
Violence and harassment
Cross-industry framework agreement 
on harassment and violence at work
The European cross-industry social 
partners (the ETUC — representing 
also the Liaison Committee Eurocadres/
CEC — BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME 
and CEEP) signed the framework agree-
ment on harassment and violence at 
work on 26 April 2007. This is the third 
autonomous agreement negotiated by 
them, following a consultation by the 
European Commission under Article 
138 of the EC Treaty.
In reaction to the first stage of the 
Commission consultation, launched 
on 23 December 2004, concerning vi-
olence at the workplace and its effects 
on health and safety at work, the Eu-
ropean cross-industry social partners 
informed the Commission that they 
would organise a seminar on this issue 
to explore the possibility of negotiat-
ing an autonomous agreement, in line 
with their social dialogue work pro-
gramme for 2003–05. Following this 
seminar, the organisations prepared 
their negotiating mandates and offi-
cially opened negotiations on 6 Febru-
ary 2006. The negotiations on a frame-
work agreement lasted over 10 months 
and were successfully concluded on 
15 December 2006. After approval by 
the internal decision-making bodies 
of the four social partner organisa-
tions involved in the negotiations, the 
agreement was officially signed on 26 
April 2007 and presented to the press.
The agreement aims to prevent and, 
where necessary, manage problems of 
psychological and sexual harassment 
and physical violence at the workplace. 
It condemns all forms of harassment 
and violence and confirms the duty of 
the employer to protect workers against 
them. Companies in Europe are request-
ed to adopt a policy of zero tolerance of 
such behaviour and to specify proce-
dures to deal with cases of harassment 
and violence where they occur. These 
procedures can include an informal 
stage involving a person trusted by man-
agement and the workforce. Complaints 
should be investigated and dealt with 
quickly. The principles of dignity, confi-
dentiality, impartiality and fair treatment 
need to be respected. Appropriate meas-
ures will be taken against the perpetra-
tor, including disciplinary action up to 
dismissal, and the victim will receive 
support with reintegration, if needed.
The autonomous agreement is to be 
implemented by the members of the 
signatory parties, i.e. the national so-
cial partner organisations, in accord-
ance with the procedures and practices 
specific to management and labour and 
the Member States, as provided for by 
the first alternative in Article 139(2) of 
the EC Treaty. It is to be implemented 
within three years after signature. The 
first progress report was adopted by 
the Social Dialogue Committee in June 
2008. In the fourth year the Social Dia-
logue Committee will prepare a report 
on implementation of the agreement.
In order to raise awareness and as an-
nounced in its last communication on 
social dialogue (31), the Commission 
informed the European Parliament and 
the Council about the conclusion of the 
framework agreement. This communi-
cation (32) contains a brief ex ante assess-
ment of the representativeness of the 
signatory parties as well as the compat-
31 COM(2004) 557 of 12 August 2004.
32 COM(2007) 686 of 8 November 2007.
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ibility of the agreement’s content with 
EU law and policy. Furthermore, the 
communication provided a translation 
of the agreement in all official EU lan-
guages, with a view to facilitating or ac-
celerating the dissemination and imple-
mentation process in Member States.
Sectoral follow-up of the framework 
agreement
European social partners from the elec-
tricity and the gas sectors signed joint 
declarations endorsing the autonomous 
agreement. In the declaration they call 
upon their national affiliates to imple-
ment this agreement by May 2010. 
Moreover, they pledge to monitor the 
implementation process through an-
nual reports. The final implementation 
reports are foreseen for June 2010. The 
European social partners for central 
public administration have included 
the issue of violence and harassment at 
work in the work programme for their 
test phase in 2008 and 2009.
Multisector initiative on third-party 
violence
The signatory parties of the cross-indus-
try agreement chose not to agree on de-
tailed provisions with regard to violence 
from third parties, i.e. violence exerted 
by individuals from outside the enter-
prise or work organisation, e.g. custom-
ers, students and patients. The form it can 
take and ways to tackle it depend very 
much on the characteristics of those sec-
tors whose employees have contact with 
third parties. It can range from abusive 
behaviour of clients to armed robbery. 
As such it differs from violence within 
the workplace. Therefore, Hospeem, 
CEMR, EuroCommerce, UNI-Europa, 
EPSU and CoESS (commerce, local 
governments, hospitals and private 
security) informed the Commission in 
a joint letter that, as the social partners 
of sectors particularly affected by third-
party violence, they wished to jointly ex-
plore any possibility to complement the 
cross-sectoral agreement from a more 
specific sectoral and/or multisectoral 
point of view. The representatives of 
these sectors met four times in 2007 and 
early 2008 to develop ways to promote 
the violence and harassment agreement 
on the sectoral level.
At their initiative, the Commission 
organised a multisectoral seminar on 
third-party violence in Brussels on 14 
March 2008. The seminar gathered 
nearly 200 participants from 26 Mem-
ber States. The representatives of 16 
sectors attended the seminar (organis-
ing sectors: commerce, local govern-
ments, hospitals and private security; 
observers: Horeca, finance, banking, 
post, electricity, education and central 
administration; invited sectors: tel-
ecommunications, temporary work, 
railways, local public transport, and the 
cleaning industry). The representatives 
of the cross-industry social partners 
were also present in the seminar.
The conference was an occasion for the 
exchange of good practices, collecting 
concrete experience from employers and 
workers that have been able to successful-
ly put in place policies against third-party 
violence. This first exchange allowed the 
Box 4.2: Cross-sector cooperation: the promotion  
of socially responsible procurement
European social partners of four sectors have joined forces to promote socially responsible 
procurement. With the support of the Commission, four sectoral social dialogue commit-
tees have issued handbooks for organisations and public authorities awarding contracts in 
the areas of contract catering, cleaning, private guarding and clothing–textiles (1).
The aim of these handbooks is to assist public purchasers in selecting best value bids, i.e. 
awarding contracts not only on the basis of the price but also taking quality into account. 
Quality may relate to the skills and capabilities of the service providers; working conditions 
of staff; environmental, health and hygiene requirements for the methods and products used; 
and working conditions in supply chains. The guides are in line with EU public procurement 
directives, which allow for contracting authorities to award a contract either on the basis of 
the lowest price, or on the basis of the economically most advantageous tender.
The social partners concerned consider that a cross-sectoral approach can improve aware-
ness of purchasers in public entities and companies. They therefore agreed, together with 
the Commission, to organise a major event on 18 April 2008 to highlight the importance of 
qualitative criteria in procurement and to present the guides to potential users. In addition 
to best practices presented by users of the guides, the EU legal framework was explained 
and recent developments in terms of social criteria in procurement outlined.
In a joint statement the social partners of the four sectors call upon public and private 
contractors to select the economically and socially most advantageous offer rather than the 
lowest bid, taking into consideration quality criteria such as competencies of the service 
provider, environmental and sustainable aspects, working conditions, respect for labour 
standards, trade union rights, social legislation and collective agreements of workers along 
the supply chain. Both sides of the industry agree that ‘procurement processes based solely 
upon price leads to unprofessional or even illegal practices, which are strongly condemned 
by the social partners of all four sectors’. They committed to further promote the principle 
of best value, to update the guides as necessary, and to evaluate their impact in the Member 
States, without, however, setting a target date. They also encouraged the social partners of 
other sectors to take up the initiative in the fields where their goods or services are subject 
to the awarding of contracts through procurement procedures.
1 Catering: ‘Guide to most economically advantageous offering in contract catering’ (2006); Cleaning 
industry: ‘Selecting best value — A manual for organisations awarding contracts for cleaning services’ (2004); 
Private security: ‘Selecting best value — A manual for organisations awarding contracts for private guarding 
services’ (1999); Textiles: ‘Public procurement awarding guide for the clothing–textile sector’ (2005)
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social partners at the sectoral level to gain 
a common understanding of the issue and 
to explore the possibility for further joint 
action in this field. As a next step, the sec-
toral social partners will assess the conclu-
sions of the seminar and decide on further 
actions, for example to open multisectoral 
negotiations on third-party violence.
This initiative on third-party violence 
shows the potential for reinforced co-
operation between several social dia-
logue committees on specific subjects. 
Another example of such multisecto-
ral cooperation is the promotion of 
procurement guides (see Box 4.2).
Reconciliation of professional, 
private and family life
In response to the second-phase con-
sultation under Article 138 of the EC 
Treaty on the reconciliation of profes-
sional, private and family life launched 
in May 2007, the ETUC, BUSINES-
SEUROPE, UEAPME and CEEP, in a 
joint letter to the Commission, of 11 
July 2007, committed themselves to:
•  assess, more than 10 years after its 
adoption, the progress made with 
the implementation of the frame-
work agreement on parental leave 
(1995) (33) in the EU Members States;
•  evaluate parental leave arrange-
ments in connection with other ar-
rangements supporting parents and 
work–life balance, such as flexible 
work arrangements and childcare, as 
well as other forms of leave; and
•  determine whether joint actions 
need to be taken.
In autumn 2007 the European social 
partners subsequently launched a 
consultation of their members at na-
tional level to obtain the necessary 
information and held two meetings 
of an ad-hoc working group in early 
33 Integrated in Council Directive 96/34/EC on the 
framework agreement on parental leave concluded by 
UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC.
2008. In their progress report (34) to 
the Tripartite Social Summit of 13 
March 2008, the social partners as-
sessed the progress made in the field 
of work–life balance in the last ten 
years and agreed to:
•  undertake joint action to better 
achieve the aims of the Parental 
Leave Directive as part of wider 
work on reconciliation;
•  agree, with regard to maternity pro-
tection, which has a larger scope 
than just leave arrangements, that 
an assessment should be made of the 
current legal framework at EU level 
to see if it is still up to date;
•  assess if and in what form innova-
tive and adaptable working arrange-
ments for women and men can be 
promoted; and
•  call on the EU to add a new target to 
the Lisbon goals regarding care serv-
ices for dependants.
Social partners met after the Tripar-
tite Social Summit to decide on the 
content and form that these actions 
will take. As one of the key actions, 
they decided to open negotiations to 
revise their agreement on parental 
leave. Negotiations started in Septem-
ber 2008 and it is the first time that so-
cial partners themselves revise one of 
their agreements implemented by way 
of directive.
Restructuring, management of 
change and skills development
Social dialogue can be a powerful in-
strument for successful anticipation 
and management of change. The repre-
sentatives of management and labour 
are well placed and they have a respon-
sibility at company, sector, national and 
European level. The European Com-
mission has consulted European social 
partners twice on appropriate ways to 
34 Available online (http://www.etuc.org/IMG/
pdf_2008-00393-E.pdf). 
tackle the challenge of restructuring. 
Social partners have responded to this 
call in four different ways.
Firstly, they have continued to iden-
tify and disseminate best practices. 
The European social partners in the 
contract catering sector signed policy 
orientations for corporate social re-
sponsibility at the beginning of 2007 
which recommends that employees 
be kept aware of the situation of the 
enterprise and be informed in due 
time. The sectoral social dialogue 
committee will agree on best prac-
tices, disseminate them and moni-
tor progress in its application. This 
practice is already being followed in 
the sugar (35) and the hospitality sec-
tors. Three sectors, local and regional 
governments, chemicals and tex-
tiles, are implementing joint projects 
on the identification of best practices 
in the management of restructuring. 
A similar initiative in the rail sec-
tor adds a study on the employment 
consequences of the reorganisation of 
freight services to this exercise, which 
should help workers and enterprises 
in anticipating change.
Secondly, they have been developing 
research and recommendations. The 
cross-industry social partners contin-
ued to engage in dialogue with their 
members on restructuring through 
national studies and seminars on the 
economic and social change under 
way in their countries. The aim of this 
component of the so-called ‘integrated 
programme’ is to contribute to a bet-
ter understanding of the restructuring 
phenomenon and a better analysis of 
the underlying causes and effects, both 
in individual Member States and at an 
aggregate European level. It also looks 
at the role that social partners play in 
the restructuring process, in particular 
through a number of company case 
studies. The first project covering the 
35 See European Commission, Industrial Relations in 
Europe 2006, pp. 101 et seq. (http://www.eurosugar.org).
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new Member States (2004–06) con-
cluded that joint, strategic and an-
ticipatory management of important 
and inevitable changes had been rare 
and analysed the reasons for this. In 
2006–08 the social partners extended 
the national studies and seminars to 
cover the EU-15. At the time of writ-
ing, seminars had been held in Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, France, 
Austria, Denmark, Spain, the United 
Kingdom and Sweden and there was 
an interim conference in June 2008. 
Themes that came up at several of 
those seminars and were discussed by 
the Brussels conference include the 
causes of restructuring, flexibility and 
security, the need for a shared diag-
nosis and agenda, current and future 
skills gaps as well as the phenomenon 
of ‘silent restructuring’. The remaining 
EU Member States will also be visited, 
and in 2010 the social partners plan to 
use the information and experience 
gathered to review their agreed ‘ori-
entations for reference in managing 
change and its social consequences’ of 
2003 (36). Social partners in the rail and 
electricity sector conducted a number 
of studies and conferences on the con-
sequences of liberalisation over the last 
two years with the aim to better antici-
pate restructuring triggered by policy 
changes. These joint activities will lead 
to a best-practice toolkit for restruc-
turing in the electricity sector, which 
will be useful for human resource and 
line managers and trade union officials 
working in the electricity sector.
Practical toolkits are a third area of 
activity. The social partners in the 
civil aviation sector agreed on a tool 
aiming at promoting consultation 
 arrangements between air naviga-
tion service providers (employers) 
and workers within the context of the 
important reorganisation of the air 
traffic management sector (creation 
of ‘functional airspace blocks’, Sin-
36 See European Commission, Industrial Relations 
in Europe 2004, pp. 146 et seq.
gle European Sky). In October 2007, 
the parties committed themselves to 
assess on a yearly basis the progress 
made by their members in achieving 
the agreed goals. The social partners in 
the furniture industry have been de-
veloping a sophisticated tool to guide 
restructuring in SMEs ‘Furniture in-
dustry in restructuring: solutions and 
tools’ (FIRST) (37) from 2006 to 2008. 
The tool allows SMEs to identify their 
strengths and weaknesses by compar-
ing different criteria relating to what 
they can do in-house and what they 
can subcontract in order to reduce 
their costs with neutral social costs. It 
provides for benchmarking with other 
manufacturers’ experiences and in-
dicates potential partners. The social 
partners of the chemical industry sec-
tor collected good practice examples 
of handling restructuring cases. They 
analysed these cases together with ex-
ternal project partners and found that 
some economic developments can-
37 Available online (http://www.ueanet.com/first/
default.htm).
not be influenced. Joint lessons were 
learned and will be further analysed 
to manage restructuring cases and to 
minimise constraints on individuals.
Finally, the European social partners 
are also exploring ways of anticipat-
ing future skills needs in their sectors. 
The Social Dialogue Committee of 
the postal sector agreed a joint dec-
laration on training and skills devel-
opment in the postal sector in June 
2006. It established six orientations 
for training and provides for a review 
report summarising actions taken 
after one year. The declaration has 
been disseminated in 2007 and 2008 
through a series of workshops organ-
ised by the European social partners 
in Tallinn, Vienna and London. The 
Social Dialogue Committee of the 
postal sector also adopted in 2007 a 
joint statement on developments in 
the postal sector, in which it states that 
future market opening must go hand 
in hand with socially acceptable em-
ployment conditions. A postal sector 
Box 4.3: European social dialogue in the Treaty of Lisbon
In the Lisbon Treaty social dialogue at the EU level has an enhanced role in the governance 
of employment and social affairs. A new article (Article 152) features at the beginning of 
the chapter devoted to social policy.
The Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at its level, taking into 
account the diversity of national systems. It shall facilitate dialogue between the social 
partners, respecting their autonomy. 
The Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment shall contribute to social dialogue.
This article extends the recognition and promotion of European social dialogue from the Com-
mission (ex Article 138 TEC) to the Union. It also gives Treaty-status to the most important 
instrument of tripartite concertation, the Tripartite Social Summit. Tripartite concertation at 
EU level dates back to the 1970s. A tripartite meeting between the troika (the previous, present 
and following Council Presidencies), the Commission and European social partners delega-
tions coordinated by the ETUC and BUSINESSEUROPE has been taking place since 1997 and 
was institutionalised by Council Decision 2003/174/EC in March 2003.
There are two further changes related to industrial relations. An addition to Article 153 (ex 
Article 137 TEC) clarifies that framework agreements concluded by the European social 
partners and implemented through a Council decision can also be implemented by the so-
cial partners at national level, like directives that are adopted through the classical legisla-
tive procedure. In addition, paragraph 4 of Article 154 (ex Article 138 TEC) now stipulates 
that the European social partners can already enter into negotiations after the first consul-
tation based on this article, and not only at the stage of the second consultation.
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evolution working group will collect 
and share practices of social regula-
tion at the national level, and analyse 
work organisation and skills develop-
ment policies. Similarly, the European 
Social Dialogue Committees in the 
sugar and furniture industries have 
respectively set up working groups 
on employability. The social part-
ners in the civil aviation sector have 
launched a joint project on ‘training 
and qualifications in the ground han-
dling sector’, with the aim of benefit-
ing from members’ experience. The 
objective is a compendium of best 
practices which will help national 
members to anticipate change follow-
ing the gradual opening-up of access 
to the ground handling market.
Major developments in 
European sectoral social 
dialogue
Working conditions
On 9 November 2007 the European 
social partners reached a Joint Agree-
ment on Maritime Labour Stand-
ards after negotiations lasting more 
than a year. This agreement aims to 
incorporate certain provisions of 
the ILO Maritime Labour Conven-
tion 2006 into Community law. This 
would encourage the ratification and 
implementation of the ILO Conven-
tion, and it would create a global level 
playing field in terms of legislation. In 
practice, maritime labour standards 
will be strengthened at global level 
and this will be helpful to combat 
substandard working conditions and 
social dumping in the long term. The 
social partners requested the Com-
mission to work on a proposal for a 
Council decision through which the 
provisions contained in their agree-
ment should be effectively imple-
mented at Community level. This 
implementation into Community law 
would create binding standards. The 
Commission proposed this Council 
directive on 2 July 2008 as part of its 
social package.
The social partners of the inland wa-
terways sector entered officially into 
negotiations in January 2008 with a 
view to reaching an agreement on 
working time after a number of pre-
paratory talks during the last couple 
of years. With such an agreement, the 
parties wish to adapt the general rules 
on working time which are currently 
applicable to them (Directive 2003/88/
EC concerning certain aspects of the 
organisation of working time) to the 
specific circumstances of the sector, 
like the crewing of vessels, qualification 
of on-call duty, reference periods, etc.
On 4 October 2007, the railway social 
partners signed policy orientations on 
the concept of employability in the 
railway sector which aim at imple-
menting employability as a new con-
cept for human resources policy. The 
signatory parties CER, EIM and ETF 
will take stock of the progress made 
at a conference which will be held one 
year after the signature of the recom-
mendations.
Mobility
Free movement of labour is one of the 
key pillars of the European Union. Job 
mobility helps match labour supply 
and demand but Europeans still make 
little use of this opportunity. Only 
2.2 % of EU citizens lived and worked 
in a Member State different from their 
country of origin in 2007. But mobil-
ity has been on the increase in the EU 
and is much higher in certain sec-
tors. The social partners in those sec-
tors have, driven by the needs of their 
members, started to work at EU level 
to make qualifications comparable, 
match supply and demand and im-
prove framework conditions.
Qualification passports
It is often difficult for workers to 
provide documentary proof of their 
qualifications and particularly skills 
acquired on the job when looking for 
employment in another country. And 
for employers, particularly of small 
and medium-size companies, it is of-
ten difficult to assess qualifications 
and skills documented in another 
country/language. Several European 
social partners have taken initiatives 
to jointly develop sector-specific in-
struments to make workers’ qualifica-
tions and skills more transparent and 
comparable.
At their plenary meeting in December 
2007 the social partners in the hospi-
tality sector agreed on a qualification 
and skills’ passport. Horeca (hotels, 
restaurants, and cafés) is one of the 
sectors with a high cross-border mo-
bility of workers. The passport will 
be jointly administered by the social 
partners (European and national). It 
will be an internet-based data system 
where workers can introduce detailed 
information about their skills; this is 
then automatically displayed in vari-
ous Community languages. The social 
partners aim to make it compatible 
with existing systems such as Euro-
pass (sectoral supplement) and Eures.
Social partners in the personal servic-
es sector (UNI-Europa and Coiffure-
EU) launched negotiations in 2007 
to implement their European Hair-
dressers’ Certificate through an au-
tonomous agreement. The agreement 
should cover education and training, 
building upon the EHC levels B and 
C, as well as health and safety and en-
vironmental issues. The EHC sets up 
minimum requirements for the vari-
ous branches of the standard train-
ing, and it is being implemented in a 
number of EU Member States.
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Table 4.1 European social partner joint texts May 2006 to September 2008
Title Domain Sector Type Date
Agreements implemented in accordance with Article 139(2)
Framework agreement on harassment and violence  
at work Health and safety Cross-industry
Autonomous 
agreement 27/04/2007
Agreement on the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 Working conditions Sea transport Autonomous agreement 19/05/2008
Process-oriented texts
Code of conduct and follow up on Ethical Cross-Border - 
Recruitment and Retention in the Hospital Sector Mobility Hospitals Code of conduct 7/04/2008
Policy statement on Health & Safety and Training Health and safety Electricity Guidelines 13/12/2006
Guidelines to drawing up gender equality action plans in 
local and regional government Gender equality
Local and regional 
government Guidelines 14/12/2007
Joint recommendation on the prevention of occupational 
stress in the construction sector Health and safety Construction Policy orientations 10/01/2006
Agreement on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) CSR - Corporate social responsibility Catering Policy orientations 31/01/2007
Joint recommendations for a better representation and 
integration of women Gender equality Railways Policy orientations 12/06/2007
The concept of employability in the railway sector Working conditions Railways Policy orientations 4/10/2007
Joint statement on the social and economic aspects of CSR CSR - Corporate social responsibility Telecommunications Policy orientations 1/12/2007
Joint opinions, declarations, tools
Appeal of social partners in the security sector of the Baltic 
States to the National Administrations of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania responsible for private security issues
Social dialogue Private security Declaration 22/03/2006
Social Dialogue as a tool to tackle changing environments Social dialogue Audiovisual Declaration 7/05/2006
Joint declaration on Worker’s mobility in public 
administrations Mobility Others Declaration 29/05/2006
Joint declaration on training and skills development in 
the postal sector Training/lifelong learning Postal services Declaration 22/06/2006
Reach: safety and workability Economic and/or sectoral policies Chemical industry Declaration 26/10/2006
Promoting a safer working and shopping environment in 
European commerce Health and safety Commerce Declaration 28/11/2006
BeQuaWe European Certified Training Training/lifelong learning Commerce Declaration 28/11/2006
CEMR - EPSU joint statement on the development of 
social dialogue in local and regional government Social dialogue
Local and regional 
government Declaration 29/11/2006
Joint declaration on the extension of the social dialogue 
in the enlarged countries Enlargement Furniture Declaration 19/12/2006
Joint position on the expected communication on culture Social aspects of Community policies Live performance Declaration 1/02/2007
Joint Declaration within the framework of the “Flexicurity 
debate” as launched and defined by the EU Commission Employment
Temporary agency 
work Declaration 28/03/2007
Sofia Declaration: strengthening social dialogue 
and reinforcing capacities of national social partner 
organizations in the new member states in the 
performing arts sector
Enlargement Live performance Declaration 26/06/2007
Bucharest Declaration: strengthening social dialogue 
and reinforcing capacities of national social partner 
organizations in the new member states in the 
performing arts sector
Enlargement Live performance Declaration 22/09/2007
Common declaration on ECOTEC study on the impact 
on employment in EU-25 of the opening of electricity 
and gas markets, and of key EU directives in the field of 
energy
Economic and/or sectoral 
policies Gas Declaration 15/11/2007
Joint declaration on violence at work Harassment Gas Declaration 15/11/2007
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Title Domain Sector Type Date
Common Understanding on a Competence and Training 
Scheme for Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel 
(ATSEP)
Training/lifelong learning Civil aviation Declaration 22/11/2007
Joint declaration on harassment and violence at work Harassment Electricity Declaration 7/12/2007
Joint declaration on stress Health and safety Electricity Declaration 7/12/2007
Joint declaration “Towards responsible awarding of 
contracts Public procurement Multisectoral Declaration 18/04/2008
Joint recommendations on employment and training in 
logistics Health and safety Road transport Joint opinion 31/03/2006
Joint position against undeclared work in the private 
security sector Undeclared work Private security Joint opinion 6/04/2006
Common position on the mid-term review of the 2001 
White Paper on European Transport Policy
Economic and/or sectoral 
policies Railways Joint opinion 19/05/2006
Relation between the European social partners in the 
railway sector and the European Railway Agency
Social aspects of 
Community policies Railways Joint opinion 19/05/2006
Position paper on the European Commission 
Communication “Improving the economic situation in 
the fishing industry” (COM(2006)103 final)
Economic and/or sectoral 
policies Sea Fisheries Joint opinion 12/06/2006
Social partners demand the recognition of wood-based 
products as carbon stores with a positive contribution to 
climate change
Sustainable development Woodworking Joint opinion 24/10/2006
Joint statement on functional airspace block 
developments
Economic and/or sectoral 
policies Civil aviation Joint opinion 24/01/2007
Joint statement regarding the proposed Green Paper on 
Urban Mobility
Economic and/or sectoral 
policies Road transport Joint opinion 30/01/2007
Joint position on Green paper on Labour Law Social aspects of Community policies Live performance Joint opinion 1/03/2007
Response to the second stage consultation on work-
related musculoskeletal disorders Health and safety Telecommunications Joint opinion 1/03/2007
Joint declaration on daytime cleaning Working time Cleaning Industry Joint opinion 2/03/2007
Public consultation on Simplification of Cosmetics 
Directive 76/768/EEC
Social aspects of 
Community policies Personal services Joint opinion 16/03/2007
Joint response to the European Commission’s Green 
Paper COM (2006) 708 Modernising Labour Law to Meet 
the Challenges of the 21st Century
Working conditions Local and regional government Joint opinion 3/04/2007
Joint Position on Green Paper on Labour Law Social aspects of Community policies Audiovisual Joint opinion 16/04/2007
Joint declaration on internalisation of external cost in 
transport for an acceleration of Community activities
Economic and/or sectoral 
policies Railways Joint opinion 17/04/2007
Joint IRU-ETF Press Release on rest facilities Working conditions Road transport Joint opinion 11/06/2007
Joint opinion regarding the Green paper on the future EU 
maritime policy
Economic and/or sectoral 
policies Sea Fisheries Joint opinion 15/06/2007
Joint statement from the European social partners in the 
“Live performance” sector on the Communication from 
the Commission on a European agenda for culture in a 
globalising world
Social aspects of 
Community policies Live performance Joint opinion 15/06/2007
Joint Statement on Just Culture Economic and/or sectoral policies Civil aviation Joint opinion 20/06/2007
Joint Declaration on the evolution of the postal sector Economic and/or sectoral policies Postal services Joint opinion 22/06/2007
Joint Position on articles and aspects of Regulation 
561/2006/EC Requiring Clarification and Enforcement 
Guidance
Working conditions Road transport Joint opinion 5/07/2007
Joint position on the Commission proposal for a EU-
Framework Directive on Soil Protection (COM 2006 
(232) - 22.09.2006)
Social aspects of 
Community policies Extractive industry Joint opinion 22/07/2007
Joint declaration on illegal logging Sustainable development Woodworking Joint opinion 1/10/2007
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Title Domain Sector Type Date
Common Statement on obesity Health and safety Catering Joint opinion 9/10/2007
Joint statement from the European conference on 
functional airspace blocks
Economic and/or sectoral 
policies Civil aviation Joint opinion 9/10/2007
Common declaration on illegal employment Employment Road transport Joint opinion 16/10/2007
Joint analysis of key challenges facing European labour 
markets Employment Cross-industry Joint opinion 18/10/2007
Joint statement on EC proposals revising the regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and 
services
Economic and/or sectoral 
policies Telecommunications Joint opinion 23/10/2007
Joint Statement on the Commission Proposal for a 
Directive providing for sanctions against employers of 
illegally staying third-country nationals
Mobility Live performance Joint opinion 1/12/2007
Joint declaration on employment effects of the opening of 
electricity & gas markets (ECOTEC study)
Social aspects of 
Community policies Electricity Joint opinion 7/12/2007
Joint declaration on health services Health and safety Hospitals Joint opinion 7/12/2007
The social aspects of the European energy community 
(south east Europe) and the implementation of the 
Memorandum of Understanding
Economic and/or sectoral 
policies Electricity Joint opinion 7/12/2007
Joint position on “Posting of workers within the 
framework of the provisions of services: Maximising its 
benefits and potential while guaranteeing the protection 
of workers” COM(2007)304
Working conditions Construction Joint opinion 11/12/2007
Energy policy and the future of the extractive industries: 
Inseparably linked
Social aspects of 
Community policies Extractive industry Joint opinion 12/12/2007
Common contribution regarding the “Second stage 
consultation of the European Social Partners on active 
inclusion of people furthest away from the labour market”
Employment Commerce Joint opinion 28/02/2008
Joint statement for the second Single European Sky package Economic and/or sectoral policies Civil aviation Joint opinion 28/02/2008
Joint declaration on paritarian funds Social dialogue Construction Joint opinion 8/03/2008
Joint Statement on the active inclusion of those furthest 
from the labour market Employment
Local and regional 
government Joint opinion 19/03/2008
The IRU and ETF agree to work together on the 12-day 
derogation in coach tourism Working conditions Road transport Joint opinion 11/04/2008
Position paper on EU Commission’s climate package of 
23 January 2008 Sustainable development Extractive industry Joint opinion 21/05/2008
Joint Declaration on the Directive on working conditions 
for temporary agency workers Working conditions
Temporary agency 
work Joint opinion 28/05/2008
Joint Statement on the Commission proposal for the 
revision of the EU Emissions Trading System
Economic and/or sectoral 
policies Steel Joint opinion 26/06/2008
Opinion regarding the Commission’s Communication 
(COM(2007)591) on re-examining the social regulation Working conditions Sea Fisheries Joint opinion 16/07/2008
Overview of the legislation governing Cash in Transit in 
the 25 Member States Enlargement Private security Tool 25/08/2006
Skills for Chemical Businesses Understanding Society 
Needs - skills, education and training Training/lifelong learning Chemical industry Tool 26/10/2006
Equal opportunities and diversity toolkit / best practices 
guide Gender equality Electricity Tool 3/11/2006
Report by the Social Dialogue Air Traffic Management 
Work Group on the Implications of Functional Airspace 
Blocks
Economic and/or sectoral 
policies Civil aviation Tool 3/11/2006
Development of a European Educational Toolkit for three 
Private Security Activities/Profiles: 1. Mobile Patrolling, 
2. Alarm Response Centres, 3. Airport Security
Telework Private security Tool 15/12/2006
Diversity at work CSR - Corporate social responsibility Telecommunications Tool 1/05/2007
Resolution regarding creation of a Agripass CV Mobility Agriculture Tool 10/05/2007
Ergonomics in cleaning operations Health and safety Cleaning Industry Tool 25/06/2007
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Title Domain Sector Type Date
Guidelines for Consultation arrangements for Functional 
Airspace Blocks
Economic and/or sectoral 
policies Civil aviation Tool 17/07/2007
Musculoskeletal disorders - Introduction and review of 
good working practices in Telecoms Health and safety Telecommunications Tool 1/10/2007
Prevention of accidents at sea and the safety of fishermen Health and safety Sea Fisheries Tool 19/10/2007
Procedural texts
Rules of procedures Social dialogue Steel Procedural text 21/06/2006
Rules of procedures Social dialogue Construction Procedural text 22/09/2006
Rules of procedures Social dialogue Temporary agency work Procedural text 20/10/2006
Rules of procedures Social dialogue Personal services Procedural text 17/11/2006
Rules of procedures Social dialogue Private security Procedural text 15/12/2006
Rules of procedures Social dialogue Railways Procedural text 17/04/2007
Rules of procedures Social dialogue Gas Procedural text 15/06/2007
Rules of procedures Social dialogue Catering Procedural text 9/10/2007
Rules of procedures Social dialogue Cleaning Industry Procedural text 15/10/2007
Rules of procedures Social dialogue Professional Football Procedural text 1/07/2008
Follow-up reports
Framework agreement on Work-related Stress Yearly joint 
table summarising ongoing social partners activities - 2006 Health and safety Cross-industry Follow-up report 28/06/2006
Implementation of the European Framework Agreement 
on Telework - Report by European Social Partners Telework Cross-industry Follow-up report 28/06/2006
Framework of actions on gender equality - First follow-up 
report 2006 Gender equality Cross-industry Follow-up report 7/11/2006
Fourth Implementation Report (2006) on the Code of 
conduct on Corporate Social Responsibility
CSR - Corporate social 
responsibility Sugar Follow-up report 28/02/2007
Implementation of the Framework agreement on work-
related stress - Yearly joint table summarising ongoing 
social partners activities - 2007
Health and safety Cross-industry Follow-up report 20/06/2007
Framework of actions on gender equality - Second follow-
up report 2007 Gender equality Cross-industry Follow-up report 7/11/2007
Fifth Implementation Report (2007) on the Code of 
conduct on Corporate Social Responsibility
CSR - Corporate social 
responsibility Sugar Follow-up report 28/02/2008
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The social partners in the inland 
waterways sector are currently ad-
dressing the issue of professional 
profiles and professional qualifi-
cations. They aim to adopt joint 
recommendations for the harmo-
nisation of professional profiles by 
describing the tasks carried out by 
boatmen and skippers, using the Eu-
ropean Qualifications Framework 
(EQF) (see Box 4.4).
In the preparatory work for a Europe-
an social dialogue in the sports sector, 
the issue of definition, comparability 
and recognition of qualifications has 
been highlighted as a priority. Some 
of the organisations that are consoli-
dating at the European level have ac-
tively engaged in the development of 
the EQF in this sector.
The social partners in the agricul-
tural sector are presently develop-
ing a multilingual online database. 
They have defined job descriptions 
for agricultural professions that help 
jobseekers to communicate their 
competences in a comparable way to 
potential employers. Jobseekers and 
employers can enter their profile and 
vacancies in their language, and they 
will be automatically matched. The 
launch of this process took place in 
May 2007. The challenge is to find 
stable financing for the system and 
to make it complementary with other 
mobility initiatives.
Improving framework conditions for 
mobility
In the hospitals sector, EPSU and 
Hospeem have committed to a code 
of conduct on ethical cross-border re-
cruitment and retention. It addresses 
inequalities and unnecessary burdens 
on healthcare caused by unethical re-
cruitment practices. This agreement 
establishes a full commitment to pro-
mote ethical recruitment practices at 
European, national, regional and local 
levels in the European hospitals sec-
tor. It sets out 12 key principles and 
commitments that include minimum 
standards such as the exclusive use 
of agencies with demonstrated ethi-
cal recruitment practices, or a sound 
and comprehensive induction policy 
for newly recruited staff that should 
at least include in-house training on 
the work practices and relevant regu-
latory framework, as well as informa-
tion on local housing and community 
facilities. The national affiliates will 
implement the code within a period of 
three years, as well as report annually 
on progress and in the fourth year on 
overall implementation.
In their joint position on the Commis-
sion communication regarding post-
ing of workers (38) of December 2007, 
the social partners in the construction 
industry reconfirm that the Posting of 
Workers Directive does not need to be 
revised, and that it is a well-balanced 
38 ‘Posting of workers within the framework of 
the provision of services: maximising its benefits 
and potential while guaranteeing the protection of 
workers’ (COM(2007)304 final of 13 June 2007).
instrument. As this directive aims at 
guaranteeing the free movement of 
services and persons while ensuring 
that the service provider posting work-
ers in another Member State will real-
ise this ‘under the same conditions as 
imposed by that state on its nationals’, 
the social partners in the construction 
industry ‘regret that prior declarations 
are never expressly mentioned as ad-
equate and proportionate formalities 
to ensure that the host Member State’s 
social law is respected’. The social part-
ners in the construction industry are 
also working on a ‘Posting of workers’ 
database. This database will contain all 
necessary information on the posting 
of workers, national regulations and 
the administrative stages to satisfy in 
the event of the workers’ detachment 
within the EU.
Social partners in the culture and 
live performing arts sector adopted 
at the end of 2007 a joint position in 
which they highlighted the particular-
ity of the sector and the high mobil-
ity of cultural workers, who in some 
cases work on the basis of short-term 
contracts that can only be arranged at 
very short notice, and they urged the 
Commission, the European Parlia-
ment and the Council to recognise the 
necessity of first improving the proce-
dures for residence and work permits 
so that the legal employment of third-
country nationals can be appropriately 
fast-tracked if necessary.
Box 4.4: European Qualifications Framework  
and social partners
The European Qualifications Framework is a common European reference framework 
which links countries’ qualifications systems together, acting as a translation device to 
make qualifications more readable. Its eight reference levels will simplify comparisons be-
tween qualifications and enable a better match between supply and demand for knowledge, 
skills and competences both between and within countries and sectors. For employers, the 
EQF will make it easier to interpret the qualifications of foreign applicants. The social part-
ners have been involved in developing the EQF from its earliest stages. In particular, social 
partner representatives helped draft the descriptors for the eight reference levels. Addition-
ally, the EQF aims to facilitate the development of sectoral frameworks and qualifications, 
which reflects the growing internationalisation of qualifications. The EQF wa  formally 
adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on 23 April 2008.
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Health and safety
In quantitative terms, occupational 
health and safety is the area where Eu-
ropean social partners have been most 
active over the last two years. A set 
of concrete guidelines and practical 
guides addressed directly to enterpris-
es and workers has been developed by 
sectoral social partners.
In December 2006, social partners in 
the electricity sector signed guidelines 
on health and safety (H & S) and train-
ing. The document recommends na-
tional affiliates to include recent docu-
ments adopted at EU level, such as the 
framework agreement on stress and 
new directives on workers exposure to 
risks arising from asbestos, noise etc., 
in their vocational training curricula. It 
recognises the importance of the train-
ing on H & S provided by employers 
and it includes recommendations on 
the structure and objectives of such 
training. Likewise, it recommends that 
employees on fixed or short-term con-
tracts should also be able to participate 
in training and stipulates information 
that new employees should obtain on 
health and safety. Moreover the state-
ment includes provisions on training of 
workers’ representatives, managers and 
H & S advisers. Social partners pledge to 
compile best practices in this area and to 
monitor the situation in the sector. 
After completing successfully a set of 
guidelines to prevent musculo-skeletal 
disorders (MSDs) in the telecoms sec-
tor (www.msdonline.org) social part-
ners started exploring the link between 
MSD and psychosocial factors such 
as stress and burnout. In their work 
programme for 2008 the Committee 
has given a mandate to the health and 
safety working group to begin work on 
a shared ‘Good work — Good health’ 
agenda, with particular focus on the 
psychosocial aspect, looking at shared 
values with other working groups and 
possible best practices.
The culture and live performing arts 
working group cooperated during 
2006 and 2007 with the Commission 
in the preparation of a set of voluntary 
guidelines for the implementation of 
the Noise Directive, adopted in 2003. 
Social partners provided key expertise 
for the identification of measures that 
employers and workers of orchestras, 
ballets, etc. could take in order to min-
imise noise exposure and its effects.
The social partners in the furniture 
sector agreed, in 2007, on a joint dec-
laration on accident reduction and 
organised a conference that presented 
best-practice campaigns in order to 
incite national members to be more 
active in the area of accident preven-
tion campaigns. Progress will be re-
viewed after two years.
The European social partners in fish-
ing adopted the European handbook 
for the prevention of accidents at sea 
and the safety of fishermen in 2007. This 
clear handbook lays out graphically the 
minimum advice on safety and health 
for fishermen working on board fishing 
vessels. It is not a safety manual nor is 
it a substitute for effective training but 
it raises the awareness of the need for 
such training, knowledge and compe-
tence with regard to safety. It was print-
ed and disseminated in 13 languages.
The European social partners in the 
cleaning sector published a practi-
cal guide to ergonomics in cleaning 
operations in 2007. It is addressed to 
cleaning workers directly with con-
crete examples and illustrations.
Gender equality
The European social partners in local 
and regional government adopted on 
14 December 2007 common guide-
lines for drawing up gender equality 
action plans. These guidelines aim to 
support regional and local initiatives 
on equality and to encourage a joint, 
long-term and sustained approach to 
equality by national social partners. 
They provide a framework to de-
velop best practices and to monitor 
progress. A template for gender equal-
ity plans should be used by employers 
in cooperation and in dialogue with 
trade unions and employees to bet-
ter implement equality legislation or 
other equality objectives. An equality 
checklist helps social partners to as-
sess equality performance over time. 
The guidelines also refer to the rel-
evant EU legal instruments.
The social partners in the electricity 
sector published in March 2007 a very 
comprehensive equal opportunities 
and diversity toolkit. The main pur-
pose of the toolkit is to promote gen-
der equality and diversity in the work-
place and to raise awareness for the 
benefits this brings for the company. It 
provides practical advice and tools for 
managers and unions to implement 
equality and diversity programmes in 
the workplace. The document goes be-
yond gender equality and refers to all 
sources of discrimination. The toolkit 
can assist managers in drawing up and 
implementing strategies in areas such 
as recruitment and selection, work–
life balance, sexual harassment and 
training. It presents practical tools 
such as how to carry out an equality 
review or audit in the workplace and 
how to ensure that pay systems do not 
under-value women’s skills. Finally it 
provides monitoring tools.
On 12 June 2007, CER and ETF 
adopted joint recommendations for 
a better representation and integra-
tion of women in the railway sector. 
These policy orientations, addressed 
to their affiliated members, aim to 
contribute to a better representa-
tion and integration of women in a 
traditionally ‘male-dominated sec-
tor’. The joint document contains a 
Charter for Equal Opportunities in 
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the European Railway Companies 
and Trade Unions, recommendations 
for positive actions, methodological 
recommendations and provisions 
on evaluation and follow-up. The 
social partners have agreed to assess 
progress on an annual basis and per-
form a study on the measures intro-
duced by their affiliated companies 
and unions three years after signing 
the  recommendations.
The social partners of the Telecoms 
Committee published in 2007 a col-
lection of good practices to promote 
diversity at work. Diversity is con-
sidered from a large perspective and 
takes into account a wide array of as-
pects such as gender equality, sexual 
orientation, disabilities, age, race and 
religion, and work/life balance. Social 
partners highlight the business case 
for diversity and illustrate how valuing 
and encouraging diversity is good for 
customers, employees and business.
The cross-industry social partners 
continued to follow up and report on 
their framework of actions on gender 
equality of 2005 (see Chapter 5).
Attractiveness
In March 2006, the Social Dialogue 
Committee organised the first Eu-
ropean Shipyard Week. The start-
ing point was the social partners’ 
conviction that the public image 
of the shipbuilding sector is often 
in stark contrast to its strategic 
importance and performance as a 
high-tech industry that relies on a 
highly skilled workforce. The me-
dia frequently presents the indus-
try as old, of poor financial per-
formance and with an uncertain 
future. As a result, the industry has 
not been able to attract sufficient 
interest of young graduates and 
highly skilled workers.
This project intended to demon-
strate to key target groups (schools, 
universities, people within the sec-
tor, policymakers, financial institu-
tions, etc.) the contribution of the 
European shipyards to the imple-
mentation of the employment and 
growth objective of the Lisbon strat-
egy. The European Shipyard Week 
consisted of numerous events or-
ganised by the social partners at na-
tional, regional and company levels. 
The national events were conducted 
on the basis of a centrally organ-
ised campaign with a common logo, 
common campaign messages and 
centrally produced campaign mate-
rial, i.e. promotional DVDs, multi-
lingual leaflets and dedicated pages 
on the EMF and CESA websites.
Corporate social responsibility
On 17 June 2008, the Tanning and 
Leather Sectoral Social Dialogue 
Committee adopted a Framework 
Agreement on Social and Envi-
ronmental Reporting Standards 
of the European Leather/Tanning 
Industry. This autonomous agree-
ment is based on Article 139 of the 
EC Treaty.
The document provides indications 
for companies in the leather sector for 
the preparation of social reports and 
environmental declarations aimed at 
informing all concerned parties about 
their policies. A list of key social and 
environmental indicators is provided 
for this purpose. Moreover, this docu-
ment includes guidelines to independ-
ent certification bodies for auditing 
these reports.
The European social partners Cotance 
and ETUF:TCL call on their members 
to actively encourage companies and 
workers of the sector to develop social 
and environmental reporting and they 
will provide an annual overview of the 
implementation process of the agree-
ment. An implementation report will 
be agreed after three years. In addi-
tion, they will follow up the signature 
of this document with training and 
awareness-raising programmes.
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Table 4.2 Topics covered by sectoral social partners’ work programme
In quantitative terms, life-long learning, which includes measures to facilitate mobility, occupational health and safety, and work-
ing conditions are currently the most important topics in the sectoral European social dialogue. But the social dialogue committees 
continue to make their voice heart on policy developments that affect their sectors.  
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Agriculture x x x x x x 2008
Audiovisual x x x x 2008
Banking x x x x 2006
Catering x x x x x 2007-2008
Chemical industry x x x x 2007-2008
Civil aviation x x x x 2007-2008
Cleaning industry x x x x x 2008
Commerce x x x x x x x x x 2008
Construction x x x x x x x x x 2008-2011x
Electricity x x x x x x 2008-2009
Extractive industry x x 2008-2009
Footwear x x x x x 2006
Furniture x x x x  
Gas x x x x 2007-2008
Horeca x x x x x x 2008
Hospitals x x x x x x 2008-2012
Inland waterways x x 2007-2008
Insurance x x x x x 2007-2008
Live performance x x x x x x 2007-2009
Local and regional 
government x x x x x x 2008-2010
Personal services x x 2008
Postal services x x x x 2008
Private security x x x x x x 2007-2008
Professional 
football x x 2008-2009
Railways x x x x x x x 2008-2009
Road transport x x x x x x  
Sea fisheries x x x x 2007
Shipbuilding x x 2007-2008
Steel x x x x 2006-2008
Sugar x 2008
Tanning and leather x x x x x 2008
Telecommunications x x x x 2008
Temporary agency work x x x x x x 2008-2009
Textile and clothing x x x x x x x 2008
Woodworking x x x 2008
Sum 26 25 21 17 13 12 9 9 8 8 8 3 3 3  
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Increasing number of new 
sectoral committees
The launch of three new European 
sectoral social dialogue committees 
(SSDCs) since 2006 has brought the 
overall number to 36, bringing closer 
the goal of engaging management and 
labour of all main sectors of the econ-
omy in a dialogue at European level.
On 9 October 2007, the European 
Federation of Food, Agriculture and 
Tourism Trade Unions (EFFAT) and 
the European Federation of Contract 
Catering Organisations (FERCO) 
resumed their long-standing co-op-
eration at EU level, in the setting of 
a European social dialogue commit-
tee, with the backing of the European 
Commission. They have been pursu-
ing a constructive — although infor-
mal — dialogue with the support of 
the EU Commission since 1998. Main 
achievements are: a joint declaration 
in favour of a reduced VAT rate for 
the contract catering sector (1998), 
guidelines on employment and train-
ing (1999), a joint declaration on food 
hygiene and safety (2000), a survey 
on employment and training in the 
contract catering sector (2002) and 
in 2006, the publication of a ‘Guide to 
the economically most advantageous 
offer’ (www.catering-guide.org). In 
January 2007, EFFAT and FERCO 
signed policy recommendations on 
corporate social responsibility.
The first meeting of the SSDC in the 
gas sector took place on 15 March 
2007. The European Public Service 
Union (EPSU), the European Mine, 
Chemical and Energy Workers’ Fed-
eration (EMCEF) and Eurogas agreed 
to work on issues such as health and 
safety, demographic change and social 
consequences of the opening of the en-
ergy markets. In November 2007 social 
partners signed their first joint docu-
ment ‘Joint declaration on violence 
at work’ endorsing the autonomous 
agreement on violence. They are cur-
rently working on a project proposal 
concerning the ageing workforce.
EUPAN (European Public Admin-
istrations Network), an informal 
network of the Directors General re-
sponsible for public administration 
in the Member States of the European 
Union, accession and candidate coun-
tries, and TUNED (Trade Union del-
egation composed of EPSU and CESI, 
European social partners) had been 
engaged in an informal social dialogue 
in the central public administrations 
sector for years, under the aegis of the 
European Council Presidency. 
In order to comply with the man-
date of the ministers responsible for 
public administration to further en-
hance their European social dialogue, 
EUPAN and TUNED decided to test a 
real social dialogue committee during 
two years (2008 and 2009) by adopt-
ing common rules of procedure and a 
work programme. They also agreed on 
indicators with a view to assessing the 
feasibility of establishing a permanent 
social dialogue committee at the end 
of the test phase. The interim and final 
evaluations of the test phase will be un-
dertaken during the French and Swed-
ish Presidencies at the end of 2008 and 
2009 respectively.
The themes of their common work 
programme are:
•  social dialogue (horizontal theme), 
e.g. reacting to relevant initiatives 
from the Commission;
•  sustaining efficient administration — 
in view of demographic changes, etc.;
•  effective contribution of central gov-
ernment administrations to the im-
plementation and foreseen revision 
of the Lisbon Strategy 
•  violence and harassment at work.
The consolidation of social dialogue 
in the sports sector has made big 
advances over the last two years. 
The European Association of Sports 
Employers (EASE) and the Europe-
an services trade union EURO-MEI 
have recognised each other as the so-
cial partners representing the other 
side of industry at European level and 
informed the Commission that they 
want to take part in an official Euro-
pean social dialogue. Both are open 
for membership from the four sub-
sectors of sport: professional, volun-
tary, outdoor and fitness. In 2007 and 
2008, two more organisations were 
set up; the European Elite Athletes 
Association (EEAA) has the ambi-
tion to represent the interests of pro-
fessional athletes; and the European 
Confederation of Outdoor Employ-
ers (EC-OE) aims to represent com-
mercial outdoor sports employers.
The Commission has encouraged so-
cial dialogue as an instrument which 
would allow social partners to con-
tribute to the shaping of employment 
relations and working conditions in 
an active and participative way in its 
White Paper on Sport of 2007. In its 
accompanying document the Com-
mission explains that while it strongly 
encourages cooperation between the 
different subsectors it will adopt a 
pragmatic approach towards requests 
and to the future architecture of so-
cial dialogue in the sports sector. Due 
to the specificity of sport it remains a 
challenge to find the appropriate role 
for sports federations and governing 
bodies that reflects both their role in 
the governance of sport and the fact 
that they are not social partners. A 
study into the representativeness of 
social dialogue actors in the sport sec-
tor will be carried out in 2009. Issues 
discussed so far in informal meetings 
are minimum standards for standard 
player contracts relating to insurance 
cover, education, health and safety, 
etc., the cross-border recognition of 
qualifications, or the strengthening of 
social dialogue in the sector.
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The European Association of Pro-
fessional Football Leagues (EPFL) 
and the Federation of Professional 
Footballers Associations — Division 
Europe (FIFPro) launched the Euro-
pean social dialogue in professional 
football on 1 July 2008. The Europe-
an Club Association (ECA) that rep-
resents around 100 (of which up to 
60 in the EU) clubs playing in Euro-
pean club competitions complements 
the employers’ side. UEFA (Union 
of European Football Associations) 
has a facilitating role in this social 
dialogue and will chair the meetings. 
Minimum requirements for profes-
sional players’ contracts is the first 
issue on the table. The partners will 
discuss and try to reach agreements 
on minimum standards in fields like 
health and safety at work, health in-
surance, education for young play-
ers, obligations and rights of players, 
conflict resolution and image rights. 
In addition, they will promote social 
dialogue in the new Member States 
and candidate countries.
The Commission received an inde-
pendent request for the establishment 
of a European SSDC in the profession-
al cycling sector at the end of 2007. It 
has not yet received all necessary in-
formation from the organisations rep-
resenting teams and cyclists.
Conclusions
European social dialogue continues 
to play its role in employment and 
social governance in the EU, includ-
ing increasingly autonomous action. 
The cross-industry social partners’ 
joint analysis of the European la-
bour market facilitated the agree-
ment on principles of flexicurity and 
laid the foundation for future joint 
texts on employment and more in-
clusive labour markets. For the first 
time, the cross-industry social part-
ners re-negotiate a Council directive 
based on a framework agreement, 
the Parental Leave Directive of 1996. 
Their new autonomous agreement on 
violence and harassment at work will 
be implemented until 2010 and help 
to prevent and manage problems of 
psychological and sexual harassment 
and physical violence at the work-
place. Several sectoral European so-
cial partners took the opportunity 
to complement this agreement by a 
multisector initiative on third-party 
violence. Violence is typically an area 
which is not easily regulated by law, 
but where social partners can make 
a difference by influencing practices 
at the workplace. Sectoral social dia-
logue led to an agreement on mari-
time labour standards and an auton-
omous agreement on environmental 
and social reporting in the leather/
tanning sector. The coverage of Eu-
ropean social dialogue has now ex-
tended to the contract catering and 
professional football sectors as well as 
public administrations where the so-
cial partners are testing the European 
social dialogue in 2008 and 2009.
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Table 4.3:  The 36 sectoral social dialogue committees
Sectors Employees’ organisations Employers’ organisations Date of creation
Agriculture EFFAT GEOPA/COPA 1999
Audiovisual EFJ, EURO-MEI, FIA, FIM ACT, AER, CEPI, EBU, FIAPF 2004
Banking UNI-Europa EACB, ESBG, FBE 1999
Contract catering EFFAT FERCO 2007
Chemical industry EMCEF ECEG 2004
Civil aviation ECA, ETF ACI Europe, AEA, CANSO, ERA, IACA, IAHA 2000
Cleaning industry UNI-Europa EFCI 1999
Commerce UNI-Europa Eurocommerce 1999
Construction EFBWW FIEC 1999
Electricity EMCEF, EPSU Eurelectric 2000
Extractive industry EMCEF APEP, Euracoal, Euromines, IMA 2002
Professional football FIFPro EPFL (ECA) 2008
Footwear ETUF:TCL CEC 1999
Furniture EFBWW UEA 2001
Gas EMCEF, EPSU Eurogas 2007
Horeca EFFAT Hotrec 1999
Hospitals EPSU Hospeem 2006
Inland waterways ETF EBU, ESO 1999
Insurance UNI-Europa ACME, BIPAR, CEA 1999
Live performance EAEA Pearle 1999
Local and regional government EPSU CEMR 2004
Personal services UNI-Europa EU Coiffure 1999
Postal services UNI-Europa PostEurop 1999
Private security UNI-Europa CoESS 1999
Railways ETF CER, EIM 1999
Road transport ETF IRU 1999
Sea fishing ETF Europeche/Cogeca 1999
Sea transport ETF ECSA 1999
Shipbuilding EMF CESA 2003
Steel EMF Eurofer 2006
Sugar EFFAT CEFS 1999
Tanning and leather ETUF:TCL Cotance 2001
Telecommunications UNI-Europa ETNO 1999
Temporary work UNI-Europa Euro CIETT 2000
Textile and clothing ETUF:TCL Euratex 1999
Woodworking EFBWW CEI-Bois 2000
Sectors having submitted a formal request to create a committee
Automotive industry EMF CLEPA
Non-ferrous metal EMF Eurometaux
Cycling CPA AIGCP, IPCT
Sport EURO-MEI EASE
Test social dialogue (2008–10)
Public administration TUNED (EPSU + CESI) EUPAN
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The implementation of European social dialogue joint texts attracts increasing at-
tention from the social partners, academia and public authorities. It is still a recent 
process but first success stories and a gradual improvement can be observed. In par-
ticular, European autonomous agreements (e.g. telework, stress at work) clearly have 
an impact. Process-oriented texts can create a learning process and raise awareness, 
but further research is needed. The commitment and capacity of the European and, 
in particular, the national social partners are fundamental. 
Introduction
In their social dialogue at European 
level, social partners have developed 
trust and a shared understanding on 
a large range of issues such as eco-
nomic and labour market policy, cor-
porate social responsibility, vocational 
training, social dialogue practices and 
others. By engaging employers’ and 
workers’ representatives from Mem-
ber States in a wider European debate 
their cooperation has also had a ben-
eficial impact on social dialogue at na-
tional level. With joint opinions they 
influence and initiate policy debates. 
Transnational projects produce con-
crete results and forge links between 
practitioners in trade unions and em-
ployers’ organisations. As such, Euro-
pean social dialogue produces many 
results that are not easily measured.
In recent years, however, there has 
been a qualitative shift towards more 
autonomous action. This is reflected 
by the increasing adoption of ‘new 
generation’ texts, in which European 
social partners undertake commit-
ments or make recommendations to 
the national level, which are followed 
up by them and their national mem-
bers. This has increased the interest 
in the actual implementation of Eu-
ropean social dialogue results and its 
monitoring.
A lack of transparency about the 
nature of European social dialogue 
outcomes and a failure to clarify all 
aspects of the follow-up of texts in 
negotiations were regarded as one 
reason for difficulties when it comes 
to implementing them in practice 
by those not directly involved in the 
process. Therefore, in its last com-
munication on social dialogue from 
2004, the Commission encouraged 
the social partners to include detailed 
follow-up provisions in their new gen-
eration texts and proposed a typology 
(see Table 5.1) and drafting checklist 
to be used by social partners. (39)
This chapter presents some experienc-
es with implementing European social 
dialogue results.
Agreements based on Article 
139(2) of the EC Treaty
Two options are available for imple-
menting and monitoring of agree-
ments negotiated by the social part-
ners according to Article 139 of the 
EC Treaty.
1.  The European agreement is ‘im-
plemented in accordance with the 
procedures and practices specific 
to management and labour and 
the Member States’. This method 
of implementation implies that the 
national members of the European 
social partners are responsible for 
implementing the agreements ac-
cording to their respective indus-
trial relations systems. For this 
purpose they are expected to make 
use of the existing structures, pro-
cedures and instruments which 
would be applied for national reg-
ulations. Such texts are called au-
tonomous agreements. This option 
was chosen for the first time for the 
autonomous agreement on telework 
of 2002. Consequently, evidence on 
the functioning of this implementa-
tion option has now become avail-
able for the first time.
39 For definitions and further information, see 
COM(2004) 557 of 12 August 2004. 
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Table 5.1 Outcomes of the European social dialogue
Category Sub-categories Follow-up
Joint opinions & tools
Guides, handbooks, websites
Joint opinions, declarations
No follow-up clauses
Promotional activities
Process-oriented texts Guidelines, codes of conduct
Frameworks of actions
Policy orientations
Follow-up reports
Article 139 (2)
Agreements
Implementation by directive
Implementation by social partners
Implementation reports
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2.  The Commission presents a proposal 
for a Council decision in areas cov-
ered by Article 137. So far this has 
always taken the form of a directive. 
This follows a joint request of the sig-
natory parties following examination 
by the Commission of the following 
criteria: sufficiently representative 
contracting parties, lawfulness of all 
clauses of the agreement under Com-
munity law, and compliance with 
the provisions concerning small and 
medium-sized enterprises. The so-
cial partners’ agreement is then pre-
sented to the European Parliament 
for its opinion and transmitted to the 
Council for its decision. In such cases, 
which take the form of a procedure 
for extending agreements negotiated 
and concluded by the social partners, 
the Council is required to take a deci-
sion on the social partners’ text with-
out changing the substance.
Autonomous agreements
Three autonomous agreements (on tel-
ework, work-related stress, and harass-
ment and violence at work) have so far 
been concluded in cross-industry social 
dialogue since 2002 and negotiations on 
a fourth (on inclusive labour markets) 
started in October 2008. As regards im-
plementation, all these agreements ex-
plicitly refer to the first option given in 
Article 139 of the EC Treaty.
The adoption of autonomous agreements 
ushered in a new phase in European so-
cial dialogue and upgraded the role of 
national social partner organisations. 
While they were previously involved 
in the agenda-setting, negotiation and 
decision-making phases, they now also 
have a key role to play in the implemen-
tation phase. Through their affiliation in 
European organisations, they commit 
to putting the agreements into practice 
through the instruments and procedures 
available to them in their own systems of 
industrial relations.
Telework
The Framework Agreement on Tel-
ework was signed on 16 July 2002 by 
the ETUC (representing also the Li-
aison Committee Eurocadres/CEC), 
BUSINESSEUROPE (then called 
UNICE), CEEP and UEAPME. The 
negotiation of this first autonomous 
agreement followed a two-stage con-
sultation of the social partners by the 
European Commission under Article 
138 of the EC Treaty on modernising 
and improving employment relations, 
launched in 2000. Telework was rec-
ognised by both sides of industry as a 
means for workers and companies to 
modernise work organisation by in-
troducing flexible work arrangements 
and greater autonomy and to allow 
better reconciliation of work, private 
and family life.
The aim of the framework agreement 
is to promote the development of tel-
ework, while safeguarding the protec-
tion of workers and the interests of 
employers. The intention is to avoid 
the expansion of telework resulting in 
a new employment status. Telework 
was therefore defined as ‘a form of 
organising and/or performing work, 
using information technology, in the 
context of an employment contract/
relationship, where work, which could 
also be performed at the employer’s 
premises, is carried out away from 
those premises on a regular basis’.
The agreement established a general 
framework of rules and minimum 
standards for the introduction and 
use of this new method of working 
which respond to the needs of both 
employers and workers. While stress-
ing that teleworkers benefit from the 
same legal protection as employees 
working permanently at the em-
ployer’s premises, it identifies the 
aspects which are specific to working 
at a distance and which require ad-
aptation or special attention, such as 
employment conditions, data protec-
tion, privacy, equipment, health and 
safety, organisation of work, training 
and collective rights.
The implementation period stipulated 
in the framework agreement was three 
years after the date of signature, i.e. un-
til July 2005. In the fourth year (June 
2006), the Social Dialogue Committee 
adopted a joint report on the imple-
mentation of the agreement, which 
was presented by the social partners 
to the public on 11 October 2006.
The social partners’ implementation 
report is based on joint national re-
ports from member organisations in 
21 EU Member States, Iceland and 
Norway. Final joint reports had not 
been received from Cyprus, Estonia, 
Lithuania and Slovakia. The imple-
mentation process had not started 
yet in Bulgaria and Romania, whose 
social partners joined the European 
social dialogue only in 2007.
The EU-level implementation report 
considers that implementation has 
been achieved or was in the process 
of being finalised in all countries cov-
ered. It looks at actions carried out to 
translate the agreement into the na-
tional languages and to disseminate 
it amongst members. It also analyses 
the choice of instruments used in each 
country to implement the text. Finally 
the report examines the way in which 
the provisions of the framework 
agreement have been implemented, 
looking at each individual clause. This 
part does not contain a systematic 
analysis of implementation in each 
country, but opts for giving examples 
of elements which have been agreed 
by national social partners beyond the 
requirements of the EU text.
The conclusions of the report stress 
the wealth and heterogeneity of im-
plementation activities. While recall-
ing that this is the first time that an 
autonomous agreement had to be im-
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plemented by national social partners, 
it stresses the capacity of the member 
organisations to follow up their com-
mitments taken at European level. The 
question of what will be done in those 
countries or sectors where implemen-
tation has been lacking or insufficient 
(or not reported yet) is not addressed.
As announced in the last Commis-
sion communication on social dia-
logue (40), the Commission carried 
out its own monitoring of the imple-
mentation process and presented its 
assessment in the form of a report 
published in July 2008 (41).
Overall, the report found that the im-
plementation of the agreement has 
been successful, bearing in mind that 
it was a first-time experience for the 
European and national social partners. 
Social partners in most countries have 
developed rules and tools to apply the 
principles of the telework agreement 
in the national context. The key provi-
sions of the agreement were integrated 
in most of the national implementing 
measures. However, in two countries 
(the Czech Republic and Slovenia) not 
all principles were covered; and in six 
others no implementing measures had 
yet been taken (Bulgaria, Estonia, Cy-
prus, Lithuania, Malta and Romania).
Taking account of the variety of in-
dustrial relations systems, very dif-
ferent instruments were used to 
implement the European text. The 
traditional procedures and practices, 
i.e. those which would be usual prac-
tice for the regulation of similar issues 
in the context of national industrial 
relations, have been followed in most 
instances: collective bargaining at na-
tional or sector level has reflected tra-
ditional practice in several countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, 
40 COM(2004) 557 of 12 August 2004.
41 Commission Staff Working Paper, ‘Report on 
the implementation of the European social partners’ 
framework agreement on telework’, SEC(2008) 2178.
Iceland, Italy and Luxembourg). 
Some national social partners have 
made recommendations to counter-
parts at lower levels in accordance 
with their usual procedures (Spain, 
Finland, the Netherlands and Swe-
den). Guidelines have been adopted 
by the social partners in countries 
where industrial relations tend to be 
decentralised and do not provide for 
binding instruments at national level, 
leaving national social partners with 
Table 5.2: Telework – implementing measures adopted
Country Implementing measure(s)
Austria Guide by employer organisations (15.7.2005); no trade union involvement.
Belgium Collective Labour Agreement No 85 on telework adopted by National Labour Council (9.11.2005), extended by royal decree (13.6.2006)
Bulgaria No implementation reported yet (joined social dialogue only in 2007)
Cyprus No implementation reported yet
Czech Republic New Labour Code (Act No 262/2006 Coll.), Article 317, entering into force on 1.1.2007 (only partial implementation) 
Denmark
Private sector: collective agreements (industry: 16.7.2005; services: April 
2006), accompanying guidelines and subsidiary agreement by the cross-
industry social partners (27.10.2006)
Public sector: renewal of previous agreements and guidelines in the state 
(6.7.2005) and local and regional government (30.11.2005) sectors
Estonia No implementation reported yet
Finland Social partner agreement (23.5.2005) with recommendations
France National collective agreement (19.7.2005), extended by government decree (30.5.2006)
Germany Joint declaration; model company agreements by some sectoral social partners 
Greece Reference in and annex to National General Collective Labour Agreement 2006–07 (12.4.2006)
Hungary Amendments to the Labour Code, new Chapter X/A, and other laws, entering into force on 1.5.2004 (implementation of most provisions)
Iceland National collective agreement (5.5.2006)
Ireland Updating of code of practice on ‘e-working’ (not finalised yet)
Italy National collective agreement (9.6.2004)
Latvia Social partner agreement (12.4.2006)
Lithuania No implementation reported yet
Luxembourg National collective agreement (21.2.2006), extended by grand-ducal decree (13.10.2006)
Malta No implementation reported yet
Netherlands Recommendation by the Labour Foundation (11.9.2003) to lower bargaining levels
Norway Joint guidelines (Dec. 2005)
Poland Amendments to Labour Code, new Chapter II b, entering into force on 15.11.2007, on the basis of a social partner agreement (10.6.2005)
Portugal New Labour Code (Act No 99/2003), Articles 233–243, entering into force on 1.12.2003
Romania No implementation reported yet (joined social dialogue only in 2007)
Slovakia Amendment to Labour Code, Article 52, entering into force on 1.9.2007
Slovenia Amendment to Employment Relationship Act, extending provisions on homework (Articles 67–71) to telework (only partial implementation) 
Spain Reference in and annex to national agreement on collective bargaining 2003 (30.1.2003) and following agreement in 2005 and 2007
Sweden Common guidelines (28.5.2003) 
United Kingdom ‘Telework Guidance’ (guidelines) (Aug. 2003)
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little more than a coordinating func-
tion (Ireland, Latvia and the United 
Kingdom). In Germany the issue has 
typically been dealt with at company 
level and several social partners have 
issued model agreements for use at 
that level. In some Member States, 
given their industrial relations sys-
tem, the social partners left regula-
tory matters to the legislator even 
though they were involved in the 
drafting or consultation process (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia).
In several cases the social partners 
have developed promising innovative 
practices that have sometimes gone 
further than could have been expect-
ed, given the traditional industrial re-
lations there (Poland and the United 
Kingdom). 
In some countries the implementing 
measures have not gone as far as ex-
pected, given the degree of develop-
ment of industrial relations there. Sec-
toral social partner organisations could 
have been more involved in the imple-
mentation process (Germany, Austria 
and Sweden) and coordination and 
dissemination at cross-industry level 
could have been better. In Portugal and 
Slovenia, the social partners would tra-
ditionally have been more involved in 
the implementation process.
Table 5.2 gives an overview, coun-
try by country, of the implementing 
measures adopted or of the lack of im-
plementation.
The agreement successfully triggered 
discussions and joint actions by so-
cial partners in most Member States 
on how this new form of work can be 
used to the advantage of both work-
ers and employers. It had a real value 
added, since only two Member States 
(Denmark and Ireland) already had 
a comprehensive set of rules on tel-
ework prior to the EU agreement.
Telework has been ‘mainstreamed’ in 
common labour law in the vast ma-
jority of countries. It is recognised as 
a form of work organisation, instead 
of a new employment status. The risk 
of discrimination of teleworkers com-
pared to employees working perma-
nently at the employer’s premises is 
likely to have been reduced, as well 
as fake self-employment among tele-
workers.
There is still scope for improvement in 
the way the agreement has been im-
plemented in some countries, and ef-
forts are needed particularly in those 
countries that have not yet imple-
mented the agreement or have done it 
partially. More visibility also needs to 
be given to the agreement by raising 
awareness among individual employ-
ers and trade union officials in order 
to ensure tangible results.
The commerce as well as the telecom-
munications social partners agreed 
voluntary guidelines for telecom-
merce shortly before the cross-in-
dustry social partners. The European 
social partners of the electricity sec-
tor called on their members to imple-
ment the cross-industry agreement. 
But follow-up provisions were more 
vague or missing, and no implemen-
tation measures have been reported in 
these cases.
Work-related stress
The Framework Agreement on 
Work-related Stress was adopted on 
8 October 2004 by the cross-indus-
try social partners. The process and 
status of this agreement is equiva-
lent to the telework agreement (ne-
gotiations following an Article 138 
consultation (in 2002) and autono-
mous implementation. The respon-
sibilities of European and national 
social partners in the implementa-
tion process are therefore the same 
(see below).
The aims of the framework agree-
ment are to ‘increase the awareness 
and understanding of employers, 
workers and their representatives of 
work-related stress, draw their at-
tention to signs that could indicate 
problems of work-related stress’ and 
to ‘provide employers and work-
ers with a framework to identify 
and prevent or manage problems of 
work-related stress’. The agreement 
gives indications as to how such 
problems can be detected and which 
factors have to be analysed. Further-
more, it clarifies the responsibilities 
of employers and workers, and in 
particular the fact that all employers 
have a legal duty under Framework 
Directive 89/391/EEC to protect the 
occupational health and safety of 
workers, which also applies to stress. 
Finally the agreement highlights 
measures to prevent, eliminate or 
reduce stress problems at work.
The social partners, both at Europe-
an and national level, could benefit 
from the experiences of the telework 
autonomous agreement. The Euro-
pean organisations fulfilled their 
coordinating and monitoring func-
tion by informing their members 
and regularly requesting them to 
report on progress in the implemen-
tation process. As foreseen in the 
agreement, European social part-
ners compiled yearly progress tables 
in 2006 and 2007 with information 
on activities carried out in the EU 
Member States to date.
Furthermore, the ETUC carried out a 
project to assist its member organisa-
tions in the implementation process, 
through the drafting of an interpre-
tation guide, the translation of the 
agreement into several languages, and 
the organisation of regional seminars 
and a conference to allow an exchange 
of experience between trade unions 
from different Member States in deal-
ing with the implementation.
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At national level, social partners in 
many countries followed the same 
procedures and instruments they 
had already used for the telework 
agreement. In Spain, for instance, 
the national social partners (CEOE, 
CEPYME, UGT and CC.OO.) trans-
lated the agreement and integrated it 
in the annual framework agreement 
for collective bargaining (Acuerdo 
interconfederal para la negociación 
colectiva — ANC) for 2005, which is 
addressed to negotiators at sectoral 
and company level; it encourages sec-
toral and local social partners to adapt 
the agreement in the context of the 
Spanish labour market. The UK social 
partners (TUC, CBI, CEEP UK and 
FPB) developed, with the support of 
the government and the involvement 
of the Health and Safety Executive, a 
‘guide’, similar to the one on telework, 
which also contains links to useful ex-
isting tools (management standards, 
stress risk assessment tool). In Poland 
the trade union confederation NSZZ 
Solidarność launched a project to 
raise awareness and knowledge about 
work-related stress among social part-
ners and to start a negotiation proc-
ess with the employers and the other 
trade unions.
As in the case of telework the Icelan-
dic, Italian and French social partners 
signed specific national collective 
agreements on work-related stress on 
7 June 2007, 9 June and 2 July 2008 
respectively, while the Finnish and 
Swedish social partners issued rec-
ommendations to lower bargaining 
levels and the Latvian social partners 
agreed to implement the text. In Aus-
tria, social partners developed joint 
guidelines, while the Dutch social 
partners’ Labour Foundation updated 
an earlier joint declaration and bro-
chure on work-related stress. Social 
partners in several countries (Bel-
gium, Denmark and Norway) con-
sidered that the legal or conventional 
framework already in place covers 
the content of the autonomous agree-
ment and that additional implement-
ing measures were not necessary.
European social partners will present 
their joint implementation report 
in December 2008. While it is too 
early to draw conclusions, it can be 
assumed that some of the instru-
ments will strongly resemble those 
developed on telework. However, it 
can also be assumed that the overall 
process will generate more ‘soft’ tools 
like guidelines, recommendations 
and brochures, and less legislation or 
‘hard’ collective bargaining than on 
telework, since the European agree-
ment on work-related stress does not 
stipulate detailed rules to be observed, 
but rather presents a pragmatic ap-
proach on how to address stress-re-
lated problems at the workplace. This 
may also be linked with the difficulty 
of regulating the prevention of psy-
chosocial risks in the context of occu-
pation health and safety in general.
Multisector agreement on crystalline 
silica
In April 2006, the first agreement in 
the history of European social dialogue 
covering 14 industrial sectors was 
concluded on the theme of prevent-
ing occupational exposure to breath-
able crystalline silica, as a hazardous 
chemical agent (42). This autonomous 
agreement establishes a strong follow-
up mechanism that does not rely on 
the development of an implementing 
measure by national social partners or 
a Member State.
Instead, Article 7 of the Agreement re-
quires information on the application 
of agreed good practices, which are an-
nexed to the agreement, to be collected 
at site level and consolidated by the 
signatory parties before being commu-
nicated to a joint controlling body, the 
so-called ‘Council’. For this purpose, a 
42 See in more detail in Industrial relations in 
Europe 2006, Chapter 5, p. 106
reporting format was developed and 
annexed to the agreement. This format 
allows each of the 15 signatory EU sec-
tor associations to provide the ‘Coun-
cil’ with quantitative data on the ap-
plication of the agreement. This report 
forms the basis of a summary report 
on the application of the Agreement to 
be addressed to the Commission, the 
Member States and the authorities re-
sponsible for health and safety.
The signatories of the Agreement had 
to provide information on its applica-
tion within their sector for the first 
time in June 2008 and every two years 
from then on. In order to facilitate re-
porting, and to ensure a harmonised 
reporting procedure, collection of 
data and therefore consistent results, 
the Council decided to create an on-
line reporting system. This tool al-
lows minimising the reporting effort 
and consolidation workload for sec-
tors totalling thousands of sites and 
ensuring that the same instructions 
and guidance on reporting are pro-
vided to all, from the signatories at 
European level to each site applying 
the agreement. The reporting tool is 
placed on the agreement’s web portal 
(www.nepsi.eu).
In order to maintain the efforts initi-
ated at the negotiation stage to ensure 
an immediate and efficient dissemina-
tion of the Agreement, the Council 
decided in 2007 to issue a prelimi-
nary summary report on the status of 
the application of the agreement. Six 
months after its entry into force, in-
formation was collected on the actions 
already undertaken at national level. 
So far, the Agreement has been trans-
lated into 22 languages and published 
in the Official Journal. It has been 
fully implemented by the Czech ce-
ment industry into ISO systems in the 
plants. In Finland, social partners and 
public authorities agreed on a project 
to fight against exposure to crystalline 
silica dust. In most countries aware-
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ness campaigns, training sessions, 
working groups and workshops were 
organised with a view to disseminate 
and implement the Agreement and 
the good practices guide. Signatories 
are now finalising the first interim re-
port, which will provide the results of 
the first quantitative reports for indus-
trial sectors and sites.
Agreement on the European licence 
for drivers carrying out a cross-border 
interoperability service
Through this agreement signed on 27 
January 2004, CER and ETF decided 
to set up a European licence for train 
drivers. The agreement shall be im-
plemented by the CER-affiliated com-
panies pending a European directive. 
For the part covering the scope of the 
agreement, both parties wanted the 
directive to be written on the basis of 
the social partners agreement. Indeed, 
Directive 2007/59/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 
October 2007 on the certification of 
train drivers operating locomotives 
and trains on the railway system in 
the Community took some elements 
from the social partners agreement. 
Thus, its Annexes II (Medical require-
ments) and V (Professional knowl-
edge of rolling stock and requirements 
regarding the certificate) are largely 
inspired by the agreement. However, 
some elements of the agreement are 
not covered by the directive, and the 
signatory parties still have to decide 
how to deal with these points. In their 
agreement, the social partners com-
mitted themselves to follow up the 
agreement and to discuss problems 
linked to the implementation of the 
agreement. In May 2008, the signatory 
parties decided to identify the provi-
sions not covered by the directive and 
to clarify how to deal with them by the 
end of 2008.
Conclusions
Several years of experience with the 
implementation of autonomous agree-
ments have produced a clearer picture 
of the different actors involved and 
their respective responsibilities. Table 
5.3 attempts to indicate how different 
levels and instances need to interact 
so that the implementation process 
can be successful.
The cross-industry social partners 
have also refined the implementation 
provisions in the consecutive autono-
mous agreements. The innovations are 
highlighted in italics in Table 5.4.
The Commission has also taken steps 
to better reflect the regulatory nature 
of agreements in European social dia-
logue. The autonomous agreements 
on violence and harassment at work 
and on crystalline silica as well as the 
cross-industry social partners imple-
mentation report on their telework 
agreement were communicated to the 
European Parliament and the Coun-
cil as well as published in the Official 
Journal. For the telework agreement, 
it has also published the first report on 
the implementation of an autonomous 
agreement.
European agreements take their way 
from the European to the national 
level, and further from there onwards. 
In a somewhat different manner, the 
crystalline silica agreement creates a 
sort of direct effect on the workplace 
by establishing good practices and re-
porting procedures in all companies 
represented by the signatory parties. 
Commentators observed that ‘a pri-
vate dispute settlement and reporting 
system as set up with the “Council” 
may be more appropriate to agree-
ments that regulate the introduction 
of mechanisms than in cases where an 
agreement aims to establish substan-
tial rights’ (Eurofound 2007, p. 41).
The agreement on the European driving 
licence for train drivers is an interesting 
example of an encompassing agreement 
that covers issues outside the scope of 
Article 137 of the EC Treaty (on social 
policy) but served as a starting point for 
EU legislation in other areas.
The implementation of autonomous 
agreements follows the specific rules 
of each country’s national industrial 
relations systems, which vary consid-
erably as regards the responsibilities 
of the actors, which implies great vari-
ation in legal status and options for 
enforcing the implementation meas-
ure. Autonomous agreements are very 
well adapted to regulate and improve 
certain aspects of working conditions, 
but they cannot guarantee uniform 
Table 5.3: Responsibilities in the implementation process
Actors Responsibilities
National social partners 
Main responsibility for implementation
Translation (if necessary)
Dissemination of autonomous agreement and information
Discussions/negotiations between social partners
Developing implementing measure
Reporting about implementation activities
European social partners 
Assistance and advice (e.g. translation, best practices)
Coordination and monitoring of activities
Yearly progress reports and final implementation reports
Interpretation (in case of doubts/requests)
National authorities Subsidiary role in implementation, e.g. through regulation or legislation (not compulsory)
Commission Assistance and financial support (if necessary)Monitoring and assessment
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outcomes, binding status and full cov-
erage in all countries. Therefore ex-
perience seems to confirm the state-
ment made in the 2004 Commission 
communication: `while recognising 
the broad scope of the social partners’ 
competences […] where fundamental 
rights or important political options 
are at stake, or in situations where the 
rules must be applied in a uniform 
fashion in all Member States and cov-
erage must be complete, preference 
should be given to implementation by 
Council decision’.
Agreements implemented by 
way of a Council decision
This category includes the three cross-
industry framework agreements on 
parental leave, part-time work and 
fixed-term contracts, as well as the 
Table 5.4: Implementation and follow-up provisions of autonomous agreements
Telework Stress Violence
In the context of article 139 of the Treaty, 
this European framework agreement shall 
be implemented by the members of UNICE/
UEAPME, CEEPand ETUC (and the liaison 
committee EUROCADRES/ CEC) in 
accordance with the procedures and practices 
specific to management and labour in the 
Member States. 
In the context of article 139 of the Treaty, this 
voluntary European framework agreement 
commits the members of UNICE/UEAPME, 
CEEP and ETUC (and the liaison committee 
EUROCADRES/CEC) to implement it in 
accordance with the procedures and practices 
specific to management and labour in the 
Member States and in the countries of the 
European Economic Area. 
In the context of article 139 of the Treaty, this 
autonomous European framework agreement 
commits the members of BUSINESSEUROPE, 
UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC (and the liaison 
committee EUROCADRES/CEC) to implement 
it in accordance with the procedures and 
practices specific to management and labour in 
the Member States and in the countries of the 
European Economic Area. 
The signatory parties also invite their member 
organisations in candidate countries to 
implement this agreement.
The signatory parties also invite their member 
organisations in candidate countries to 
implement this agreement.
This implementation will be carried out within 
three years after the date of signature of this 
agreement. 
The implementation of this agreement will be 
carried out within three years after the date of 
signature of this agreement.
The implementation of this agreement will be 
carried out within three years after the date of 
signature of this agreement.
Member organisations will report on the 
implementation of this agreement to an ad 
hoc group set up by the signatory parties, 
under the responsibility of the social dialogue 
committee. This ad hoc group will prepare a 
joint report on the actions of implementation 
taken. This report will be prepared within 
four years after the date of signature of this 
agreement.
Member organisations will report on the 
implementation of this agreement to the 
Social Dialogue Committee. During the first 
three years after the date of signature of this 
agreement, the Social Dialogue Committee 
will prepare a yearly table summarising the 
on-going implementation of the agreement. 
A full report on the implementation actions 
taken will be prepared by the Social Dialogue 
Committee during the fourth year.
Member organisations will report on the 
implementation of this agreement to the 
Social Dialogue  Committee. During the first 
three years after the date of signature of this 
agreement, the Social Dialogue  Committee will 
prepare and adopt a yearly table summarising 
the on-going implementation of the  agreement. 
A full report on the implementation actions 
taken will be prepared by the Social Dialogue 
Committee and adopted by the European social 
partners during the fourth year.
In case of questions on the content of this 
agreement, member organisations involved 
can separately or jointly refer to the signatory 
parties.
In case of questions on the content of this 
agreement, member organisations involved 
can jointly or separately refer to the signatory 
parties, who will jointly or separately reply.
In case of questions on the content of this 
agreement, member organisations involved 
can jointly or separately refer to the signatory 
parties, who will jointly or separately reply.
The signatory parties shall review the 
agreement five years after the date of signature 
if requested by one of the signatory parties.
The signatory parties shall evaluate and review 
the agreement any time after the five years 
following the date of signature, if requested by 
one of them. 
The signatory parties shall evaluate and review 
the agreement any time after the five years 
following the date of signature, if requested by 
one of them.
When implementing this agreement, the 
members of the signatory parties avoid 
unnecessary burdens on SMEs
When implementing this agreement, the 
members of the signatory parties avoid 
unnecessary burdens on SMEs.
Implementation of this agreement does not 
constitute valid grounds to reduce the general 
level of protection afforded to workers in the 
field of this agreement. 
This agreement does not prejudice the right of 
social partners to conclude, at the appropriate 
level, including European level, agreements 
adapting and/or complementing this agreement 
in a manner which will take note of the specific 
needs of the social partners concerned. 
Implementation of this agreement does not 
constitute valid grounds to reduce the general 
level of protection afforded to workers in the 
field of this agreement. 
This agreement does not prejudice the right of 
social partners to conclude, at the appropriate 
level, including European level, agreements 
adapting and/or complementing this agreement 
in a manner which will take note of the specific 
needs of the social partners concerned. 
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maritime transport and civil aviation 
sector agreements on working time, 
and the railway sector agreement on 
the working conditions of mobile 
workers assigned to cross-border in-
teroperable services. The three cross-
industry framework agreements were 
negotiated as a result of a Commis-
sion consultation under Article 138, 
whereas the sectoral agreements make 
use of the space left to the social part-
ners by a directive (43) to adapt the 
Community provisions to the specific 
needs of the sector.
The responsibility for ensuring that 
agreements implemented by Council 
decision are transposed and imple-
mented lies with the Member States, 
even in cases where the provisions 
are implemented through collective 
bargaining by the social partners. 
Responsibility for monitoring these 
agreements lies with the Commis-
sion, although the social partners are 
systematically consulted on the imple-
mentation reports. They also play an 
enhanced role in the review of these 
directives. For example, the agree-
ment on working time in civil aviation 
and the agreement on working con-
ditions in the railway sector indicate 
that the social partners will undertake 
evaluations of the implementation of 
these agreements. The negotiation of 
the cross-industry social partners to 
revise their 1995 parental leave agree-
ment was already mentioned above.
Part-time work directive
A good example to analyse the imple-
mentation by way of directive is the 
cross-industry social partners’ frame-
work agreement on part-time work of 
1997. It was adopted as Directive 97/81/
EC by the Council. The Commission 
delivered its  implementation report in 
43 In this instance Directive 93/104/EC concerning 
certain aspects of the organisation of working time 
(OJ L 307, 13.12.1993), now replaced by Directive 
2003/88/EC.
accordance with the relevant provision 
in the directive (44) in 2003. It found 
that ‘part-time work was an established 
phenomenon and was already covered 
by legislation in some Member States 
before the directive was adopted. Thus 
many Member States (Spain, Finland, 
France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands) have 
transposed the directive by means of 
changes to existing legislation. Two 
Member States (Belgium and Den-
mark) have combined legislation with 
collective agreements to implement the 
directive. In two others (Austria and 
Luxembourg) the authorities did not 
consider specific transposition meas-
ures necessary. Five Member States 
(Portugal, Germany, Ireland, Sweden 
and United Kingdom) actually took the 
advantage of the opportunity to draft 
new and specific legislation concerning 
part-time work with a view to encour-
aging its promotion. In general, it could 
be considered that Member States have 
correctly transposed the provisions’. 
Some shortcomings were found.
Research (45) shows that although the 
directive had only one binding stand-
ard, i.e. the principle of non-discrimi-
nation against part-time workers, plus 
11 ‘soft law’ recommendations and four 
exemptions, it nevertheless had some 
impact in most Member States. The 
principle of non-discrimination was 
new in seven (of the then 15) Member 
States, and in terms of need for adap-
tation it ranked in the middle range 
of directives on employment matters. 
The directive improved the situation of 
part-time workers in several countries 
(e.g. Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom), while it facilitated access to 
44 Report by the Commission’s services on the 
implementation of Council Directive 97/81/EC of 17 
December 1997 concerning the framework agreement 
on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and 
the ETUC.
45 M. Hartlapp, Social Science Research Centre, 
Berlin, presentation at conference, ‘European social 
dialogue — Working together for results’, 29 and 
30 November 2008, Lisbon (http://ec.europa.eu/
employment_social/social_dialogue/docs/lisbon_
conf_hartlapp_20071129_en.pdf).
part time work in other countries (e.g. 
Germany, Spain, Italy and Portugal) 
by transforming the soft-law provi-
sions into hard law. The social partners 
were active in several Member States to 
transpose the directive.
The European Trade Union Institute 
(ETUI) has produced its own imple-
mentation reports on the parental 
leave, part-time and fixed-term work 
agreements through its Netlex net-
work of national legal experts (www.
etui-rehs.org).
European agreement on the organisa-
tion of working time of mobile staff in 
civil aviation
The agreement of 22 March 2000 imple-
mented by Council Directive 2000/79/
EC of 27 November 2000 provides for 
a review of the provisions of the agree-
ment two years after the end of the im-
plementation period laid down in the 
directive (i.e. December 2005). The sig-
natories launched the review process in 
mid-2006 before eventually examining 
thoroughly the problems encountered 
with the agreed clauses at the end of 
2007. A report is planned for 2008.
Working conditions of railway mo-
bile workers assigned to interoperable 
cross-border services
The agreement of 27 January 2004 
implemented by Council Directive 
2005/47/EC of 18 July 2005 provides 
for an evaluation of the provisions of 
the agreement two years after its sign-
ing in the light of initial experience 
in the development of interoperable 
cross-border transport. Consider-
ing that January 2006 was too close 
to start this evaluation exercise (slow 
evolution of the interoperable cross-
border market), it was launched by the 
signatory parties in June 2008.
In their agreement, the social partners 
also agreed that at European level, the 
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question of the number of  consecutive 
rests away from home as well as com-
pensation for the rest away from home 
will be renegotiated two years after 
signature of the agreement. This rene-
gotiation at European level started in 
early 2007 but has not yet been con-
cluded. However, the signatory parties 
shall jointly inform the Commission 
about the outcome of their negotia-
tions. The Commission will submit a 
report to the Council taking account of 
the economic and social impact of the 
social partners’ agreement on under-
takings and workers and of the social 
dialogue talks held under Clauses 10 
and 11 of the agreement (‘Follow-up to 
the agreement, evaluation‘) on all per-
tinent issues, including Clause 4 (‘Daily 
rest away from home’). In order to pre-
pare this report, the Commission has 
launched a study on the economic and 
social impact of the agreement which is 
being carried out in 2008.
Conclusions
When we compare the actual imple-
mentation measures for autonomous 
and for ‘legislative’ European level 
agreements, the two implementation 
routes reveal distinct features. Agree-
ments that take an erga omnes effect 
through a Council decision entail 
Member State legislation. It is some-
times accompanied by collectively 
bargained transposition and more 
often by a consultation of social part-
ners. In general, the involvement of 
national social partners is seen less 
than is the case with implementation 
of autonomous agreements. The proc-
ess resembles the implementation of 
‘classic’ Council directives. In contrast, 
legislation remains the exception as 
transposition instrument for autono-
mous agreements and collective bar-
gaining or social dialogue solutions 
prevail. But experience shows that, in 
both cases, actual implementation im-
plies a sustained effort of all actors, the 
European Commission, Member State 
authorities and social partners.
The Commission has drawn up im-
plementation reports for directives as 
well as for autonomous agreements. 
For EU directives, it has the task of 
monitoring their implementation. In 
its 2002 communication, the Commis-
sion pointed out that the implementa-
tion of a Council decision is monitored 
in accordance with the nature of the 
instrument used (directive, regulation 
or decision). However, social partners 
who triggered the regulatory text hold 
special responsibility for its imple-
mentation and revision. The re-nego-
tiation of the cross-industry parental 
leave agreement, the ETUI-REHS 
reports, and the joint reports of the 
railway and civil aviation social part-
ners show a re-enforced interest in the 
process. For autonomous agreements, 
the Commission verifies whether the 
Community objectives outlined in the 
consultation phase have been reached 
as the negotiations of the autonomous 
agreement have interrupted the legis-
lative procedure.
Process-oriented texts
In process-oriented texts the Europe-
an social partners make recommen-
dations of various kinds to their mem-
bers for follow-up in different forms. 
As such, implementation is more in-
cremental and difficult to assess.
Frameworks of actions
Frameworks of actions identify certain 
policy priorities at EU level towards 
which the national social partners un-
dertake to work. The social partners 
report annually on the action taken to 
follow up these texts.
Framework of actions on gender 
equality
Following the experience with the 
‘Framework of actions for the lifelong 
development of competencies and 
qualifications’ (2002), the European 
cross-industry social partners had de-
veloped in March 2005 the ‘Framework 
of actions on gender equality’ (46). This 
joint document has been followed up 
during the past three years.
As stipulated in the text, the Social 
Dialogue Committee adopted yearly 
follow-up reports in 2006 and 2007 
which described how the four pri-
orities identified in the framework of 
actions (addressing gender roles, pro-
moting women in decision-making, 
supporting work–life balance, tack-
ling the gender pay gap) have been 
integrated into the social partners’ 
activities on gender equality in the 
Member States. National fact sheets 
from 20 and 18 countries respectively 
give information about initiatives at 
European, national, cross-industry, 
sectoral and company levels.
In the first year of implementation, 
translating and disseminating the 
framework of actions comprised the 
major task for national social part-
ners, whereas later action focused 
more on finding practical solutions 
to the problems faced by workers and 
companies on the ground. The report-
ing revealed a range of activities such 
as the negotiation of collective agree-
ments addressing gender equality 
concerns, the discussions with public 
authorities, the design of new gender 
equality policies or the development 
of projects tackling gender gaps.
The reports revealed that many or-
ganisations focused on the priority of 
facilitating work–life balance, which 
represented the largest number of re-
ported activities (e.g. introduction or 
extension of care leave, prevention 
of long working hours, promotion 
of flexible and innovative forms of 
working). The issue of equal pay also 
features high on the agenda (through 
guidance tools, training schemes, bet-
46 See in more detail in Industrial Relations in 
Europe 2006, Chapter 5.
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ter statistics to understand the under-
lying causes of the pay gap). Addition-
al efforts were also made to address 
gender-related labour market segrega-
tion and the under-representation of 
women in management positions.
The follow-up reports were presented 
at the launch and closing conferences 
of the European Year of Equal Op-
portunities for All, 2007. The need for 
better dissemination of the framework 
and its results was stressed at a ‘mid-
term reflection’ conference organ-
ised by the German social partners in 
July 2008. Overall, participants gave a 
positive assessment to this point, even 
though some underlined that it should 
not only monitor social partner initia-
tives at national level on gender equal-
ity, but it should also be used as a start-
ing point to trigger new action.
Agriculture: musculoskeletal disorders
In November 2005, the social partners 
in agriculture signed the ‘European 
agreement on the reduction of work-
ers’ exposure to the risk of work-related 
musculoskeletal disorders in agriculture’. 
This framework of actions calls on the 
social partners in each Member State to 
create a ‘national observatory of agricul-
tural workers’ health and safety’ and to 
encourage the designation of an author-
ity or body in each Member State to be 
responsible for defining and coordinat-
ing policies for the prevention of mus-
culoskeletal disorders (MSD). National 
social partners shall also ensure that, in 
line with the arrangements defined by 
each Member State, best practices for 
the prevention of MSD are implement-
ed in farms and agricultural enterprises. 
A monitoring committee was to be set 
up within three years.
Given that a common final report pre-
senting best practices in different coun-
tries will be finalised by the end of 2008 
it is still too early to draw conclusions on 
implementation. Among others, the so-
cial partners in agriculture participated 
in the activities of the European Agency 
for Health and Safety at Work in Bilbao 
to fight against MSD and were invited to 
the final conference of the campaign to 
report on their activities. One of the nine 
prizes awarded in Bilbao was won by an 
agricultural undertaking in Cyprus. The 
Bilbao Agency has appointed a special 
contact person to deal with agriculture. 
Flyers and posters on the joint text were 
produced in all official EU languages, as 
well as in Turkish and Croatian, and dis-
seminated to companies.
Other process-oriented texts
In the ‘Code of conduct on corporate 
social responsibility’ in the sugar in-
dustry EFFAT and CEFS agreed in 
2003 some minimum standards and a 
formalised follow-up procedure. They 
monitor the progressive implementa-
tion of the code through a survey and 
jointly choose and regularly update ex-
amples of good practice. This evaluation 
is carried out each year in the form of 
a detailed annual report. The survey for 
2007 confirmed that this process is de-
livering constructive results within the 
national delegations’ areas of respon-
sibility against a background of heavy 
restructuring following the reform of 
the sugar regime. Three new examples 
of good practices were agreed and pro-
posed to other national members; two 
in the field of health and safety (a French 
expert handbook on security and sani-
tary issues and a free vaccination pro-
gramme against specific occupational 
disease risks in the Czech Republic) and 
one concerning restructuring (the Ital-
ian agreement on assistance for workers 
affected by company closure).
The European social partners of the 
commerce sector have compiled na-
tional follow-up actions of their last 
three policy recommendations with 
the help of a questionnaire that was 
answered by affiliates from eight and 
six Member States in 2006 and 2007. 
The exercise showed that a number of 
measures have been taken at the na-
tional level but it does not analyse how 
they are linked to the European texts 
nor the extent to which they address 
the recommended standards.
Social partners in the postal sector 
published best practices related to 
their declaration on training (2006) on 
their joint website (www.postsocial-
dialogue.org) and are implementing an 
EC project to assess the impact of this 
joint declaration. The telecoms SSDC 
is preparing a report to follow-up the 
impact of the guidelines for the pre-
vention of MSD adopted at the end of 
2005. Social partners in this committee 
have also launched a questionnaire to 
assess the level of implementation of 
their ‘Guidelines on customer contact 
centres’, adopted in 2004. The personal 
services committee started working in 
2006 on the follow-up of adopted texts. 
They are currently assessing through a 
questionnaire the level of implementa-
tion of their ‘How to get along’ code of 
good conduct, adopted in 2001.
Conclusions
European social partners of most sec-
tors have improved the labelling of 
their joint texts and strengthened their 
follow-up provisions. In most cases, 
addressees can now better identify 
what the texts aim at. But it remains 
difficult to evaluate the impact and the 
value added of process-oriented texts.
In the case of frameworks of actions 
it is difficult to assess which activities 
have been triggered by the follow-up 
process and which activities would 
have also taken place without the Eu-
ropean text. Nevertheless, the process 
has several clear merits.
•  Frameworks of action spell out the 
most urgent priorities where social 
partners should concentrate their 
work at national level.
•  It helps to raise the visibility and aware-
ness at EU and national level of the role 
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and experience that social partners 
have in promoting specific concerns, 
e.g. gender equality at work.
•  The reporting process allows for an 
exchange among national trade union 
and employer experts and the docu-
mentation of experiences with differ-
ent approaches and instruments.
•  The duty to produce national reports 
provides an opportunity for contact 
persons in national trade unions and 
employers’ organisations to meet 
and discuss jointly the best strategies 
for certain policy areas in the context 
of the respective national industrial 
relations systems. This may result in 
new joint action and/or influence 
collective bargaining.
Frameworks of actions are inspired 
by the open method of coordination 
(OMC) (as suggested by the High-Level 
Group on Industrial Relations in 2001). 
The OMC uses priority and target set-
ting, monitoring and benchmarking as 
well as peer review and learning. Pri-
ority setting and monitoring have been 
institutionalised. Targeted peer reviews 
and mutual learning do not seem to 
have been established in an equally 
structured form. Recent research in-
dicates, however, that the national so-
cial partner organisations appreciate 
the informal learning that takes place 
(Eurofound 2007). It is also unclear to 
which extent European social partners 
chose best practices according to estab-
lished criteria, rather than selecting all 
possible examples.
Robust and detailed monitoring and 
follow-up procedures for other process-
oriented texts remain the exception. The 
structured approach of the sugar indus-
try is facilitated by the fact that the sec-
tor is dominated by a comparably small 
number of large enterprises. But the 
interest in knowing more about actual 
implementation is growing. As indicat-
ed, some European SSDCs have started 
the exercise of gathering more informa-
tion on implementation (see Box 5.1 for 
information on different approaches). 
Box 5.1: The sectoral European social partners’ approach  
to monitoring implementation
The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions is pre-
paring a report on the dynamics in the European sectoral social dialogue. Among others, 
it found six categories of practical follow-up techniques on the basis of an analysis of 14 
process-oriented texts from 2005 to 2007, i.e. the formal procedures adopted by the social 
partners to monitor and evaluate the impact of their joint texts. In many cases, several 
techniques are used and these categories are not mutually exclusive.
1. Written survey among members
Very often the verification of the national implementation is done through a questionnaire 
sent to the national affiliates. This questionnaire is generally a joint questionnaire. It can 
be completed by both sides of industry at national level or each side may send (or not) 
its questionnaire back to its European body. The advantage of this last possibility is that 
it could create some competition and can be used by each side to encourage the national 
affiliates to answer by sending the questionnaire completed by the other side. Generally 
speaking it is a long process with only limited results. The EU secretariats have to mobilise 
and call personally their affiliates for a return, which is generally well below 50 %. The sur-
vey can be on a single joint text or a sample. For example, commerce and private security 
have decided to cover most of their joint texts.
2. Annual/periodic reports
More systematic is the elaboration of an annual or biannual report. This technique was 
used by the social partners at cross-industry level for the framework of action on equality 
between men and women and on lifelong learning, and on their autonomous agreements 
on stress as well as violence and harassment. It is more sophisticated since the report is 
made public and disseminated. For a good result it should be considered as strategic by 
both parties. In a sense, it is a tool for showing that ‘something has happened’ at national 
level and the soft law approach delivers.
3. Task forces/working groups/plenary meetings
A third technique is less formalised. It consists in an oral report by the parties in a plenary 
meeting. Each affiliate is supposed to present what has been achieved at national level. 
Contrary to the annual report, this is much more informal and does not necessarily lead 
to a written document. Consequently, there is no cumulative knowledge about the imple-
mentation process.
4. Agreement on good practices
The presentation of a selection of good practices is often linked to a charter or a corporate 
social responsibility text. A typical example is the code of conduct of the sugar sector, 
which is reviewed each year and both sides agree on selected good practices related to one 
or more provisions of the code of conduct. This technique is linked to the importance of 
big enterprises which are the key players.
5. Conferences/websites
The follow-up can also be through the organisation of a public event and by creating a 
common website (sugar, post for example). In such cases, compliance with the provision 
of the texts is supposed to increase via better visibility. The website approach is generally 
developed when a minimum of trust exists between partners.
6. New texts/new initiatives
The follow-up can also be another text or initiative. Very often the dialogue on a topic 
is a dynamic one and each step leads incrementally to another one. Then, the follow-up 
provision is more a commitment to deepen the dialogue than an objective per se. In other 
words, the follow-up process serves to reinforce the consensus between the members and 
between the partners than being a real exercise of implementation.
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (forthcoming) 
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Further empirical research is needed 
on the actual implementation as well as 
on the dynamics between the European 
and national level.
Conclusions
In 2004 the Commission expressed con-
cern that imprecise and vague follow-up 
provisions compromise the impact of 
European social dialogue outcomes. 
Experience shows that joint texts do not 
realise their full potential when precise 
follow-up and monitoring provisions 
are missing or not respected as, for ex-
ample, in the case of sectoral texts on 
telework. Furthermore, the political 
commitment and the technical capac-
ity of both the European social partners 
and their national affiliates are essential 
prerequisites for a successful follow-up.
The case of the telework agreement 
demonstrated that a structured proc-
ess, commitment of the European so-
cial partners and a feeling of owner-
ship in most Member States can create 
a real value added. Its implementation 
is a groundbreaking achievement for 
the European and national social part-
ners. In many instances, national actors 
needed to discuss and agree on their 
responsibilities for the implementation 
process. Some of them may have had 
initial doubts and reservations concern-
ing their involvement and commitment. 
Implementation is a continuous process 
of learning (including across borders) 
and confidence-building. Lessons will 
certainly be learned for the future im-
plementation of other autonomous 
agreements at national level.
The implementation of European social 
dialogue outcomes and in particular 
autonomous framework agreements 
is not necessarily finished at the date 
stipulated in the text. It may continue to 
provide useful guidance for many years. 
National industrial relations have their 
own dynamics and different priorities 
may prevail at different times in different 
countries. European agreements may be 
implemented as part of package deals 
or in conjunction with other issues. In 
several countries, collective bargaining 
rounds on the subject of working con-
ditions (other than wages and working 
time) take place only every few years. 
A European social dialogue text could 
therefore feature as one aspect of peri-
odic sector-level bargaining years later.
The impact of European social dialogue 
texts depends crucially on awareness 
and also commitment among national 
and sectoral social partner organisa-
tions as well as among individual em-
ployers and trade union officials. This 
is especially true in the case of non-
binding instruments, where specific 
efforts to disseminate social dialogue 
results are essential.
In successful implementation proce-
dures, the European social partner 
organisations have played an impor-
tant role in informing, coordinating 
exchanges and cross-border learning, 
and monitoring the implementation 
process. This coordinating role has 
been recognised by all actors in the 
context of the telework agreement.
With regard to recent enlargement 
rounds, the Commission stated in 
2002 that ‘only with sufficiently robust 
national structures the social partners 
will be able to participate effectively 
in negotiations and other European 
social dialogue activities and also im-
plement agreements at national level’. 
For the Member States having joined 
in 2004 and 2007, most of them with 
recent social dialogue structures, im-
plementation of autonomous agree-
ments presents a particular challenge. 
The implementation experience of the 
telework agreement suggests two con-
clusions. Firstly, the national indus-
trial relations structures in some new 
Member States have proved their ca-
pacity to implement a European social 
dialogue agreement. European social 
partners’ activities have contributed 
to improving the capacity of their na-
tional members to implement such 
social dialogue results (47). Secondly, 
it points to the fact that national pub-
lic authorities have a facilitating role 
in some Member States and can, in 
the last resort, transpose autonomous 
agreements by their inclusion in the 
labour code. Indeed, this potential role 
is provided for in Article 139(2) of the 
EC Treaty, which refers to procedures 
and practices specific to management 
and labour and the Member States.
The experience gathered by different ac-
tors over the past few years shows that 
when implementation is treated serious-
ly, European social dialogue texts and in 
particular autonomous agreements can 
go a long way to improving working con-
ditions and competitiveness. European 
social partners are increasingly prepared 
to take the responsibility for the imple-
mentation (and potentially the revision) 
of their joint instruments that they took 
on by taking autonomous regulatory ac-
tion in their field of competence.
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The EU has among its objectives the promotion of employment, improved work-
ing conditions, and dialogue between management and labour (Article 136 of the 
EC Treaty). In contrast to other regional trade areas, like NAFTA, Mercosur and 
ASEAN, the EU has the competence to establish minimum standards to support and 
complement the activities of its Member States with a view to achieving its objectives 
(see Chapter 1). Over the years, a considerable body of EU law has been adopted and 
subsequently implemented in the Member States.
1. Introduction
Since the Industrial Relations in Europe 
2006 report action relating to legislation 
has been carried out in the fields of la-
bour law, health and safety at work, anti-
discrimination and social security. The 
Commission launched several consul-
tations of the European social partners 
before submitting proposals, in accord-
ance with Article 138 of the EC Treaty.
Given the time since the adoption and/
or transposition of some directives, 
the Commission carried out a review 
of their application to assess whether 
they need to be up-dated or clarified. 
Such a review was carried out in the 
area of information and consultation 
of workers.
In addition, the Commission contin-
ued to deploy significant efforts to 
monitor the correct implementation 
and application of Community law 
in the enlarged EU. It also provided 
technical assistance with regard to the 
implementation of the relevant EU ac-
quis in the candidate countries.
Furthermore, the European Court of 
Justice handed down several impor-
tant judgments (see boxes below), ei-
ther following infringement proceed-
ings launched by the Commission or 
in response to preliminary questions 
submitted by national tribunals seek-
ing guidance on the interpretation of 
EU law. Several of these judgments 
have significant implications for in-
dustrial relations in certain Member 
States, the extent of which in some 
cases remains to be seen.
2. Labour law
2.1. Working time and temporary 
agency work
The Employment, Social Policy, 
Health and Consumer Affairs (EP-
SCO) Council continued its first read-
ing of the Commission’s legislative 
proposals to revise the Working Time 
Directive (Directive 2003/88/EC) and 
for a directive on temporary agency 
work. Political agreement was reached 
on a compromise package under the 
Slovenian Presidency on 9 June 2008.
On working time, the Council agreed 
by qualified majority on a common 
position which would:
•  introduce specific provisions about 
‘on-call’ time (when a worker has 
to remain at the workplace ready to 
work if called upon to do so);
•  allow more flexibility about the tim-
ing of compensatory rest for missed 
minimum rest periods;
•  introduce a number of extra protective 
conditions for workers who agree to use 
the ‘opt-out’ from the normal 48-hour 
limit to average weekly working time;
•  allow Member States to calculate 
weekly working time over a longer 
average period (maximum one year);
•  support measures to reconcile work 
and family life, including ensuring 
that employers inform workers in 
good time of any major changes to 
organisation of working time.
On temporary agency work, the Council 
agreed by near unanimity on a common 
position which would ensure that the 
principle of equal treatment, as regards 
basic working and employment condi-
tions like pay, maternity leave and leave, 
can apply between temporary agency 
workers and the workers directly re-
cruited by user companies from day one 
of their assignments. Different industrial 
relations practices among the Member 
States have been accommodated through 
derogations which can be introduced by 
collective agreement or — under specific 
conditions — by agreement between the 
social partners at national level.
Other features of the proposed direc-
tive include the following provisions.
•  Temporary agency workers must be in-
formed about permanent employment 
opportunities in the user enterprise.
•  Temporary agency workers will have 
access to any childcare facilities, as 
well as canteens and transport serv-
ices that may be provided by user 
enterprises for their own employees. 
They should also be afforded access 
to childcare facilities provided by 
their temporary work agencies even 
when they are between assignments.
•  Temporary agency workers should 
be afforded access to the training 
provided by user enterprises for their 
own workers and their training needs 
should also be assisted in the period 
when they are between assignments.
•  Member States will have to review and 
justify any restrictions or prohibitions 
that may have been imposed on the 
use of temporary agency work.
Both legislative proposals are now in 
their second reading under the co-
decision procedure.
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Meanwhile the Commission is final-
ising a report on the application of 
the Working Time Directive in the 
Member States, following reports 
from national authorities and social 
partners, which is expected to be pre-
sented to the European Parliament 
and the Council during the second 
half of 2008. 
2.2. Employee involvement
2.2.1. Revision of the European Works 
Councils Directive
The Commission adopted a pro-
posal for a Directive recasting 
Directive 94/45/EC on European 
Works Councils (EWC) in the con-
text of the renewed Social Agenda 
on 2 July 2008 (48). On 20 February 
2008, the European social partners 
were consulted on the objectives and 
content of the proposal envisaged by 
the Commission, and were invited to 
start negotiations on updating and 
improving the way European works 
councils operate, with a view to revis-
ing the existing legislation (49). They 
could, however, not agree to start 
such negotiations.
European works councils currently 
operate in 820 major companies 
across the EU, covering some 14.5 
million employees. They have a key 
role in anticipating and managing the 
social dimension of change in large 
enterprises Europe-wide. They also 
contribute to improving corporate 
governance, a key factor in sustaining 
competitiveness.
The revision of the 1994 directive 
governing European works councils 
is one of the Commission’s legislative 
priorities for 2008. It is part of the 
renewed Lisbon strategy and of the 
48 COM(2008) 419 of 2 July 2008.
49 COM(2008)660 of 20.2.2008.
Commission’s ‘Better regulation’ pro-
gramme. It adds to the promotion of 
best practice, for which the European 
Union continues to provide substan-
tial aid to social partners.
The Commission considers that a 
Community initiative could meet the 
following objectives.
Firstly, ensure the effectiveness of 
employees’ transnational informa-
tion and consultation rights, currently 
lacking in a significant proportion of 
situations. Secondly, increase the take 
up of EWCs. Thirdly, resolve the prob-
lems identified in the practical appli-
cation of the directive and remedy the 
lack of legal certainty resulting from 
some of its provisions or the absence 
of certain provisions. Finally, ensure 
consistency with Community legisla-
tion on information and consultation 
of employees.
2.2.2. Review of Directive 2002/14/EC 
establishing a general framework for 
informing and consulting employees 
in the European Community
On 17 March 2008, the Commis-
sion adopted a communication on 
the review of the application of Di-
rective 2002/14/EC in the EU. This 
communication summarises the main 
characteristics of the transposition of 
Directive 2002/14/EC in the 27 EU 
Member States, sets out the conclu-
sions drawn from the analysis of the 
transposing measures, and takes a po-
sition on the review of the application 
of the directive. It points out that the 
implementation of the directive rep-
resents an important step forward in 
the consolidation of the right to infor-
mation and consultation of employees 
across the EU, and that a particularly 
significant impact is expected in the 
Member States which did not previ-
Box 6.1: Stakeholder views on  
the European Works Councils Directive
In April 2004, the Commission launched the first phase of consultation of the social part-
ners on a review of the directive. This consultation showed a divergence of opinion with 
employees’ organisations in favour of a revision and employers’ organisations opposed 
to it. While all social partners agreed on the usefulness of European works councils and 
the benefits of a clear procedure guaranteeing the timely information and consultation 
of workers, they noted that it is difficult to organise useful information and consultation 
without delays and uncertainties and that getting all workers to accept a European works 
council constitutes a challenge.
In March 2005, the Commission again consulted the European social partners simultane-
ously on the restructuring of undertakings and on the ‘best-practice’ aspect of European 
works councils, encouraging them to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on the 
requisite ways and means for promoting best practice. The social partners have included 
promotion and evaluation of their joint conclusions on European works councils in their 
2006–08 work programme.
The European Parliament has given its views on European works councils on several occa-
sions. In its resolution of 10 May 2007 on strengthening European legislation in the field 
of information and consultation of workers, it called on the Commission to update this 
legislation in order to ensure a coherent and efficient framework of law, guarantee legal 
certainty and improve the linking of the social dialogue at the national and the European 
levels, and to present to it a timetable, in particular for the ‘long-awaited revision of the 
Directive on European Works Councils”.
The European Economic and Social Committee has also delivered opinions on European 
works councils, the most recent of which, in 2006, recommended ‘rapid updating’ of cer-
tain points in the directive.
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ously have a general, permanent and 
statutory system of information and 
consultation. It notes, however, that 
the directive has not yet deployed 
its full impact, and that more time is 
needed before a definite assessment 
on a possible revision can be made. 
It concludes that it is not justified to 
propose amendments to the directive, 
with the exception of the inclusion of 
seafarers in its scope of application (see 
point 2.4). The main challenge now is 
to ensure its correct transposition and 
enforcement, through monitoring and 
control of its implementation, whilst 
stepping up efforts geared to aware-
ness raising, exchange of best prac-
tices, research and capacity building 
of the concerned stakeholders. (For 
empirical research on developments 
concerning workers’ representation at 
company level see Chapter 3 of Indus-
trial Relations in Europe 2006.)
2.2.3. Transnational company agree-
ments
On 2 July 2008, a staff working docu-
ment and a study report were issued 
on the role of transnational company 
agreements in the context of increas-
ing international integration (50). 
In the context of the renewed Social 
Agenda, the document emphasises 
the role and the potential of transna-
tional company agreements in today’s 
increasingly international business 
environment. It is intended as input 
to the debate on such agreements and 
on the contribution of different stake-
holders to their development.
The growing need to anticipate devel-
opments in terms of employment, re-
structuring and managing human re-
sources throws down new challenges 
for both management and workers in 
transnational companies. Against the 
backdrop of new approaches to dia-
logue and corporate social responsi-
50 SEC(2008) 2155 of 2 July 2008.
bility, companies and workers’ repre-
sentatives have begun agreeing texts 
in various forms, which are to be ap-
plied in more than one Member State. 
The Commission has listed 147 joint 
transnational texts in 89 companies, 
most of which have been concluded 
since 2000, affecting nearly 7.5 mil-
lion workers across the world. These 
texts include worldwide international 
framework agreements on fundamen-
tal rights and social responsibility as 
well as texts addressing specific Eu-
ropean issues such as anticipation of 
change and management of restruc-
turing, development of joint health 
and safety standards, common strate-
gies on equal opportunities, a mecha-
nism for transnational financial par-
ticipation, rules on cross-border data 
protection, joint principles on human 
resources policy, training or mobility.
Some practical, legal and political 
questions for the social actors and 
the European Union are related to the 
potential discrepancies between the 
transnational scope of texts conclud-
ed and national norms and references. 
The documents provide for a map-
ping of existing texts, analyse their 
development, and propose a number 
of practical measures to the social 
partners, the EU institutions and the 
other stakeholders (see also Box 1.4 in 
Chapter 1)
2.3. Review of Directive 2001/23/EC 
on transfer of undertakings
On 20 June 2007, the Commission 
launched a first-stage consultation of 
the European social partners on the 
need to amend Directive 2001/23/
EC to clarify its application to cross-
border transfers of undertakings with 
a change in the place of work.
In its communication of 18 June 2007, 
the Commission analysed the effects 
of this directive in the EU Member 
States. It concluded that by achieving 
the correct balance between the pro-
tection of employees and the freedom 
to pursue an economic activity, the 
directive has made a major contribu-
tion to ensuring that numerous re-
structuring operations in Europe are 
socially more acceptable.
The Commission pointed out, how-
ever, that the directive does not deal 
explicitly with cross-border trans-
fers, although it does apply to trans-
fers in which the undertaking being 
transferred ‘falls within the territorial 
scope of the Treaty’. It considered that 
this can cause uncertainty on the part 
of employers and employees. Conse-
quently, it requested the opinion of the 
social partners at Community level on 
the eventual need to amend this direc-
tive to cover explicitly this issue.
The social partners replied, in essence, 
that no problems have been detected 
so far that could not be dealt with by 
the existing legal instruments of Com-
munity or private international law. 
Taking into account these replies, the 
Commission decided not to pursue 
further, for the time being, the pro-
cedure for amending the directive. 
However, it will continue to monitor 
developments in this field in order to 
gather more information and evidence 
in this regard.
2.4. Review of the regulatory social 
framework concerning seafarers
On 10 October 2007, the Commis-
sion launched a first-stage consulta-
tion of the European social partners 
on reassessing the regulatory social 
framework for more and better sea-
faring jobs in the EU. This consulta-
tion aimed to strengthen the social 
dimension of maritime policy and to 
make the sector more attractive with-
out undermining its competitiveness. 
It was a follow up to last year’s Green 
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Paper on the Future of Maritime Poli-
cy and part of the EU maritime pack-
age adopted also on 10 October 2007.
The maritime sector is currently ex-
cluded from the scope of part of EU 
labour and social legislation and this 
situation was reassessed in close co-
operation with the social partners. 
The Commission reviewed the perti-
nent legislation, identified exclusions 
or derogations affecting workers in 
maritime professions and pointed out 
problems raised by the practical ap-
plication as well as difficulties of inter-
pretation of such legislation.
The social partners were invited to 
take a position on the Commission’s 
analysis and to assess priority ar-
eas for action. They were requested, 
in particular, to express their opin-
ions on which ‘exclusions’ could be 
suppressed because they are not/no 
longer justified or which may need to 
be adapted. The social partners were 
also asked to provide input on what 
means of action would be appropriate 
in order to improve the social secu-
rity protection of workers in seagoing 
professions and to improve health and 
safety on board, in particular on small 
fishing vessels.
Table 6.1 gives an overview of all Article 
138 consultations of the last two years.
2.5. Posting of workers
On 13 June 2007, the Commission is-
sued a communication entitled ‘Post-
ing of workers in the framework of 
the provision of services: maximising 
its benefits and potential while guar-
anteeing the protection of workers’ 
and on 3 April 2008 a Recommenda-
tion on enhanced administrative co-
operation in this context.
The Commission communication on 
posting of workers examined the situa-
tion and developments in the Member 
States, in particular following its guid-
ance of 4 April 2006, and identified the 
next steps with a view to remedying 
the shortcomings in the implementa-
tion, application and enforcement of 
Directive 96/71/EC concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework 
of the provision of services.
As a follow-up to this communication, 
the Commission adopted a Recom-
mendation on enhanced administra-
tive cooperation in the context of the 
posting of workers.
This act contains a number of con-
crete recommendations focusing in 
particular on (a) enhancing admin-
istrative cooperation between the 
Member States, through the use of 
a more effective system of exchange 
of information, such as the internal 
market information system (IMI), (b) 
improving access to information for 
service providers and posted  workers, 
Table 6.1: Article 138 consultations 2006–08
Date Subject Social partners’ contribution Result
2006 Musculoskeletal disorders
First phase of consultation November 2004  
to January 2005.
Second phase planned for second half of 2006.
Framework of actions (‘agreement’) in the 
agriculture sector
2006 Strengthening of maritime labour standards First phase of consultation in 2006 Agreement on Maritime Labour Standards
2006 Blood-borne infections due to needlestick injuries
First phase of consultation in 2006
Second phase in 2007
2007 Carcinogens, mutagens and reprotoxic substances
First phase of consultation in 2004
Second phase in 2007
Multisectoral agreement on crystalline silica
2007 Reconciliation of professional, private and family life
First phase of consultation in 2006
Second phase in 2007
Negotiations on revising the parental leave 
agreement
2007
Cross-border transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of 
undertakings or businesses
First phase of consultation in 2007
2007 Regulatory social framework for more and better seafaring jobs in the EU First phase of consultation in 2007
2007 Active inclusion of the people furthest from the labour market First phase of consultation in 2007
Negotiations on a framework agreement on 
the integration of disadvantaged groups on 
the labour market
2008 European works councils (EWC) First phase of consultation in 2004Second phase in 2008
Commission proposal for recast of EWC 
Directive; ‘joint advice’ of the ETUC 
and BUSINESSEUROPE to European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers
All consultations are available on the social dialogue website (http://ec.europa.eu/socialdialogue) ‘Consultations (Art. 138)’.
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and (c) promoting exchange of in-
formation and best practices among 
Member States through the setting up 
of a High-Level Committee.
2.6. Facilitation and monitoring of im-
plementation in the Member States
2.6.1. Transposition/application reports
In the past two years, the Commis-
sion has prepared a number of reports 
concerning the transposition and/or 
application of certain directives in the 
area of EU labour law. In particular, it 
issued on 7 July 2006 a report on the 
operation of the provisions of Directive 
2003/88/EC (organisation of working 
time for workers concerned with the 
carriage of passengers on regular ur-
ban transport services) and on 22 De-
cember 2006 a report on the operation 
of the provisions of Directive 2003/88/
EC applicable to offshore workers. On 
11 August 2006, a Commission staff 
working document was published on 
the implementation in the EU-15 of Di-
rective 1999/70/EC concerning fixed-
term work. Another Commission staff 
working document of 17 March 2008 
dealt with the transposition of Direc-
tive 2002/14/EC on information and 
consultation of  employees.
2.6.2. Monitoring of implementation 
of directives
Following the 2004 enlargement, the 
Commission launched a wide-rang-
ing series of studies with the aim of 
reviewing the process of implementa-
tion of the EU labour law acquis in the 
enlarged European Union. The studies 
covered not only the EU-10 as regards 
the transposition and application of 
all directives in the field of labour law, 
but also the EU-15 Member States as 
regards the more recent acquis.
The studies were prepared by inde-
pendent national experts and are 
published on the website of the Direc-
torate-General for Employment, So-
cial Affairs and Equal Opportunities. 
Given that the studies do not deal with 
Romania and Bulgaria, the Commis-
sion envisages new studies to cover 
these countries. These studies are ex-
pected to be finalised by mid-2009.
In line with its communication enti-
tled ‘A Europe of results — applying 
Community law’ (51), the Commission 
lays great emphasis on monitoring the 
correct transposition and application 
of the labour law directives. Following 
complaints or on the basis of its own 
findings, it cooperated with the Mem-
ber States concerned to resolve the is-
sues. Where it was not possible to find 
a solution, it launched infringement 
proceedings for non-notification and/
or incorrect implementation of the 
EU legislation, which led in some cas-
es to judgments by the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities. The 
Commission intends to use the results 
of the studies as well as its own reports 
on the application of the directives 
to ensure better enforcement of the 
Community law focusing on the pri-
ority categories of cases described in 
its 2007 communication.
2.7 Green Paper and follow-up
The Green Paper on ‘Modernising 
labour law to meet the challenges of 
the 21st century’ was launched by the 
European Commission in order to 
identify the key challenges in adapt-
ing labour law to the changing reali-
ties of the world of work; to engage 
all stakeholders in an open debate 
about how labour law can assist in 
promoting flexibility and security; to 
stimulate discussion on how flexible 
contractual relations combined with 
basic rights can facilitate job creation 
and promote transitions in the labour 
51 COM(2007) 502.
market; and to contribute to the ‘Bet-
ter regulation’ agenda.
The Commission’s communication 
on the outcome of the public consul-
tation on the Green Paper on Labour 
Law was adopted on 24 October 2007. 
The debate launched by the Green Pa-
per became a focus for public opinion 
and media interest throughout the EU, 
stimulating consultation processes at 
national level between governments 
and their social partners, public au-
thorities and independent experts. At 
the EU level, the Green Paper was dis-
cussed at the EPSCO Council and was 
the subject of an own initiative resolu-
tion adopted by the European Parlia-
ment on 11 July 2007. The European 
Economic and Social Committee also 
adopted an opinion on the Green Pa-
per. Overall the responses reflected a 
deep awareness of the challenges pre-
sented by the emerging European la-
bour market — which is being shaped 
by increased labour mobility and 
trans national corporate activity.
The Commission’s follow-up commu-
nication presented the results of this 
extensive public consultation process. 
Over 450 opinions had been received 
from a wide range of stakeholders 
in the EU and beyond — including 
Member States, national parliaments, 
social partners, social NGOs, enter-
prises, legal experts and individuals. 
The responses have been made availa-
ble on the Commission’s Europa web-
site (52). A Commission staff working 
document also provided a detailed 
summary of the responses received.
Despite great divergence in the con-
tent of the responses, the results of the 
consultation highlighted the central 
role that labour law is deemed to play 
in managing the EU’s workforce and 
providing workers with a sense of se-
curity. Overall, contributors expressed 
52 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/labour_
law/green_paper_responses_en.htm
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a preference for finding solutions pri-
marily through action at national level 
— involving a variety of approaches 
reflecting national legal traditions, in-
dustrial relations and practice. How-
ever, they also showed that there is a 
strong willingness to test that expe-
rience through dialogue and an ex-
change of good practice at EU level.
The variety of views expressed un-
derlined the relevance and timeliness 
of the main strands of the debate. It 
also highlighted areas where labour 
law reform has a role to play in the 
efforts of the Member States to frame 
national policy options and specific 
national arrangements in the field of 
flexicurity.
The social partners put strong empha-
sis on the need to address the mod-
ernisation of labour law as part of a 
broader flexicurity agenda, acknowl-
edging that labour law is only one 
component of a flexicurity approach. 
Their responses revealed a common 
concern to reduce the segmentation 
of labour markets and to harness edu-
cation and training measures to assist 
individuals in their career develop-
ment. They also showed a shared in-
terest in developing arrangements to 
strengthen the position of workers in 
the context of job-to-job transitions 
through effective active labour market 
policies combined with employment-
friendly social protection systems.
The responses received from social 
partner organisations at EU, national 
and sectoral levels placed strong em-
phasis on the need to avoid a uniform 
top-down EU approach to promoting 
flexicurity policies including labour 
law reform and flexible contractual 
arrangements. They shared the view 
that no single model of flexicurity 
policies can be applied everywhere 
since each country has to decide it-
self on the sequence of reforms and 
on the different components of the 
policy mix to be put in place. While 
employers considered that compe-
tence to modernise labour law lies 
primarily at national level, trade un-
ions favoured the development of an 
EU-wide supportive legal framework. 
The European social partners em-
phasised their shared commitment 
to joint initiatives such as the analy-
sis of key labour market challenges, 
a framework of action on employ-
ment and an autonomous agreement 
for the facilitation of access to and 
progression in the labour market for 
workers at risk (see Chapter 4).
The responses to the public consul-
tation on the Green Paper provide 
useful information on national legal 
systems and on emerging European 
labour market issues. Issues raised in-
clude the challenges of greater cross-
border mobility and the extended 
scope of transnational business op-
erations throughout the EU. While 
the Commission decided not to pro-
pose any new legislative initiatives on 
the issues raised in the Green Paper, 
it nonetheless identified a number of 
areas that should, in its view, act as a 
basis for further discussion so as to 
achieve more cooperation, clarity and 
better information and analysis. They 
pick up on a number of themes of the 
consultation, namely:
•  the prevention and combating of 
undeclared work, especially in cross-
border situations;
•  the promotion, development and im-
plementation of training and lifelong 
learning to ensure greater employ-
ment security over the life cycle;
•  the interaction between labour law 
and social protection rules in sup-
port of effective employment transi-
tions and sustainable social protec-
tion systems;
•  the clarification of the nature of the 
employment relationship to promote 
greater understanding and facilitate 
cooperation across the EU;
•  the clarification of the rights and 
obligations of the parties involved 
in subcontracting chains, to avoid 
depriving workers of their ability to 
make effective use of their rights.
The Commission’s communication 
marked the end of the public consul-
tation process on the Green Paper. It 
is envisaged that the topics that the 
Commission has identified as areas for 
continued discussion might usefully 
be addressed by Member States and 
their national social partners in the 
context of the preparation of their na-
tional reform programmes under the 
EU’s Jobs and Growth Strategy, par-
ticularly in the light of the adoption of 
common principles on flexicurity (53). 
Similarly, they might be addressed in 
the context of social dialogue at sec-
toral or cross-industry level whether 
within Member States or at EU level. 
Already the Commission is aware of 
proposals for improving information 
and analysis on topics addressed in 
the Green Paper that have featured 
among proposals for studies submit-
ted for support under the Community 
financial instrument PROGRESS. The 
Commission will be examining fur-
ther avenues for improving informa-
tion and analysis in these areas.
53 See EPSCO Council conclusions of 5 and 6 
December 2007 in Doc 15497/07 defining common 
principles on flexicurity (http://register.consilium.
europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st15/st15497.en07.pdf).
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On the Working Time Directive(1), two judgments about the right 
to paid annual leave are worth mentioning. In Case C-124/05 (2) the 
ECJ ruled that Article 7(2) of the directive precludes a national pro-
vision which, during a contract of employment, permits days of an-
nual leave which are not taken in the course of a given year, to be re-
placed by an allowance in lieu in the course of a subsequent year. In 
Joined Cases C-131/04 and 257/04 (3) the Court further ruled that 
Article 7 of the directive precludes part of the remuneration payable 
to a worker for work done from being attributed to payment for an-
nual leave without the worker receiving, in that respect, a payment 
additional to that for work done; it also ruled that Article 7(1) of the 
directive precludes payment for minimum annual leave from being 
made in the form of part payments staggered over the correspond-
ing annual period of work and paid together with the remuneration 
for work done, rather than in the form of a payment in respect of a 
specific period during which the worker actually takes leave.
A further judgment of the Court, in Case C-484/04 (4), considered the 
definition of ‘autonomous workers’ in the derogation at Article 17(1) 
of the working-time directive and the obligations of Member States 
and of employers to promote observance of workers’ rights to mini-
mum daily and weekly rests under Articles 3 and 5 of the directive.
As for Directive 2001/23/EC (transfer of undertakings) two judgments 
are worth mentioning: (i) in Case C-499/04 (5) the Court ruled that 
Article 3(1) of the directive does not preclude, in a situation where the 
contract of employment refers to a collective agreement binding the 
transferor, that the transferee, who is not party to such an agreement, 
is not bound by collective agreements subsequent to the one which 
was in force at the time of the transfer of the business; (ii) in Case 
C-458/05 (6) the Court ruled that Article 1(1) of the directive applies 
to a situation where part of the administrative personnel and part of 
the temporary workers are transferred to another temporary employ-
ment business in order to carry out the same activities in that business 
for the same clients and the assets affected by the transfer are sufficient 
in themselves to allow the services characterising the economic activ-
ity in question to be provided without recourse to other significant 
assets or to other parts of the business.
As for Directives 75/129/EEC and 98/59/EC (collective redundan-
cies) two judgments are significant: (i) in joined Cases C-187/05 to 
C-190/05 (7) the Court ruled that the directive is applicable in the case 
of collective redundancies that result from the definitive termination 
of the operation of an undertaking or establishment which has been 
1 Directive 2003/88/EC
2 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 6 April 2006. Federatie 
Nederlandse Vakbeweging [2006]. ECR I-3423
3 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 16 March 2006, Robinson-Steele 
[2006] ECR I-2531.
4 Judgment of the Court of 7 September 2006, Commission v United Kingdom 
[2006] ECR I-7471 (OJ C 261, 28.10.2006, p. 3). 
5 Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 9 March 2006, Werhof [2006] 
ECR I-2397.
6 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 13 September 2007, Jouini and 
Others [2007] ECR I-7301.
7 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 7 September 2006, Agorastoudis 
and Others [2006] ECR I-7775.
decided on by the employer of his own accord without a prior judicial 
decision; (ii) in Case C-270/05 (8) the Court ruled that an ‘establish-
ment’, in the context of an undertaking, may consist of a distinct entity, 
having a certain degree of permanence and stability, which is assigned 
to perform one or more given tasks and which has a workforce, techni-
cal means and a certain organisational structure allowing for the ac-
complishment of those tasks; the entity in question need not have any 
legal autonomy, nor need it have economic, financial, administrative or 
technological autonomy; is not essential either, for the unit in question 
to be endowed with a management which can independently effect col-
lective redundancies; nor must there be a geographical separation from 
the other units and facilities of the undertaking.
As for Directive 1999/70/EC (fixed-term work), one of the directives 
based on a European social partners’ framework agreement, five judg-
ments are worth mentioning: (i) in Case C-212/04 (9) the Court ruled 
that the concept of ‘objective reasons’ within the meaning of Clause 
5 of the framework agreement requires that recourse to fixed-term 
contracts be justified by the presence of specific factors relating in 
particular to the activity in question and the conditions under which 
it is carried out; it also ruled that a national rule under which only 
fixed-term contracts that are not separated from one another by a 
period of time longer than 20 working days cannot be regarded as 
‘successive’ within the meaning of Clause 5; (ii) in Cases C-53/04 (10) 
and C-180/04 (11) the Court recalled the mandatory requirement for 
the domestic law of the Member States to include effective measures 
to prevent and, where relevant, punish the misuse of successive fixed-
term contracts; (iii) in Case C-307/05 (12), the Court ruled that in ap-
plying the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Clause 4(1) 
of the framework agreement, one of the constituent parts of the pay 
should, as an employment condition, be granted to fixed-term work-
ers in the same way as it is to permanent workers; it also ruled that the 
concept of objective grounds within the meaning of Clause 4 of the 
framework agreement requires the unequal treatment between fixed-
term workers and permanent workers to be justified by the existence 
of precise and concrete factors, characterising the employment condi-
tion to which it relates, in the specific context in which it occurs and 
on the basis of objective and transparent criteria in order to ensure 
that that unequal treatment in fact responds to a genuine need, is ap-
propriate for achieving the objective pursued and is necessary for that 
purpose; 4(iv) in Case C-268/06 (13).the Court ruled that an authority 
of a Member State acting in its capacity as a public employer may not 
adopt measures contrary to the objective pursued by the directive as 
regards prevention of the abusive use of fixed-term contracts, which 
consist in the renewal of such contracts for an unusually long term in 
8 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 15 February 2007, Athinaïki 
Chartopoïïa AE [2007] ECR I-1499.
9 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 4 July 2006, Adeneler and Others 
[2006] ECR I-6057.
10 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 7 September 2006, Marrosu and 
Sardino [2006] ECR I-7213.
11 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 7 September 2006, Vassallo 
[2006] ECR I-7251.
12 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 13 September 2007, Del Cerro 
Alonso [2007] ECR I-7109.
13 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 15 April 2008, Impact, not yet 
published in the ECR.
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the period between the deadline for transposing the directive and the 
date on which the transposing legislation entered into force; it also 
ruled that Clause 4 of the framework agreement must be interpreted 
as meaning that employment conditions within the meaning of that 
clause encompass conditions relating to pay and to pensions which 
depend on the employment relationship, to the exclusion of condi-
tions relating to pensions arising under a statutory social-security 
scheme; furthermore, the Court ruled that Clause 4(1) of the frame-
work agreement is unconditional and sufficiently precise for individu-
als to be able to rely upon it before a national court; that is not the case, 
however, as regards Clause 5(1) of the framework agreement.
As for Directive 2002/14/EC (general framework for information 
and consultation), one case is to be mentioned: in Case C-385/05 (14) 
the Court ruled that national legislation cannot exclude even tem-
porarily, a specific category of workers from the calculation of staff 
numbers (this is also valid for the interpretation of Directive 98/59/
EC on collective redundancies).
As to Directive 96/71/EC (posting of workers), three judgments are 
to be mentioned: (i) in Case C-341/05 (15) the Court acknowledged 
that the right to take collective action for the protection of the work-
ers of the host state against possible social dumping may constitute 
an overriding reason of public interest within the meaning of the 
case-law of the Court which, in principle, justifies a restriction of 
one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty; the 
Court ruled, however, that by virtue of Article 49 of the Treaty and 
Article 3 of the directive a trade union, in a Member State in which 
the terms and conditions of employment covering the matters re-
ferred to in Article 3(1), first subparagraph, (a) to (g) of that direc-
tive are contained in legislative provisions, save for minimum rates 
of pay, is barred from attempting, by means of collective action in 
the form of a blockade of sites, to force a provider of services estab-
lished in another Member State to enter into negotiations with it on 
the rates of pay for posted workers and to sign a collective agree-
ment the terms of which lay down more favourable conditions than 
those resulting from the relevant legislative provisions, while other 
terms relate to matters not referred to in Article 3 of the directive; 
(ii) in Case C-490/04 (16) the Court considered that the obligation to 
have translation of four documents (the employment contract, pay 
slips, time-sheets and proof of payment of wages) in the context of 
14 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 18 January 2007, Confédération 
générale du travail and Others [2007] ECR I-611.
15 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 18 December 2007, Laval un 
Partneri [2007] ECR I-11767.
16 Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 18 July 2007, Commission v 
Germany [2007] ECR I-6095.
posting of workers does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
the objective sought, namely social protection, and is therefore jus-
tified; (iii) in Case C-346/06 (17) the Court ruled that the directive, 
interpreted in the light of Article 49 EC, precludes an authority of 
a Member State, in a situation such as that at issue in the main pro-
ceedings, from adopting a measure of a legislative nature requir-
ing the contracting authority to designate as contractors for public 
works contracts only those undertakings which, when submitting 
their tenders, agree in writing to pay their employees, in return for 
performance of the services concerned, at least the remuneration 
prescribed by the collective agreement in force at the place where 
those services are performed; in its findings, the Court had noted 
that the collective agreement at stake had not been declared univer-
sally applicable by Germany.
As to Directive 80/987/EEC (insolvency of the employer), three 
judgments are to be mentioned: (i) in Case C-278/05 (18) the court 
ruled that where the employer is insolvent and the assets of the sup-
plementary company or inter-company pension schemes are insuf-
ficient, accrued pension rights need not necessarily be funded by 
the Member States themselves or be funded in full; it also ruled 
that a national system of protection that may, in certain cases, lead 
to a guarantee of benefits of less than half of the benefits to which 
an employee was entitled, cannot be considered to fall within the 
definition of the word ‘protect’ used in the directive; (ii) in Case 
C-246/06 (19), the court ruled that where rules of national law fall 
within the scope of the directive, the national courts are bound, as 
regards a state of insolvency occurring between the date of its entry 
into force and the deadline for transposition into national law, to en-
sure that the application of those rules of national law is consistent 
with the principle of non-discrimination, as recognised by the Com-
munity legal order; (iii) in Case C-498/06 (20), the Court ruled that 
the first paragraph of Article 3 is to be interpreted as meaning that 
a Member State has the power to exclude compensation granted for 
unfair dismissal from the payment guarantee of the guarantee insti-
tutions pursuant to that provision where they have been recognised 
by an extra-judicial conciliation settlement and such exclusion, ob-
jectively justified, constitutes a measure necessary to avoid abuses 
within the meaning of Article 10(a) of that directive. 
17 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 3 April 2008, Rüffert, not yet 
published in the ECR.
18 Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 25 January 2007, Robins and 
Others [2007] ECR I-1053.
19 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 17 January 2008, Velasco 
Navarro [2008] ECR I-105.
20 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 21 February 2008, Robledillo 
Núñez [2008] ECR I-921.
3. Health and safety of 
workers
3.1 Community strategy on health and 
safety at work
On 21 February 2007, the Commis-
sion adopted a communication on 
improving quality and productivity 
at work: Community strategy 2007–
12 on health and safety at work (54).
The new strategy aims to increase the 
productivity and competitiveness of 
European enterprises by effectively 
reducing the rate of accidents at work, 
occupational diseases and absentee-
54 COM(2007) 62 final.
ism. It continues the activities initi-
ated by the 2002–06 strategy, focusing 
more on the new challenges in order 
to permanently improve prevention 
of occupational hazards, encourage a 
true culture of prevention, promote a 
longer working life and reconcile so-
cial progress and economic prosperity, 
sustainable growth and social cohe-
sion, and promotion of decent work 
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on the international stage. The overall 
objective should be to aim for a 25 % 
reduction in the total incidence rate of 
accidents at work by 2012. In order to 
achieve this ambitious goal, the follow-
ing main instruments are proposed.
•  Guarantee the proper implementa-
tion of EU legislation.
•  Support SMEs in the implementa-
tion of the legislation in force.
•  Adapt the legal framework to chang-
es in the workplace and simplify it, 
particularly in view of SMEs.
•  Promote the development and im-
plementation of national strategies.
•  Encourage changes in the behaviour of 
workers and encourage their employers 
to adopt health-focused approaches.
•  Finalise the methods for identifying 
and evaluating new potential risks.
•  Improve the tracking of progress;.
•  Promote health and safety at inter-
national level.
In the meantime, the Council (55), the 
European Parliament (56), the Commit-
tee of the Regions (57) and the European 
Economic and Social Committee (58) 
have welcomed the adoption of the 
strategy, but wished for more emphasis 
on the issue of health at work and the 
prevention of occupational illnesses.
3.2. Violence at work
As reported in Chapter 4, on 26 April 
2007 the social partners concluded an 
autonomous framework agreement 
on harassment and violence at work 
that was followed by initiatives of sev-
eral sectoral European social partners, 
including on third party violence.
55 Council resolution of 25 June 2007 on a new 
Community strategy on health and safety at work 
(2007–12) (OJ C 145, 30.6.2007, p. 1).
56 European Parliament resolution of 15 January 
2008 on the Community strategy 2007–12 on health 
and safety at work.
57 Opinion of 28 November 2007 of the Committee 
of the Regions on the Community strategy 2007–12 
on health and safety at work.
58 Opinion of 29 May 2008, CESE 372/2008.
3.3. Risks arising from physical agents
3.3.1. Electromagnetic fields
On 23 April 2008, the European Par-
liament and the Council adopted Di-
rective 2008/46/EC amending Direc-
tive 2004/40/EC on minimum health 
and safety requirements regarding 
the exposure of workers to the risks 
arising from physical agents (electro-
magnetic fields) (18th individual di-
rective within the meaning of Article 
16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) (59).
The directive postpones by four years, 
until 30 April 2012, the deadline for the 
transposition of this directive to allow a 
full analysis of studies regarding the po-
tential negative impact of the exposure 
limit values set by the directive on the 
medical use of MRI and, pending the re-
sults of the review of the recommenda-
tions of the International Commission 
for Non-Ionising Radiation Protection, 
to take into account the environmental 
health criteria for electromagnetic fields 
of the World Health Organisation. The 
directive further allows for an in-depth 
impact analysis to be done of the pro-
visions of Directive 2004/40/EC and to 
propose amendments to it in order to 
guarantee both a high level of health 
and safety protection for workers and 
the continuation and development of 
medical and industrial activities using 
electromagnetic fields.
3.3.2. Vibrations
A guide to good practice with a 
view to implementation of Directive 
2002/44/EC on the minimum health 
and safety requirements regarding 
the exposure of workers to the risks 
arising from physical agents (vibra-
tions) has been published.
This non-binding guide aims to facili-
tate the assessment of risks from ex-
posure to hand–arm and whole-body 
59 OJ L 114, 26.4.2008, p. 88.
vibrations, the identification of con-
trols to eliminate or reduce exposure, 
and the introduction of systems to 
prevent the development and progres-
sion of injury. It contains a number of 
good-practice  examples.
3.4. Risks arising from chemical agents
On 5 April 2006, the Commission 
adopted Decision 2006/275/EC 
amending Decision 95/320/EC set-
ting up a Scientific Committee for 
Occupational Exposure Limits to 
Chemical Agents in order to adapt it 
to the enlarged EU.
The decision aims to ensure that the 
committee provides impartial scien-
tific opinions of a high quality, that 
its members are independent and 
highly qualified and that a high level 
of efficiency is maintained. The com-
mittee will be composed of a maxi-
mum of 21 members, selected from 
Member States’ proposals of suit-
able candidates and appointed by the 
Commission.
3.5. Musculoskeletal disorders
On 14 March 2007, the second-stage 
consultation of the social partners 
on the issue of musculoskeletal dis-
orders at work was launched by the 
Commission.
Work-related musculoskeletal disor-
ders are one of the major safety and 
health problems affecting both wom-
en and men in all sectors of activity 
throughout the European Union. There 
are specific legal provisions focusing 
on work-related musculoskeletal disor-
ders: Directives 90/269/EEC (manual 
handling of loads), 90/270/EEC (dis-
play screen equipment) and 2002/44/
EC (vibration). However, work-related 
musculoskeletal disorders are not ad-
dressed in a comprehensive manner in 
the existing legislation.
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The Commission consulted the social 
partners at European level on the content 
of a Community initiative addressing all 
significant risk factors of work-related 
musculoskeletal disorders and laying 
down minimum health and safety re-
quirements for the protection of workers 
from problems due to the exposure to 
these risk factors in all workplaces.
3.6. Carcinogens or mutagens
On 16 April 2007, the second-stage 
consultation of the social partners 
on a possible amendment of Direc-
tive 2004/37/EC was launched by the 
Commission.
The Commission consulted the Euro-
pean social partners on the content of 
a Community initiative aiming to ex-
tend the scope of the Carcinogens and 
Mutagens Directive to substances toxic 
for reproduction, to revise the occupa-
tional exposure limits values (OELVs) 
for carcinogens listed in the directive, 
and to establish OELVs for some car-
cinogens, mutagens and reproductive 
toxicants not yet included in the direc-
tive. The Commission will analyse and 
evaluate the opinions with a view to 
deciding the policy options for possible 
Community action in this area.
3.7. Work equipment
A guide to good practice for imple-
menting Directive 2001/45/EC (work 
at a height) (60) was published in 2007.
This non-binding guide is aimed not 
only at all employers that regularly use 
work equipment for temporary working 
at heights, particularly where there is the 
risk of falling (e.g. the construction sec-
tor), but also at those in any other sectors 
who from time to time have to carry out 
temporary work operations at a height 
and who must therefore use equipment 
designed for this purpose. It can help 
employers and the self-employed to as-
60 ISBN 978-92-79-06511-8.
sess the risks associated with work at a 
height and to choose the most suitable 
equipment, so that the work can be car-
ried out without danger to the safety or 
health of workers.
3.8. Implementation and simplification 
of health and safety directives
3.8.1. Practical implementation reports
On 20 June 2007, the European Parlia-
ment and the Council adopted Direc-
tive 2007/30/EC amending Council 
Directive 89/391/EEC, its individual 
directives and Council Directives 
83/477/EEC, 91/383/EEC, 92/29/EEC 
and 94/33/EC with a view to simpli-
fying and rationalising the reports on 
practical implementation (61).
The directive aims to simplify and ration-
alise the obligation imposed on Member 
States in Community directives in the 
field of health and safety at work to sub-
mit practical implementation reports. 
The frequency of submission of the re-
ports is fixed at five years for all directives. 
In addition, Member States will establish 
one single practical implementation re-
port covering all directives, containing 
a part with the general principles and 
specific chapters relating to the different 
directives concerned.
3.9. Statistics on health and safety at 
work
On 7 February 2007, the Commission 
adopted a proposal for a Regulation on 
community statistics on public health 
and health and safety at work (62).
The proposal aims at establishing the 
framework for the systematic produc-
tion of statistics in these two areas, in 
the form of a minimum data set, carried 
out by the European statistical system, 
i.e. Eurostat, the national statistical in-
stitutes and all other national authori-
61 OJ L 165, 27.6.2007, pp. 21–24.
62 COM(2007) 46 final.
ties responsible for the provision of 
official statistics in these areas. The rea-
son is to have a global and coherent ap-
proach to responding to policy needs 
and to promote synergies since health 
issues at work and outside the work-
place, and their different elements, are 
linked; when relevant, some statistical 
collections can usefully be carried out 
for both areas together, using common 
tools such as population surveys. The 
proposed regulation sets the general 
principles and describes the main con-
tents of the related data collections.
4. Equality rights in employment
4.1. Anti-discrimination directives: 
implementation, impact and future 
developments
Two anti-discrimination directives 
(2000/43/EC (63), the Racial Equality 
Directive, and 2000/78/EC (64), the 
Employment Equality Directive) were 
adopted in 2000. All Member States 
have now amended their national 
legislation in order to transpose the 
racial equality and employment 
equality directives. The Commission 
places great emphasis on the cor-
rect transposition and application of 
these directives in practice.
Without a full and correct transposition 
of the directives, individuals will not be 
able to rely upon their right to non-dis-
crimination. The Commission has there-
fore initiated infringement proceedings 
against Member States that have not cor-
rectly transposed the directives and has 
issued in this regard reasoned opinions 
to the concerned Member States on 27 
June 2007 concerning Directive 2000/43/
EC and on 31 January 2008 concerning 
Directive 2000/78/EC (65).
63 OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 22.
64 OJ L303, 2.12.2000, p. 16.
65 See more details under http://ec.europa.eu/
employment_social/fundamental_rights/legis/
lginfringe_en.htm
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Reports by the Commission on the ap-
plication of the Racial Equality Directive 
and the Employment Equality Directive 
were adopted in 2006 and 2008 (66). 
Furthermore, a network of independent 
legal experts in anti-discrimination law 
reports regularly on developments in 
the Member States (67).
The directives have helped to raise sig-
nificantly the level of protection against 
discrimination across the EU, and to 
provide a uniform level of protection 
across the EU. They have led to the in-
troduction of legal provisions covering 
certain grounds in some Member States 
for the first time (particularly sexual 
66 See http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/
fundamental_rights/legis/lgenforce_en.htm
67 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/
fundamental_rights/policy/aneval/legnet_en.htm
orientation and age). They have clari-
fied rights and obligations by introduc-
ing new, detailed definitions of direct 
discrimination, indirect discrimination 
and  harassment. The case-law at Euro-
pean level remains limited at present. 
However, it can already be noted that 
cases referred to the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities relate to 
‘new’ grounds of discrimination such 
as disability (68), sexual orientation (69) 
and, in particular, age (see box).
68 Judgment of 11 July 2006, Case C-13/05 Chacón 
Navas [2006] ECR I-6467.
69 Judgment of 1 April 2008, Case C-267/06, 
Maruko, not yet published in the ECR.
4.2. Equality between women and men
4.2.1. Consultation of the European 
social partners on the issue of reconcili-
ation of work, private and family life
The Commission consulted the Euro-
pean social partners in a first (12 Oc-
tober 2006) and second (30 May 2007) 
consultation on reconciliation. In re-
sponse, the European social partners 
made several commitments, in par-
ticular to open negotiations to revise 
their agreement on parental leave 
from 1995, which was implemented 
via Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996. 
For further information, see Chapter 4, 
‘Reconciliation of professional, private 
and family life’ section.
4.2.2. Communication entitled 
‘Tackling the pay gap between women 
and men’
On 18 July 2007, the Commission 
adopted a communication entitled 
‘Tackling the pay gap between wom-
en and men’. The pay gap between 
men and women was, in 2005, esti-
mated at 15 %, only two points be-
low its level in 1995, in contrast to 
the marked and continuous increase 
in the female employment rate.
The Commission stresses that tackling 
the gender pay gap is a political priority. 
Four areas of action have been identi-
fied: (a) exploring ways to improve the 
legislative framework and its implemen-
tation; (b) exploiting to the full the Eu-
ropean Strategy for Growth and Jobs; (c) 
encouraging employers to respect equal 
pay; and (d) supporting the exchange of 
good practice at Community level.
The Commission recognises that the 
current legislation has contributed to 
progress for women in the labour mar-
ket, in particular with regard to elimi-
nating direct discrimination. But it has 
been far less effective in ensuring respect 
of the principle of equal pay for work of 
equal value. Changes to the Community 
legal framework could be examined to 
ECJ rulings on discrimination
The Court has ruled or is in the process of ruling on a number of cases related to age dis-
crimination. Two cases are worth noting.
•  In Mangold (1), a German law allowed workers over 52 to be hired on a succession of 
short-term contracts, in order to encourage recruitment by employers. The Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities held that the aim of increasing the employability of 
older workers was legitimate, but the measure did not respect the principle of propor-
tionality, as it was deemed to be too wide in scope and the aim could have been achieved 
in a less discriminatory way.
•  In Palacios de la Villa (2), the Court of Justice of the European Communities considered 
that rules on age did not need to be explicitly justified to be valid, but that such justifica-
tion should be clear from the elements available in each particular case.
Both cases give some indication as regards the type of ‘justification test’ required: even if na-
tional authorities have broad discretion as to social policy choices, it is essential to ensure in 
each particular case that the measure is suited and proportionate to the aim (for example by 
avoiding measures that rely solely on age and by relying on other relevant criteria as well). 
In Coleman (3) the Court ruled that the prohibition of discrimination laid down by the 
Council Directive on equal treatment in employment and occupation, including irrespec-
tively of disability (2008/78/EC)(4) is not limited only to people who are disabled themselves, 
but should be extended to a person who is associated with a person with disability and has 
been discriminated against by reason of that association. The Court confirmed that where 
an employer treats an employee who is not himself disabled less favourably than another em-
ployee is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and it is established that the 
less favourable treatment of that employee is based on the disability of his child, whose care 
is provided primarily by that employee, such treatment is contrary to the prohibition of direct 
discrimination. Equally this interpretation is valid for the prohibition of harassment. 
1 Judgment of 16 October 2007, Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981.
2 Judgment of 16 October 2007, Case C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa [2007] ECR I-8531; other cases related 
to age discrimination are pending before the ECJ, in particular Case C-87/06 Pascual García and Case 
C-388/07 The Incorporated Trustees of the National Council for Ageing. 
3 Judgment of 17 July 2008, Case C-303/06 Coleman
4 http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/news/2001/jul/directive78ec_en.pdf
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ensure that direct and indirect discrimi-
nation based on sex is excluded from 
the systems used to set pay.
The Commission is currently analys-
ing the current legislation on the gen-
der pay gap and will propose, where 
necessary, amendments to the Com-
munity legal framework. For empirical 
evidence on the relationship between 
wage bargaining institutions and the 
gender pay gap, see Chapter 3.
4.2.3. Monitoring of the implemen-
tation of Community law
The Commission attributes utmost im-
portance to a reinforced control of the 
proper implementation of Community 
law in the Member States. In particular, 
it is currently examining the transposi-
tion of Directive 2002/73/EC amending 
Directive 76/207/EEC on the implemen-
tation of the principle of equal treatment 
for men and women as regards access to 
employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions. It 
is further carrying out a thorough anal-
ysis of the implementation of the entire 
acquis communautaire in the field of 
equal treatment of men and women in 
the new Member States.
The Commission has also initiated in-
fringement proceedings against nine 
Member States for non-communication 
of their national measures transposing 
Directive 2004/113/EC implementing 
the principle of equal treatment be-
tween men and women in the access to 
and supply of goods and services.
5. Free movement of workers 
and social security
5.1. Coordination of social security 
schemes
5.1.1. Amending regulations on the co-
ordination of social security schemes
The Council and the European Par-
liament adopted Regulation (EC) 
No 629/2006 on 5 April 2006, and 
Regulation (EC) No 1992/2006 on 18 
December 2006. These regulations are 
two of the regular amending regula-
tions of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 
on the coordination of social security 
schemes. It is necessary to regularly 
update Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 
in order to take into account changes 
in national social security legislation, 
and the case-law of the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities.
5.1.2. Regulation (EC) No 1791/2006
This Council regulation, which was 
adopted on 20 November 2006, amends 
(amongst others) Regulation (EEC) 
No 1408/71 following the accession to 
the EU of Bulgaria and Romania.
5.1.3. Proposal for the implementing reg-
ulation of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 
on the coordination of social security 
schemes and proposal for Annex XI to 
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004
These proposals, adopted by the Com-
mission in January 2006, are currently 
being discussed in the appropriate 
Council working group. Negotiations 
are now well advanced.
5.1.4. Proposal for the remaining an-
nexes to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004
In July 2007 the Commission adopted a 
proposal for completion of the remaining 
annexes to Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. 
This completes two further annexes that 
are currently empty, and makes additions 
to the remaining annexes to the regula-
tion, principally to take into account 
the needs of the 12 Member States who 
have acceded to the EU since Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004 was adopted. Negotia-
tions have begun in the Council working 
group on this proposal.
5.1.5. Proposal for extending Regula-
tion (EC) No 883/2004 to third-coun-
try nationals
In July 2007 the Commission adopted 
a proposal for extending the scope of 
Regulation (EC) No  883/2004 to third-
country nationals, as had previously been 
done for Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71.
5.1.6. Proposals for Council decisions 
on the position to be taken by the Com-
munity within the respective association 
councils created by the association agree-
ments concerning Algeria, Croatia, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Israel, Morocco and Tunisia, with regard 
to the adoption of provisions on the coor-
dination of social security systems
On 11 and 12 December 2007, the Com-
mission adopted the above proposals. 
The association agreements concluded 
between the European Communities, 
their Member States and some third 
countries, notably Tunisia, Morocco, 
Algeria, Croatia, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and Israel, con-
tain provisions for a limited coordina-
tion of social security systems. In order 
to give these provisions effect, all of 
these agreements require a decision of 
the respective association council laying 
down the necessary implementing rules. 
A first discussion on these proposals 
should take place under the Slovenian 
Presidency (by the end of June 2008).
5.2. Portability of supplementary pen-
sion rights
Discussions have continued under 
various presidencies on the proposed 
 directive on improving the portability 
of supplementary pension rights. This 
proposal aims to ensure that workers 
who move jobs do not lose occupational 
pension rights in the process, by address-
ing acquisition and preservation rules. 
However, despite strenuous efforts it has 
not as yet proved possible to reach agree-
ment on the proposal. This is disappoint-
ing, because the issue at the heart of this 
— removing obstacles caused by supple-
mentary pensions to the free movement 
of workers — remains.
In today’s constantly evolving world, 
being able to change jobs easily or to 
recruit the right person with the right 
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Case C-299/05 — Commission v Parliament and Council (1)
One of the main principles in the coordination of social security schemes 
is the right to ‘export’ social security benefits acquired in one Member 
State to another Member State: in other words, individuals should not 
lose entitlement to their benefits if they go to live in another Member 
State. However, there is an exception to this rule for ‘special non-contrib-
utory benefits’, which are mixed social security and social assistance ben-
efits. These benefits are not exportable; Annex IIa to Regulation (EEC) 
No 1408/71 contains a list of such benefits for each Member State.
Following the introduction of Annex IIa into Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71 in 1992, the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
was asked on several occasions to consider the benefits that had been 
listed in that annex, and as a consequence of this case-law, the legisla-
tor decided to review the whole coordination system for the special 
non-contributory benefits, including Annex IIa. As part of the chang-
es to the legislation, Annex IIa was completely replaced, and a number 
of benefits that had previously been listed in the annex were removed 
on the grounds that they could not be classed as special non-contribu-
tory benefits, but were in fact classic social security benefits within the 
meaning of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71. The amending regulation 
that replaced Annex IIa was Regulation (EC) No 647/2005.
However, the Commission was of the opinion that five further 
benefits (one for Finland, one for Sweden and three for the UK) 
should not have been included in the new Annex IIa, and sub-
sequently applied for annulment of the relevant provisions of 
Regulation (EC) No 647/2005. In its judgment, the Court sup-
ported the Commission’s reasoning This means that these ben-
efits are to be treated as classic social security benefits, and must 
now be paid to beneficiaries resident in other Member States. 
Case C-444/05 — Stamatelaki (2)
The question raised in this case was whether the Greek legislation 
which precludes the reimbursement by a national social security or-
ganisation of hospital expenses for its insured persons aged over 14 
in a private care establishment abroad, constitutes a restriction on 
the principle of the freedom to provide services. For the Court, it 
is clear that such legislation discourages, or even prevents, patients 
from approaching hospital services established in a Member State 
other than the one of affiliation; it therefore constitutes a restriction 
on the freedom to provide services. Can such a regulation objec-
tively be justified? The Court considered that the absolute nature of 
the prohibition (except for children aged under 14) was not propor-
tionate to the aims of maintaining the capacity of providing care or 
medical competence on national territory, and of safeguarding of 
the financial balance of the national social security scheme. On the 
contrary, measures that are less restrictive and more respectful of 
the freedom to provide services could be envisaged, such as a pre-
liminary authorisation arrangement respecting the requirements of 
Community law, or the definition of reimbursement scales.
This is a judgment that will further facilitate patients’ mobility in 
the EU without upsetting or challenging national social security 
schemes. Indeed, this judgment does not oblige any Member State 
to meet, in every case, expenditure incurred in private clinics in oth-
er Member States. However, if national legislation enables patients 
1 Judgment of the Court of 18 October 2007.
2 Judgment of the Court of 19 April 2007.
to attend national private clinics in an emergency without paying 
expenses, in this case only, the Member State in question must 
meet hospital expenses in the private clinics of other countries. It 
is therefore the absolute exclusion of the reimbursement of hospital 
expenses abroad that is against Community law.
Case C-287/05 — Hendrix (3)
The Court has ruled that Articles 39 EC and 7 of Regulation (EEC) 
No 1612/68 should be interpreted so that they do not prohibit na-
tional legislation which applies Articles 4, paragraph 2a, and 10a of 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 and stipulates that special non-con-
tributory benefit listed in Annex IIa of the latter regulation can be 
awarded only to persons who reside on national territory. However, 
the implementation of this legislation must not interfere with the 
rights of a person who is in a situation such as that of the complain-
ant in the main action in a way that goes beyond the attainment of 
the legitimate objective pursued by the national law.
The Court points out that the national legislation stipulates express-
ly that there may be derogation from the condition of residence 
when it leads to a ‘major injustice’. It then recalls that it is up to the 
national courts to interpret, as far as possible, national law in a way 
that is compatible with the requirements of Community law. Conse-
quently, the referring judge must ensure that, in the circumstances 
of the case concerned, the requirement of a condition of residence 
on national territory does not lead to such an injustice, taking ac-
count of the fact that Mr Hendrix exercised his right to freedom of 
movement as a worker and that he maintained his economic and 
social attachments in the Netherlands.
Finally, the Hendrix judgment confirms an important change in the 
case-law relating to the application of Community law to cross-bor-
der situations: a worker who always works in one Member State and 
who moves his residence for personal reasons can invoke Article 39 
with regard to his state of origin.
Cases C-396/05, C-419/05 and C-450/05 — Habelt, Möser and 
Wachter (4)
The Court has declared that it is incompatible with the freedom of move-
ment for persons for Germany to allow the inclusion of contribution pe-
riods completed outside the Federal Republic to be made subject to the 
condition that the recipient reside in Germany. Community Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71 lays down rules for coordination in the area of social 
security in order to ensure that persons who move within the Commu-
nity retain their acquired rights and advantages. The regulation estab-
lished the principle that old-age pensions acquired under the legislation 
of a Member State must not be affected by the fact that the recipient lives 
in the territory of another Member State. However, there are exceptions 
to that principle. As regards Germany, the regulation allows, inter alia, the 
inclusion, for the purposes of the payment of old-age benefits, of contri-
bution periods completed outside the territory of the Federal Republic of 
Germany to be made subject to the condition that the recipient resides in 
Germany. On the basis of that exception, the Rentenversicherung Bund 
(Federal pension insurance body) refused to take account of two types of 
contribution period. Contribution periods completed between 1939 and 
1945 in the territory of the Sudetenland and between 1937 and 1945 in 
Pomerania (Cases C-396/05 and C-419/05).
3 Judgment of the Court of 11 September 2007.
4 Judgment of the Court of 18 December 2007.
Significant ECJ cases in the area of free movement of workers and social security in 2006–08
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In its judgment, the Court rejects, first of all, the argument that old-
age benefits in respect of contribution periods completed between 
1937 and 1945 must be considered to be benefits for victims of war 
or its consequences and are therefore excluded from the provisions 
of the regulation.
The Court finds that the situation of Ms Habelt and Ms Möser does 
fall within the scope of Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71. The pen-
sion due to them represents the counterpart of contributions that 
they have paid to insurance bodies of the Reich and subsequently 
of the Federal Republic. The refusal to take account, for the pur-
poses of calculating the old-age benefits paid to recipients who do 
not reside in Germany, of contributions paid between 1937 and 
1945 constitutes an obstacle to their right to freedom of movement 
within the Union.
In the absence of any objective justification for that obstacle, the 
Court concludes that the provision which makes it possible to make 
the inclusion, for the purposes of the payment of old-age benefits, of 
contribution periods completed outside the territory of the Federal 
Republic subject to the condition that the recipient reside in  Germany 
is incompatible with the freedom of movement for persons.
skills is more important than ever be-
fore. Furthermore, the promotion of 
the adaptability of workers, the flexi-
bility of job markets and the moderni-
sation of social protection systems are 
cornerstones of the Lisbon strategy.
The Commission will continue its ef-
forts to tackle the issue of portability 
of occupational pensions and be open 
to a range of further work on this in-
cluding looking again at all the op-
tions to make progress.
6. Conclusion and future 
perspectives
The Green Paper on ‘Modernising labour 
law to meet the challenges of the 21st 
century’ gave rise to a wide and stimulat-
ing debate. The Commission took stock 
of the results and, while it decided not to 
propose any new legislative initiatives on 
the issues raised, it identified a number 
of areas worth focusing upon in order 
to achieve more cooperation, clarity and 
better information and analysis.
The political agreement on a directive on 
temporary agency work and the Working 
Time Directive is a major step forward 
for European workers and it strengthens 
social dialogue. It is in line with the flexi-
curity approach. It creates more security 
and better conditions for workers and 
temporary agency workers while main-
taining the flexibility that industry needs 
and workers want when reconciling fam-
ily life and working life. Last but not least 
it contributes to a level playing field in the 
EU. Adoption depends on the outcome 
of the co-decision procedure of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council.
In the area of collective labour law, 
which was not specifically covered by 
the Green Paper because of its focus on 
the individual employment relation-
ship, several important developments 
took place. The Commission reviewed 
a number of directives, in particular in 
the area of information and consulta-
tion of employees. On the basis of its 
analysis, carried out in cooperation 
with national governments and the 
European social partners, it decided 
that it was not necessary to propose, 
at this stage, any further amendments 
as regards the directive establishing a 
general framework for informing and 
consulting employees at company 
level and the directive on transfer of 
undertakings. As regards the imple-
mentation of the Directive on Europe-
an Works Councils, the Commission’s 
assessment of the current situation led 
it to conclude that a revision is neces-
sary in order to remedy a number of 
problems encountered in the practical 
application of the directive. The Com-
mission is also seeking to facilitate 
social dialogue between management 
and labour and promote industrial re-
lations, e.g. in the field of transnational 
collective negotiations.
Several ECJ rulings provided impor-
tant contributions to a more clear 
interpretation of provisions laid out 
in a number of directives in the field 
of labour law, such as working time, 
employers’ insolvency and fixed-term 
work. The series of rulings on the Vi-
king-Line, Laval and Rüffert cases, in 
particular, dealt with the crucial issue of 
how to balance the exercise of workers’ 
rights and the respect of fundamental 
economic freedoms enshrined in the 
Treaty, as well as the interpretation of 
the obligations laid out in the posting 
of workers directive, against a back-
ground of increasing labour mobility.
In the area of health and safety at 
work, the Commission’s strategy for 
the years 2007–12 addresses the new 
challenges and paves the way towards 
improving the quality and productiv-
ity at work.
In the area of anti-discrimination, the 
Commission’s recent communication 
sets out the state of play and lays down 
the actions necessary to combat dis-
crimination and ensure equality of op-
portunity for all. The Commission will 
make particular efforts to contribute to 
the reduction of the gender pay gap.
In the area of mobility of workers, in 
addition to the measures facilitating co-
ordination of social security schemes, 
emphasis is laid on the adoption of the 
proposed directive concerning supple-
mentary pension schemes.
For all areas of EU labour law, the 
Commission attaches the utmost im-
portance to monitoring the effective 
implementation and enforcement of 
the acquis. It uses a variety of means 
to achieve this objective: For exam-
ple, it publishes non-binding guides, 
issues guidance and adopts recom-
mendations. It commissions studies 
or reports by independent experts. 
It monitors compliance, i.e. correct 
transposition and application of the 
acquis, and, in its role as guardian of 
the Treaty, it launches infringement 
proceedings against the Member 
States concerned.
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Despite the unquestionably positive developments and initiatives74, there is still scope 
for further improvement in the capacity of social partners in the 12 new member 
States (EU-12) to take part in social dialogue and in social, labour market and eco-
nomic governance. Since 2007 the EU has provided financial support for capacity 
building of social partners in Member States through the European Social Fund. This 
represents a significant change in comparison to previously available support instru-
ments and will improve the capacity of European social partners to enhance social 
dialogue at national level and improve links with the EU level.
The rationale for capacity 
building
A well-developed and constructive so-
cial dialogue can provide a significant 
contribution to economic and social 
performance, as shown in earlier chap-
ters of this report. Chapter 2 demon-
strates how social partners can contrib-
ute to improving working conditions 
and competitiveness and Chapter 3 
shows that strong and encompassing 
collective wage bargaining institutions 
are one element of improved macro-
economic performance and equity.70
The role of social partners is also re-
flected in EU employment and social 
governance. In its European Employ-
ment Strategy the EU calls on social 
partners specifically to ‘promote flex-
ibility combined with employment 
security and reduce labour market 
segmentation’ and to ‘ensure employ-
ment-friendly labour cost develop-
ments and wage setting mechanisms’ 
(Employment Guidelines 21 and 22). 
European social dialogue gives social 
partners the opportunity to shape EU 
legislation and to act autonomously. 
The implementation of more autono-
mous actions and process-oriented 
outputs of European social dialogue 
(see Chapter 4) and the responsibili-
ties of social partners in the Employ-
ment Strategy require greater interac-
tion between the different levels, more 
effective industrial relations systems 
and improved social partner capaci-
ties at national level.
70  See Industrial Relations in Europe 2004 (ch. 3.4)  
and 2006 (ch. 4) reports
The accession of 12 new Member States 
in 2004 and 2007 has increased the 
variety of industrial relations systems 
within the EU as there is little tradi-
tion of social partnership and autono-
mous, bipartite collective bargaining 
in the EU-12 (see Chapter 1). Trade 
union density rates are among the 
lowest in the EU and employers’ or-
ganisation density rates even more so, 
leading to a particularly low coverage 
of collective agreements. In addition, 
in Cyprus, Slovakia, UK, the Czech 
Republic, Greece, Spain, Poland, Hun-
gary, Portugal, Latvia, Estonia, Lithua-
nia, and Malta less than 50 % of work-
ers were represented by a trade union 
and/or a workers’ council at the work-
place level in 2003 (Industrial relations 
in Europe 2006, p. 71) (71). In most 
new Member States, tripartite con-
certation prevails while bipartite and 
sectoral social bargaining is rarely well 
developed. Whereas the formal insti-
tutions of tripartite councils are estab-
lished in all the EU-12, the analysis in 
Chapter 2 shows that the ‘established 
and validated expectation’ of effective 
and routine participation in tripartite 
policy arrangements is not yet fully 
established, in particular with regard 
to trade unions. Compared against the 
background of the four pillars of in-
dustrial relations in Europe, this situa-
tion was confirmed in a joint capacity-
building project of the cross-industry 
social partners (see Box 7.1).
71 No information for Bulgaria and Romania.
Social partners and the 
European Social Fund
Social partners are involved in the 
European Social Fund (ESF) in many 
ways. They participate in program-
ming and management, but they are 
also beneficiaries for networking ac-
tivities, joint actions and — as of 2007 
— capacity building.
The European Social Fund (ESF) leg-
islative framework for 2007–13 rein-
forces both the importance and the 
responsibility of social partners. It 
not only continues to emphasise the 
need for the active involvement of rel-
evant stakeholders, and in particular 
the social partners, in programming 
and implementing ESF programmes, 
but makes specific reference to part-
nership and capacity building in a 
number of new instances.
Partnership
EU cohesion policy, of which the ESF 
is a part, is an example of good govern-
ance through partnership. Sustainable 
development and conflict avoidance 
require a partnership between differ-
ent interests, based on mutual trust 
and shared values. Several issues need 
to be addressed if government, private 
sector and civil society are to work ef-
ficiently to improve service delivery. 
Development issues and challenges 
have become too complex and inter-
dependent and the financial and man-
agerial resources for addressing them 
too scarce, for any one single institu-
Chapter 7:  Building capacity of social partners 
through the European Social Fund  
and European social dialogue
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The cross-industry European social partners organised a discussion 
process in all Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, as 
well as in Croatia and Turkey, on what needed to be done in order to 
strengthen national social partners’ capacity to represent the views of 
their members in the European social dialogue. These discussions were 
regularly extended to more general joint analyses and action plans. The 
following is a summary of the main results of the expert’s report:
While being country-specific, the action plans reflect general devel-
opment needs:
•  coordination among trade unions or employers and reporting to 
members;
•  establishing a regular national level dialogue between the social 
partners;
•  securing more financial and material resources;
•  the quantity and quality of human resources; 
•  early identification of priority issues; and
•  developing cooperative approaches with national social partner 
organisations in other Member States
With regard to bipartite dialogue the final expert report concluded 
that initially ‘given the existence of tripartite dialogue in some form 
or other in every country, the national social partners felt little ‘de-
mand-side pull’ either from members or from government for an 
additional national and bipartite social dialogue. They often strug-
gled to see bipartism and tripartism as complementary processes; 
they could not see an independent agenda for bipartite dialogue, 
particularly when the legislative role of the state left little flexibility 
for independent operation; they saw difficulties in resourcing bipar-
tite dialogue, given that the state supported the administrative ar-
rangements for the tripartite version; and they could not see beyond 
a tripartite dialogue that was often adversarial in nature. By the end 
of the phase one seminars, every country had concluded that not 
only was an autonomous system of bipartite social dialogue neces-
sary to link effectively with the European level equivalent, but that 
effective bipartite dialogue could increase the influence of the social 
partners in the existing tripartite system’ (p.6).
In its final comments intended to ‘inform and provoke further dis-
cussion’ the expert’s report stresses that inter- and intra-organisa-
tional cooperation is the prerequisite for any successful social part-
nership (given the widespread organisational fragmentation) and 
discusses inhibitors of an effective bipartite social dialogue.
‘(i) Poor inter- and intra-organisational cooperation
Put simply, where one or both sides are unable to represent their 
worker or employer constituency without significant challenge, agree 
priorities, establish common positions and deliver outcomes, effective 
bipartite dialogue cannot happen. Adequate cooperation within the 
respective sides of the social dialogue is “building block one”.
(ii) Domination of tripartism and the encouragement of adversarial 
relationships
Tripartite committees are well established in each of the Central 
and Eastern European Member States. Indeed, tripartism has an ex-
tremely important role to play in providing a way for the state [to] 
listen to the views of the nation’s most important stakeholders rep-
resenting workers and business when making key decisions. Where 
the tripartite system evolved prior to the establishment of effective 
bipartite dialogue between the social partners it can make both joint 
cooperation and autonomous decision-making difficult. 
Dialogue in the tripartite form can easily become a forum where ei-
ther side plays, or is played by, Government and each debate results 
in a clear winner and a loser.  Unless Government decides other-
wise, consensus is not needed to move forward. When the most im-
portant decisions on the national agenda are discussed in this way, it 
is extremely difficult for the social partners to develop genuinely co-
operative approaches outside the tripartite system on what are often 
seen as lesser priorities. The comments reported from Hungary and 
Poland on the social partners difficulty in moving from an exclu-
sively adversarial relationship to one where compromise is possible 
on certain issues is a good example of this effect.
In some countries the problem does not arise as the social partners 
have their own well-established agenda where they have to resolve 
complex problems between themselves. This is normally through 
multi-employer wage negotiations but can be in other areas where 
multi-employer agreements have to be reached. Other than in Slov-
enia, and to an extent in Slovakia, there is no history of widespread 
multi-employer bargaining or discussion in these countries.
(iii)Lack of Government enthusiasm for autonomous social dialogue
Government can support bipartite dialogue primarily by creating 
the space for dialogue on things that matter. It is equally open to 
Governments to stifle dialogue by filling the available space with 
detailed and prescriptive regulation and approaching tripartite 
dialogue as a form of “pendulum arbitration” where Governments 
of particular affiliation generally agree with the same social part-
ner. It would seem from the seminars that not all governments are 
convinced of the case for strong and autonomous social dialogue in 
their country.
(iv) Weak employer commitment or ability to engage
Where there is no tradition of multi-employer bargaining, and where 
employers are happy with Government views dominating the legis-
lative agenda, business sees no compelling reason either to invest in 
membership of employers’ organisations or to mandate such bodies 
to represent them in discussions or negotiations. Recent research (26) 
suggests that employers who seek to avoid either multi-employer or 
company-level collective bargaining actively shun membership of 
employers’ organisations. This factor is reinforced where member-
ship and influence of trade unions in a sector or a country is low. 
The identification of this problem is complicated by the fact that 
trade unions are quite likely to accuse employers’ organisations 
of lack of enthusiasm, but employers’ organisations themselves 
are unlikely either to accept this criticism or admit the analysis 
to be fair.
(v) Declining trade union membership and insufficient representa-
tiveness, notably of workers in small family businesses
There are genuine concerns with the representativeness of both sides 
of the social partnership.
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tion, public or private, to be able to 
respond effectively to all these socio-
economic challenges alone. Given the 
ESF’s relationship to employment and 
social affairs, the social partners have 
a central role in the broad partnership 
for change, and their commitment to 
strengthening economic and social 
cohesion by improving employment 
and job opportunities is essential.
The partnership principle implies 
close cooperation between the Com-
mission, the authorities at national, 
regional and local levels in the Mem-
ber States and other governmental 
and non-governmental organisations 
and bodies during the different stages 
of the implementation cycle of the 
Structural Funds.
The ESF Committee at the EU level it-
self reflects the importance of involv-
ing social partners in the monitoring 
of the ESF. Since its inception it has 
been a tripartite committee with equal 
representation of social partners and 
governments. This allows the social 
partners to be actively involved in the 
operation of the ESF at EU level as 
well as in the Member States.
Article 11 of the general regulation 
requires Member States to apply the 
partnership principle right from the 
beginning of the preparation of 
Structural Funds interventions and 
to involve the most representative 
partners at national, regional and 
local levels in the economic, social, 
environmental and other spheres. 
This requires an active, broad, bal-
anced and transparent participation 
of the relevant partners resulting 
in a visible and measurable value-
added to the whole process. The ESF 
regulation stresses that the manag-
ing public authorities must actively 
seek the involvement of social part-
ners (Article 5.2). The Commission’s 
assessment of the now completed 
programming phase for 2007–13 
concluded that there has been an 
increased participation of social and 
economic partners in most Member 
States and that there has been an in-
volvement of social partners outside 
‘traditional’ activities.
With regard to implementation, the 
partnership principle is linked to the 
principle of subsidiarity, which im-
plies that decisions should be made 
at the level most competent to carry 
them out, within the context of a 
broader cooperative network that 
pools resources and experiences. 
Over the last few years, various evalu-
ations on the impact of partnership 
in the Structural Funds showed that 
partnership can improve the imple-
mentation of cohesion policy through 
enhanced legitimacy, greater coordi-
nation, guaranteed transparency, and 
better absorption of funds through 
improved selection of projects and 
dissemination of information to po-
tential project promoters (72).
In the previous programming periods, 
the participation of partners in moni-
toring committees was one of the more 
visible aspects of the application of the 
partnership principle in the Structural 
Funds. In most cases, the social partners 
had the same participatory or voting 
rights as other members of the moni-
toring committee. The setting up of the 
monitoring committee falls within the 
exclusive competence and jurisdiction 
of the Member States. Its composition 
should reflect the principles of partner-
ship. From the assessment by the Com-
mission of the operational programmes 
it can be concluded that the working 
groups (where social partners were rep-
resented) established during the elabo-
ration of the operational programmes 
form the basis of the monitoring com-
mittees of those programmes, result-
ing in a stronger sense of ownership 
amongst the members.
72 ‘The thematic evaluation of the partnership 
principle: final synthesis report’, Tavistock Institute, 
1999; ‘A study on the efficiency of the implementation 
methods for Structural Funds’, ÖIR in association with 
LRDP and IDOM, 2003; ‘Opinion on the partnership 
for implementing the Structural Funds’, European 
Economic and Social Committee, 2003; and ‘The EU 
“partnership principle”: still a sustainable governance 
device across multiple administrative arenas?’, Michael 
W. Bauer, 2002.
Other than in Slovenia, [where the compulsory chamber of com-
merce system existed], there is no history of employer solidarity 
through high levels of membership of employers’ organisations. Pri-
or to the early 1990s the state was the nation’s primary employer in 
central and east European countries and employers’ organisations as 
we know them today did not exist. In particular employers’ organi-
sations have found it difficult to attract small business members.
In six of the eight states studied (the exceptions being Slovenia and 
Slovakia) trade union membership has fallen to around or below 
the 20 % level and is focused on larger enterprises in the state sector 
and “heavier” industries. In virtually every country, the trade unions 
spoke of the difficulties of organising in the workplace and finding a 
parallel social partner at the sectoral level. […]
In summary, the promotional work being undertaken by the Euro-
pean social partners […] is extremely valuable. However, in those 
cases where group coordination is chronically poor and bipartite 
dialogue fails to emerge or to thrive, more fundamental country-
based analysis and work is needed. The first priority in these cases 
is to find ways to improve in-group coordination. The second is to 
find a formula that works in the national context to improve the ef-
fectiveness of bipartite dialogue.’
Quoted from Alan Wild (2006),‘CEEC social partners’ participa-
tion in the European social dialogue: What are social partners’ 
needs?’, Final report, Joint project of the European social partner 
organisations (Phase Two — Follow-up meetings, May 2005 to 
June 2006).
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Social partners as beneficiaries
The ESF regulation calls upon the na-
tional managing authorities to encour-
age the adequate participation and ac-
cess of social partners to the activities 
funded under the ESF (Article 5.3). In 
addition, in convergence regions (73) 
73 The convergence objective aims to stimulate 
growth and employment in the least developed 
regions. It highlights innovation and the knowledge-
based society, adaptability to economic and social 
changes and the quality of the environment and 
administrative efficiency. It is financed by the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 
an appropriate amount (74) of the ESF 
resources shall be allocated to capacity-
building and activities jointly under-
taken by the social partners (second 
subparagraph of Article 5(3)).
and the European Social Fund (ESF) as well as the 
Cohesion Fund (CF) and targets the least well-
developed Member States and regions. The areas 
eligible for the convergence objective combine the 
regions eligible on a regional criteria basis (GDP is 
less than 75 % of the Community average) and on a 
national criteria basis (GNI is less than 90 % of the 
European average). 
74 The initial proposal of the Commission was the 
fixed amount of 2 %.
Joint actions
Social partners can implement — 
jointly or as individual organisations 
— projects for workers and employers. 
Experience shows that social partners 
have mostly implemented successful 
actions whenever they were involved 
as promoters in projects financed by 
the ESF. In the programming period 
2000–06, social partners have been 
particularly visible in the area of adapt-
ability of workers and enterprises, es-
pecially in the provision of training and 
Article 11 of the general regulation
Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down 
general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regula-
tion (EC) No 1260/1999
1.  The objectives of the Funds shall be pursued in the framework of close 
cooperation, (hereinafter referred to as partnership), between the Com-
mission and each Member State. Each Member State shall organise, 
where appropriate and in accordance with current national rules and 
practices, a partnership with authorities and bodies such as:
 (a) the competent regional, local, urban and other public authorities;
 (b) the economic and social partners;
 (c)  any other appropriate body representing civil society, environ-
mental partners, non-governmental organisations, and bodies 
responsible for promoting equality between men and women. 
Each Member State shall designate the most representative partners at na-
tional, regional and local level and in the economic, social, environmental 
or other spheres (hereinafter referred to as partners), in accordance with 
national rules and practices, taking account of the need to promote equal-
ity between men and women and sustainable development through the 
integration of environmental protection and improvement requirements.
2.  The partnership shall be conducted in full compliance with the re-
spective institutional, legal and financial powers of each partner 
category as defined in paragraph 1.
The partnership shall cover the preparation, implementation, moni-
toring and evaluation of operational programmes. Member States 
shall involve, where appropriate, each of the relevant partners, and 
particularly the regions, in the different stages of programming within 
the time limit set for each stage.
3.  Each year the Commission shall consult the organisations represent-
ing the economic and social partners at European level on assistance 
from the Funds.
ESF regulation
Regulation (EC) No 1081/2006 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 5 July 2006 on the European Social Fund and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1784/1999
Article 3 Scope of assistance
‘1 (e) promoting partnerships, pacts and initiatives through network-
ing of relevant stakeholders, such as the social partners and non-gov-
ernmental organisations, at the transnational, national, regional and 
local levels in order to mobilise for reforms in the field of employment 
and labour market inclusiveness.’
Article 5 Good governance and partnership
‘1.  The ESF shall promote good governance and partnership. Its 
support shall be designed and implemented at the appropriate 
 territorial level taking into account the regional, regional and local 
level according to the institutional arrangements specific to each 
Member State.
2.  The Member States shall ensure the involvement of the so-
cial partners and adequate consultation and participation 
of other stakeholders, at the appropriate territorial level, 
in the preparation, implementation and monitoring of 
ESF support.
3.  The managing authority of each operational programme shall en-
courage adequate participation of the social partners in actions 
funded under Article 3.
Under the Convergence objective, an appropriate amount of ESF 
resources shall be allocated to capacity-building, which shall in-
clude training, networking measures, strengthening the social 
dialogue and activities jointly undertaken by the social partners, 
in particular as regards adaptability of workers and enterprises 
referred to in Article 3(1)(a).’
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lifelong learning. In Belgium, the social 
partners were strongly involved in the 
implementation of three key priorities 
representing approximately 45 % of the 
global ESF budget in Flanders — ‘De-
veloping entrepreneurship’, ‘Encour-
aging flexibility of business and their 
employees’, ‘Strengthening policies for 
equal opportunities’. In the Nether-
lands, the social partners are responsi-
ble for and finance (vocational) training 
of employees through the sector funds. 
The national government provides for 
additional incentives in the tax system. 
Sector funds managed by the employ-
ers’ organisations and the trade unions 
can apply for ESF funding in order 
to up-grade low-skilled workers. The 
ESF finances 40 % and the remaining 
60 % is paid by the sector funds. For 
2007–13, three groups are targeted in 
the grant scheme:
•  employees who need vocational educa-
tion to attain the basic vocational quali-
fication; they can also obtain an ‘Ac-
creditation of Prior Learning’ (APL);
•  employees who need secondary vo-
cational education to attain a higher 
level of vocational education;
•  employees who need trans-sectoral 
vocational education to facilitate 
their mobility.
One of the requisites for financing is 
the participation of 5 % of women in 
the actions. On the whole, the measures 
in which social partners implement the 
bulk of projects represent 13 % of the 
ESF budget in the  Netherlands.
The ESF is an important source of fi-
nancing for sector training funds as 
referred to in Chapter 2 on lifelong 
learning. The English Unionlearn 
scheme and sector skills councils also 
benefited from ESF funding. Wales has 
established a Social Partners Unit (a 
limited company jointly owned by the 
main employer and trade union organ-
isations) to provide the social partners 
with the capacity to input to the policy 
work of the National Assembly. 
Capacity building
Capacity building is a process of devel-
oping organisational, financial and per-
sonnel capacities of trade unions and 
employer organisations and enhancing 
their contribution to governance on 
both national and regional levels. Ac-
tions to enhance their capacity for so-
cial dialogue could consist of training 
on information, participation and ne-
gotiation mechanisms, strengthening 
the role of social partners in shaping 
working conditions and the function-
ing of the labour market, consolidating 
sectoral structures, improving the link 
between the national and EU-level so-
cial dialogue, assisting the implemen-
tation of European social dialogue out-
comes and others.
The ESF managing authority together 
with the relevant partners and in a dia-
logue with the European Commission 
decide during the preparation phase 
which kind of actions are eligible for 
ESF funding at national level. The ac-
tivities to be developed cover areas such 
as human resources development, in-
stitutional capacity building, including 
campaigning, sectoral, cross-industry 
and regional cooperation, with activi-
ties such as professional training, the 
development of education and train-
ing systems, as well as of labour market 
systems, research projects, surveys and 
studies feeding into collective bargain-
ing, enhancing the work of economic 
and social councils, setting up websites, 
joint actions regarding restructuring 
and anticipating and managing of eco-
nomic change, migration, or legal aid 
services run by employers’ organisa-
tions and trade unions.
The support to social partners can take 
the form of support to individual social 
partner organisations as well as to ac-
tions jointly undertaken by organisa-
tions representing both sides of indus-
try. The right of freedom of association 
and the autonomy of the social partners 
must be respected. Capacity building is 
therefore a bottom-up process and de-
pends largely on the efforts of the social 
partners themselves. The ESF regulation 
does not establish an individual right for 
financial support, but it obliges manag-
ing authorities to allocate a specified 
amount and define areas of support.
Networks
Last but not least, the ESF promotes 
networking in partnerships, pacts and 
initiatives that can involve and mobilise 
social partners and organised civil so-
ciety in the modernisation of employ-
ment and social policy. Social partners 
are expressly mentioned as potential 
beneficiaries under such activities any-
where in the EU (Article 3(1)(e)).
The FPPZ (Western Poland Employ-
ers Federation) project ‘Partnership as 
a form of active labour market policy’ 
is an example from the EU-12 of the 
past programming period. Just after 
accession a partnership of different 
partners was set up, such as local la-
bour agencies and local administrative 
authorities, lobbying organisations, 
universities, information centres for 
unemployed workers and social part-
ners. The main objective is to develop 
dialogue and concrete strategies for 
the development of the local labour 
market within the partnership.
ESF allocations for capacity building of 
social partners
The European Commission has sup-
ported the process of programming 
by initiating an ad hoc group within 
the ESF Committee that worked from 
March to November 2007. It served 
as a clearing house for questions and 
good ideas for the inclusion of capac-
ity-building measures in operational 
programmes. Member States, which 
were represented by government and 
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social partners, were asked to present 
their approach to programming and 
the types of actions foreseen and indi-
cate the estimated amount they were 
planning to allocate to social part-
ners. The ad hoc group adopted three 
technical fact sheets on ‘Partnership’, 
‘Social partners as beneficiaries’ and 
‘Complementarity and consistency 
with other EU financial instruments’. 
This process raised awareness of the 
new capacity-building facility and 
provided concrete examples to the 
practitioners in charge of program-
ming. Clearer ideas on the types of ac-
tivities to be developed have emerged.
The latest data available from the oper-
ational programmes shows that some 
EUR 1.200 million have been allocat-
ed to social partner activities in con-
vergence Member States and regions. 
Allocations range from around 1 % 
to much higher figures. With a 20 % 
allocation, Spain is a notable case: 
most actions will be undertaken in the 
framework of the tripartite Training 
for Employment Agreement of 2006. 
It includes training for workers (joint 
actions) as well as measures for capac-
ity building of social partners.
When analysing this outcome, two 
aspects need to be stressed. From a 
positive point of view, and although 
the position of Member States was one 
of reluctance and doubts as to the im-
portance and goal of this facility, the 
encouraging response given and re-
sults achieved should be highlighted. 
While there are differences in terms 
of scale and means, all Member States 
either have a concrete allocation of 
funds, or intended to launch actions 
specifically for social partner applica-
tions. Moreover, some Member States 
plan to increase the initial allocation 
if social partners prove to be capable 
of absorbing it, but also to decrease if 
proposals are too weak. To overcome 
this weakness, some ESF managing 
authorities are issuing pre-announce-
ments of the calls and organising ‘in-
formation sessions’ for the prospec-
tive applicants to help them prepare 
applications and in consequence to 
enhance the quality of the projects 
and proposals (e.g. Malta).
However, there is a need for some 
improvement, for instance the clari-
fication of the partnership principle, 
or the differentiation between social 
and civil dialogue, and social part-
ners and NGOs. Not all the amounts 
allocated are exclusively dedicated 
to social partner activities. Some 
Member States make no distinction 
between social partners and NGOs 
when implementing the second sub-
paragraph of Article 5(3) of the ESF 
regulation. This is most often the case 
in the EU-12.
Conclusion
With the operational programmes 
now adopted and calls being launched 
it is clear that although Member States 
and regions chose different ways for 
guaranteeing the support to social 
partners, progress is visible. In spite 
of this progress, there remains plenty 
of scope for improvement. Enhancing 
the capabilities of social partners will 
increase the probability of success of 
the projects in which social partners 
act as promoters and, ultimately, of 
the Growth and Jobs strategy. 
Outputs and results from cohesion 
policy programmes take some time 
to deliver and then to be reported 
on. The first annual implementation 
reports (AIR) from the current pe-
riod are required for mid-2008, but 
concrete actions are only expected for 
the 2009 reports. Although the ESF 
regulation does not require reporting 
on the implementation of the social 
partner capacity-building provision, 
the Member States have agreed to do 
so in the ESF Committee.
European social dialogue’s 
contribution to capacity 
building
Over the last two years, European so-
cial partners continued and, in some 
cases intensified, efforts to increase 
the capacity of national social partner 
organisations and to involve them in 
the European social dialogue commit-
tees. These activities focus on but are 
not limited to the Member States that 
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007.
Cross-industry
The European cross-industry social 
partners (ETUC, BUSINESSEUROPE, 
CEEP, UEAPME) recognised very 
early that their capacity to effectively 
carry on their social dialogue and 
implement its results in an enlarged 
European Union depended on their 
ability to sufficiently prepare their 
new member organisations. Even be-
fore the first wave of enlargement in 
2004, they launched a pilot project in 
2003 with their members in the Czech 
Republic, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia to prepare their partici-
pation in European social dialogue.
In 2004–06 this ‘integrated programme’ 
was extended to cover all new Member 
States and consisted of several compo-
nents (75). Two rounds of seminars were 
held in each country (except in Malta 
and Cyprus where there was only one) 
to assess the needs of national social 
partner organisations to successfully 
participate and contribute to social 
dialogue and to ensure the interaction 
with national industrial relations. Na-
tional studies, which were discussed in 
national seminars and a final European 
conference, were carried out into the 
scope of economic and social change 
and the role of social partners in the 
restructuring process. Resource centres 
75 See in more detail in Industrial relations in 
Europe 2006, Chapter 4, Section 3.
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were set up for trade unions and the em-
ployers to provide information, notably 
via websites, as well as targeted training 
and mentoring for representatives from 
the new member federations.
Given the importance of this work 
and the need to continue efforts in 
particular for the Member States join-
ing in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) 
and the candidate countries (Croatia 
and Turkey), European social partners 
decided, in their work programme for 
2006–08, to continue the integrated 
programme and notably to:
•  ‘complete the national studies on 
economic and social change in the 
EU-10, enlarge them to cover the 
EU-15 and on that basis promote 
and assess the orientations for ref-
erence on managing change and its 
social consequences and the joint 
lessons learned on EWCs;
•  continue their work of capacity 
building for the social dialogue in 
the new Member States, extend it to 
candidate countries, and examine 
how the employers and trade union 
resource centres providing techni-
cal assistance to the 10 new Member 
States could provide help to social 
partners of all EU countries.’
The new ‘integrated programme’ 
2006–08 was again co-financed by the 
EU budget and managed by the ETUC 
and BUSINESSEUROPE on behalf of 
all European social partners. As the 
need for better cooperation and sup-
port between the European and na-
tional level was felt throughout the 
EU, the new programme clearly did 
not focus on just the new Member 
States, but also extended to the EU-15 
as well as the candidate countries.
The programme pursued the ini-
tiatives launched earlier. Concretely, 
a first round of seminars concerning 
the needs of national social partners 
participating in the EU social dialogue 
was held in Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania 
and Turkey. National studies and semi-
nars on restructuring were carried out 
in Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
France, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. The 
two resource centres were opened to 
all member federations and enlarged 
their activities: websites (76) with rel-
evant and extensive information about 
the programme and social dialogue in 
general; a translation fund to translate 
the results of European social dialogue 
in all 23 EU languages upon the na-
tional social partners’ request; training 
and mentoring programmes as well 
as the possibility to organise seminars 
or other activities related to European 
social dialogue on an ad hoc basis for 
those members that joined European 
social dialogue in 2004 (EU-10).
For the social dialogue seminars, a final 
conference was held in Brussels in Janu-
ary 2008 (see Box 5.1 for conclusions) 
and a synthesis seminar on restructuring 
in June 2008 (see Chapter 4 for conclu-
sions). Given the success and resonance 
of the programme among members, the 
European social partners were already 
planning, at the time of writing, a fol-
low-up for the period 2008–10, which 
will involve, among others, a second 
round of social dialogue seminars in 
the south-east European countries, the 
organisation of restructuring studies in 
the remaining EU Member States (Bel-
gium, Bulgaria, Germany, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Romania and Finland, ) and a 
continuation of the resource centres.
Sectoral initiatives
European sectoral social partners have 
been working with their new mem-
bers in the EU-12 and the candidate 
countries for many years. Projects, 
technical seminars, round tables and 
76 Employers’ resource centre (http://www.
erc-online.eu/); ETUC resource centre (http://
resourcecentre.etuc.org/).
the development of tools for capacity 
building increased over the last two 
years. Several social dialogue commit-
tees have also adopted joint declara-
tions and opinions on social dialogue.
Round tables, tools and country visits
After a first project in 2006 and 2007, 
the European social partners in the 
textiles, clothing and leather sectors 
currently continue their joint work on 
the reinforcement of sectoral social 
dialogue at sector level in the 10 cen-
tral and east European Member States 
and its interaction with the EU-level 
social dialogue. Following round ta-
bles in each country, both sides of 
industry agreed national action plans 
and presented them at the final con-
ference in May 2007. A new one-year 
project, which also includes the shoe 
sector, first took stock of the progress 
achieved at national seminars. By 
way of example, the project had facil-
itated sectoral wage bargaining and 
the extension of the new agreement 
in the Czech Republic. Furthermore, 
social partner representatives had the 
chance to learn about European and 
national social dialogue structures at 
expert seminars with their Belgian, 
Italian and UK counterparts. Lastly, 
practitioners in social partner organ-
isations will be trained in the areas 
of social dialogue techniques, voca-
tional training and promotion of the 
sector’s image at national seminars. 
A website is intended to promote 
exchange on social dialogue in the 
sector within Europe (http://www.
buildingtrust-tcl.org).
The European social partners in the fur-
niture industry implemented a capacity-
building project in 2006 and 2007 that 
targeted Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and 
Turkey. The aim was to promote social 
dialogue and contribute to a level play-
ing field in Europe through concrete re-
sults. A guide to collective bargaining in 
the EU-27 + 2 gives an overview of the 
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existing collective agreements at national 
level. In addition, bipartite visits were car-
ried out in the four countries. As a result, 
the Croatian social partners agreed to 
establish a permanent sectoral social dia-
logue and the Bulgarian social partners 
asked for an extension of their agreement 
from the government. Both initiatives 
were supported in a joint declaration by 
EU employers and trade unions. The 
partners agreed to build upon the posi-
tive results of the project. The approach 
of country-based support had been suc-
cessful and should be maintained.
The rail social partners held informa-
tion seminars in Tallinn and Bucharest 
(2006). The seminars gathered partici-
pants from across the enlarged EU and 
the accession countries and aimed at 
improving the social partners’ knowl-
edge of their counterparts, holding an 
exchange of views on the work of the Eu-
ropean social dialogue in the sector and 
identifying the social partners’ needs 
after enlargement. This capacity-build-
ing action helped to develop trust and 
mutual understanding and has already 
led to an increased participation of the 
new Member States in European social 
dialogue. A brochure was published 
summarising the debate and the wealth 
of information gathered during the two 
seminars (available also in the languages 
of the countries involved: http://www.it-
fglobal.org/etf/publications.cfm).
Social partners from the insurance and 
the banking sector launched projects 
targeted at the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary and Slovakia. The projects aim at 
increasing awareness of European so-
cial dialogue, exchanging information 
on different industrial systems and ad-
dressing obstacles that prohibit social 
partners from these countries from tak-
ing active part in social dialogue at the 
EU level. First meetings of these projects 
in central Europe took place in March 
and April 2008. These are to be conclud-
ed at the end of 2008 and lessons learnt 
are to be used in similar actions directed 
at other new Member States. Currently 
affiliates from EU-12 participate only 
sporadically in both committees.
The social partners of the culture and 
live performing arts social dialogue 
committee implemented a project in 
2006 consisting of a series of regional 
conferences to promote European so-
cial dialogue in EU-12. The conferenc-
es took place in Tallinn (covering the 
Baltic countries), Krakow (covering 
central European countries) and Buda-
pest (covering south European coun-
tries). The second pillar of the project 
consisted of study visits of social part-
ners from the EU-12 to their EU-15 
counterparts. Social partners in this 
committee are implementing a similar 
project in 2007 and 2008 focusing on 
Romania and Bulgaria. National con-
ferences have been organised in both 
countries and, as a result, the first Bul-
garian employers’ organisation in the 
sector was created. This process was 
accompanied by the Budapest, Krakow 
(2006), Bucharest, and Sofia Declara-
tions (2007) that encourage develop-
ment of sectoral bipartite negotiations.
The social partners in the audiovisual 
sector followed up on a joint declara-
tion of 2006 with a project aiming at 
raising awareness in the EU-12 on the 
importance of social dialogue as a tool 
to manage change, with the audiovisu-
al sector undergoing constant change 
and developing new business mod-
els. Social partners in the committee 
are currently implementing a second 
project consisting of an awareness-
raising conference in Prague in June 
2008, followed by study visits from 
social partners in the EU-12 to their 
counterparts in the EU-15.
Social partners in the telecoms sector 
organised a conference in Warsaw in 
December 2007 targeting telecoms so-
cial partner organisations in the EU-12. 
It mirrored a telecoms European sec-
toral social dialogue plenary session. 
The objective was to identify topics of 
discussion that can be relevant and at-
tractive for social partners in the EU-
12, and to familiarise them with the 
logistics and organisation of a plenary 
session of a social dialogue committee 
in order to improve participation of 
social partners from the EU-12 in the 
telecoms European  social dialogue.
The social partners in the temporary 
agency work sector organised round 
tables in Poland and Hungary in co-
operation with TAIEX (the Technical 
Assistance and Information Exchange 
Office of the Enlargement DG). The 
objective was to bring together social 
partners who do not have established 
sectoral dialogue at national level and 
discuss the problems they face.
Also in cooperation with TAIEX, tech-
nical seminars were organised in the 
road transport sector in Hungary, Po-
land and Slovenia in 2006 and in Esto-
nia, Lithuania and Latvia in 2007. Their 
objective was to bring to the national 
level the European social partners’ ap-
proach to understanding EU driving 
and rest time rules, the digital tacho-
graph and Driver Training Directive.
The social partners of the private secu-
rity sector launched a project to build 
capacity for their sector in Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slove-
nia (as well as in Croatia and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). The 
project is funded by the European Com-
mission and managed by the Slovenian 
employer organisation ZRSZV. The aim 
of the project is to strengthen coopera-
tion, to create a network and to look at 
best-practice models.
The social partners in commerce pur-
sued their series of round table meet-
ings in new and future Member States 
with a meeting in November 2007 in 
Zagreb. At these occasions social part-
ners can discuss working conditions in 
the sector and exchange information 
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on social dialogue at national and EU 
level. The next round table is planned 
for December 2008 in Istanbul.
The common declaration on social dia-
logue in the local and regional gov-
ernments sector of November 2006 
aims to help members to better explain 
the bases of social dialogue in the EU-
12. The European social partners (a) 
reiterate their commitment to the so-
cial dialogue processes; (b) highlight 
the benefits of social dialogue in local 
and regional government; and (c) com-
mit themselves to support the further 
development of social dialogue activi-
ties at national and local level, between 
members of CEMR and EPSU.
From 2006 to 2008, the European As-
sociation of Sport Employers together 
with the sports section of EURO-MEI 
implemented a project to reinforce the 
link among each other, to strengthen 
their respective representative sta-
tus and to structure employers’ and 
workers’ organisations in those coun-
tries where they are missing. Round 
tables in Spain, Austria and Portugal 
brought together for the first time 
social partners from all sports sub-
sectors. Country visits to Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Bulgar-
ia showed that social dialogue in the 
sector barely exists. A feasibility study 
on the creation of social dialogue in 
these countries, as well as information 
provided in numerous meetings, has 
raised awareness. Finally, a database of 
all social partner organisations in the 
sports sector has been set up (http://
easesport.org/ease/rbt-db/) in order 
to facilitate networking. A follow-up 
project will start at the end of 2008.
The western Balkan countries and the 
Memorandum of Understanding for 
the Energy Community
The European Commission organised 
a conference on ‘Building capacity to 
enhance social dialogue in the west-
ern Balkan countries’ in October 2007 
in Belgrade. The conference targeted 
social partners and public authorities 
responsible for social dialogue from 
the countries of the western Balkan 
region: Albania, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (also a can-
didate country), Montenegro, Serbia, 
and Kosovo under United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1244. As 
many as 120 participants, including 
20 speakers and 13 panellists, repre-
sented employer organisations, trade 
unions and public authorities from the 
western Balkan region and the EU.
At the conference, social partners 
and public authorities responsible for 
social dialogue from the region ex-
changed views and best practices on 
the elements that make social dialogue 
successful. Subjects such as the insti-
tutional set-up, the autonomy princi-
ple and the balance between bipartite 
and tripartite dialogue were discussed. 
Moreover, the role of social dialogue 
in the management of change was un-
derlined. Participants also debated the 
ways social dialogue can contribute to 
bringing Balkan countries closer to 
the European  social model.
The conference reinforced links be-
tween European social partners and 
their counterparts in the Balkans. It 
raised awareness of the social dialogue 
at the European level and provided 
participants from Balkans with prac-
tical examples of how social dialogue 
can contribute to the effective antici-
pation and management of change.
The second day was dedicated to the 
Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) related to the Energy Treaty 
signed two days earlier in Vienna. 
Presentations addressed to social 
partners from the sector described 
main provisions of the MoU that gives 
a prominent role for social partners in 
the implementation of its provisions.
Memorandum of Understanding on so-
cial issues in the context of the Energy 
Community 
A MoU was signed by the contract-
ing parties of the Energy Community, 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia, UNMIK and the European 
Community, on 17 October 2007 in 
Vienna. The MoU addresses possible 
social consequences of the necessary 
reforms of the energy markets in the 
participating countries following im-
plementation of the European rules 
on competition. The MoU focuses on 
the role of social partners, the social 
acquis communautaire and the pro-
tection of vulnerable customers. It 
underlines the role for consultation of 
social partners in the process of man-
agement of change. Signatories sin-
gled out four main areas they intend 
to focus on: Workers’ fundamental 
rights; labour laws; health and safety; 
and equal opportunities. The memo-
randum of understanding will be the 
basis for developing a structured dia-
logue on social issues within a regular 
social forum. The first is planned for 
18 and 19 November 2008 in Tirana.
Conclusion
Capacity-building measures in the 
framework of the European social 
dialogue range from one–off meetings 
to more sophisticated projects that in-
volve research, seminars and techni-
cal delegation visits to the EU-12 and 
vice versa. The cross-industry social 
partners organised more than one 
seminar in each country and encour-
aged national social partners to ana-
lyse the situation and agree on action 
plans themselves. This process has de-
veloped into two resource centres for 
all Member States that will strengthen 
the interaction between the European 
and the national level.
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Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities DG social dialogue 
website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/socialdialogue 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities DG social dialogue 
grant website: http://ec.europa.eu/
employment_social/social_dialogue/
grants_en.htm 
European Industrial Relations Dic-
tionary: http://www.eurofound.eu.int/
areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/
index.htm 
European Foundation for the Im-
provement of Living and Working 
Conditions: 
http://www.eurofound.eu.int/eiro 
European Industrial Relations Ob-
servatory: 
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int 
European Monitoring Centre on 
Change: 
http://www.eurofound.eu.int/emcc 
European Working Conditions Ob-
servatory (EWCO): 
http://www.eurofound.eu.int/ewco
Cross-industry social partners
BUSINESSEUROPE: 
http://www.businesseurope.eu  
CEEP — http://www.ceep.org 
UEAPME: http://www.ueapme.com 
ETUC: http://www.etuc.org
European Confederation of Execu-
tives and Managerial Staff (CEC): 
http://www.cec-managers.org/ 
Eurocadres: 
http://www.eurocadres.org/ 
Resource Centres: 
http://www.resourceetuc.com 
http://www.erc-online.eu 
European Sectoral Social 
Dialogue Committees’ 
websites
Postal Services Sectoral Social Dia-
logue Committee website: 
http://www.PostSocialDialog.org 
Sugar Sectoral Social Dialogue Com-
mittee website: 
http://www.eurosugar.org
Extractive Industries Sectoral Social 
Dialogue Committee website: 
http://www.mining-dialogue.eu 
European trade union 
institutes
European Trade Union Institute 
(ETUI): http://www.etui-rehs.org/ 
European Centre for Workers’ Ques-
tions (EZA): www.eza.org
International social partners 
organisations
International Trade Union Confedera-
tion (ITUC): http://www.ituc-csi.org/ 
International Organisation of Employ-
ers (IOE): http://www.ioe-emp.org/ 
European Social Fund (ESF)
European Social Fund website: http://
ec.europa.eu/employment_social/esf/ 
Partnership in ESF: http://ec.europa.
eu/employment_social/esf/fields/
partnership_en.htm 
Useful documents
‘Industrial Relations in Europe’ re-
ports 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006
‘Report of the High Level Group on 
Industrial Relations and Change in 
the European Union’
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_so-
cial/social_dialogue/reports_en.htm 
Commission Communication, ‘Com-
mission’s Communication on the Re-
newed Social Agenda: Opportunities, 
access and solidarity in 21st century 
Europe, COM(2008) 412 final, 2 July 
2008: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.
jsp?langId=en&catId=547 
‘Employment in Europe 2008’
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?c
atId=113&langId=en&newsId=415&f
urtherNews=yes 
‘Joint Employment Report 2007/2008’
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_so-
cial/employment_strategy/employ_
en.htm
“Keeping up the Pace of Change” 
Commission’s December 2007 Strate-
gic Report
http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/
european-dimension/200712-annual-
progress-report/index_en.htm
Useful websites and documents
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